Chapter 45

In the event that an enemy dominates a region or reaches the very center of the lands of Islam (dar al-Islam), it becomes incumbent upon all the inhabitants of that land to set forth, whether light or heavy (in circumstances), young or old, each according to their capacity. Those who have a father must set forth without his permission, and those who do not have a father must also do so. No one capable of fighting or of increasing the number (of the army) shall remain behind. If the people of that town are unable to repel their enemy, it becomes incumbent upon those nearest to them and their neighbors to set forth, based on the same obligations as the people of that town, until it is known that they possess the capacity to confront and push back the enemy. Likewise, anyone who is aware of their weakness against the enemy and knows that they can reach them and offer aid is also obliged to set forth... Even if the enemy only approaches the territory of Islam without having entered it, it is still incumbent upon them to set forth against them, so that the religion of Allah may prevail, the protective wall (baydah) of Islam may be defended, the territory safeguarded, and the enemy disgraced. There is no disagreement regarding this. ¶

It is stated in Mukhtasar al-Khiraqi: 'It is obligatory upon the people, when the enemy arrives, that they set forth, both the poor among them and the wealthy...' ¶

Ibn Qudamah states: 'His statement, "the poor among them and the wealthy," means—and Allah knows best—the rich and the poor... Its meaning is that the mobilization (nafir) encompasses all people who are of the age and ability to fight when the need arises due to the arrival of the enemy. It is not permissible for anyone to remain behind, except for those whose staying back is necessary to guard the place, the family, and the property, or those whom the leader (Amir) prevents from going, or those who lack the physical capacity to go or to fight. This is based on the saying of Allah the Almighty: "Go forth, whether light or heavy" (At-Tawbah: 41), and the saying of the Prophet (PBUH): "And if you are called for mobilization, then mobilize." Furthermore, Allah the Almighty condemned those who sought to return to their homes on the day of the Confederates (Al-Ahzab), saying: "And a party of them asks permission..."' ¶

The Prophet; they say: {Our houses are exposed, while they are not exposed. They only intend to flee} (Surah Al-Ahzab: 13). ¶

It is worth noting that the intent behind the 'fard al-'ayn' (individual obligation) in our issue centers on preventing the enemy from occupying Muslim lands or committing aggression against them and their people. However, if it is assumed that this objective is better achieved through a war strategy that involves letting the enemy enter Muslim lands or land its forces there, considering that this would put the Muslims in a stronger position to crush and eradicate them, then there is no harm in implementing such a plan. Regarding this, Ibn al-Qayyim states, concerning the rulings and jurisprudence derived from the Battle of Uhud: ¶

'It is not mandatory for Muslims, if an enemy strikes them in their homes, to go out to them; rather, it is permissible for them to remain in their homes and fight them therein if that is more conducive to victory over their enemy, as the Messenger of Allah ﷺ indicated on the day of Uhud.' ¶

This is the first condition under which jihad becomes an individual obligation (fard al-'ayn). In light of what has preceded, this fard al-'ayn is specific to the people of the country that is being attacked. If they are not sufficient to repel the enemy, or if they are negligent, the obligation extends to the nearest and then the next nearest, until the enemy is repelled, even if this encompasses all Muslims in the East and the West. ¶

Ibn Taymiyyah says: 'If the enemy enters the lands of Islam, there is no doubt that it is mandatory to repel them by the nearest and then the next nearest, for all the lands of Islam are in the position of a single city.' ¶

And Imam al-Jassas says: 'It is known in the belief of all Muslims that if the people of the frontier regions (thughur) fear the enemy, and there is no...' ¶

resisting, and they fear for their lands, their lives, and their offspring, then it is an obligation upon the entire Ummah to mobilize toward them to repel their aggression against the Muslims. There is no disagreement on this among the Ummah.(1) ¶

2. The Second State: Where Jihad becomes an Individual Obligation (Fard 'Ayn). ¶

If the Caliph or the legitimate authority issues an order to a specific faction of the army, people, or individuals to go out to fight. This is what is called a summons (istid'a) or general mobilization (istinfar).(2) It then becomes obligatory upon the one to whom the order was issued, by specific designation or name,(3) to join the ranks of the fighters, and it is haram (forbidden) for him to refrain. However, there is some detail here: ¶

a) The summons or mobilization issued by the authority may be for the purpose of defending Islamic lands occupied by the enemy or under threat, and those ordered to mobilize are residents of the occupied or threatened lands, whether they are native to them or not. Here, the basis for the individual obligation (fard 'ayni) to fight rests on two aspects: First, because they are from the people of the land under attack, as mentioned in the first case; and second, due to the obligation of obeying the Imam. ¶

