Chapter 64

If the rejection of Islam or the Islamic system by countries or peoples is of an active nature—meaning they have taken up arms against the Muslims to prevent the annexation of those lands and peoples into the Islamic State—then in this case, it is mandatory for Muslims to fight anyone who prevents them from establishing the religion of Allah by applying Islamic rule while bearing arms against them. However, regarding those who do not prevent the Muslims from establishing the religion of Allah in the aforementioned manner, a difference of opinion exists among the jurists: Is it permissible to fight non-combatant infidel civilians during times of war? Or is it mandatory to restrict fighting only to those bearing arms from the army and armed resistance elements who stand in the way of the Muslims? In any case, the legitimacy of declaring Jihad against peoples and countries that reject Islam or submission to Islamic rule through peaceful means is a matter upon which there is no disagreement between the two schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence: those who argue that the cause (illah) of fighting the infidels is disbelief and the refusal to accept the Islamic system, and those who argue that the cause of fighting is active warfare (muharaba). In light of the above, we understand what Ibn Taymiyyah stated in his book 'Al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya'—who is among those who hold that the cause of fighting is active warfare—correctly, without mistakenly attributing to him the view that he believes in leaving the infidels to their own affairs as long as they do not fight the Muslims, and that the legitimacy of Jihad in his view is restricted only to defense against aggression. We cite here the words of Ibn Taymiyyah to see how, despite his view that it is impermissible to kill many categories of the enemy who are not actual combatants, he simultaneously affirms the legitimacy of Jihad for the sake of establishing the religion of Allah among His servants. Ibn Taymiyyah says: 'If the origin of legitimate combat is Jihad, and its purpose is that the entire religion be for Allah and that the word of Allah be supreme, then whoever obstructs this is fought by the consensus of the Muslims. As for those who are not among the combatants or those who hinder, such as women, children, monks, the elderly, the blind, the disabled, and the like—they are not to be killed according to the majority.' ¶

The scholars hold that one should not be fought unless he fights with his words or actions, although some permit killing all of them merely for kufr (disbelief), excluding women and children. The former is the correct view, because fighting is directed against those who fight us when we seek to manifest the religion of Allah. Allah has permitted the taking of lives only to the extent necessary for the welfare of humanity, as He states: 'And fitnah (tribulation/oppression) is worse than killing.' This means that although there is evil and corruption in killing, the evil and corruption in the fitnah of the disbelievers is far greater. Therefore, whoever does not prevent the Muslims from establishing the religion of Allah, his kufr does not cause harm to anyone but himself. This is why the fuqaha (jurists) stated: 'The one who propagates innovations (bid'ah) contrary to the Quran and Sunnah is to be punished in a way that the one who remains silent is not.' ¶

It is stated in a hadith: 'If a sin is hidden, it only harms the doer, but if it becomes manifest and is not denounced, it harms the general public.' For this reason, the Shariah has obligated fighting the disbelievers, but it has not obligated the killing of those among them who are captured. Rather, if one of them is taken prisoner—whether during battle or otherwise, such as being washed ashore by a ship, losing his way, or being captured through a ruse—the Imam is to decide what is most beneficial: executing him, enslaving him, releasing him as a favor, or ransoming him. ¶

This is the statement of Ibn Taymiyyah, which clarifies that jihad is legislated for the establishment of the religion of Allah against all who prevent its establishment. It is obvious that the meaning of 'establishing the religion of Allah' in other lands is to apply the system contained within the religion of Allah in those lands and for authority to be in the hands of the Muslims to establish this religion. After that, if any of the local disbelievers remain in their kufr—while having lost their power—their kufr causes no harm to the Muslims or the state. The harm of their kufr returns only to themselves. This is the opposite of the situation where authority remains in the grip of the disbelievers, who apply their systems of kufr. There is no room here to say that Muslims are establishing the religion of Allah in those lands while they see that the religion of Allah is being ruled over, and the religion of kufr or its system is the ruler. Thus, in this situation, if the holders of power in the land do not hand over authority to the Muslims—by peaceful means—for the sake of establishing the religion of Allah, then jihad is legislated against every disbeliever who prevents that, even if they did not initiate the aggression. ¶

