Chapter 5

Or through verbal intervention, seeking aid, or striking. If the aggressor is not deterred except by the use of weapons, the victim is permitted to use weapons. Scholars have stated: 'If fighting breaks out between them—meaning the aggressor and the victim—and the situation escalates beyond control, the observance of the order [of gradual deterrence] is waived.' That is, in this state, there is no place for the method of 'using the lightest and then the next lightest' means to deter the aggressor; rather, one must fight in defense of one's own sanctities or the sanctities of others! ¶

We shall limit our discussion on fighting in defense of private sanctities (al-hurumat al-khassa) to the following points: - What are private sanctities? - What is the ruling on fighting to defend each of these sanctities? - Is fighting in defense of private sanctities considered part of Jihad? ¶

* What are private sanctities? Private sanctities are the sanctity of life (blood), the sanctity of honor, and the sanctity of property. These are the ones mentioned in the Prophet’s ﷺ sermon during the Farewell Pilgrimage, as narrated by al-Bukhari and Muslim: '...Indeed, your blood, your properties, and your honors are sacred to you, as is the sanctity of this day of yours, in this month of yours, in this city of yours. Let those present inform those who are absent.' They are termed 'private' because they pertain to each individual separately, distinguishing them from 'public sanctities,' which are the Shariah rulings related to what is called 'public morality.' Violating them constitutes an aggression against the rights of Allah or what is known as the rights of society, such as the consumption of intoxicants and the commission of acts of immorality and vice. The discussion on fighting to prevent those forbidden acts will follow in its proper place. ¶

* Fighting in defense of private sanctities: First: Fighting in defense of one's own self: There are several jurisprudential opinions regarding the ruling on defending oneself through fighting and killing, which are: ¶

A - Self-defense is mandatory (wajib): This is the view of the majority of jurists (fuqaha) from the Hanafis, Malikis, and Shafi'is (1). However, the Shafi'is qualified the obligation of self-defense by stating that the aggressor must be a disbeliever, an animal, or a Muslim whose blood is not protected (mahdur al-dam), such as a married adulterer, a person who abandons prayer, or a highway robber who has committed murder (2). Among the proofs for the obligation of self-defense is the Almighty's saying: 'And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction' (3). ¶

B - Surrendering to be killed and refraining from self-defense is recommended (mandub): This is the opinion of the Shafi'is, and it applies if the aggressor is a Muslim whose blood is protected (ma'sum al-dam). Their evidence is the hadith which states: '...If one enters your house, be like the better of the two sons of Adam' (4). Furthermore, Uthman, may Allah be pleased with him, forbade his four hundred slaves from defending him on the Day of the House (Yawm al-Dar) when the rebels besieged him and threatened him with death. He told his slaves: 'Whoever drops his weapon is free.' This became well-known among the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them, and no one objected to it (5). The Shafi'is did not restrict this surrender to times of fitna (civil strife), though they stipulated that surrendering must not lead to specific harms regarding one's family and children; otherwise, self-defense becomes mandatory (6). Likewise, they stipulated that it must not lead to general harms—for instance, if the person surrendering is a person of authority or a scholar whose killing would disrupt the interests of the Ummah; in such a case, fighting becomes mandatory (7). According to some jurists, surrendering to be killed is recommended during times of fitna to minimize the strife (8). ¶

C- Surrendering to death is permissible: This applies if the targeted individual alone is intended (to be killed) without general civil strife (fitnah). ¶

Secondly: Defense of Honor (Ird): Imam al-Nawawi states in his commentary on Sahih Muslim: '...As for defending the sanctity of women/honor, it is mandatory without disagreement.' This mandatory defense may be carried out by the woman whose honor is being attacked, by her husband, her relatives, or by any Muslim who has no kinship with her. This is because honor constitutes the sacred sanctities of Allah on earth, and there is no way to permit its violation under any circumstances. This is based on the saying of the Prophet (PBUH): 'Whoever is killed defending his family is a martyr.' It is also based on the report in Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah: 'A man hosted a person from the Hudhayl tribe. A slave girl belonging to the host went out to gather firewood, and the guest attempted to assault her. She struck him with a stone (fihr), killing him. The matter was brought to Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said: This is one slain by Allah; no blood money shall ever be paid for him.' ¶

