Table of contents

Chapter 14

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As in the statement of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'Strive (jihad) against the polytheists with your wealth, your lives, and your tongues' (1), and his saying (peace be upon him): '...and if you are called to arms (for jihad), then march forth' (2).

Thus, all the texts concerning the command for combat came in an absolute (mutlaq) form, unconstrained by any restriction—neither the restriction of the legitimacy of authority over the one under whose banner we fight, nor any other such restrictions. The meaning of this is that fighting is obligatory under the banner of any Muslim ruler, whether his authority is legitimate or illegitimate, just or tyrannical, ruling by Islam or ruling by other than Islam, sincere to his religion and nation, or insincere... This is the implication of the 'absolute' nature of the texts, as long as those against whom the order to fight is issued are the enemy from among the disbelievers.

There is another type of Sharia evidence commanding combat, which are the evidences that explicitly state the obligation to fight under the banner of every Muslim ruler, even if he is a sinner (fasiq) or a tyrant (ja'ir), as in the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ) reported by Abu Hurairah: 'Jihad is obligatory upon you with every commander (amir), whether he is righteous or wicked, and prayer is obligatory behind every Muslim, whether he is righteous or wicked, even if he commits major sins' (3). And as in his saying (peace be upon him) reported by Anas bin Malik: 'Three things are from the foundation of faith: Withholding (from harming) the one who says: There is no god but Allah; we do not declare him a disbeliever due to a sin, nor do we expel him from Islam due to a deed. Jihad continues from the time God sent me until the last of my nation fights the Dajjal. It is not invalidated by the tyranny of a tyrant nor the justice of a just person, and belief in divine decrees' (4).

Based on this, if the holder of illegitimate authority orders combat, his obedience is obligatory; because the description of being an 'amir' applies to him, even if he commits major sins, and the evidences have come regarding the obligation to fight with every amir.

Here, we would like to dispel a doubt held by some in this regard, which is their saying: It is true that the evidences obligate fighting under the banner of every Muslim amir, even if he is wicked or a tyrant, but this only applies to the amir who obtained the emirate, i.e., authority, through a legitimate means, except that...

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Despite tyranny and corruption, a ruler does not lose his status as a holder of legitimate (shar'i) authority unless he is removed and dismissed. Calling him an 'emir' indicates that he is an emir according to the Shariah, meaning he is a possessor of legitimate authority. Otherwise, whoever usurps power, for example, or assumes it based on ruling by something other than Islam, is not a holder of legitimate authority, and thus, it is not valid to call him an emir. This is because among the conditions for the legitimacy of assuming power are consent and choice by the Ummah—if it is they who granted him power—or appointment by the Imam, if one exists. Furthermore, among the conditions for its legitimacy is ruling by what Allah has revealed.

Proponents of this doubt state that the evidence for the condition of consent and choice for the legitimacy of authority is that the Prophet (peace be upon him) placed the right of 'ta'mir' (appointing an emir)—that is, giving authority to its holder—with the people, so they may appoint over themselves whom they wish. It follows from this that whoever the people have not appointed as emir, but rather imposed himself upon them by force, does not deserve the imarah (emirate) in the eyes of the Shariah. That is, the legitimacy of his authority is non-existent according to the ruling of the Shariah, 'and that which is non-existent according to the Shariah is like that which is non-existent in reality.'

Ibn Taymiyyah says in explaining the subject of appointment and the emirate: 'It must be known that the governance of people is one of the greatest duties of the religion; in fact, there is no establishment for the religion without it. For the interests of the children of Adam cannot be fulfilled except through social cooperation, due to their need for one another, and they must have a head when gathered, so much so that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 'When three go out on a journey, they should appoint one of them as their emir.'' Imam Ahmad narrated in the Musnad from Abdullah ibn Umar that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: 'It is not lawful for three who are in a desolate land unless they appoint one of them as their emir.' Thus, the Prophet (peace be upon him) made it mandatory to appoint one leader in a small, temporary gathering during a journey, thereby providing a warning regarding all other types of social gatherings.'

Ibn Taymiyyah then clarifies that authority is not established for its holder except with the consent of the majority of the people, and the rejection of the minority does not matter. The Caliphate of Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) was not completed by Abu Bakr’s (may Allah be pleased with him) nomination of him as Caliph, but rather by the people’s pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) to him. Ibn Taymiyyah says: '... Likewise, Umar became an Imam...'