As for those who did not hinder the Muslims from what they intend, these are the non-combatants. Even regarding these non-combatants, Ibn Taymiyyah specifically forbids directing weapons only at those whom the majority of jurists have declared forbidden to kill. These are: those whom the Shariah has explicitly stated should not be killed, such as women, children, the monk in some narrations, and those incapable of carrying weapons or fighting, like the blind. As for others among the non-combatants in reality, Ibn Taymiyyah does not say that killing them is forbidden, although he does not make their killing obligatory either. That is: killing them is not forbidden, nor is it obligatory, but it is permissible, provided their land has prevented the establishment of the religion of Allah therein, as we have indicated. In fact, he is even more explicit, stating that those among them whom we capture by mistake, coincidence, or ruse—even if not in a state of battle—it is permissible to kill them, as stated in his words. Furthermore, although we have finished with this subject in the third chapter of this treatise, it was necessary to point it out here, due to the confusion that arises in understanding this issue because the statement of the majority—that the cause for fighting the disbelievers is waging war, not disbelief—has not been placed in its proper context, and particularly because the aforementioned words of Ibn Taymiyyah have not been placed in their proper context either. ¶

Having concluded the discussion on this issue, we move on to the third issue in this research. ¶

3. The Third Issue: What are the circumstances in which it is permissible to fight those enemies who are, in principle, forbidden to be killed during war? ¶

I say: Regardless of determining who among the enemies are forbidden to be killed during war, based on the various interpretations of this issue—as previously mentioned—that Shariah immunity is lifted from those who are forbidden to be killed, and it becomes permissible to direct weapons at them in the following cases: ¶

First Case: If those enemies who are forbidden to be killed take up arms against the Muslims, or engage in acts considered acts of war, or assist the enemies in fighting the Muslims. This is evident from the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) reasoning for forbidding the killing of a woman from the enemy, which is that she was not fighting. Or as it appears in the text: 'She was not of those to fight' (1). ¶

(1) Sunan Abi Dawud: No. (2669) Vol. 3/ 72-73. ¶

Ibn Hajar says: 'Its implication is that if they were to fight, they would be killed.'(1) Imam al-Nawawi says: 'His statement: The Prophet (PBUH) forbade the killing of women and children(2). Scholars have reached a consensus on acting upon this hadith and on the prohibition of killing women and children if they do not fight. However, if they do fight, the majority of scholars say: They are to be killed...'(3) Likewise, every person who is not among those who fight cannot be killed unless they fight in reality or in essence, through opinion, obedience, incitement, and the like.'(4) ¶

Second Case: When launching raids against enemies, by night or by day, and utilizing what war necessitates against them, such as setting fires in their lands, using heavy weaponry, explosive projectiles, and what is called weapons of mass destruction— In this situation, it is impossible to distinguish between those who may be killed and those who may not be killed among the combatants in those hostile lands. For this reason, Shar'i texts have established the legitimacy of this type of combat, even if it results in the kind of mass killing that claims—incidentally, not intentionally—some or many lives that would, in principle, be prohibited to target for elimination from the enemy ranks. In this regard, the Shar'i texts are diverse. ¶

1. There are texts that permitted launching raids on the enemy's land, despite the resulting casualties that may affect women and children. In Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim: 'From Sa'b bin Juthama, he said: The Prophet (PBUH) was asked about...' ¶