b) The mobilization may also be for the purpose of defending Islamic lands, but those ordered to mobilize are not residents of the threatened or attacked country. However, the residents of those lands may have been slothful in defending their country, thus incurring the sin of neglecting their individual duty, or they may have risen to defend but are insufficient to repel the enemy or liberate the entire occupied territory. In this case, the basis for the individual obligation on those mobilized is also from two aspects, as in the previous paragraph. That is: - From the aspect that they are among those upon whom defense is obligatory due to their proximity to the attacked land. - And from the aspect of the necessity of obeying the Imam. ¶

(1) Ahkam al-Qur'an by al-Jassas: 4/312. (2) Al-Jami' li-Ahkam al-Qur'an by al-Qurtubi: 8/142. (3) 'Jurists hold the view that a communal obligation (fard kifayah) becomes an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) upon designation by the Imam in Jihad.' [From the supervisor's notes on the thesis]. ¶

C - Mobilization (Istinfar) may also be for the purpose of defense, as in the previous paragraph, but the people of the threatened or attacked territory are capable of confronting the enemy and saving the land; in this case, the mobilization is driven by the motive of solidarity with other Muslims. Here, engaging in this combat-related solidarity is not originally a Fard 'Ayn (individual obligation) for those who are not threatened or attacked, as long as those to whom the threat or aggression is directed are capable of confronting the aggression on their own. However, despite this, those who have been called upon and mobilized to participate in the defense must respond to the call. Fighting becomes a Fard 'Ayn for them as well, and the basis for this in such a case is solely the obligation of obedience to the Imam. ¶

D - Mobilization may be for the purpose of Ghazw (offensive warfare), i.e., for offensive combat, meaning invading the lands of the disbelievers on the basis of their refusal to respond to the Islamic call or to submit to the Islamic system after the call has been sent to them and the warning of the three well-known options has been issued to them. This is with the aim of applying the Islamic system to them by force, as they have refused to submit to it through consent and choice. In this case, those who are requested to mobilize (Nafeer) must respond to this mobilization. The basis for this obligation is the fulfillment of Fard Kifayah (communal obligation), as mentioned in the previous section, and the performance of this duty becomes binding upon the person designated by the Imam based on the obligation to obey him in this matter. ¶

Furthermore, we will present hereafter some of the Shariah proofs and jurisprudential texts which indicate that Jihad becomes a Fard 'Ayn for whomever the Imam designates for it. ¶

- The Almighty says: "O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go forth in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth?" - Then the Almighty says: "If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment." Imam al-Jassas says regarding this: "The apparent meaning of the verse necessitates the obligation of mobilization (Nafeer) for the one who is mobilized." ¶

The Messenger of Allah ﷺ says: 'There is no Hijrah (migration) after the conquest (of Makkah), but there is jihad and intention, and if you are summoned (for jihad), then respond.' Fath al-Bari states regarding this hadith: 'In this is evidence for the obligation of individual duty (fard 'ayn) to set out for battle upon those whom the Imam appoints.' ¶

Al-Jassas mentions in Ahkam al-Qur'an regarding this hadith: 'It is a command to mobilize when mobilization is called, and this corresponds to the apparent meaning of the Almighty's saying: "O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go forth in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth?" (Surah At-Tawbah: 38). This applies to the mobilization we mentioned due to need. For when the people of the frontier regions are sufficient for themselves and there is no need for others, they are rarely summoned. However, if the Imam summons them—even if those at the frontier are sufficient to face the enemy—because he intends to invade the territory of the belligerents and tread upon their lands, then it is incumbent upon those Muslims who were summoned to set out.' ¶

Al-Qurtubi mentions in Ahkam al-Qur'an: 'Summoning and mobilizing is unlikely to make something obligatory that was not obligatory before, except that when the Imam appoints a group and calls them to jihad, they may not act sluggishly upon that appointment. It becomes, by his appointment, a fard (obligation) upon whomsoever he has appointed—not because of the nature of the jihad itself, but because of obedience to the Imam, and Allah knows best.' ¶