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When they pledged allegiance to him and obeyed him. If it were assumed that they had not implemented the pledge of Abu Bakr, he would not have become the Imam, regardless of whether that would have been permissible or impermissible, for 'halal' (permissibility) and 'haram' (prohibition) relate to actions, whereas wilaya (governance) and saltana (authority) refer to the power obtained. If it were assumed that only Umar and a group of companions had pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr, and the rest of the companions had refrained, he would not have become the Imam thereby. He only became the Imam through the allegiance of the majority of the people; therefore, the absence of Sa’d (i.e., Sa’d ibn Ubada, from the Ansar) caused no harm, as it did not impair the purpose of the wilaya. As for Umar being the first to pledge allegiance, every pledge requires a first participant. As for the appointment (covenant) of Umar, it was completed by the Muslims pledging allegiance to him after the death of Abu Bakr, and thus he became the Imam.

The point of all this is that anyone who seizes authority without the consent of the public does not become a legitimate Amir in Shariah – as Ibn Taymiyyah posits.

Similarly, one who seizes authority on the basis of ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, his authority is not legitimate, because authority is a contract ('aqd). Every contract has four pillars: two contracting parties and two considerations ( عوضان). If corruption (fasad) occurs in any of these pillars, the contract is considered void, and that which is void is legally non-existent. For example, if someone sells gold for gold on the basis that one quantity exceeds the other in goods subject to riba, the contract is void because the pillar of 'consideration' here involves a condition that is invalid in Shariah—namely, one quantity exceeding the other in riba-prone goods. Thus, the contract is void because it is 'riba.' {Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest}. This is based on the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): 'Gold for gold, weight for weight, equal for equal; silver for silver, weight for weight, equal for equal. Whoever gives more or asks for more has engaged in riba.'

The same applies to the contract of authority or governance—whoever enters into a contract of authority on the basis of ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, and the people obey him on that basis, the contract is void because the pillar of 'consideration' in this contract includes a condition that is invalid in Shariah, which is: ruling by other than what Allah has revealed regarding the consideration (service/governance) that the ruler provides to the people. And submission or obedience to a ruler who does not rule by what Allah has revealed, in [that which...]

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It relates to the compensation offered by the people to the ruler in this contract, i.e., the contract of authority (aqd al-sulta). Both are corrupt conditions that have entered into two of the pillars of the contract, rendering it corrupt. For, a condition for the validity of a contract of governance is that the ruler must judge based on the Book of Allah, and the obedience from the subjects must also be based on the Book of Allah. All the evidences regarding judging by what Allah has revealed, and listening to and obeying the ruler within the limits of what Allah has revealed, point to what we are discussing, and many of them have been presented in previous chapters.

Such was the state of governance during the time of the Pious Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Salih):

Imam Ali bin Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) says: 'It is a right upon the Imam to judge by what Allah has revealed and to be just with the subjects. If he does that, then it is their right to listen, obey, and respond when called. And any ruler who does not judge by what Allah has revealed has no (right to) obedience.' (1)

It is stated in the Musannaf of Imam Abd al-Razzaq al-San'ani, on the authority of Ibn Afif, who said: 'I came to Abu Bakr while he was taking the pledge (bay'ah) from the people. He said: I take your pledge upon listening and obeying for the sake of Allah, for His Book, and then for the Amir. He said: I learned that. He then said: I came to him and said: I pledge to you upon listening and obeying, for the sake of Allah, for His Book, and then for the Amir. He said: He looked at me intently, and then accepted my pledge.' (2)

Based on what has preceded, we say:

Whoever usurps authority or seizes it on the basis of ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, his authority is illegitimate. That is to say, it is non-existent in the eyes of the Shariah. And what is non-existent by Shariah is like what is non-existent in reality—as previously discussed.

Since the evidences explicitly state the obligation of jihad with every Amir—meaning every holder of authority, even if he be a sinner (fajir) or a tyrant (jair)—they only apply to anyone who possesses the authority of the Imamate legitimately, even if he be a sinner or a tyrant. As for one who does not possess it legitimately because his authority is illegitimate, he is not called an Amir to begin with. Thus, those evidences do not cover the matter in dispute; they are outside the scope.

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The focus of the discussion is on those holding illegitimate authority. Based on this, these proofs do not contain anything that mandates Muslims to fight under the banner of such rulers. This is the doubt relied upon by the proponents of this view, and I hope that what I have presented is sufficient to clarify it. It is not the intention of this research to debate this doubt or conclude with a specific opinion on it. Rather, the goal is to neutralize this doubt and remove it from the path of the obligation of jihad alongside rulers, regardless of whether their authority is legitimate or illegitimate. This is as follows: 1. The first category of proofs regarding the obligation to fight enemies unconditionally—as previously mentioned—imposes fighting upon Muslims without the condition that the one under whose banner the Muslims fight must be a legitimate or illegitimate ruler. 2. The statement of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ): 'Jihad continues from the time Allah sent me...' (1), in the presence of illegitimate rulers for the Muslims, necessitates that Muslims should not refrain from jihad due to the illegitimacy of their authority. Otherwise, the continuity of jihad until the Day of Judgment would be obstructed, and obstructing a Shariah text is not permissible. 3. There is a narration in Abu Dawud from Abu Hurairah—as found in Nayl al-Awtar—which says: 'Jihad continues with every righteous and wicked person...' (2) without describing this righteous or wicked person as an 'emir' or otherwise. Therefore, the possessor of illegitimate authority, even if he is a transgressor (fajir), and even if it is not technically correct to call him an emir, falls under this general text. It is not permissible to stop fighting alongside him because jihad continues with the righteous and the wicked. This is a report intended as a command, meaning: Continue jihad with both the righteous and the wicked. 4. The word 'emir' in the text: 'Jihad is obligatory upon you with every emir...'