The defense of people's honor by others falls under the Prophet’s (PBUH) instruction: 'Help your brother, whether he is an oppressor or oppressed. A man asked: O Messenger of Allah, I help him if he is oppressed, but how do I help him if he is an oppressor? He replied: Restrain him or prevent him from the oppression, for that is his help.' ¶

In a narration by al-Bukhari, it states: 'You seize his hand.' Furthermore, in a hadith in al-Bukhari prior to this one, it is stated: 'A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim; he does not wrong him, nor does he surrender/abandon him,' meaning: he defends him and does not hand him over to someone who intends harm or aggression against him. It states in Fath al-Bari: '...Whoever is capable of rescuing the oppressed is duty-bound to repel the oppression by every possible means. When he defends him, his intention is not to kill the oppressor, but rather to repel him. Therefore, if...' ¶

If the repelling of an oppressor results in his blood being shed, it is considered a matter of no consequence (literally: his blood is wasted/permitted), and in this case, there is no difference between repelling him from oneself or from someone else (1). It is mentioned in Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal from the Prophet ﷺ: 'Whoever sees a believer being humiliated and does not aid him while being capable of doing so, Allah the Almighty will humiliate him before all of creation on the Day of Resurrection' (2). Furthermore, assault on honor is among the most heinous of evils (munkarat), for which the Hadith has established the legitimacy of removing it by force, in the words of the Prophet ﷺ: 'Whoever among you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand...' (3), as we will discuss in the section: Fighting to remove evils and defending general sanctities. Third: Defense of property through combat. The opinions of the jurists on this matter vary as follows: A - Defensive combat for property is obligatory: This is the view held by some scholars (4). It is also the opinion of the Shafi'is in the following cases: 1. If another person’s right is attached to the property of the defender, such as a lease or a pledge. 2. Or if the property is a living being (an animal), even if the person destroying the animal in a prohibited manner is the owner himself, provided that the defender, or his honor, is not endangered (5). 3. Or if the property belongs to others, then it is obligatory for any capable Muslim in this situation to defend the property of others. This is because, while it is permissible for a Muslim to practice self-sacrifice regarding his own rights by waiving them, it is not permissible for him to practice such self-sacrifice regarding the rights of others! This applies provided he does not suffer harm as a result of defending the property of others (6). ¶

B - Defensive combat to protect property is permissible: This is the position of the majority of jurists (fuqaha). Al-Nawawi states in his 'Sharh Sahih Muslim': "The rulings of this chapter indicate the permissibility of killing one who intends to seize property unjustly, regardless of whether the property is small or large, due to the generality of the hadith—i.e., 'Whoever is killed while defending his property is a martyr'—and this is the view of the majority of scholars. Some followers of Malik argued that it is not permissible to kill him if he demands a trivial item, such as a garment or food, but this is baseless; the correct view is what the majority have stated... defending property is permissible, not obligatory, and Allah knows best." ¶

C - Abstaining from combat to defend property is obligatory: This applies when the aggressor is the legitimate political authority (the Sultan). Ibn al-Mundhir stated: "The consensus of the people of knowledge is that a person may defend what has been mentioned if it is taken unjustly, without distinction, except that all the hadith scholars from whom these rulings are recorded appear to agree on exempting the Sultan, based on the reports (athar) that command patience regarding his tyranny and prohibit rising against him." ¶

Among the hadiths regarding this is what is recorded in Sahih Muslim: "Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman said: I asked, 'O Messenger of Allah! We were in evil, then Allah brought us goodness in which we now live. Will there be evil after this goodness?' He said, 'Yes.' I asked, 'Will there be goodness after that evil?' He said, 'Yes.' I asked, 'Will there be evil after that goodness?' He said, 'Yes.' I asked, 'How?' He said, 'After me, there will be leaders who do not follow my guidance and do not adopt my sunnah. Among them will be men whose hearts are the hearts of devils in human bodies.' I asked, 'What should I do, O Messenger of Allah, if I live to see that?' He said, 'Listen and obey the leader; even if your back is beaten and your wealth is taken, listen and obey.'" ¶

