Chapter 85

Those who deviate—whether they are in positions of authority or otherwise—must be addressed through the enjoinment of good and the prohibition of evil (al-amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar), the holding of officials accountable, and mobilizing public opinion against them to compel them to adhere to the rulings of Islam and submit to its laws in punishing those who transgress against them. ¶

Furthermore, the aforementioned researches contain many details that clarify the issue at hand, accounting for the variations in circumstances and conditions. This is one aspect. ¶

On the other hand, an organization, in its capacity as an organization, possesses neither judicial nor executive authority under Shariah, neither in a Muslim society nor a non-Muslim one. How, then, can it be permissible for it to issue a judicial death sentence against this person or that, and then proceed to execute that sentence? Often, this concept is exploited for lowly motives and personal interests. ¶

Fourth: As for taking up arms to overthrow the current governing systems in the countries of the Islamic world today in order to establish an Islamic state, we have addressed this issue in detail in our research 'Combat for the Establishment of the Islamic State.' The essence of the argument regarding taking up arms to achieve this purpose is as follows: In countries where the establishment of an Islamic state is sought—if public opinion supports this idea, the circumstances are favorable, and the available power is sufficient to establish the state (according to a high level of probability based on precise, conscious assessments and comprehensive calculations, far from the recklessness and haste driven by the desire to seize power)—then, in this case, the Islamic state is latent in the womb of the Ummah, its vital elements having matured, leaving only the need for it to emerge into reality. If the birth of this state occurs through peaceful means—in any form—then this is the desired outcome, just as the Islamic state was born in the society of Medina during the time of the Prophet ﷺ. However, if the birth of this state is impeded by the natural peaceful path in the aforementioned situation due to certain problems and obstacles, are we to leave that state latent in the womb of the Ummah to stifle and die, which may subsequently result in grave complications for the Ummah itself? Is performing a surgical procedure, or a 'Caesarean section'—as it is called—to deliver that state in this situation not a means of saving that state, while simultaneously saving the life of the Ummah? I do not mean to say through this question that the Shariah basis for taking this coercive measure to deliver the state... ¶

The emergence of the Islamic state from the womb of the Ummah is a metaphor akin to the surgical extraction of a living fetus from a mother's womb, should the need arise. No, I do not mean to imply that... because the Shariah basis for the matter at hand is the 'Pledge of War' (Bay'at al-Harb) that the Prophet (PBUH) took from the Ansar at al-Aqabah, shortly before the Hijrah. It implies, among other things, preparing for the likelihood that the Islamic state—once the decision for its 'birth' was taken in Medina—would face certain difficulties. Thus, the 'war' upon which the 'pledge' was taken to eliminate those difficulties is the surgical procedure to deliver the living newborn latent within the society of Medina—that is, it is the coercive measure to bring the Islamic state into existence and protect it from the plots devised to stifle it, both before and after! This applies if the land where the Islamic state is intended to be established on the basis of military action has an public opinion that has embraced this idea... under the conditions previously mentioned. ¶

As for when the public opinion in the land where the Islamic state is intended to be established has not embraced this idea, or when circumstances are unfavorable and power is unavailable... as mentioned earlier, then in such a case, the inability to establish the state is a Shariah excuse for delaying attempts to establish it; and 'Allah does not charge a soul except [with that within] its capacity.' Furthermore, venturing into reckless attempts in this field, which result in many tragedies and pains, is a grave error for which those adventurers bear the burden, in proportion to their negligence in calculation and assessment! ¶

This is the summary of the statement on this issue. As for the details, they have already been covered in the discussion on 'Combat for the Establishment of the Islamic State,' as previously indicated. ¶

With this, we conclude the first section of this research and move on to the second section. ¶

Second Requirement: The various sources of financial, military, and political support upon which organizations rely, and the stance of Shariah jurisprudence (Ijtihad) regarding them. ¶