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These rulings came in a general sense, not specific, and absolute, without the restriction of being a 'Shar'i' (legitimate) leader or otherwise in his emirate. Furthermore, there is no prohibition in calling a void contract a 'contract,' provided it is stated: it is a void contract. Thus, according to those who hold that the contract of authority was not valid for such and such a person, it does not prevent calling him an 'Amir' (leader); however, it is said: he is an 'illegitimate Amir.' The description of legitimacy can be determined by the implication of circumstances, just as it can be by speech. Similarly, there is no prohibition in calling a sales contract a 'sale,' provided it is said: it is a void sale. Although the ruling here and there is the obligation to strive to remove the void contract or correct it, this is a separate discussion from the one we are currently engaged in.

5. Some Hadiths from the Prophet (peace be upon him) indicate the corruption that would occur in the history of this Ummah regarding governance. Nevertheless, the texts stating that Jihad shall continue remain applicable to this corrupt history from the perspective of governance.

He (peace be upon him) says: 'The knots of Islam will be undone one by one. Whenever a knot is undone, people will cling to the one that follows. The first to be undone is governance, and the last is prayer.' (1)

In fact, some Hadiths explicitly order Jihad while pointing to the existence of this corruption in governance, as in the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him) narrated by Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both): 'The beginning of this matter will be prophethood and mercy, then there will be a Caliphate, then there will be kingship and mercy, then there will be an Emirate and mercy, then they will bite one another like donkeys, so upon you is Jihad...' (2)

'Al-Kadm' means biting, and 'al-kadmah' (plural: kadamat) means the mark of a bite. The intended meaning is: they will struggle for power and dispute among themselves like certain creatures that bite one another during a conflict, such that each of them bears the scars and marks of wounds! It may also mean that authority, under such constant conflict, does not remain stable for any of the rulers. It is said in the language: 'Takadamat al-dabbatu al-hashish' (the animal bit the grass but could not firmly grasp it). (3)

(1) Musnad al-Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal: 5/251. (2) Kanz al-Ummal: (Collected by Tabarani from Ibn Abbas) 4/323. Hadith No: 10715. (3) Al-Qamus al-Muhit by al-Firuzabadi: entry under 'kdm'.

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In any case, it is evident from the Hadith’s description of the state of authority in this final stage of governance that the authority during this period is illegitimate according to established standards. This is indicated by the condemnation expressed in the text, and by characterizing it as lacking stability or effective control, which entails a lack of popular mandate and, consequently, a loss of legitimacy. This is in addition to the implications of connecting the Hadith to the reality we live in today. Despite such authority lacking legitimacy by some or all standards, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ stipulates the obligation of Jihad even under such authority, as he says: 'Then they will bite each other like donkeys; so upon you is Jihad...'

In summary, those who hold illegitimate power, once the illegitimacy of their authority is established, are not entitled to the obedience of the people; for they do not legally possess this authority under Sharia, and he who lacks authority does not possess the right to obedience. However, the Sharia texts have mandated that people obey them in one specific matter, which is related to Jihad. Thus, it is mandatory to fight the enemy under their authority if they command it or raise its banner.

However, those who harbor doubts regarding the legitimacy of these rulers may further speculate, driven by the deep-seated suspicion in their hearts toward those in power, by raising another question: What if they order fighting against the disbelieving enemy, but according to a cunning plan whose result is to inflict harm upon the Muslims for the benefit of that enemy state, or for the benefit of another state outside the framework of the Islamic world?

The answer is: This is a different matter. In such a case, it is forbidden to fight alongside this ruler, just as it would be forbidden to fight alongside a Caliph of the Muslims if such a situation were to occur under his reign; because this 'obligatory' fighting, in this specific instance, becomes a means to harm, which is forbidden, and the means to a forbidden act is itself forbidden, as previously established. Imam al-Qarafi says: 'It is a known principle in Sharia: to avert harm by omitting a mandatory act if that is the only way to avert the harm.' And there is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator.

He says in another place: 'Notice: Know that just as blocking the means to evil (sadd al-dhari'ah) is mandatory, opening the means to good (fath al-dhari'ah) is also mandatory.'