Furthermore, some jurists did not exempt rulers from the permissibility of fighting them if they aggress against private property; rather, they extended this right—the right to defend property through combat—even to the face of oppressive rulers. ¶

It is narrated in Sahih Muslim: 'When the tension between Amr and Anbasa ibn Abi Sufyan reached its peak, they prepared for combat. Khalid ibn al-As went to Abdullah ibn Amr and advised him. Abdullah ibn Amr replied: Do you not know that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "Whoever is killed while defending his property is a martyr?"' In Fath al-Bari, there is a narration of the hadith that clarifies the evidence: 'An agent of Mu'awiyah was constructing a water channel to irrigate his land. He approached a wall belonging to the family of Amr ibn al-As and intended to break it to direct the water. Abdullah ibn Amr arrived with his clients, armed, and said: "By Allah, you shall not break our wall as long as one of us remains alive," and then he mentioned the hadith. The agent mentioned was Anbasa ibn Abi Sufyan, who was the governor of Makkah and Ta'if for his brother, and the land in question was in Ta'if.' Ibn Hazm narrated in Al-Muhalla that Abu Bakr al-Siddiq wrote this document for Anas when he sent him to Bahrain: 'In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is the obligation of Zakah that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ mandated for the Muslims... Whoever is asked for it from the Muslims according to its proper measure, let him give it, and whoever is asked for more, let him not give it.' Abu Muhammad (Ibn Hazm) comments: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ commanded one whose property is demanded unjustly not to give it, and ordered him to fight in its defense, so that he is either killed while being righteous and steadfast, or he is killed innocently as a martyr; he (the Prophet) did not exclude any form of property. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq and Abdullah ibn Amr (may Allah be pleased with them) viewed the Sultan and others as equal in this regard. ¶

My view is that the right to fight in defense of property is established in general texts. However, authentic hadiths have excluded the Sultan from the legitimacy of this defensive combat—as mentioned previously—if the Sultan is the aggressor: "Even if he strikes your back and takes your wealth, hear and obey." Thus, the general hadiths are qualified by the hadiths regarding patience in the face of the Sultan's injustice. It is possible that these specific hadiths had not reached Abdullah ibn Amr, and his action was based on the general text—as the narration clarifies. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) heard of the incident and failed to object to him. ¶

That 'Khalid ibn al-Aas' objected to 'Abdullah ibn Amr'. This Khalid is among the Sahaba who embraced Islam on the day of the Conquest [of Mecca], as mentioned in al-Isaba (1). ¶

Finally, we arrive at the last point: * Is fighting against aggressors (as-sa'il) in defense of private sanctities considered Jihad? The answer is that if the aggressors are Harbi (belligerent) disbelievers, then fighting them conforms to the definition of Jihad, as it is the fighting of disbelievers to exalt the Word of God. Therefore: If a Muslim in an occupied Islamic land is attacked by a colonialist disbeliever seeking his wealth, soul, or honor, then fighting him is indeed Jihad in the path of God. ¶

However, if the aggressors are Musta'man (those granted a pact of security), the treaty of security is not voided by their aggression; they do not become Harbi such that their protection is nullified and their blood is made permissible to shed. Rather, fighting them remains a fight to repel aggression, not a fight to spill blood. If an aggressor among them ceases his aggression, it is not permissible to kill him; rather, the ruler shall punish him (ta'zir) for his aggression, and his status regarding the implementation of Islamic rulings is the same as that of a Muslim (2). The reality of Jihad is that it is a war against disbelievers who have no security, as their blood is protected neither by faith nor by a pact of security. ¶

The same is said regarding the Dhimmis. In fact, they are more entitled to have their protection remain intact despite aggression, because the covenant of Dhimma is stronger than the covenant of security. Furthermore, the covenant of Dhimma is not voided by highway robbery (3), which is a graver offense; therefore, it follows a fortiori that it is not voided by mere aggression, which is a lesser offense. ¶