Regarding the offspring [dharaari] of the polytheists, whether to launch a night raid [bayat] on them, during which their women and children might be struck? He [the Prophet] said: 'They are from among them.' These are the words of Muslim. In a narration by Al-Bukhari: 'He was asked about the people of the house among the polytheists who are attacked at night, and their women and children are struck. He said: They are from among them.' - Ibn al-Athir says: 'Yubayyitun: Al-Tabyeet is raiding the enemy at night, by surprise, for the purpose of plunder and looting... 'They are from among them' means: their legal status and the status of their elders are the same. Similarly, his saying (in one narration): they are of their fathers.' - Ibn Hajar says: 'His saying (about the people of the house): meaning the inhabitants... (They are from among them): meaning in terms of legal status during that specific situation, and it does not imply the permissibility of intentionally killing them. Rather, it means that if it is impossible to reach the fighters except by passing through the offspring—if they are struck due to being intermingled with them, their killing is permissible.' - He also says: 'The meaning of bayat in the hadith is that the disbelievers are raided at night in such a way that their individuals cannot be distinguished.' - Imam al-Nawawi says: 'This hadith, which we mentioned regarding the permissibility of bayat and killing women and children during such a raid, is our school of thought (i.e., the Shafi'i school), as well as the school of Malik, Abu Hanifa, and the majority. The meaning of bayat and yubayyitun is to raid them at night in a way that a man cannot be distinguished from a woman or child... This hadith is evidence for the permissibility of night raids and the permissibility of raiding those to whom the call [dawah] has reached without notifying them beforehand.' This is what relates to the sunnah of raiding the enemy. 2 - There are other Shariah texts that have permitted, among the weapons used against the people of war [ahl al-harb], the setting of fires in the lands of the enemy. ¶

It is understood that, as a consequence of this, many or few lives may be lost, as they cannot escape or survive the spreading flames. This occurs most often among those whom it is forbidden to target intentionally with killing—such as women, children, and the incapacitated elderly—if they happen to be present in the place where such fires are ignited. ¶

In Sahih al-Bukhari, under the chapter heading 'Burning of Dwellings and Palm Trees,' it states: 'Narrated Ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with both): The Prophet ﷺ burned the palm trees of Banu Nadir.' ¶

Fath al-Bari states: 'The heading, Burning of Dwellings and Palm Trees, refers to those belonging to the polytheists. The majority of scholars hold the view that burning and destruction in the land of the enemy is permissible. Al-Awza'i, al-Layth, and Abu Thawr deemed it reprehensible, citing the bequest of Abu Bakr to his armies not to do any of that. Al-Tabari replied that the prohibition applies to doing so intentionally, unlike when it occurs incidentally during combat, as happened with the installation of the mangonel (manjaniq) at Ta'if. This is similar to the answer given by the Prophet regarding the killing of women and children. This is the view of most scholars. Another opinion is that Abu Bakr forbade his armies from this because he knew those lands would be conquered, and he wanted to preserve them for the Muslims. And Allah knows best.' ¶

Al-Shawkani comments after quoting this: 'It is not hidden that what emanated from Abu Bakr cannot be used to oppose what is established from the Prophet ﷺ, given the established principle that the opinion of a Companion is not a binding proof (hujjah).' ¶

In Sunan Abi Dawud, under the heading 'Burning in the Land of the Enemy,' the following text appears: 'Urwah said: Usamah narrated to me that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ commissioned him, saying: Raid Obna in the morning, and burn!' ¶

Ibn al-Athir stated: 'Abna and Yubna: A place name between Ashkelon and Ramla in the land of Palestine.' ¶

3. There are other Shariah texts that have urged the use of projectile weapons (al-ramy). ¶

As is known, 'al-ramy' (archery/projectile warfare) generally includes all ancient and modern weapons launched at the enemy from a distance, whether they be arrows shot by bows, heavy stone projectiles, burning masses of fire, or pieces of heated iron launched by catapults (manjaniq), or bombs dropped by cannons and aircraft, or missiles launched from their bases. All these war instruments fall under the category of projectile weaponry, which the Prophetic Sunnah has encouraged. ¶

In Sahih Muslim, it is narrated from Uqbah ibn Amir: 'I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) saying while on the pulpit: {And prepare against them whatever you are able of power}. Indeed, power is the throw/projectile, indeed, power is the throw, indeed, power is the throw.' ¶

It is self-evident that when such projectiles are fired at the enemy from a distance, they do not distinguish—in what they strike and what results from their explosions—between those whom it is permissible to kill and those among the combatants whom it is not. Despite this, the use of projectile weapons is legitimate; in fact, the Shariah texts have emphasized their use and placed greater importance on them than on others. This fact indicates the permissibility of the consequences that result from them. This is in addition to the report that the Prophet (ﷺ) deployed a catapult (manjaniq) against the people of Ta'if, which falls into the category of projectile weaponry, as mentioned in a previous discussion. ¶