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And it (the means) can be makruh (disliked), mandub (recommended), or mubah (permissible); for the 'dhari'ah' (means) is the instrument. Just as the means to a haram (forbidden) act is haram, the means to a wajib (obligatory) act is wajib, such as the effort/travel to attend Jumu'ah or Hajj...

Based on this, if a wajib fight becomes a means to a haram act, it becomes haram.

With this, we conclude the first issue, which is: The Shariah ruling regarding the issuance of a command for combat under an authority that holds the reins of power, but regarding which a doubt of 'lack of legitimacy' arises among a few or many of the people.

We now move to the second issue, which is: What if that authority prohibits Jihad and fighting against the enemies? The answer has two parts: 1. The first part: If this prohibition of the obligatory fighting was dictated by necessity and maslaha (public interest), such that fighting in this situation would result in harm to the Muslims, then it is obligatory to adhere to this prohibition. This is not due to the obligation of obeying this authority—since in the view of those harboring the doubt, the authority does not deserve such obedience—rather, the obligation to abstain from fighting here is due to what was previously explained: the obligation to repel harm by abandoning a wajib if it becomes the determined way to repel that harm. 2. The second part: The answer to the question posed is: If this prohibition of the obligatory fighting was not imposed by the interest of the Muslims, but on the contrary, is antithetical to the interest of the Muslims, and is merely a suspension of Islamic Jihad in fighting the enemies based on the personal interests of those in power, and their submission to the will of others—I say: if such is the case, then this prohibition of fighting is a sin (ma'siyah), because it involves the suspension of the Shariah text mandating the implementation of Jihad. 'Jihad will continue from the time of my mission...' and 'There is no obedience to a creature in the disobedience of the Creator.'

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Therefore: It is obligatory to rebel against this prohibition and to initiate combat against the enemy by whoever is capable of it, even at the level of individual combat or by fedayeen (guerrilla) groups — as they are called these days.

In Tafsir al-Qurtubi, regarding the explanation of the Almighty’s saying: «So fight in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself...» (Surah An-Nisa: 84), it states: «This is an example of what is said to every person regarding their own self. Meaning: O Muhammad, and every individual of your Ummah, the instruction for them is: 'Fight in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself.' For this reason, it is necessary for every believer to strive (jihad), even if alone. Among this is the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'By Allah, I will surely fight them until my neck stands alone' (i.e., until I am left alone to fight). And the saying of Abu Bakr at the time of the Apostasy (Ridda): 'If my right hand were to oppose me, I would fight it with my left.'»

Based on this, some private media outlets in our countries encourage such combat operations at the level of individuals and fedayeen groups, even if it involves going against the will of the ruling authorities.

In the Beirut-based magazine 'Al-Wa'i', in the issue published in Ramadan 1409 AH (April 1989 AD), on the page 'Kalimat Haq' (A Word of Truth) under the title 'Another Stance with the Infiltrators', it states: «Once again, the subject of fedayeen penetrating the security fences surrounding the Jews sparks controversy between Jewish leaders and the rulers of the entities that guard them... The Jews are keen to label those fedayeen as 'saboteurs'. As for the guarding rulers, they call them 'infiltrators'; this is because the use of this term implies that crossing the borders is, from the viewpoint of these rulers, an illegal act punishable by the law of their country, which the 'civilized' society does not approve of! That is why we find them keen to brand everyone who breaks through the walls of silence and shame as an 'infiltrator'...» Then the editor of this page says:

«Although crossing the borders is not enough to eliminate the Jewish state, its continuation means that there is no truce with the Jews, no peace, and no meeting between us and them except on the field of the decisive battle, and that every...»

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Attempts at reconciliation with them do not reflect the desire of the sons of this Ummah, who are thirsty for the establishment of truth and the removal of falsehood in all its forms and manifestations. Furthermore, breaching the borders means, among other things, breaching the status quo and the absolute, Sphinx-like silence that envelops the silent fronts. This keeps the embers of enmity against the Jews alive and the flames of enthusiasm burning, until Allah provides this Ummah with someone to lead it toward the path of glory and honor. It is the duty of those who breach these walls of silence—whether from the Negev, Wadi Araba, or Southern Lebanon—to remind the armies that Israel still exists. This should be done by addressing a call to them with every operation, summoning them to perform their Shariah-ordained duty: removing the impure entity from this sacred land. They must also call upon their leaders to close the gap that those who recognized the Jewish state have opened in their defensive walls. Do not those who forfeit rights require a few 'infiltration' (tasallul) operations?

This is what is said regarding fighting the enemy under the shadow of the governing authorities in the Muslim lands today. With this, we conclude the second issue in our research, which is: the issue of the Shariah position regarding an individual or group fighting without the permission of the Imam or the leader in authority.