Based on this, a Muslim's fighting against an aggressor who is a Musta'man or a Dhimmi is not Jihad in the Shariah sense, as the reality of Jihad does not apply to it. Naturally, a Muslim's fighting against an aggressor is also not Jihad if the aggressor is a Muslim, as in such a case, there is no fighting of a Muslim against a disbeliever. ¶

It is true that a Muslim who is killed while defending his private sanctities and rights is considered a martyr; however, he is only a 'martyr of the Hereafter' (shaheed al-akhirah). As for the one killed in Jihad, he is both a 'martyr of this world and the Hereafter' (shaheed al-dunya wa al-akhirah), or a 'martyr of this world only' (1), as we shall discuss in the section regarding the martyr. (1) Sharh al-Nawawi 'ala Muslim: 1/515. ¶

Fifth Section Combat to Defend Public Sanctities in Islamic Society ¶

- Introduction: Concerning the definition of public sanctities and the general legal (Shar'i) evidence for defending them. - First: The rulings on forbidding evil (inkar al-munkar) according to varying circumstances. - Second: The legitimacy of combat in forbidding evils, and the degrees of intervention that precede combat. - Third: Is combat for the purpose of removing evil to defend public sanctities considered Jihad in its technical sense? ¶

Sharh Durar al-Hukkam fi Sharh Ghurar al-Ahkam, by the eminent scholar Mawla Muhammad ibn Faramurz ibn Ali, known as Mulla Khusraw (may his secret be sanctified). ¶

Volume One [The Book of Purification (Kitab al-Taharah)] ¶

Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi Beirut - Lebanon ¶

Fifth Topic: Combat for the Defense of Public Sanctities in Islamic Society ¶

Introduction: Regarding the definition of public sanctities and the Shariah evidence for combat to defend them. ¶

In the previous research, we discussed combat for the sake of defending private sanctities: life, honor, and property, which is known as 'daf’ al-siyal' (repelling aggression). ¶

There is another form of aggression which we are discussing now, namely, aggression against the community, manifested in the violation of public sanctities. These are the sanctities that scholars of usul (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) refer to as 'Huquq Allah' (rights of Allah), and which contemporary Islamic writers call 'Huquq al-Mujtama’' (rights of society), because they were ordained to protect the community and for the common good. ¶

Aggression here is manifested by violating these sanctities and committing prohibited acts (munkarat) openly. Thus, we find ourselves facing neglected obligations, widespread sins, and suspended Shariah rulings. ¶

Just as Islam ordained defense through combat against those who commit aggression against private sanctities to protect them, it likewise ordained defense through combat against those who commit aggression against public sanctities to protect them. This latter form of defense is what jurists express as using one's hand or weapon to remove evil (munkarat), acting upon the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'Whoever among you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; if he cannot, then with his heart, and that is the weakest of faith.' ¶

The matter may become confused in certain similar instances. Are they of the category of 'siyal' (assault) or transgression against private sanctities (hurumat), and thus defending them is a defense of private sanctities? Or are they of the category of 'siyal' or transgression against public sanctities, and thus defending them is a defense of public sanctities? The issue is simple: regardless of the case, defending sanctities is legitimate, whether they are private or public. However, from a technical or jurisprudential perspective, there is a criterion or standard to distinguish between them. If the 'siyal' is in its real sense—that is, an assault by one person against another regarding their life, honor, or property—then we are facing an assault on private sanctities, and consequently, the defense here is a private defense. Examples include: a person assaulting another to shed their blood, a dissolute person assaulting a woman against her will for the purpose of immorality, or a person assaulting another's property to destroy or usurp it. ¶

As for 'siyal' in its metaphorical sense—that is, the transgression against the commands and prohibitions of Allah by violating them—then we are facing an assault on public sanctities, and thus the defense here is a public defense. Examples include: a person attempting suicide; here, there is no assault on others, but rather it is the commission of what Allah has forbidden in His saying: 'And do not kill yourselves' (1). Or a dissolute person committing an immoral act with a consenting woman. Here, there is no assault on the woman because she is a willing participant, but the matter is the commission of what Allah has forbidden in His saying: 'And do not approach unlawful sexual intercourse' (2). ¶