This requirement contains two issues: First Issue: What are the entities from which support of various types comes to organizations? Second Issue: Receiving support from these various entities — what is the stance of Shariah jurisprudence regarding it? ¶

First Issue: What are the entities from which support of various types comes to organizations? There are several entities from which various types of support come to organizations: (a) In the field of financial support: Support may come through self-funding; by this, I mean through the members of the organization or group themselves, such as permanent monthly subscriptions from these members into the treasury of the entity to which they belong. This source of financial support for organizations, or groups in general, and the extent of the significant volume it can reach—which has a profound impact on the activities of those organizations or groups—is illustrated by what was stated in the book 'Memoirs of the Call and the Caller' by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna, the founder and General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This is in the context of him revealing the financial sources that provide the Brotherhood with the funds necessary to cover the enormous expenses required by their activities, in order to respond to the suspicions that have been raised regarding this matter. He (may Allah have mercy on him) said in this regard: 'It happened that the Da'wah needed money...' ¶

Their scope of activity expanded somewhat in Cairo in the year 1357 AH, corresponding to 1938 AD. Professor Abdul Hakim Abideen proposed the 'Sahm al-Da'wah' (The Share of the Call)... The General Committee approved this proposal. Its summary: that each member [of the Muslim Brotherhood] contribute at least one-fifth or one-tenth of their income to the Da'wah! The Ikhwan competed commendably to implement this. ¶

Furthermore, there is support that comes through donations from outside the organization or group, whether those donations are from ordinary individuals expressing their support for the organization's activities, or from governments and their official institutions in Islamic countries. ¶

In this regard, it is mentioned in the book 'Mudhakirat al-Da'wah wal-Da'iyah' (Memoirs of the Call and the Caller) by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna: 'The Council of the Dakahlia Governorate decided in its session held on 14 Rabi' al-Awwal 1356 AH / 24 May 1937... to grant the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Mansoura an annual subsidy of one hundred and fifty Egyptian pounds.' ¶

Also of this nature is the significant support provided by Arab governments to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during certain stages, regardless of the underlying motives for this support. ¶

Talal Khalidi says in this context: 'Arab and regional regimes hailed the slogan: 'The independent identity of the Palestinian people,' and went further by deciding that the Palestinian people, represented by their organization, alone have the right to choose their destiny! They poured huge amounts of money to support the organization and consolidate its entity.' ¶

B - One of the forms of support for militant organizations in the Islamic world is military support. By this, I mean everything related to arms supplies, training of fighters, and so on. ¶

In this context, the book 'Qadaya al-Alam al-Islami' (Issues of the Islamic World) states the following regarding the military support provided to the 'Polisario' Front: 'The Polisario was armed, trained, and funded through Algerian-Libyan support'(1). This support may also come from outside the Islamic world. In the same source, while discussing the Polisario Front, its military operations against Morocco, and the parties providing it with support, it states: 'The Polisario employed guerrilla warfare tactics with concentrated attacks, involving large numbers—between four to five thousand fighters in a single attack! They used advanced weaponry, especially surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, as well as medium and short-range artillery.' It then adds: 'It is notable here that Algerian-Libyan backing played the primary role in this military advancement, in addition to the emerging roles of Cuba and Vietnam'(2). Elsewhere in the same source, it says: 'On May 7, 1980, the Moroccan minister responsible for Saharan affairs in the Moroccan government stated that Morocco is facing an international conspiracy orchestrated by the Soviets, as they are providing the Polisario with highly sophisticated weapons from the latest Warsaw Pact arsenal'(3). C. Furthermore, one of the forms of support for fighting organizations in the Islamic world is political support. This support implies various forms of state backing for these organizations regarding the issues upon which they were founded. An example of this is when states supporting a particular organization arrange their foreign relations with other states based on those states' positions toward that organization. ¶