We now move to the third issue: Is it permissible for a Muslim to fight the enemy with the intention of seizing their wealth?

Third Issue: Is it permissible for a Muslim to fight the enemies with the intention of obtaining their wealth? The answer to this question is clarified by the reality of the Prophet's (PBUH) biography regarding his military expeditions (saraya) and battles (ghazawat) that were intended to intercept the Quraish caravans traveling to or returning from the Levant. We shall quote some of these accounts verbatim as provided by Ibn al-Qayyim in 'Zad al-Ma'ad,' which clarifies the intent behind them. We have limited his text to what is relevant to our research so that the parts we omit do not affect the intended meaning, for the sake of brevity. Ibn al-Qayyim says: 1- 'The first banner that the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) hoisted was for Hamza bin Abdul-Muttalib, in the month of Ramadan...'

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1. Seven months after his Hijrah (migration)... and he sent him with thirty men... to intercept a caravan of the Quraish coming from al-Sham (Greater Syria), in which Abu Jahl ibn Hisham was present with three hundred men; they reached the seacoast in the direction of al-'Is.'(1)

2. 'Then the Prophet ﷺ sent Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas to al-Kharrar(2), in Dhu al-Qi'dah, nine months after his Hijrah... they were twenty riders, intercepting a caravan of the Quraish.'(3)

3. 'Then the Prophet ﷺ himself undertook the expedition of al-Abwa', also known as Waddan... and it took place in Safar, twelve months after his Hijrah... to intercept a caravan of the Quraish.'(4)

4. 'Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ went to Buwat, in the month of Rabi' al-Awwal, thirteen months after his Hijrah. He set out with two hundred of his companions to intercept a caravan of the Quraish, which included Umayyah ibn Khalaf al-Jumahi, one hundred men from the Quraish, and two thousand five hundred camels.'(5)

5. 'Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ set out in Jumada al-Akhirah, sixteen months after his Hijrah, with one hundred and fifty, or it is said, two hundred of the Muhajirun... to intercept a caravan of the Quraish heading to al-Sham... which contained wealth belonging to the Quraish. He reached Dhu al-'Ushayrah... which is in the direction of Yanbu', and between Yanbu' and Medina there are nine burud (a unit of distance). This was the same caravan he set out to intercept when it returned from al-Sham.'(6)

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This was the very caravan that served as the cause of the Battle of Badr, which the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) missed on its return from the Levant (al-Sham), just as he had missed it earlier on its departure to the Levant.

6. 'Then the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) sent Abdullah bin Jahsh al-Asadi to Nakhlah in the month of Rajab, seventeen months after the Hijra, accompanied by twelve men... to observe a trade caravan of the Quraish.'

7. 'When the month of Ramadan of that year arrived, news reached the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) regarding the caravan coming from the Levant belonging to the Quraish, led by Abu Sufyan. This was the same caravan they had set out in pursuit of when it departed from Makkah, consisting of about forty men, and carrying vast wealth for the Quraish. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) urged the people to set out for it and ordered those who had mounts ready to move immediately. He did not make extensive preparations because he set out in haste with three hundred and some odd men.'

- In the Sirah of Ibn Hisham, regarding the cause that ultimately led to the Battle of Badr, it is stated: 'When the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) heard of Abu Sufyan returning from the Levant, he summoned the Muslims to him and said: This is the caravan of the Quraish, containing their wealth, so go out towards it; perhaps Allah will grant it to you as spoils (anfal). The people responded; some were swift while others were slow, because they did not think that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) would face actual combat.'

- In the Hadith of Ka’b bin Malik regarding the reason for this expedition, mentioned in the context of his absence from the Battle of Tabuk, it is stated: 'I have never missed a military campaign (ghazwa) with the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) except for the Battle of Badr, and that was a campaign for which Allah and His Messenger did not rebuke anyone who stayed behind. This is because the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) had only set out intending to intercept the Quraish's caravan, until Allah brought him and his enemy together without a prior appointment.'

After this review of some of the expeditions (saraya) and campaigns (ghazawat) in the life of the Messenger (ﷺ) in terms of their motivation and driving force, this perplexing question may come to mind:

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If this is the case, does it not contradict what the Shariah texts demand, namely that Jihad in the way of Allah should be purely for His sake and intended for the exaltation of the word of Allah Almighty? We leave the task of answering this question to Imam al-San'ani, who says in his book, *Subul al-Salam*: 'Furthermore, the polytheists may be targeted solely to seize their wealth, just as the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) went out with his companions in the Battle of Badr to intercept the caravan of the polytheists. This does not contradict that the word of Allah should be supreme; rather, it is a part of exalting the word of Allah Almighty, and Allah approved them for it. Indeed, Allah Almighty said: "And you wished that the one unarmed would be yours" (Quran 8:7), and He did not rebuke them for that, even though this report indicates their preference for wealth over fighting.' He mentioned before this that Jihad performed for the sake of reputation and showing off (Riya') invalidates the Jihad, contrary to the intention of seeking wealth. He writes: '...unlike seeking war spoils (Ghanimah), for it does not contradict Jihad. In fact, if taking the spoils is intended to enrage the polytheists and to utilize it for acts of obedience, there is a reward for it. For the Almighty says: "No gain do they acquire from an enemy but a righteous deed is inscribed to their credit because of it" (Quran 9:120). The "gain" refers to what is religiously permitted. Furthermore, the Prophet's (peace be upon him) saying: "Whoever kills a person has the right to his spoils" (before the fighting began) is evidence that intending to take spoils does not contradict the intention of fighting; rather, it was said so that the listener would strive harder in fighting the polytheists.' Jurists have addressed this issue under the heading of 'Participation of Intentions in Acts of Worship' (Tashrik fi al-Ibadat), meaning: If a person combines their act of worship with another intention—a worldly benefit—does this participation invalidate the worship and result in sin, or not? They answered this as follows: 1. If the other intention the person has in their worship is showing off (Riya'), seeking fame, or renown—that is, gaining the pleasure of people and their glorification—then this intention is haram (forbidden), because it is a form of Shirk.

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The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said: 'The hidden shirk is for a man to perform a deed for the sake of another man.' (1) Narrated by Shaddad bin Aws: 'During the time of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ), we used to consider riya' (showing off) as the minor shirk.' (2) Ibn al-Qayyim said: 'As for minor shirk, it is like slight riya'... and sometimes this can become major shirk depending on the state and intention of the person.' (3)

The author of Nayl al-Awtar cited the hadith recorded in Sahih Muslim from Abu Hurairah, from the Prophet (ﷺ): 'The first of the people against whom judgment will be pronounced on the Day of Resurrection will be a man who died a martyr. He will be brought, and Allah will make him acknowledge His blessings, and he will acknowledge them. Allah will ask: 'What did you do with them?' He will say: 'I fought for Your sake until I was martyred.' Allah will say: 'You have lied. You fought so that it would be said: He is brave! And so it was said.' Then he will be ordered to be dragged on his face until he is cast into the Fire...' (4)

2 - As for any other intention that a person may have while performing an act of worship, which is a worldly interest other than riya' (showing off) or seeking fame, it is permissible, because the Shariah texts indicate the legitimacy of this 'sharing' of intentions in worship.

Imam al-Qarafi says: 'As for absolute sharing of intentions, such as a person performing Jihad to attain the obedience of Allah through Jihad, while also aiming to obtain wealth from the spoils of war, this does not harm him, nor is it forbidden by consensus, because Allah the Almighty has permitted this for him in this act of worship. Thus, there is a distinction between fighting so that people might say: 'He is brave,' or so that the leader might honor him and increase his stipend from the treasury—which is forbidden riya'—and fighting to obtain captives, horses (al-kur'a), and weapons from the enemy's wealth, which does not harm him even though he has shared his intentions. Likewise, for someone who performs Hajj and includes the purpose of trade in his Hajj, provided that the bulk or entirety of his intention is traveling for trade, and the Hajj [is the secondary purpose]. This does not incur sin, nor...

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is a sin. Similarly, a person who fasts to keep their body healthy, or to recover from an illness that fasting does not conflict with, and their intention is medical treatment—or partly so—while also intending the fast, such intentions do not invalidate their fast. In fact, the Lawgiver (the Prophet ﷺ) commanded it in his saying: 'O assembly of youth! Whoever among you can afford the burden of marriage should marry, and whoever cannot, let him fast, for it is a shield (wija') for him'—meaning, a suppressant. Thus, he commanded fasting for this purpose; if this were a defect, the Prophet ﷺ would not have commanded it in acts of worship.

Then Imam al-Qarafi says: 'Yes, it cannot be denied that these purposes mixed with worship may decrease the reward, and that if the act of worship is free of them, the reward increases and becomes greater. However, there is no way it leads to sin or invalidity.'

Given this, since Jihad is an act of worship, it is permissible for a person while performing it to also intend the acquisition of wealth, and there is no harm in this. This intention does not contradict the sincerity (ikhlas) required in the words of the Almighty: 'And they were not commanded except to worship Allah, [being] sincere to Him in religion' (Surah Al-Bayyinah, 5); because as long as the Shariah has granted permission to intend the acquisition of worldly benefits alongside an act of worship, but has not granted permission to intend the acquisition of people's approval and their veneration alongside such worship, this indicates that what contradicts sincerity is for the fighter to seek the approval of people in his worship, not to seek those material benefits. For what is prohibited is ostentation (riya'). And ostentation is not possible unless one intends, alongside the worship, people who have eyes to see the performer of the worship and thereby have their admiration and veneration stirred.