The Third Case: In which it is permissible to kill those enemy individuals whose killing is otherwise forbidden during warfare. This is the state of 'tatarrus' (using human shields). That is, when the enemy uses their children, women, the elderly, and similar groups as human shields, taking refuge behind them, knowing full well that it is forbidden for Muslims to kill the enemy's children, women, and others who are protected from harm. They employ this action as a means to protect themselves from the Muslims' assault. However, the reality is that in such a situation, Muslim jurists have held the view that it is permissible to strike the human shield if there is a necessity or public interest (maslahah) to reach those protected by them. It is stated in al-Maqdisi’s 'al-Sharh al-Kabir': "If they use women, children, and those who are forbidden to be killed as shields in war, it is permissible to target them with projectiles, while intending to hit the combatants. This is because the Prophet (peace be upon him) attacked them with a catapult, even though women and children were among them. Furthermore, if Muslims were to refrain from attacking them, it would lead to the paralysis of Jihad, for whenever the enemy learns of this, they will always use them as shields whenever they fear defeat. This applies whether the battle is intense or not, as the Prophet (peace be upon him) did not wait for the heat of battle to use projectile weapons."(1) Having concluded this issue, we now move to the final question in this research regarding those among the enemy who are forbidden to be targeted with weapons. 4 - The Fourth Issue: Does the authority holder have the right to prohibit the killing of specific individuals or groups from the enemy territory during wartime? Answer: Yes, the authority holder has the right to issue orders to the army not to target specific individuals by name or by defined characteristics that distinguish them from others(2); this is done either based on... ¶

Either based on an interest perceived in it, or based on an international or bilateral agreement by which the Islamic state has bound itself with other states. Such an action falls under the category of 'aman' (security/safe-conduct) which the authorized Islamic authority grants to individuals or groups from enemy lands. Moreover, such a matter should be surrounded by conditions and precautions that prevent it from being exploited by enemies to harm the Muslims. Based on this, the Islamic army, during combat engagement with an enemy army or while invading their lands, is prohibited from intentionally killing those enemy individuals who have been ordered to be spared, whether they are correspondents and photographers present on battlefields in modern wars, or politicians, scholars, industrial workers, or those occupying hospitals, such as patients and doctors, or ordinary individuals, etc., depending on the orders issued in this regard. Hence, Ibn Hazm—as we have seen before—who holds the view that it is permissible to kill all disbelievers during war, except women and children, believes that the Muslims' refraining from killing merchants during the Islamic conquests was from this category; that is, it was the choice of the Muslim leaders not to kill them, based on an interest they saw in doing so, and not because the killing of them had been forbidden by an explicit Shariah text. Similarly, Imam al-Shafi'i—according to what is in his book 'al-Umm', as we have seen before—when he preferred not to kill monks, following Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him) in his testament not to kill them, it was not established to him that killing them is forbidden by a Shariah text or by analogy to a Shariah text. Despite that, he preferred not to kill them, following Abu Bakr al-Siddiq in exempting them from killing... '...men from Banu Hashim and others have been brought out against their will; they have no need to fight us. So whoever of you meets anyone from Banu Hashim, do not kill him. And whoever meets Abu al-Bakhtari ibn Hisham ibn al-Harith ibn Asad, do not kill him. And whoever meets al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, the uncle of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), do not kill him, for he was brought out under duress...' (al-Rawd al-Unuf: 3/39). ¶

It is understood from this that it is permissible for the Waliy al-Amr (the ruler) to grant protection from killing to certain groups within enemy lands, even though, in principle, it is permissible to direct weapons against them just like other belligerents (Ahl al-Harb). ¶

Based on this Hadith regarding the authority of the leader to grant amnesty to specific individuals or groups from the enemy lands, and to protect them from killing during war with the enemy in accordance with an interest that necessitates it... I say: with this Hadith... we arrive at the beginning of the end of this research, which revolved around the rulings of non-combatants among the enemy during times of war. ¶