Al-Shawkani says: 'It is obligatory upon whom the Imam summons to set out, and it becomes a specific duty for him. For this reason, Allah, the Exalted, threatened those who did not set out with the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, saying: "It was not [appropriate] for the people of Madinah and those surrounding them of the bedouins..."' ¶

stay behind the Messenger of Allah (1) to the end of the verse. And the mobilization (istinfar) by the Imam is understood in light of the Almighty's saying: {Go forth, whether light or heavy} (2). (3) With this, we conclude the second of the conditions under which Jihad is fard ayn (individual obligation). Now we come to the third condition. ¶

3 - Third Condition: One of the conditions in which Jihad is fard ayn. When the combatants arrive at the battlefield, it is not permissible to withdraw from it until the war has run its course, or a ceasefire is decided by those in authority, as dictated by the interest (maslaha) of the matter. But who is meant by 'combatants' in this case? - Naturally, it does not mean those defending their lands against aggression or the threat of aggression, because for these defenders, fighting is originally a fard ayn, as previously mentioned in the first condition. It has been established that the defense of Medina during the Battle of the Trench was an individual obligation on all capable Muslims therein, even though the attacking disbelievers outnumbered the Muslims several times over. - Similarly, this condition does not apply to those mobilized by the Imam for combat, whether they are army personnel, leaders, or subjects, because fighting has become a fard ayn for these mobilized individuals as well, due to the obligation of obeying the Imam. So, who are the 'combatants' meant in this condition we are discussing? In reality, this condition applies to two groups of combatants: - The first group: Those who volunteer for combat without being mobilized by the Imam, are not part of the army assigned to fight, and for whom fighting has not become obligatory due to the defense of their land. If these volunteers go out to fight, it is permissible for them to return as long as the battle has not commenced; however, if... ¶

Once he is present at the battlefield, fighting becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn) upon him. Of this nature is the case of one who has living parents and sets out for voluntary jihad without their permission; it is prohibited (haram) for him to leave, as obedience to parents is an individual obligation, and an individual obligation takes precedence over voluntary jihad. However, if this son violates this and sets out for combat, and the battle commences, it becomes prohibited for him to withdraw from it at that point. Regarding this and similar cases, Ibn Qudamah says: ¶

'If he sets out for a voluntary jihad with their [his parents'] permission, and they forbid him from it after he has traveled, but before it [fighting] becomes obligatory, he must return... But if he arrives at the battle line, it becomes obligatory upon him by virtue of his presence, and the permission of the parents no longer remains.'(1) These and their likes are the first group upon whom fighting becomes fixed once they have reached the battlefield, the ranks have met, and the advance has begun. ¶

- The Second Group: These are the fighters who are performing a communal obligation (fard al-kifayah) in an offensive against enemies—for the sake of the Islamic call, for example. It is permissible for these fighters to refrain from launching an attack against the enemies before the fighting begins, as the commander of the battle deems appropriate for the interest of the situation. However, once the fighting begins and the ranks clash, it becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn) for these fighters to continue fighting in light of the rulings that necessitate steadfastness and prohibit fleeing.(2) ¶

The wisdom behind jihad becoming an individual obligation for every individual who is present at the battle, and the prohibition of withdrawing from it, is that the withdrawal of some fighters during the engagement of war between the Muslims and their enemies constitutes a desertion of the fighting Muslims. This would weaken their position, spread chaos, confusion, and panic among their ranks, embolden the disbelievers against them, and cause the balance of power to tilt in favor of their enemies. Hence, the Shariah has commanded steadfastness during the encounter and prohibited fleeing and turning one's back on the day of battle. ¶

Ibn Qudamah says: 'When the two armies meet and the ranks face each other, it becomes prohibited for whoever is present to withdraw, and remaining becomes obligatory due to the saying of Allah the Almighty: "O you who have believed, when you encounter a company, stand firm and remember Allah much..."' ¶

Many (1) . . . And the saying of the Almighty: "O you who have believed, when you meet those who disbelieve advancing [for battle], do not turn to them your backs [in flight] . . ." (2) (3). ¶

Regarding the command for steadfastness and patience during an encounter, the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) says: "Do not desire to meet the enemy, and ask Allah for well-being. But if you meet them, then be patient, and know that Paradise is under the shadows of swords." (4). ¶

It is stated in Sharh al-Nawawi 'ala Muslim: "The prohibition against desiring to meet the enemy is because it contains an element of self-admiration and reliance upon the self . . . and because it implies a lack of concern for the enemy and despising them, which contradicts caution and resoluteness . . . Then he said: As for his saying (ﷺ), 'If you meet them, then be patient,' this is an encouragement for steadfastness in combat, and it is among its most vital pillars." (5). ¶