Ostentation is not possible when one intends wealth alongside worship because money does not have eyes to see the one performing the deed, thereby venerating him or raising his status. This is the secret of the prohibition of riya', as indicated by the root of the word itself, 'ru'yah' (seeing)—meaning, if it is intended alongside the desire for worship that the worshiper be seen by those who are capable of seeing, so that he becomes great in their eyes—this is riya', and it is haram.

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When something is intended alongside an act of worship from which the concept of 'viewing' (riya'/ostentation) cannot be realized by the worshipper—such as wealth—then the word 'riya'' does not apply to it at all. Consequently, such an intention is not forbidden.

Imam al-Qarafi’s expression regarding this is: 'Riya' (being seen) is only possible by the creation. Therefore, regarding that which does not see or perceive, it cannot be said of an action in relation to it that it is 'riya''. Wealth taken as spoils of war and the like cannot be said to 'see' or 'be seen'; thus, the term 'riya'' does not apply to these objectives because there is no 'viewing' involved.'

Indeed, if the fighter intends nothing from the worship of jihad except obtaining wealth, without this being a means to disturb the enemy, preoccupy them with fear and terror, weaken them, strengthen the Muslims, and elevate the Word of Allah, then such fighting—devoid of these intended goals—is stripped of the quality that makes it fighting in the cause of Allah. Thus, no reward or merit is attained. This is consistent with the hadith of Abu Hurayrah: 'A man said: O Messenger of Allah! A man desires to perform jihad in the cause of Allah while seeking some worldly gain. He (the Prophet) said: He has no reward. The man repeated this three times, and each time he replied: He has no reward.'

What is understood from this hadith, when combined with other shariah texts on the subject, is that this man desired to fight, meaning he wanted 'combat' solely for money! Since his objective was 'worldly gain,' as stated in the hadith, and it is not mentioned that his goal included 'elevating the Word of Allah.' As for him saying he wanted jihad in the cause of Allah, the meaning of the phrase is that he wanted to fight for the end he declared as his goal, which is wealth alone. Hence, there was no reward for him. This interpretation is corroborated by other texts that permit the seeking of wealth behind fighting—in the manner previously mentioned. Furthermore, the hadith here only mentions the deprivation of reward for this fighter; it does not state that he committed a sin or disobedience merely because he sought worldly gain.

Evidence that intending wealth alone from fighting is not a sin is found in Ibn Qudamah’s 'Al-Mughni,' narrated by Aisha: 'She said: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ went out towards Badr until he reached Harra al-Wabara, when a man caught up with him...'

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A man among the polytheists was known for his boldness and bravery, and the Muslims were pleased with him. He said: 'O Messenger of Allah! I have come to follow you and to gain [spoils] with you.' The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said to him: 'Do you believe in Allah and His Messenger?' He replied: 'No.' He (ﷺ) said: 'Go back, for I will not seek help from a polytheist.' She [the narrator] said: Then the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) proceeded, and when he reached al-Bayda, the man caught up with him. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said to him: 'Do you believe in Allah and His Messenger?' He said: 'Yes!' He (ﷺ) said: 'Then proceed.' (Agreed upon).

In this hadith, the man’s intention for participating in the combat was solely to acquire wealth. The Prophet (ﷺ) did not rebuke him for that, but he forbade him from participating in the combat while he was a disbeliever, and permitted him once he became a Muslim. The hadith does not indicate that the man’s intention for participating in the combat changed.

Indeed, such combat, for someone whose intention is purely to seek wealth, is not called jihad in his regard, nor does he deserve the reward of the mujahideen, for there is no jihad except with the intention of making the word of Allah, the Exalted, supreme—even if he combines this intention with the aim of obtaining wealth—in accordance with his (ﷺ) saying: 'Whoever fights so that the word of Allah may be supreme, then he is in the path of Allah...'

However, a Muslim still has the right to intend to reach the enemy's wealth, even by infiltrating them and shedding their blood, as long as this Muslim has not entered among them under a covenant of security (aman). This is because the abode of the enemy is an abode of combat, an abode of plunder, and an abode of permissibility, as evidenced by the legality of fighting them and seizing their wealth.

Furthermore, Imam al-Shawkani goes even further, stating: 'It is permissible for a Muslim who enters the Dar al-Harb (abode of war) with the security granted by its people to take whatever he can of their wealth and shed as much of their blood as he is able.' His argument is that the disbelievers granting a Muslim security to enter their lands—i.e., what is called an 'entry visa' these days—does not necessitate that they themselves are also secure from him by virtue of the security they granted him.