Or a person attempting to destroy property that they own (3); here, there is no assault on the property of others, but the matter is a violation of what the Shariah has forbidden regarding the squandering of wealth, as per the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): 'Indeed, Allah has forbidden for you: disobedience to mothers, burying daughters alive, withholding (rights) and demanding (what is not yours), and He has disliked for you: idle talk, excessive questioning, and the squandering of wealth' (4). ¶

These instances of violating public sanctities may resemble instances of violating private sanctities due to their shared subject matter—life, honor, and property—but the mentioned criterion clarifies the affiliation of each case to its respective category. ¶

Outside the framework of these similar instances, every suspension of a mandatory obligation, or the sinful commission of a forbidden act, constitutes a violation of public sanctity and the perpetration of a munkar (reprehensible act). Examples include the suspension of prayer, fasting, and the shariah-mandated hijab for women, and other similar matters commanded by the texts of the Shariah. Similarly, this includes the consumption of intoxicants, engaging in usury (riba), gambling, and other similar matters prohibited by the texts of the Shariah. ¶

In this research, we will limit ourselves to matters related to fighting (qital) in the path of prohibiting the munkar, or what we have termed the defense of public sanctity within the Islamic society. Therefore, we will address only the following points: ¶

First: The rulings on prohibiting the munkar under different circumstances. Second: Is fighting to eliminate munkarat (reprehensible acts) part of jihad? ¶

First: The rulings on prohibiting the munkar under different circumstances. ¶

1. The fundamental rule regarding prohibiting the munkar is that it is a fard kifaya (communal obligation); if some perform it such that the objective is achieved, the requirement is dropped for the rest, based on the Almighty's saying: 'And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining righteousness and forbidding evil, and those will be the successful.' ¶

Imam al-Ghazali says in 'Ihya', while deriving the ruling of communal obligation from this verse: 'It contains a clarification that—i.e., enjoining good and forbidding evil—is a fard kifaya, not a fard ayn (individual obligation), and that when a group undertakes it, the obligation is lifted from others, and success is reserved for those who actively perform it. However, if all people refrain from it, then the sin (haraj) will inevitably fall upon everyone who was capable of stopping it.' ¶

2. Changing the munkar becomes a fard ayn for whoever witnesses it and is capable of removing it, provided they do not fear aggression against their own private sanctities, and provided that their interference does not result in... ¶

a mischief greater than the mischief of the vice occurring before them (1). The Prophet (peace be upon him) says: “There is no man who is among a people where sins are being committed, and they are capable of changing them but do not change them, except that Allah will afflict them with a punishment from Him before they die” (2). In another narration: “There is no group of people among whom there are those who commit sins—and they (the observers) are more powerful and influential than them—but they do not stop them, except that Allah (the Almighty and Majestic) will afflict them with a punishment from Him” (3). ¶

3. If preventing the vice results in a mischief greater than the mischief of the vice itself, such as the commission of other vices as an act of defiance, or out of contempt for those who are forbidding the evil, then forbidding the evil in such a case becomes forbidden (haram) based on the application of the Shariah principle: “When two mischiefs collide, the greater of the two is to be avoided by committing the lesser one.” ¶

And the other Shariah principle: “The lesser of the two evils is to be chosen” (4). However, in this state, it is incumbent upon the Muslims to work on rectifying their weakness so that they may become capable of removing vices without any resultant mischief, because the removal of vice is a mandatory duty (wajib). And: “That without which a mandatory duty cannot be completed is itself mandatory” (5). ¶

4. As for the case where preventing the vice does not result in the occurrence of other vices, but leads to harm and injury being inflicted upon the persons forbidding the vice—as is the habit of the immoral and depraved for the purpose of seeking retribution against the reformers, or to deter them from performing the duty of forbidding evil, and to warn others from walking the same path so that the atmosphere in the country may be left open for deviation and the deviant—I say: If the affliction of harm is confined only to the persons forbidding the evil, without extending to others such as relatives, companions, and other citizens, then forbidding the evil in this case is... ¶