Another example of this is the granting by some states of independent broadcasting programs to organizations on their radio stations, as some Arab governments do with regard to certain factions of the Palestinian resistance. ¶

Furthermore, political support for organizations may come from outside the Islamic world, as in the support of countries like Cuba, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union for the Polisario Front in the Moroccan Sahara, and as in the support of many countries in the outside world for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). ¶

In sum, these are various facets of support for militant organizations in the Islamic world, regardless of the entities from which this support originates—that is, from within the organizations or from outside them, and from within the Islamic world or from outside it. ¶

With this, we conclude this issue and move to the second issue. ¶

Second Issue: The receipt of support by militant organizations and the like from various entities—what is the position of Shariah-based Ijtihad (legal reasoning) regarding it? ¶

Research into this issue, naturally, is confined to organizations that are legitimate in the foundations upon which they are established and in the activities they carry out. Otherwise, as long as other organizations are illegitimate in their foundations and activities, the subject of their support and the receiving of such support is also illegitimate, regardless of the nature of that support or the entity from which it came. The following verse of Allah applies to such rejected support: 'And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression. And fear Allah; indeed, Allah is severe in penalty' (Surah Al-Ma'idah: 2). ¶

Regarding the answer to the question about whether legitimate organizations may receive support from various parties and what its Shariah ruling is, it can be summarized as follows: ¶

First: Political support, in all its forms, is a matter concerning the parties granting that support. For organizations to benefit from it is unobjectionable, even if the party providing this support belongs to non-Muslims or is from outside the Islamic lands. However, it should be noted here that it is not permissible for organizations to concede any of their legitimate, non-negotiable causes in exchange for that support, whether this concession is made as a gesture of gratitude to those who provided any form of support or as a means to obtain the sought-after assistance. ¶

In this regard, we may find in the Prophetic biography (Seerah) an indication of the permissibility of receiving political support from non-Islamic parties. Furthermore, this support is considered a favor to be remembered, so that it may be reciprocated in positive positions when they are in need of having that favor returned. It is narrated that the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade the killing of certain polytheists at the Battle of Badr due to their previous political stance of refraining from harming the Islamic message and its followers in Makkah, and for their role in nullifying the agreements the polytheists had made in this regard. ¶

Second: Financial and military support. There are two aspects to this: A- If this support is in the form of a gift or assistance without a public or hidden condition, it is permissible to accept it, even from non-Muslims. The principle regarding gifts (hadiyah) applies here, as the Prophet (peace be upon him) accepted gifts from the disbelievers, even if they were from outside the lands of the Muslims. Additionally, the Prophet’s borrowing of weapons from Safwan bin Umayyah after the conquest of Makkah may also serve as evidence for this. ¶

Before his conversion to Islam, for the purpose of preparing for the Battle of Hunayn (1) - perhaps there is an indication in this of the legality of what we are discussing. ¶

Indeed, the implication of this borrowing goes beyond the legality of accepting such military support to requesting it as well. ¶

However, in any case, if accepting such support results in raising suspicions and question marks - as it is said - that harm the reputation of organizations and the like, even if the support is unconditional and there is no overt or covert quid pro quo behind it - then in this situation, it should be refrained from to avoid suspicion, and in accordance with the rule: 'No harm and no reciprocating harm' (2). And the rule: 'Warding off harms takes precedence over bringing about benefits.' ¶

This is if the financial and military support is without any exchange. ¶

B - As for if the support aims at achieving specific purposes, whether these intended purposes are explicitly conditional or implicitly understood, based on the custom that such mentioned support is only given in exchange for something - I say: If the support aims at specific purposes in return, then there are two points here: ¶

- If this return is to gain control over the organization or the group, it is not permissible in this case to accept this support - whether the entity providing it is a foreign entity from outside the Islamic world (3), or an entity from within the Islamic world that wants, through its support, to control the organization's policy. ¶