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"And their granting of security (aman) to a Muslim is security for them from him." In his refutation, al-Shawkani says: "I say: There is no necessary correlation (tazamum) between the two securities, neither in Shariah, nor in reason, nor by custom." (1)

Al-Shawkani’s intent is that for the disbelievers to be safe from a Muslim in their own lands, they must obtain a declaration from him that they are also safe from him, or grant him what is called an 'entry visa' (i.e., aman) based on this condition; only then is it prohibited for him to harm them. As for them merely granting the Muslim security in their lands, it does not imply that he has granted them security in return.

However, the truth regarding this—as is the international custom—is that whoever enters a land under security, that land is also in security from him. Among the legal maxims is: "That which is known by custom is like that which is stipulated by text." (2) Regarding the establishment of this security by custom, Imam al-Shafi'i says: "If a Muslim is captured, and the polytheists make him swear to remain in their land and not leave so that they may release him, then whenever he is able to leave, he should leave, because his oath is the oath of one compelled, and they have no right to detain him, and he is not unjust to them by leaving their grasp... but he may not assassinate them or attack their wealth and persons, because if they grant him security, they are in security from him. We know of nothing narrated contrary to this." (3)

In 'al-Durr al-Mukhtar': "If a Muslim enters the Dar al-Harb under security, it is forbidden for him to infringe upon anything of their blood, wealth, or honor." (4)

In concluding this issue—the matter of reaching the enemy's wealth, even through killing and combat—a brief word is necessary to affirm a reality and remove a doubt. It is: the legitimacy of combat to obtain the wealth of the enemy in the Islamic position is the same position that the enemy takes regarding Muslims and their wealth, as is clear—for example—from Abu Sufyan's raid on the outskirts.

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Medina, the cutting down of palm trees, and the killing of a man from the Ansar along with his ally, two months after the Battle of Badr.

This is because the nature of the situation between lands governed by a relationship of war and hostility is that each serves as a realm of combat and plunder relative to the other. Islam did not bring anything new in this regard; rather, it was practicing what was already established in local and international custom at that time. However, among the new initiatives Islam took was its call to end this state of war, with its associated bloodshed and looting of wealth, even if by means of a truce (muwada'a) between itself and the Quraish and neighboring tribes through peaceful treaties, so that it could focus on conveying the message of Allah. But the Quraish refused to sheath their swords against the Muslims and refused to allow the Islamic call to find a safe path to the minds and hearts of the people.

Evidence of the Prophet's ﷺ desire to end the state of war with his enemies, even through a truce rather than strictly through their conversion to Islam, is his statement at Hudaybiyyah to Budayl bin Warqa, shortly before the 'Peace' (Sulh): 'Indeed, the Quraish have been exhausted by war and have been harmed by it. If they wish, I will make a truce with them, and they should leave me and the people [to convey the message].'

The meaning of 'madadtuhum' (I will make a truce with them) is: I will enter into a 'peace treaty' with them to cease fighting for a specific period. From the jurisprudence of this stance, Ibn al-Qayyim deduces the following Shariah ruling: 'It is permissible for the Imam to initiate the request for peace with the enemy if he sees a benefit for the Muslims in it, and it does not depend on the request being initiated by them.'

This was a brief observation, so that the discussion on the legitimacy of combat is not left incomplete.

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Any impact on the mind or soul regarding wealth is far from the reality underlying this legitimacy, which is that: this economic objective of combat is merely one of the means of pressuring the enemy, like any other objective, in order to subdue them and make them yield to the will of their adversary(1). It is an objective in which both conflicting parties are equal in its use!!

Thus, we reach the conclusion of this fourth and final issue of this research, which is: Is this combat for the sake of obtaining the enemy's wealth considered Jihad in the way of Allah?

Issue Four: Is combat for the sake of obtaining the enemy's wealth Jihad in the way of Allah? I say: Perhaps the answer in the affirmative is clear from what has preceded, such that we do not need to lengthen the discourse in addressing it. Yes, combat for the sake of obtaining the enemy's wealth is considered Jihad in the way of Allah, provided two conditions are met, as previously explained: First: That this combat is coupled with the intention of exalting the Word of Allah the Almighty, alongside the intention of obtaining the enemy's wealth. Second: That it is free from the intention of 'Riya' (showing off). That is: the love of fame, glory, reputation, and the like. Meaning: That it must be free from the intention that any human creature should see the fighting he is performing in order to gain their pleasure and admiration. As for the intention of wealth—this does not manifest in this intended wealth as being a creature that sees the combatant fighting and then praises him for it or glorifies him because of it(2). Yes, if fame is achieved, praise is found, and this occurs without the intention of the combatant, then there is no sin or blame; as it came in the Hadith from Sahl ibn al-Hanzaliyyah who said: 'The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) sent a military detachment, and they met the enemy. A man from Banu Ghifar attacked and said: Take this, for I am the Ghifari youth...' then he said...