It is recommended (mandub), and if they fall victim to this act of forbidding evil, they are considered martyrs of the Hereafter, and the hadith of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ applies to them: 'Whoever is killed defending his religion is a martyr.' Thus, attributing the status of martyrdom to one who is killed while forbidding evil for the sake of the religion is evidence of the legitimacy of the action they are performing and its reward with Allah. As for the fact that forbidding evil in this case is not obligatory, it is because the aforementioned hadith narrated by Ahmad ibn Hanbal stipulated for the obligation of forbidding evil that those performing it must be stronger and more formidable than the wrongdoers (fussaq). The implication of the counter-concept (mafhum al-mukhalafah) of this is that there is no obligation if this condition is lacking, and the wrongdoers are stronger than those forbidding the evil. It is self-evident that what is meant here by strength and weakness is the ability to inflict harm or the lack thereof from the side of the perpetrators of evil, and the security or lack thereof from the side of those forbidding the evil. ¶

This is the case if the result of forbidding evil is restricted to inflicting harm only upon those who are forbidding it. ¶

5- As for if the forbidding of evil results in severe harm to those forbidding it, as well as others among their relatives, associates, and other fellow citizens, then here we are facing two dilemmas: - Either to remain silent about the evil, in which case we fall into the dilemma of abandoning the forbidding of evil. - Or to proceed with forbidding the evil, in which case we fall into the dilemma of the severe harm that will befall others. We have already established in the previous case that when the forbidding of evil leads to harm falling upon those forbidding it, the ruling shifts from obligation to recommendation (nadb). The same applies if the harm is to befall others, because the reason for the lifting of the obligatory ruling is the occurrence of harm as a result of forbidding the evil. Here: If those others upon whom the harm will fall are content with the occurrence of this harm, and they sacrifice their lives or interests for their religion, then the forbidding of evil is recommended. Even if this harm reaches the extent of killing, they are among the martyrs of the Hereafter, and the aforementioned hadith applies to them: 'Whoever is killed defending his religion is a martyr.' However, if they are not content with the harm being inflicted upon them as a result of the forbidding of evil, then Imam al-Ghazali is of the view here that if it is permissible... ¶

Those who forbid evil are permitted to show leniency regarding their own rights, seeking reward and taking initiative to forbid evil, even if they must endure harm themselves. However, they are not permitted to be lenient with the rights of others or to expose them to harm. In this regard, concerning the voluntary muhtasib (monitor) who forbids evil under such circumstances, the text states: 'If his act—that is, the voluntary muhtasib's forbidding of evil—leads to harm for his people, he should refrain from it. This is similar to the ascetic who has wealthy relatives; he does not fear for his own property if he holds the sultan accountable, but he fears that the sultan will seek revenge against him through them. Thus, if the harm from his accountability extends to his relatives and neighbors, he must abandon it, for causing harm to Muslims is forbidden, just as remaining silent about evil is forbidden.'(1) ¶

6 - It is possible that the one committing evil is the person in authority in the land. In this situation, the Shariah texts provide the following details: ¶

A - It is obligatory to forbid evil against the ruler, beginning with preaching and advice using soft language. This is because, generally, forbidding evil in a way that removes it is not possible as long as power remains in the hands of the ruler. Therefore, the obligation to forbid evil, as established in Shariah texts, is directed toward forbidding it with the tongue only, in accordance with the Prophet’s ﷺ command: 'Whoever among you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; and if he cannot, then with his heart—and that is the weakest of faith.'(2) ¶

It was made obligatory to offer preaching and advice to the ruler using soft language initially due to the Shariah texts regarding the necessity of maintaining the ruler's dignity when offering advice. Therefore, using harshness with him is not legitimate, as it involves disrespecting him, which is forbidden. Among the texts regarding this is the Prophet's ﷺ statement: 'Whoever has advice for someone in authority should not speak it to him publicly, but let him take him by the hand (in private); if he accepts it, he accepts it, and if not, he has fulfilled what was required of him and what was owed to him.'(3) ¶

B - It is recommended to use harshness when confronting the ruler with the tongue if the situation requires demonstrating zeal for the sanctities of God and making him understand the severity of his actions in deviating from the Shariah. ¶