(1) See: Sirat Ibn Hisham (Al-Rawd al-Unuf: 4/123). (2) See: In 'Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa al-Da'iyah' by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna, under the title 'Hibbat al-Qanal' regarding the discussion of the donation from this company, which was in the hands of foreigners, to the Muslim Brotherhood in the amount of (500) pounds. And how accepting this gift raised many suspicions against the Brotherhood, and 'false fatwas supported it' as the Sheikh, may Allah have mercy on him, says. Although he replied to this under the title: 'Crooked Fiqh' by saying: 'This is our wealth, not the wealth of the foreigners, and the canal is our canal, and the sea is our sea... and these people are usurpers.' See the aforementioned source: pp. 95-96. I say: Perhaps in this incident there is support for what I mentioned above regarding not accepting any donation if it is likely to raise suspicions and harm the reputation. (3) See: In the Lebanese newspaper 'Al-Safir' dated: February 21, 1989 - American financial aid to a number of Afghan organizations working against the communist rule in Afghanistan, and the amounts allocated to each organization. ¶

In such a way that they prevent it from exercising its legitimate activities, driven by suspicious and dubious agendas.(1) - If the consideration requested in exchange for that support is the undertaking of specific, legitimate tasks, then there is no objection in such a case to accepting the support and performing those tasks, provided that there is no harm or Shariah-prohibited element in this transaction. With this, we conclude this issue, and upon its completion, we bring an end to the discussion regarding the second requirement (matlab) in this research and proceed to the third requirement. (1) See: The National Dimension of the Palestinian Cause (Doctoral Thesis) by Dr. Ibrahim Abrash: p. 210 and p. 250. 1689 ¶

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and peace and blessings be upon our master Muhammad, the Seal of the Prophets, and upon all his family and companions. ¶

To proceed, this is a concise summary containing some of the Shariah rulings that every accountable person (mukallaf) needs in their daily life. It is formulated in a simple and accessible style so that the reader may grasp the obligatory duties (fara'id and wajibbat) without difficulty. ¶

We ask Allah to make this work purely for His Noble Countenance, and to make it a source of benefit for the servants and the lands; indeed, He is the All-Hearing, the Ever-Responsive. ¶

And Allah the Exalted knows best. ¶

Third Topic: Types of militant organizations according to their operational theaters ¶

Among militant organizations, some limit their armed operations against the enemy to the border strip between them. Others penetrate deep into the enemy's occupied territories to strike their positions. Some extend their activities into the colonial states themselves, particularly when those states have colonies beyond their borders. Others direct their weapons toward the state in which they reside—that is, the existing states within the Islamic world—with the intent of pressuring them to meet specific demands or to overthrow their ruling regimes. Others raise their weapons against a specific sect living within that state. ¶

I say: It is not necessary for every organization to be limited to only one of the mentioned theaters or the like; a single organization may have activities in several theaters. The intention here, in this topic, is not to review the militant organizations that have existed or currently exist in the Islamic world, nor to list the theaters in which each organization has operated or continues to operate. Rather, the intention is to address the concern that every Muslim—who carries his weapon on his shoulder, places his soul in his palm, and sets out on a path where he does not know how many corpses he will leave behind, or when he will become part of that harvest on the path he has trod—must live with. ¶

The essence of this concern, which every fighting Muslim should experience, is this: What is legitimate and what is illegitimate among the activities practiced by a fighter through the organization to which he belongs? And when is a fighter, on the path he has taken, truly in the right when he kills, or when he is killed? This is the concern that every fighting Muslim should live with, and this is what is truly important in this matter. ¶

Yes, the answers to these questions posed here are known from the topics already addressed, whether in this research or in previous studies, so there is nothing new. However, as previously indicated, the purpose of this last chapter we are in is that in our current days, discussion revolves around a number of issues related to armed struggle. It was therefore appropriate to address these issues under the headings in which they fall, and to handle those among them that have not been addressed before. As for those already covered, it is sufficient to point to the places of such treatment, without the need to repeat what was said about them. ¶