This is what is said regarding the third situation in which fighting becomes a 'fard 'ayn' (individual obligation) for those affected by it. ¶

With its conclusion, we finish the third point in this research and move on to the fourth point. ¶

4 - The fourth point: Is the existence of a Caliph for the Muslims a condition for undertaking jihad that is a 'fard 'ayn'? And how is this jihad to be performed? ¶

The answer is that it has already been established in the previous discussion that the existence of a Caliph is not a condition for undertaking jihad that is a 'fard kifaya' (communal obligation); therefore, a fortiori, it is not a condition for undertaking jihad that is a 'fard 'ayn'. ¶

As for how this jihad is to be carried out, the matter rests with the commander of combat appointed by the supreme authority, or one agreed upon by the fighters in the absence of an appointed commander. If both of these are impossible, and the enemy strikes suddenly or combat becomes necessary, then it is mandatory to repel the enemy in any way possible. ¶

It is stated in Al-Mughni: 'When the enemy attacks, jihad becomes a fard 'ayn (individual obligation), making it mandatory for everyone, and it is not permissible for anyone to refrain from it. Once this is established, they must not sally forth without the permission of the commander, for the affairs of war are entrusted to him; he is better informed about the numbers of the enemy, their strength, their hideouts, and their tactics. Therefore, one should defer to his judgment, as it is more cautious for the Muslims—unless it is impossible to obtain his permission due to a sudden enemy attack, in which case his permission is not required, because the welfare (maslahah) lies in fighting them and going out to meet them, as failing to do so would inevitably lead to ruin. For this reason, when the disbelievers raided the camels of the Prophet (peace be upon him), Salamah ibn al-Akwa' happened to be leaving Medina; he pursued them and fought them without permission. The Prophet (peace be upon him) praised him and said: 'The best of our infantry is Salamah ibn al-Akwa'.' (1) This concludes the remarks on the fourth point. With its completion, we reach the end of this discussion: 'When does combat become an individual obligation?' We now move on to the next topic. ¶

(12) A Gift of Fiqh ¶

(Issue): As long as a child remains a minor, the father or grandfather is not obligated to pay Zakat on the child's behalf. If the child does not pay Zakat after reaching puberty, the father or grandfather is not held responsible, nor will the child be absolved of the obligation if they (the father/grandfather) pay it; rather, the payment is obligatory upon the child himself. ¶

(Issue): If Zakat became obligatory upon someone and they lost all or part of their wealth before paying it, they are only required to pay Zakat on the remaining amount. ¶

(Issue): If a person gives their Zakat to someone who is not eligible to receive it, the Zakat is not considered fulfilled, and it is mandatory to pay it again. ¶

(Issue): If a person upon whom Zakat was obligatory passes away without paying it, it is mandatory to pay the Zakat amount from their estate (mirath). If they made a will, it is to be paid from one-third of the estate; if they did not make a will, the heirs should pay it on their behalf so that the obligation is discharged from the deceased. ¶

(Issue): Intention (niyyah) is a prerequisite for the payment of Zakat. If Zakat is given without intention, it will not be counted as Zakat but rather as voluntary charity (sadaqah nafilah). It is sufficient to make the intention at the time of distribution or when separating the Zakat portion from the wealth. ¶

(Issue): When giving Zakat to a poor person, it is not necessary to inform them that the money is Zakat; the obligation is fulfilled even if they are not told. However, informing them that it is a gift is discouraged (makruh); it is better to give it discreetly. ¶

(Issue): If someone hands Zakat money to an agent (wakil) to distribute among the eligible, the Zakat is only fulfilled when the agent delivers the money to the eligible recipient. If the agent fails to distribute the money, the Zakat has not been fulfilled. ¶

Section Three: Jihad - Is it originally a recommended (mandub) act? And can Jihad ever be recommended? ¶

The significant aspects we will address in this research are summarized in the following points: ¶

1. What is the definition of a recommended (mandub) act? ¶

2. The theory that the ruling on Jihad is recommendation (nadb), not obligation (wujub): a. Who are the classical jurists (fuqaha) who hold this view? What are their evidences? This includes a discussion of those evidences and an interpretation of their opinions to align with the majority view that the ruling on Jihad is a communal obligation (fard kifaya). b. Offensive Jihad is the only domain where the ruling that Jihad is recommended, rather than mandatory, is established according to those who hold this view. c. What are the implications of the claim that offensive Jihad is recommended, according to those who maintain it. ¶