This is subject to the aforementioned condition: that is, if the harm of this method is confined solely to the one performing the denunciation (inkar). (1) This is understood from a hadith narrated by al-Nasa’i: 'From Tariq ibn Shihab, that a man asked the Prophet (peace be upon him) while he had placed his foot in the stirrup: What is the best jihad? He replied: A word of truth spoken to a tyrannical ruler!' (2) The Prophet (peace be upon him) named it 'jihad' because it involves risking one's life, just as in jihad in its true, legal sense. The risk involved in making the ruler hear the word of truth while denouncing him is, frequently, bound up with harsh speech and sharp, biting criticism! ¶

C - It is forbidden to use harshness when denouncing a ruler verbally if it results in harm to other people who are not content with the hardship that will befall them, as previously discussed in the evidence for this situation. On this, Ibn al-Jawzi says: 'The permissible approach for enjoining good and forbidding evil with sultans is advice and exhortation. As for using harsh speech such as: O oppressor, O you who do not fear Allah—if this triggers a sedition whose harm extends to others, it is not permissible. If he fears only for himself, then it is permissible according to the scholars.' (3) ¶

D - It is forbidden to use physical force (striking) to stop a ruler from committing a vice, because striking a ruler contradicts the reverence that Islamic texts have commanded to be maintained for him. Furthermore, such a method of denunciation is likely to incite the ruler to retaliate for his wounded dignity and injured honor, leading him to commit corruptions and harms that are more severe than the vice he is currently perpetrating. The result would not be the removal of the current evil, but rather the addition of new evils, along with various forms of harm that affect those nearby, from which even those further away may not be safe. ¶

E - It is forbidden to use weapons or revolt against a ruler if he deviates by committing immorality, perpetrating injustice, or issuing an unlawful order. Nevertheless, he remains entitled to being heard and obeyed in matters that are consistent with Islam, but not in matters that fall outside this framework, while simultaneously being required to work towards... ¶

Removing this deviant ruler from power through peaceful means—if he persists in his deviation and continues in his transgression—is mandatory, as is objecting to him with the tongue if possible, or otherwise with the heart. This represents the final stage of weakness in the hierarchy of enjoining good and forbidding evil. ¶

This discussion concerns a ruler possessing legitimate authority who has not reached the dangerous 'red line'—if such a metaphor is permissible—which is 'kufr bawwah' (manifest unbelief), whether in the ruler's personal creed or in the ideology upon which his governing system is based. The discussion regarding this red line will follow in the next chapter; hence, we will not address it now. ¶

We have stated: It is forbidden to use weapons to fight a deviant ruler for the purpose of rebuking him, while obedience to him in good (but not in evil) remains mandatory, as does the obligation to rebuke him with the tongue and heart, or with the heart alone if that is all that is within one's capacity, along with the obligation to work toward his removal from power through peaceful means. Now, what are the shariah proofs for these four points? ¶

The prohibition of using weapons to fight a deviant ruler to rebuke him is based on numerous ahadith, among them what is recorded in Sahih Muslim from the Prophet (peace be upon him): 'There will be leaders appointed over you; you will recognize [some of their actions] and disapprove [of others]. Whoever disapproves [in his heart] is absolved, and whoever objects [outwardly] is safe, but [it is for] the one who is pleased and follows [them]!' They asked: 'O Messenger of Allah, shall we not fight them?' He said: 'No, as long as they pray.' (Meaning: he who dislikes it in his heart and objects in his heart). In Sunan al-Bayhaqi, it is clarified that 'dislike' refers to the hatred of the heart, and 'object' refers to verbal objection. In this hadith, the Messenger (peace be upon him) prohibits the use of combat to rebuke rulers whose behavior mixes evil with good, as long as they are Muslims who establish prayer. ¶