Hence, we will briefly discuss the sub-topics of this requirement. These sub-topics are: - First Section: Border activities against enemies. - Second Section: Fedayeen (guerrilla/commando) activities against enemies within occupied territories or in enemy lands. - Third Section: Activities within Muslim lands against the state or some of its factions. ¶

First Section: Border activities against enemies. Military skirmishes and operations conducted by combat organizations along the borders with the disbelieving enemy are considered Jihad in the cause of Allah, because they qualify as fighting the disbelievers to uphold the word of Allah Almighty. The word of Allah is Islam and all that it brought. Among the things Islam brought is fighting the enemy who enters Muslim lands, considering this fighting an individual obligation (fard ayn) upon every Muslim, in the manner detailed previously in the discussion of the causes for declaring Jihad in the third chapter, and the rulings of Jihad in the fourth chapter. Furthermore, the defense of Muslims regarding their lives, wealth, honor, or land against colonialist disbelievers, even if it takes the form of defense against aggressive assailants, does not remove it from the terminological concept of Jihad in Islamic Shariah, as long as this defense is directed against the disbelievers and in response to the command of Allah Almighty regarding the obligation of fighting them.(1) ¶

(1) Dr. Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti, in the context of discussing 'Combat Jihad' in Fiqh al-Sirah (p. 151), holds: 'That fighting which is a defense of life, wealth, honor, or land does not terminologically fall under the name...' ¶

From this perspective, Muslim jurists treated this type of defensive warfare under the chapter of 'Jihad' in the books of Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh). ¶

Likewise, defensive wars in the Prophetic biography (Sirah) are considered part of Jihad, such as the defense of Medina during the 'Battle of the Trench' (Ghazwat al-Khandaq). Therefore, it is narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari regarding this battle that the Muslims who were working on the defensive fortifications around Medina recited the following verse of poetry while digging the trench: 'We are those who have pledged allegiance to Muhammad, that we shall persist in Jihad as long as we live.' (1) ¶

Second Section: Fedayeen (commando/guerrilla) activities against the enemy, within occupied territories or in the enemy's own land. ¶

This Fedayeen activity, which strikes the enemy deep within occupied territories, is also a form of legitimate Jihad (Jihad Shar'i). This is because it is a battle against disbelievers who have committed aggression against Muslims and entered their lands. In fact, this type of combat is among the most obligatory forms of Jihad. In 'Al-Minhaj' by Al-Nawawi and its commentary 'Mughni al-Muhtaj', it is stated regarding the matter at hand: ¶

'Jihad during the time of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was a Fard Kifayah (communal obligation), and it could become a Fard Ayn (individual obligation) during his time, such as when the enemy surrounded the Muslims, like the Ahzab (confederates) from the disbelievers who gathered around Medina; this necessitated that Jihad against them became an individual obligation... As for after him (PBUH), the disbelievers fall into two categories: First, they are in their own lands, residing there and not intending to attack any of the Muslim lands—in this case, it is a Fard Kifayah, as indicated by the conduct of the Rightly Guided Caliphs... Second: They enter a city of ours, then it becomes incumbent upon its inhabitants to defend [themselves] by whatever means possible, and Jihad at that point becomes Fard Ayn.' (3) ¶

[Regarding the statement] 'Jihad in Islamic Shariah is actually included under the chapter of Siyal (repelling an aggressor)...' I say: We have already addressed the subject of 'Siyal' as it pertains to people transgressing against one another in some detail in our discussion on 'Combat for the Defense of Private Sanctities' in the first chapter, p. 77 and onwards. ¶

Based on this, the repulsion of the enemy by Muslims who have entered their lands and occupied their territory, by whatever means possible and available to them—even if this available means of defense is throwing stones at the enemy (1)! I say: the repulsion of the enemy by Muslims in any possible and available manner is part of Jihad, as mentioned in the previous fiqh text. In such a state, it becomes fard ayn (individual obligation), as previously stated. ¶