3. Modern Islamic writers who argue that Jihad in Islam is defensive only: a. What is the reality of the idea they advocate? b. A comparison between the view of some classical jurists that Jihad is recommended, and the modern view that Jihad is exclusively defensive and cannot be offensive. ¶

4. Is Jihad or combat against enemies ever recommended, at times, even for those who do not hold that the default ruling for Jihad is recommendation rather than obligation? ¶

These are the points around which we will conduct our discussion in this research. ¶

1 - First point: What is al-Mandub (the Recommended)? After Dr. Muhammad Mustafa al-Zuhayli defines al-mandub and proceeds to explain that definition, he provides us with the summary—sufficient for our purposes here—regarding the intended meaning of a recommended act, stating: "Al-mandub is an act requested by the Legislator (al-Shari') in a non-binding and non-definitive manner." He then explains the ruling of al-mandub, stating: "The ruling of al-mandub is that the one who performs it deserves reward and recompense from Allah the Almighty, and the one who leaves it does not deserve punishment." Furthermore, there are other names that scholars use for al-mandub. Dr. al-Zuhayli says: "Scholars apply other names to al-mandub, such as sunnah, nafilah, murghab fihi (encouraged), mustahabb, and ihsan. Ibn al-Subki said: Mandub, mustahabb, and sunnah are synonyms" (1). I add: Some scholars also apply the terms 'adab' (etiquette) and 'fadilah' (virtue) to it. It is stated in Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: "There is no difference between mustahabb, mandub, and adab" (2). It is also stated therein, regarding the reason for naming al-mandub as 'fadilah': "And fadilah, because performing it is superior to leaving it, so it is in the sense of 'fadil' (superior). Or because the one who performs it becomes a person of virtue through the reward" (3). Thus, this is al-mandub: this is its ruling, and these are its names. With this, we conclude the first point of this research and proceed to the second point. ¶

2 - Second point: The notion that the ruling of Jihad is recommendation (nadb), not obligation (wujub): (a) Who are the classical jurists who hold this view? - What are their evidences? Along with a discussion of those evidences. - Reconciling the opinion that Jihad is recommended with the opinion of the majority, who hold that the ruling of Jihad is a communal obligation (fard kifayah). ¶

b - Offensive jihad only; this is the sphere in which the ruling that jihad is mandub (recommended) is established according to those who hold that view. ¶

c - The implication of the view that offensive jihad is mandub, according to those who hold it. ¶

a - Who are those who say that the ruling on jihad is recommendation (nadb) rather than obligation (wujub)? I will present below some jurisprudential texts that indicate this opinion and its proponents. ¶

- In 'Qawanin al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyya', it is stated: 'Sahnun said: It [jihad] became voluntary (tatawwu') after the Conquest [of Mecca].' ¶

- In 'Hashiyat al-Dasuqi 'ala al-Sharh al-Kabir', it is stated: 'It is narrated from Ibn 'Abd al-Barr that it is a collective obligation (fard kifaya) during times of fear and a supererogatory act (nafila) during times of security.' ¶

- In 'Bidayat al-Mujtahid', Ibn Rushd says: 'As for the ruling of this duty [the duty of jihad], the scholars are in consensus that it is a collective obligation, not an individual one, except for 'Abdullah ibn al-Hasan, who said: It is voluntary (tatawwu').' ¶

- In Tafsir al-Qurtubi: 'Al-Mahdawi and others mentioned from al-Thawri that he said: Jihad is voluntary.' ¶

- In 'Ahkam al-Qur'an' by Ibn al-'Arabi: 'A group of jurists said: Jihad, after the Conquest of Mecca, is not an obligation unless the Imam calls upon one of them [to mobilize]. This was stated by Sufyan al-Thawri, and Sahnun inclined towards it. Some people suspected this of Ibn 'Umar when they saw him persisting in performing Hajj and leaving jihad...' ¶

- In 'Ahkam al-Qur'an' by al-Jassas: 'It is narrated from Ibn Shubruma, al-Thawri, and others that jihad is voluntary and not an obligation... A similar report has been narrated from Ibn 'Umar, although it is a matter of dispute.' ¶

Regarding the authenticity of the narration from him... and it is narrated from 'Ata and 'Amr ibn Dinar similarly.(1) ¶

It further states in it: 'From Ibn Jurayj who said: I asked 'Ata: Is fighting (ghazw) obligatory upon the people? He, along with 'Amr ibn Dinar, said: We have no knowledge of it!'(1) ¶