As for the conclusion with which we end this research, we leave it to a number of observations in which we look back at the aforementioned issues to record the following quick remarks: ¶

1. It appears to us that the reason (illah) for the prohibition of killing a woman in war is a compound reason, consisting of her being a woman and her not being a combatant, not merely that she does not fight. Therefore, this is a restricted reason limited to women, and men cannot be measured against it (by analogy). This explains why, for everyone whose killing was prohibited in acceptable and unacceptable texts, the prohibition was not accompanied by the reason that they do not fight. Rather, it was limited to simply exempting them from killing without providing a cause—except for the woman, as the prohibition of killing her was accompanied by the aforementioned reason, i.e., that she does not fight. This leads us to conclude that the reason for not killing her is a compound one: her being a woman combined with the fact that she does not fight, as mentioned. ¶

2. The 'Aseef' (laborer) whose killing is prohibited has been interpreted by the commentators unanimously as the 'Ajeer' (employee/hireling). It is known that in Fiqh terminology, 'Ajeer' applies to anyone who has contracted to perform any work or services in exchange for a wage. Based on this, Ibn al-Arabi, as mentioned, applied the term 'Usafa' (laborers) to all hirelings generally, and to farmers. His mention of farmers here is based on the fact that they have contracted to cultivate the land and manage all agricultural affairs related to it. Hence, we stated during our research that the term 'Usafa' applies to workers hired in factories, those hired to take care of medical, emergency, and nursing matters, as well as cleaners hired to take care of the cleanliness of neighborhoods and cities, following the interpretation of 'Aseef' as a general hireling. However, here in the final reflections on what has been covered in the research, we see that 'Aseef' has a customary connotation. ¶

It is linked to the nature of the work performed by the wage-earner, and also to the society's perception of this wage-earner, depending on the tasks they perform; it is not merely being a 'wage-earner' (ajir) in the technical fiqh sense. That is: anyone who works for a wage for others. This customary meaning, linked to societal perception of the wage-earner, is indicated by what is stated in Al-Qamus al-Muhit under the root 'asafa' (عَسَفَ): It says: ¶

'Asafa... fulanan: He employed him... and da'yatahum [meaning: he tended their land/estate]: He looked after it and handled their affairs for them. And 'alayhi, wa-lahu [meaning: he performed 'asafa' upon someone, and for someone]: He worked for him... And al-'asif is the wage-earner, and the slave whose help is sought. It is in the form of 'fa'il' in the meaning of 'fa'il' (active participle) from 'asafa lahu' [meaning: like nadim and jalis, in the pattern of fa'il, meaning the companion or the sitter... and here, it means the one who works for someone and attends to their service. This active participle is derived from the intransitive verb that becomes transitive through a preposition, as mentioned - 'asafa lahu': meaning he worked for him. Thus, the doer of the 'asf here is the wage-earner himself. And 'asf here means work and service]. - Then the author of the Qamus says - 'Or it is in the meaning of 'maf'ul' (passive participle) from 'asafahu': He employed him'(1). [Meaning: The word 'asif' can be on the pattern of 'fa'il' in the sense of 'maf'ul', like 'ajir' in the sense of 'musta'jar' (the one hired), or 'qatil' in the sense of 'maqtul' (the one killed)... and here, the word 'asif' would be in the sense of the object, derived from the verb that is directly transitive, from 'asafahu': meaning he employed him. Based on this, the doer of the 'asf here is the employer, not the wage-earner; because 'asf here means employment. The employer is the doer of the employment, while the wage-earner is the one upon whom the action is performed. That is, he is the one employed by the employer... i.e., he is in the sense of the object...]. ¶

Furthermore, it is observed that restricting the meaning of agency (fa'iliyyah) in the word 'asif' to it being derived from the intransitive verb that becomes transitive via a preposition - as he mentioned by saying: ('fa'il in the meaning of active participle from 'asafa lahu') - I say: this restriction is not necessary; because he mentioned at the beginning of his statement what indicates that 'asafa' comes in the meaning of: 'served', acting transitively directly, without the preposition. He said: ('asafa... da'yatahum: He tended it, and handled their affairs'). ¶