Furthermore, Jihad is not limited merely to resisting the enemy or striking them in the Muslim lands they occupy and colonize. Rather, the category of Jihad also includes activities based on striking the enemy even within their own countries outside the Islamic world. This is because the term Jihad applies to fighting the kuffar anywhere, even if it requires infiltrating their own lands for this purpose, as long as there is no legitimate peace treaty between them and the Muslims. How much more so if they are—along with that—aggressors and colonizers...? ¶

Hence, it is permissible for combat organizations to extend their combat and fedayeen (self-sacrificial) activities to strike the enemy within their own lands. ¶

Third Section: Combat activities within Muslim lands against the state or some of its factions. ¶

There are two issues here: - First Issue: The bearing of arms by organizations against the state in which they reside among the existing states in the Islamic world. We have previously defined that this combat activity: - If the intention is to pressure the state in order to rectify deviated conditions by eliminating symbols of corruption and the like... then such activity is prohibited in Shariah, as previously explained; because Islam has laid out a path other than bearing arms to forbid evil (munkarat) and resist deviations. That path is enjoining good and forbidding evil (al-amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar), spreading awareness, and working to form a righteous public opinion that exerts itself in correcting crookedness and reforming conditions... on ¶

Similar to what has been detailed previously in the research: 'Combat for the Defense of Public Sanctities' and the research: 'Combat against the Deviation of the Ruler' in the first chapter of this treatise (1). - As for the case where the intention behind bearing arms against the state is to topple it and establish an Islamic state, then the Shariah ruling on this matter and the research regarding it have already been detailed in the previous section. This applies if the bearing of arms is directed against the state, which is the first issue in this branch. As for the second issue: that is, if the bearing of arms is directed against certain sects living within the state, the most prominent example of which is the combat that sometimes occurs between Muslims and the Ahl al-Dhimma (protected non-Muslim subjects), then I say: this issue has also been discussed in detail in the research: 'Combatting the Ahl al-Dhimma', so we shall not repeat the discussion on it, as it was addressed in the first chapter of this treatise. With this, we conclude the discussion on this section and move on to another. ¶

Easy Translation of the Holy Quran: Surah Al-Baqarah ¶

(I begin) In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. ¶

(1) Alif-Lam-Mim. (2) This is the Book (of Allah) whereof there is no doubt, a guidance for the Muttaqin (the pious). (3) Those who believe in the unseen, perform Salah, and spend out of what We have provided for them (in the way of Allah). (4) And who believe in that which has been revealed to you (O Muhammad) and that which was revealed before you, and they believe with certainty in the Hereafter. (5) They are on guidance from their Lord, and it is these who will prosper. ¶

(6) Indeed, for those who disbelieve, it is the same whether you warn them or do not warn them; they will not believe. (7) Allah has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and over their vision is a veil. And for them is a great punishment. ¶

(8) And of the people are some who say, 'We believe in Allah and the Last Day,' but they are not believers. (9) They seek to deceive Allah and those who believe, while they deceive none but themselves, and they perceive (it) not. (10) In their hearts is a disease, so Allah has increased their disease; and for them is a painful punishment because they (habitually) used to lie. ¶

(11) And when it is said to them, 'Do not cause corruption on the earth,' they say, 'We are but reformers.' (12) Unquestionably, it is they who are the corrupters, but they perceive (it) not. (13) And when it is said to them, 'Believe as the people have believed,' they say, 'Should we believe as the foolish have believed?' Unquestionably, it is they who are the foolish, but they do not know. ¶

(14) And when they meet those who believe, they say, 'We believe,' but when they are alone with their devils, they say, 'Indeed, we are with you; we were only mockers.' (15) Allah mocks them and leaves them in their transgression, wandering blindly. (16) These are the ones who have purchased error at the price of guidance, so their transaction has brought no profit, nor were they guided. ¶