We conclude from what has preceded that those to whom the opinion is attributed—that the ruling of Jihad is recommendation (nadb) and not obligation (wujub)—are: Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them both), 'Ata, 'Amr ibn Dinar, Ibn Shubruma, Al-Thawri, and from the Malikis: Sahnun and Ibn 'Abd al-Barr. ¶

Dr. Arif Khalil Abu Eid has also attributed this view to Al-Jahiz, Al-Zamakhshari, and most of the contemporary jurists... He states: 'It is narrated from Ibn Shubruma, Sufyan al-Thawri, and others that Jihad is voluntary (tatawwu') and not an obligation... And Ibn Shubruma and Sufyan al-Thawri had early supporters, among them Al-Jahiz and Al-Zamakhshari... and most contemporary jurists hold the view of Al-Thawri and Ibn Shubruma.'(2) This is what Dr. 'Arif said regarding those who hold the opinion that the ruling of Jihad is recommendation rather than obligation. ¶

In my view, the opinion of these individuals regarding the ruling of Jihad differs from the opinion held by Ibn Shubruma and Al-Thawri, as will be explained when discussing the third point of this research. Now, what are the evidences relied upon by the opinion which holds that the ruling of Jihad is recommendation and not obligation? ¶

The answer is: The evidences relied upon to support this view are of two types: - Some provide clear evidence for the opinion we are discussing. - Others do not have clear indication for it; rather, they are statements and behaviors stemming from some of the Salaf (predecessors), from which some understood that they lean towards the direction that the ruling of Jihad is recommendation and not obligation. ¶

We shall present these proofs of both types without distinction, and clarify the direction of their indication toward the recommended (mustahabb) status of jihad, while also engaging in a critical discussion of these proofs. ¶

1 - Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan stated: «Al-Thawri says: Fighting the polytheists is not mandatory unless they initiate it, in which case fighting them becomes obligatory as a matter of defense—based on the apparent meaning of His saying: 'But if they fight you, then kill them' (Quran 2:191), and His saying: 'And fight the polytheists collectively as they fight you collectively' (Quran 9:36).» I say: This jurisprudential text and the reasoning contained within it indicate that Al-Thawri limits the obligation of fighting the disbelievers strictly to the state of defense. This implies that for Muslims to initiate fighting against disbelievers in non-defensive situations—after offering them the call to Islam and giving them the choice between Islam, jizya, or war—such fighting is not considered legitimate according to the two aforementioned verses. ¶

Since Imam Al-Thawri holds that this fighting is legitimate but only as a recommended act (istihbab) rather than an obligation (wujub), as noted in the previous jurisprudential texts, it appears that he applied the Shariah texts that command fighting the disbelievers unconditionally—without requiring them to be the aggressors—strictly within the realm of recommendation rather than obligation. In any case, the scope of this jurisprudential text is limited to denying the mandatory nature of jihad in defensive situations. ¶

We have discussed in previous research the claim that limits the obligation of jihad solely to defensive situations, and we argued that this ruling pertained to the first stage of the legislation of jihad in Medina. Subsequently, the legislation of jihad against all disbelievers was added, even if they had not committed an act of aggression against Islam or the Muslims, provided the call had been delivered to them and they refused to accept Islam or pay the jizya... consequently, only war remains as an option, dictated by the interests of the Islamic community. In our previous research, we presented the majority's arguments that the condition of prior aggression by disbelievers is not required for the obligation of fighting them if the Muslims are capable, provided that superior interest (maslaha rajihah) dictates it. Among those arguments is the verse: 'Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful...' ¶

and do not believe in His Messenger, and do not embrace the religion of truth, from among those who were given the Book, until they pay the jizyah with willing submission and feel themselves subdued (1), meaning: they submit to the rulings of Islam (2). ¶

As we previously cited in earlier discussions from Imam al-Jassas regarding the consensus of the jurists on the legitimacy of fighting the disbelievers in non-defensive situations, he stated: 'We do not know of any jurist who prohibits fighting those among the polytheists who have refrained from fighting us. The disagreement lies only in the permissibility of abandoning combat, not in its prohibition. There is total agreement among all that the prohibition of combat against those who fit the description mentioned has been abrogated, and Allah is the Grantor of success to what is correct' (3). This is the response given to the first argument attributed to Imam al-Thawri to support his view... Although it does not necessarily prove his specific position that Jihad is merely recommended (mandub), and its implication is limited to denying the obligatory nature of non-defensive combat, it was necessary to address this argument because denying the obligatory nature of Jihad is inherent to the claim that Jihad is only recommended. Thus, it was necessary, in any case, to refute the claim that the obligatory nature of Jihad is denied. ¶