Based on this, it is permissible for 'asif' to be in the sense of the active participle (ism al-fa'il): one who performs service, derived from the verb that is transitive by itself. It is also permissible for 'asif' to be in the sense of the passive participle (ism al-maf'ul): one upon whom the service is performed, also derived from the verb transitive by itself. However, when 'asif' is an active participle, its verb is 'asafa', meaning 'he served'. When 'asif' is a passive participle, its verb is 'asafa', meaning 'he employed'. ¶

We were compelled to elaborate on what is mentioned in the dictionary (Al-Qamus) because we deemed the text to be in need of this clarification. The purpose of citing the dictionary is to show that the word 'al-asif' does not merely denote a hired worker (ajir) as stated by the commentators of the Hadith, but it also denotes the level of tasks for which the worker is hired, which is the performance of service-related duties. This is confirmed by the margin of the dictionary, quoting its commentaries: "His saying: 'al-musta'an bihi' [i.e., the asif, the slave, and the one whose help is sought] is as it appears in all copies. The correct version is 'al-mustahan bihi' (the one who is held in low esteem), as is the text of Al-'Ubab and Al-Lisan. Nabih bin al-Hajjaj said: 'I obeyed my soul in its desires until it made me a menial servant, a slave of a slave.' - End quote from the commentator." ¶

I say: The 'asif', therefore, is not merely someone who is employed and whose help is sought, but rather someone who is employed and whose help is sought according to the nature of the tasks and services assigned to him. That the 'asif' is linked to service-related duties of the indicated level—from a social perspective—is confirmed by the story of the 'asif who committed adultery, as mentioned in Bukhari and previously alluded to. In the narration of Sunan al-Darimi for this story, it states: "My son was an 'asif' for these people, and he committed adultery with his wife... (the hadith)." Thus, the 'asif' in this text is the one hired to serve the household in whatever they need, across various forms of employment. The usages of this word when it was common also point to this. ¶

Usage... It is stated in Asas al-Balagha: 'Kam a'sifu 'alayk. Meaning: How much I strive for you, working for you, moving about in your affairs... and we shall soon assist you with our servants and helpers'(1). Given this, and based on what has preceded, we do not support extending the term 'aseef' (servant/laborer) to everyone to whom the term 'ajeer' (hired worker) applies, as suggested by the commentators who define 'aseef' generally as an 'ajeer'. Rather, we believe in narrowing the scope of those to whom this term applies within the framework we have indicated earlier. ¶

We do not see a necessity here to specify those groups within the enemy's lands to whom this name applies; however, the person in authority should determine those categories which he deems fit to be called 'usafa' (servants), based on an observation of the reality of those groups within their society... and he shall issue orders to the army to refrain from killing them. ¶

Moving on to another observation... ¶

3. We believe that the prohibition against killing a 'sheikh fani' (an elderly person who has reached the limit of old age/infirmity) from the enemy's lands—if we accept the hadith narrated regarding him—is specific, as stated in the text, to him being a 'sheikh' (elderly) in addition to being 'fani' (infirm/impotent). Meaning: that his capacity for benefit and harm has ceased within him. ¶

Consequently, the elderly person who has not reached this stage, and in whom there remains some benefit for the enemy or harm to the Muslims, is not included in the Shariah immunity that prohibits his killing. The term 'sheikh fani' does not merely mean that his ability to fight has ceased... rather, the generality of this description implies the condition that all capacity for benefit or harm must have ceased in the disbelieving elder for the prohibition of killing to apply to him. ¶

Hence, al-Shawkani was not precise in his book 'al-Sayl al-Jarrar' when he denied the permissibility of killing an elderly disbeliever if he possesses sound judgment... and limited the prohibition of killing only to the elder whose ability to fight has ceased in this regard: '...the ahadith have indicated the prohibition of killing the sheikh fani... and the sheikh must be fani (infirm), not one who retains enough strength such that he is capable of fighting, for if he is, he shall be killed.' ¶

(1) Asas al-Balagha by al-Zamakhshari: pp. 301-302. And in al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya by al-Mawardi: 'Al-usafa are the servants, and al-wasafa are the slaves', p. 41. ¶