Fourth Discussion: Fighting Between Organizations and the Stance of Sharia Ijtihad Regarding It ¶

The arena of armed struggle, which operates in the field of liberation and resistance against the enemy usurping Muslim lands, witnesses from time to time events of internal conflict among the organizations active in this field(1). Furthermore, conflict sometimes erupts between wings and factions of a single militant organization(2). There is no need for us to review the events of this conflict or that, as the news of it—which wrings the hearts—is repeated on the broadcasts and recorded by books, newspapers, and magazines. ¶

The important issue here is: What is the stance of Sharia ijtihad regarding this internal fighting, which drains the strength of the Muslims and benefits no one but their enemy, who lies in wait for them? ¶

The answer to this question depends on knowing the cause of the fighting: ¶

- If the cause is merely the desire of an organization, or a wing of an organization, to dominate others, then this fighting is prohibited (mahzur) in Sharia; because it is an illegitimate bearing of arms against Muslims, and the statement of the Prophet (ﷺ) applies to it: 'He who takes up arms against us is not one of us'(3). ¶

- But if the cause is that some corrupt elements of an organization have become active in transgressing against the sanctities of the Muslims and violating the rights of the people, and another organization has risen to stand against them... ¶

Aggression and the repulsion of such assault (siyal)—fighting here falls under the category of defense of sanctity, regarding lives, honor, and wealth. Although it is not considered jihad in the terminological sense—because it is fighting occurring between Muslims themselves, and not between Muslims and the kuffar (disbelievers) of the dar al-harb—it is nonetheless a legitimate (mashru') fight in any case, so that those who initiate aggression and assault may be restrained from their transgressions and excesses. ¶

This fighting is characterized by the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'Help your brother, whether he is an oppressor or oppressed.' A man asked: 'O Messenger of Allah, I will help him if he is oppressed, but if he is an oppressor, how shall I help him?' He replied: 'Restrain him or prevent him from injustice, for that is helping him.' (Sahih al-Bukhari). ¶

Furthermore, Imam Ibn Taymiyyah clarifies the Shariah ruling on fighting the Muslim assailant (sa'il) who transgresses against the wealth of the Muslims. This occurs during his discussion on fighting those who depart from the laws of Islam. He states: 'If the Sunnah and Ijma (consensus) are agreed that if the Muslim assailant cannot be stopped except by killing, he is to be killed, even if the property he is taking is only a carat of a dinar... then how much more so is the case for fighting those who have departed from the laws of Islam and are warring against Allah and His Messenger?' (Majmu' al-Fatawa). ¶

We have explored this issue in some detail in previous research, such as 'Fighting for the Defense of Private Sanctities' and 'Fighting for the Defense of Public Sanctities' in the first chapter of this thesis. ¶

In any case, there are many reasons for the occurrence of internal fighting between organizations or within a single organization. To determine the precise ruling in this context, every case must be studied individually. ¶

Examining the circumstances and context of combat, in order to understand the causes of conflict in every case, allows the subsequent ruling regarding them to be closer to what is correct. . . And with this, we conclude this section, and proceed to the final section of this research. ¶

Etiquette of the Murshid (Spiritual Guide) Then he states that by remaining in the service of the Sheikh (Murshid), the murid (disciple) attains the following benefits: ¶

1. His ignoble character traits (bad manners) are removed. 2. He attains the Ma'rifah (gnosis) of Allah Almighty. 3. His heart is cleansed of the love of the world. 4. He traverses the higher stations of Taqwa (piety) and asceticism. ¶

In short, the companionship of the Sheikh serves as an excellent training ground for the spiritual life of the murid. Just as a gardener nurtures a plant to turn it into a sturdy tree, in the same way, a perfect Murshid provides spiritual training to his murid, making him capable of reaching Allah Almighty. ¶