- Another argument cited by those who hold that Jihad is merely recommended is found in al-Jassas's Ahkam al-Qur'an, where he states: 'It has been narrated from Ibn Shubruma, al-Thawri, and others that Jihad is a voluntary act (tatawwu') and not an obligation (fard). They argued that {Fighting has been prescribed for you} (4) does not denote obligation, but rather recommendation, similar to the Almighty's saying: {It is prescribed for you, when death approaches one of you—if he leaves wealth—that he should make a bequest to his parents and relatives} (5)(6). This argument implies that the word 'kutiba' (prescribed) in {Fighting has been prescribed for you} does not mean 'obligatory,' but rather 'recommended,' just as the word 'kutiba' in the verse {It is prescribed for you, when death approaches...} means recommended, not obligatory, because the ruling on making a bequest is one of recommendation (nadb/istihbab) and not obligation (wujub).' ¶

We examine this argument as follows: The word 'kutiba' (prescribed) originally means 'furida' (obligatory), as in the words of the Almighty: "Fasting is prescribed for you" (Surah Al-Baqarah: 183), meaning fasting has been made obligatory upon you. As Imam Al-Jassas states: "The ruling of this term (i.e., kutiba) is obligation, unless there is evidence to suggest recommendation (nadb); and no such evidence has been established for Jihad to be merely recommended." It is known that a bequest for parents and relatives was obligatory if the deceased left wealth, which was prior to the legislation of inheritance laws, as is apparent from the meaning of 'kutiba'. Subsequently, evidence for the abrogation of this obligatory bequest came after the legislation of inheritance, alongside the Prophet’s (PBUH) saying: "Verily, Allah has given every rightful person their due right, so there is no bequest for an heir." Thus, the word 'kutiba' in the verse of bequest denotes the meaning of 'furida' as its primary intent, and the abrogation of this obligation followed as mentioned. As for the recommendation (istihbab) of bequeathing to non-heirs, it is based on other evidence, such as the statement of Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both): "I wish people would reduce to a fourth; for the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: 'A third, and a third is much,'" meaning it is recommended to bequeath less than a third of one's wealth to non-heirs, as Ibn Abbas indicated the desirability of bequeathing a fourth. In conclusion, 'kutiba' in the verse of bequest does not denote the meaning of 'nudiba' (recommended). Furthermore, even if it were argued that the verse was not abrogated and was interpreted as: "It is recommended for you to bequeath to parents who are not heirs (such as non-Muslims, for example) and to relatives who are not heirs," the meaning of recommendation and desirability here would not be because 'kutiba' signifies mere recommendation in language or Shariah. Rather, it signifies obligation and necessity, and the meaning of desirability was derived here based on other evidence that pointed toward the recommendation of bequeathing to non-heirs. And since no such evidence or context exists regarding the verse "Fighting is prescribed for you"... ¶

Another (argument) that shifts its meaning from obligation (wujub) to recommendation (nadb) and desirability (istihbab), as the meaning of the verse remains based on its original context, which is: 'Fighting has been prescribed for you.' ¶

3 - The third evidence cited by those to whom the opinion is attributed that Jihad is recommended (mandub) is the narration: 'From Maymun ibn Mahran, who said: I was with Ibn Umar when a man came to Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-Aas and asked him about the obligatory duties (fara'id). Ibn Umar was sitting nearby, listening to his words. He (Abdullah ibn Amr) said: The obligatory duties are: testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing prayer, giving zakat, the pilgrimage to the House, fasting in Ramadan, and Jihad in the way of Allah! The narrator said: It was as if Ibn Umar became angry at that! Then he said: The obligatory duties are: testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing prayer, giving zakat, the pilgrimage to the House, and fasting in Ramadan, and leaving out Jihad.' Al-Jassas cited this text regarding what was attributed to Ibn Umar concerning the denial of the obligatory nature of Jihad. ¶

- He also cited, on this occasion, the Hadith narrated by Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them both), who said: The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: 'Islam is built upon five: testifying that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing prayer, giving zakat, the pilgrimage, and fasting in Ramadan.' ¶

- Regarding what those who argue that Jihad is not obligatory may use from this Hadith, Imam al-Jassas says: 'He mentioned these five and did not mention Jihad therein, and this indicates that it is not obligatory.' ¶