And if he does not fight... As for the permissibility of killing a 'dhu al-ra’y' (a person of strategic counsel/influence), there is no evidence to support it after he has been characterized by traits that necessitate the prohibition of his killing, such as being an elderly man. The only counter-argument is that the harm caused to Muslims by his opinions may be more severe than the fighting of an actual combatant. However, this is a mere opinion, and restricting textual evidence based on mere opinion is not valid in the view of fair-minded scholars. (1) ¶

This is what al-Shawkani stated in 'al-Sayl al-Jarrar', although his view in his book 'Nayl al-Awtar' is closer to what is correct in establishing the permissibility of killing an elderly disbeliever from enemy lands if he is a person of influence whose opinion can cause benefit or harm, as previously discussed in the course of this research, along with the arguments for it. ¶

4 - In addition to what has been mentioned—regarding narrowing the scope of those from enemy lands whose killing is prohibited during war, and limiting this to those for whom textual evidence clearly prohibits any aggression—we also hold that the person in authority has the right to expand or narrow the scope of those he orders not to be killed among individuals or groups from the enemy population, who are not originally prohibited from being killed, based on whatever interest he perceives in doing so. ¶

Through this synthesis between the shariah-based restriction of the circle of non-combatants who are protected from harm, and the wide prerogative of the authority to declare the prohibition or permissibility of those for whom there are no specific texts and who are not actively fighting... I say: with this restriction and that wide authority, the leader can feel that he possesses numerous options in confronting the enemy. In light of this, he can make military decisions that he believes provide the necessary conditions for winning the war, while considering the tangible calculations involved. ¶

- For example, the situation might require the leader to threaten to eliminate large segments of non-combatants whose killing is not prohibited by shariah texts, and who could be easily wiped out in one or several strikes, with the purpose of pressuring the enemy to surrender. - Likewise, the situation may require the leader to win over global public opinion, or... ¶

Shaping public opinion in enemy lands, or winning over specific individuals or groups who wield influence within the hostile territory—in such cases, [the leader] may issue an order to the Islamic army to refrain from harming those specific individuals or groups. Through such Shariah-based restrictions regarding those whose killing is prohibited, and by granting the authority to the leader to provide or revoke amnesty for other enemy individuals, Muslims are able to confront various situations and developments that arise during war, whether on a local or global scale. They address these challenges in a manner required by the interests of the Muslims and the interests of the Islamic Da'wah, which is, in the final analysis, the interest of all humanity. Having reached this point, we conclude the pages of this research with these final remarks, so that we may open the pages of the following research, with the help of Allah, the Almighty. ¶

A Testament addressed to the initiates of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, the Founder of the Ahmadiyya Movement. In this book, Hazrat Masih Maud (the Promised Messiah) has recorded the fundamental principles and commandments for his followers to establish a relationship with God Almighty and to lead a life of righteousness (taqwa) and purity. ¶

Second Topic: The Ruling on Spies from the People of War (Harbi). ¶

- The evidence presented by jurists regarding the ruling on a spy from the People of War. - The killing of a hostile (Harbi) infidel spy, who is neither a treaty-holder (Mu'ahid) nor a recipient of protection (Musta'man) - is it a matter of obligation (Wujub) or a matter of permissibility (Jawaz)? - The hostile infidel spy - if he enters the Islamic State under a grant of protection (Aman) or by virtue of a treaty with his state, and then proceeds to spy against the Muslims - what is the ruling regarding him? ¶

A Historical Commentary on 'Khilafat wa Mulukiyyat' (Caliphate and Kingship) ¶

A selection of commentaries by the elders of the Ummah and esteemed scholars regarding the opinions presented by the author in this book is being provided, so that readers may know what opinions scholars of various schools of thought hold concerning this work. ¶

In this regard, the first to be presented is the esteemed letter from Hazrat Maulana Mufti Mahmud (may Allah have mercy on him) (former Emir of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam), which he wrote to the author of the book: ¶