Al-Bazzar narrated from Zayd ibn Wahb that the people objected to something done by an amir during the time of Hudhayfah. A man entered the Great Mosque, making his way through the people until he reached Hudhayfah, who was sitting in a circle. He stood over him and said: 'O companion of the Messenger of Allah, will you not enjoin good and forbid evil?' Hudhayfah raised his head, understood what he intended, and said to him: 'Enjoining good and forbidding evil...' ¶

is not good, and it is not from the Sunnah to unsheathe your sword against your leader." (1) - As for the obligation to obey the ruler in what is ma'ruf (righteous) and not in what is munkar (evil), this is understood from the aforementioned hadith in Sahih Muslim, as well as from another statement of the Prophet (ﷺ) recorded in Sahih Muslim: "The best of your leaders are those whom you love and who love you, whom you pray for and who pray for you. And the worst of your leaders are those whom you hate and who hate you, whom you curse and who curse you." They asked: "O Messenger of Allah! Shall we not revolt against them at that time?" He said: "No, as long as they establish prayer among you. Beware! Whoever has a ruler appointed over him and sees him committing an act of disobedience to Allah, let him hate the act of disobedience he commits, but do not withdraw a hand from obedience." (2) Similarly, regarding the lack of obedience in munkar, the statement of the Prophet (ﷺ) is recorded: "There is no obedience to a created being in disobedience to the Creator." (3) And in the Zawa'id of Al-Bazzar, from the Prophet (ﷺ): "There is no obedience in the disobedience of Allah." (4) It is understood from these hadiths that a Muslim is required to combine two things in his stance toward a deviant ruler—who is the subject of this research—meaning one who commits munkar but has not exited the fold of Islam, neither in his creed nor in his system of governance. I say: The Muslim is required to combine obedience to him in what is ma'ruf with opposition to him in what is munkar, whether this munkar is a sin committed by the ruler personally or an unlawful order he issues to the people. The burden of the sins committed in his personal behavior lies upon the ruler, just as the burden of the rulings and laws he commands that contradict the Shariah lies upon him. The people are free from that burden as long as they do not follow the ruler in either case and denounce him as much as they are able. This is indicated by the hadith of the Prophet (ﷺ): "Obey your leaders regardless of how they are; if they command you with something of what I have brought to you, they will be rewarded for it and you will be rewarded for your obedience, and if they command you with something I have not brought, then it is upon them, and you are free of it..." (5) ¶

As for the obligation of rebuking (inkar) a deviant ruler, whether by tongue and heart or by the heart alone, it is evidenced by the previously mentioned hadith of Muslim, which states: '...whoever dislikes it is absolved, and whoever speaks out against it is safe.' ¶

In Sunan al-Bayhaqi, the clarification of the meaning of this hadith states: 'Al-Hasan said: Whoever rebukes with his tongue is absolved, and that time has passed; and whoever dislikes it in his heart, that time has arrived.' Another statement is also mentioned: 'Qatada said: Meaning, whoever rebukes in his heart, and whoever dislikes in his heart.' ¶

I say: Perhaps distinguishing dislike (karahiya) as a matter of the heart and rebuke (inkar) as a matter of the tongue—as Al-Hasan al-Basri suggested—is stronger than interpreting both as matters of the heart. This is because dislike is an internal feeling, thus belonging to the actions of the heart, so we assign to rebuke a distinct meaning, namely, verbal rebuke, in accordance with the legal principle that 'establishing a new meaning is better than mere emphasis' (al-ta’sis khayrun min al-ta’kid). ¶

As for the obligation to work toward removing such a ruler from power through peaceful means, despite the fact that this point has been addressed by classical jurists and modern Islamic writers with varying viewpoints, we examine it here from a specific angle: when Islam prohibited fighting against a ruler due to limited deviation, it did not condemn the Ummah to be a captive to that deviation, sitting idly by. Rather, it obligated the Ummah to work toward removing the ruler through peaceful means. However, the process of removing him from power may take time—whether long or short—as this is a complex problem. Should we leave the country in a state of chaos in the meantime, allowing evildoers to exploit this critical situation and spread corruption in the land? ¶

And should we suspend the interests of the Ummah on the pretext of the ruler's deviation, the obligation to remove him, and the absence of someone worthy of obedience? ¶

Islam has addressed this issue by obligating the Ummah to obey the deviant ruler in matters other than sin, while simultaneously working toward his removal. As for his obedience in matters other than sin, we have already provided the evidence earlier. ¶