- Imam al-Jassas continued by citing what suggests that Ibn Umar, the narrator of this Hadith, did not view Jihad as obligatory, narrating that: 'A man came to Ibn Umar and said: O Abu Abd al-Rahman, do you not go on military expeditions (ghazw)? He replied: I heard the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) say: Islam is built upon five.' ¶

Similarly, Ibn al-Arabi mentioned the reason that led some to assume that Ibn Umar did not consider jihad to be an obligation (fard). He stated: 'A group of jurists said: Jihad after the conquest of Makkah is not an obligation unless the Imam summons one of them... Some people assumed this about Ibn Umar when they saw him regular in performing Hajj while leaving jihad.' (1) I say: Although these narrations, which we mentioned in this argument, do not explicitly indicate that jihad was considered merely recommended (mandub) by Ibn Umar as has been attributed to him, and their implication is limited to negating the obligation of jihad, yet, as previously mentioned, this argument must be discussed because it aligns with the position that denies the obligation of jihad. Therefore, we discuss this argument as follows: ¶

First: The Hadith 'Islam is built upon five' only encompasses individual obligations (fara'id al-ayniyya) and does not cover communal obligations (fara'id al-kifa'iyya), which is why jihad was not mentioned among them; for it is not an individual obligation as its basis, but rather a communal obligation. On this basis, other communal obligations were not mentioned in this Hadith either. Al-Jassas says: 'Do you not see that enjoining good and forbidding evil... learning the religion, washing the deceased, shrouding and burying them are all obligations, yet the Prophet (ﷺ) did not mention them in what Islam is built upon? And the lack of their mention does not remove them from being obligations; because the Prophet (ﷺ) intended to clarify the obligations incumbent upon the individual for their own self at specific times, for which no one else can substitute.' (2) Jihad is a communal obligation to the extent we have clarified, and that is why it was not mentioned.' (3) ¶

Second: Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with them both) narrated from the Prophet (ﷺ) what indicates the obligation of jihad, which is the Hadith: 'When people become stingy with the dinar and dirham, engage in al-inah (a form of usurious trade), follow the tails of oxen (preoccupied with agriculture), and abandon jihad, Allah will cast upon them a humiliation that He will not remove until they return to their religion.' (3) Imam Al-Jassas says: 'This wording requires the obligation of jihad, as it informs of Allah casting humiliation upon them as a punishment for [abandoning it].' ¶

Jihad and penalties are not incurred except for the omission of obligations. This indicates that the position of Ibn Umar regarding jihad is that it is a 'fard kifaya' (communal obligation). The narration reported from him regarding the negation of the obligation of jihad is interpreted in the manner we mentioned: that it is not absolutely binding in every situation and every time. It has already been noted that the narration suggesting Ibn Umar's negation of the obligation of jihad was cited in the previous texts. The correct understanding of it, as pointed out by Imam al-Jassas, is that Ibn Umar's denial pertains to classifying jihad among the 'fara'id al-ayniyya' (individual obligations); because, in reality, it is not an individual obligation like prayer and fasting, which is its original ruling. Rather, it is a communal obligation, and thus it should not be categorized with the individual obligations that the Hadith specifically mentioned to the exclusion of others. ¶

Thirdly, in refuting the inference drawn from Ibn Umar's abandonment of jihad and his consistency in performing Hajj as evidence for the non-obligation of jihad, Ibn al-Arabi says: 'Ibn Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, was consistent in performing Hajj because he believed in the truth, which is that jihad is a communal obligation; if some Muslims undertake it, it ceases to be binding on the rest. It is also possible that he held the view of not participating in jihad alongside oppressive rulers. However, the former is more correct, because there were both just and unjust rulers in his time, and throughout all of that, he preferred and maintained his consistency in Hajj.' ¶

In conclusion, these are the arguments reported from those to whom it is attributed that jihad is recommended (mandub) and not mandatory (fard), whether those arguments that point to jihad being recommended or those that sufficed with negating its mandatory status, which is the implication of the view that jihad is recommended. We have discussed these arguments, or presented the scholars' refutations of them, which strip them of the evidence they were intended to support. ¶

The question that arises now is: Since the discussion of the aforementioned arguments has proven that they do not indicate that the ruling of jihad is merely that of recommendation (mandub) and desirability, nor do they negate its mandatory status—which makes us doubt that the authors of those arguments truly held the view that jihad is merely voluntary (tatawwu') and not an obligation—then how do we interpret the statement reported from them that 'jihad is voluntary' in a way that is consistent with the majority view that jihad is a communal obligation? ¶