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Respected and Honored Maulana Muhammad Nafi, may his blessings endure, Peace be upon you, and the mercy of Allah and His blessings. Your esteemed letter and the book 'A Historical Commentary on Khilafat wa Mulukiyyat' have been received. Thank you. ¶

I have studied a significant portion of this book. Undoubtedly, the scholarly and investigative manner in which you have pursued the historical fallacies and academic oversights in Hazrat Maulana Maududi's book 'Khilafat wa Mulukiyyat' is uniquely your contribution. You have unveiled historical facts with immense sincerity, contemplation, and a spirit of goodwill. This work is highly significant and timely, for which there was a dire need in this era. May Allah Almighty accept your labor and grant the Muslim Ummah the ability to benefit from it. Ameen. ¶

Wassalam, Khadim Mahmud Central Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Pakistan ¶

Second Topic: The Ruling on Spies from the Ahl al-Harb (People of War). In this topic, we will address the following: - The evidence provided by the jurists regarding the ruling on a spy from the Ahl al-Harb. - Then, the ruling on a harbi (at war) kafir spy who is neither a mu'ahid (covenanted) nor a musta'man (one granted security). - Then, the ruling on a harbi kafir spy if he is among the mu'ahideen or the musta'maneen. ¶

The Evidence for the Ruling on a Spy from the Ahl al-Harb: Jurists based their rulings regarding a kafir spy from the Ahl al-Harb on the hadith previously mentioned in the last chapter, which is recorded in several books of Sunnah, including Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim. - In Sahih al-Bukhari: From Salama bin al-Akwa', who said: 'A spy ('ayn) from the mushrikin (polytheists) came to the Prophet ﷺ while he was on a journey. He sat with his companions talking, then he slipped away. The Prophet ﷺ said: Pursue him and kill him. I killed him, and the Prophet ﷺ granted me his spoils (salab) as a reward (nafal).' ¶

(1) 'The spy is called an 'ayn (eye) because the bulk of his work depends on his sight, or due to his intense focus on viewing and his complete absorption in it—as if his entire body has become an eye' (Fath al-Bari 6/168). (2) 'Fatala wajhahu 'anhum': He turned his face away from them (Al-Qamus 4/28). 'Infatala': is the intransitive form of 'fatala', and the intended meaning here is 'slipped away', as stated in some narrations (Fath al-Bari 6/168). (3) It contains a shift from the first-person pronoun to the third-person; the context would have required saying 'fa-nafalani' (he granted me), which is the version in Abu Dawud (Fath al-Bari 6/169). See the hadith in Sunan Abi Dawud, no. [2653], vol. 3/66. Also, see Al-Qastalani on Al-Bukhari 5/162. ¶

In Sahih Muslim, it is narrated from Salamah ibn al-Akwa' himself, who said: 'We campaigned with the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) against Hawazin. While we were having our midday meal with the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ), a man came riding a red camel, made it kneel, then took a leather strap from his waist, tied the camel, and proceeded to eat with the people. He was observing us, while some of us were weak and lacked sufficient mounts, and some were on foot. Suddenly, he ran out, reached his camel, untied it, made it kneel, sat upon it, and urged it to rise, and the camel took off at high speed. A man followed him on a greyish-colored she-camel. Salamah said: I ran out as well, and I reached the rear of the she-camel, then I pushed ahead until I was at the rear of the camel, then I moved forward until I grabbed the camel's nose-rein and made it kneel. When it placed its knee on the ground, I drew my sword and struck the man’s head, and it fell off. Then I brought the camel, leading it, with its saddle and weapons still upon it. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and the people with him met me, and he asked: 'Who killed the man?' They replied: 'Ibn al-Akwa'.' He said: 'The spoils (salab) are entirely his.' ¶

[Note: 'Nafalahu salabahu' means the Prophet (ﷺ) gave it to him as a voluntary gift (nafilah) in addition to what he was entitled to from the general spoils of war. 'Salab' refers to what is taken from the slain; it includes the deceased’s clothing, footwear, weapons, saddle, bridle, bracelets, belt, ring, and other similar items detailed in Fiqh. The 'salab' given to Salamah from his slain opponent was a red camel, with its saddle and weapons, as clearly stated in Sahih Muslim.] ¶