Chapter 16

In obtaining authority and establishing governance according to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, if the authority is not legitimate (shar’iyyah), then its holder is not entitled to what the holder of legitimate authority is entitled to, namely the right to be heard and obeyed, the obligation of patience under them, and the prohibition of drawing the sword against them. This is because the Shariah text granted this right to rulers whom it termed 'Imams'—as in the hadith: 'There will be Imams after me who will not follow my guidance...' And rulers are not termed 'Imams' in the Shariah sense except through the manner we described regarding how they obtain the authority of Imamat. ¶

Perhaps the reason for the obligation of hearing and obeying, according to the proponents of this argument, is the other hadith which states: '...I enjoin you to fear Allah, and to hear and obey, even if an Abyssinian slave is appointed over you...' And that this hadith—as understood from its apparent meaning—goes beyond the issue of consent and choice, just as it did not explicitly condition hearing and obeying upon governing by what Allah has revealed. ¶

The answer to the first point is detailed in the discussion 'Fighting the Usurper of Authority,' where we stated: that 'ta'ammara' (being appointed/becoming an amir) here means becoming an amir by being granted the imarah by another, or through the consent and choice of the people, and it does not mean 'usurping' power by force and conquest. ¶

The answer to the second point is also detailed in the discussion 'Fighting Against the Deviation of the Ruler,' which makes repetition unnecessary. Furthermore, the usuli (foundational) rule of interpreting an absolute text in light of a qualified text requires that hearing and obeying be restricted to the amir who governs by what Allah has revealed; for if the absolute meaning is understood from the hadith '...even if an Abyssinian slave is appointed over you...', it must be interpreted in light of the hadith that provides the restriction for this absoluteness, such as the Prophet's saying: '...even if a mutilated Abyssinian slave is appointed over you, hear and obey, so long as he establishes the Book of Allah among you.' That is: if he does not establish the Book of Allah among us, then there is no hearing and no obedience! I say: It is sufficient for us here, in discussing the evidence for the obligation of hearing and obeying Imams and Amirs and the prohibition of rebelling against them, to divert this evidence away from those who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, without necessarily issuing a ruling on the legitimacy of rebelling against them or using such an argument. ¶

to use weapons to overthrow them in order to establish the Islamic State; for this issue, as we mentioned before, we have an opinion that will be presented at the conclusion of our discussion of all the evidence. ¶

3 - Discussing the argument that military coups to change conditions are among the innovations (bid'ah) of the present era. That is: 'And the worst of affairs are the newly invented ones, and every innovation is a misguidance.' ¶

I say: We will not be dragged into making this issue a matter of whether it falls under the category of innovation or not. What is the definition of innovation (bid'ah) in Shariah? And does it apply to the use of military force to establish the Islamic State or not? ¶

Yes! We will not be dragged into that, because the issue is not at this level. ¶

The reality of a military coup is the use of weapons to reach power to achieve a specific purpose from seizing authority. In our issue: the purpose of seizing authority is to rule by what Allah has revealed and to establish the Islamic State. This is the reality of the issue. So why should we fly in a different airport, wander far afield, and drag the subject of innovation into our issue? ¶

Therefore, the issue is: using weapons to apply the rulings of Islam, which cannot be implemented except through this path. Has there come a Shariah evidence regarding this path that gives us the green light so that proceeding with fighting is permissible? Or does it give us a red light so that proceeding with fighting is forbidden? This is the issue. And as long as the one who brought the argument of innovation has not placed the issue on its correct level, we have nothing in this evidence to discuss. So let us move on to discussing another piece of evidence. ¶

4 - Discussing the argument that the Shariah has defined a specific method for changing conditions, which is changing what is within the selves, as declared in the Almighty's saying: 'Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves.' ¶

Therefore, seeking change through paths other than this is a violation of this Shariah text. I argue that restricting the scope of certain Shariah texts from reaching their intended, vast, and legitimate interpretation leads to erroneous rulings regarding the issues they were meant to address. That is one aspect. Another point is that seeking Shariah rulings for human actions should be done through specific texts related to those particular acts for which a ruling is sought. If we find no specific text addressing the act, no rationale ('illah) for a specific text that extends to that act, and no consensus (ijma') specifically covering it, only then do we resort to general texts like this noble verse. Even this noble verse, which establishes the greatest and most truthful principle of change in the realm of the psyche and societies—how could it be understood as prohibiting the removal of a material obstacle standing in the way of desired change by using equivalent force that shatters and clears that obstacle from the path? How? In fact, the existence of this erroneous concept in a society—that 'it is forbidden to counter force with force to rectify situations demanded by the majority of people'—is precisely what prevents the desired change. If the people of a society change this mistaken concept fixed in their souls and replace it with the correct one: 'the necessity of breaking the material force obstructing the path of desired change with an equivalent material force,' and if this correct concept drives their behavior such that they move to seek the material power capable of removing the material obstacle that imposes unjust conditions upon them—conditions they reject—and which supports those calling for reform, then I say: if this change in concept occurs in the realm of the psyche and sets it in motion, then the change in external conditions will surely follow in confirmation of the Almighty's words: 'Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves' (1). Accordingly, when this noble verse is given its natural and vast scope of understanding—according to the rules of language and the laws of Allah in the universe—it invites us to the opposite direction in our issue, which is: 'the use of...' ¶

The use of weaponry for the establishment of the Islamic state and the changing of conditions. This is because the word 'ma' (what) in this verse (Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves) signifies generality. However, this is within the bounds of the natural relationship between what is within the soul and the external conditions that are sought to be created as consequences of those things present within the soul. ¶

Furthermore, external conditions are not of one kind; rather, they are of different types governed by different laws. The fact that they result from internal factors that create or move to create them necessitates that these internal factors themselves must also be distinct. ¶

- Thus, whoever seeks to change the ignorance rampant among people into knowledge—both being external conditions—must first change what is in the people’s souls, moving them from contentment with their current reality to dissatisfaction with this ignorant reality and a sense of the necessity of acquiring the required knowledge. Once this change occurs within the soul, the drive toward knowledge in the centers of its dissemination follows, and consequently, the external condition changes from ignorance to knowledge! ¶

- And whoever seeks to change the disease rampant among people into health—also two external conditions—must first change what is in the people’s souls, moving them from contentment with their current reality to dissatisfaction with this diseased reality and a sense of the necessity of obtaining the required health. Once this change occurs within the soul, the drive toward health in medical centers, the means of providing it, and the efforts to combat factors hindering it will follow. ¶

In this way, the external condition eventually changes from disease to health and wellness! ¶

In summary: Everything is reached through its natural causes that lead to that thing. This is what the noble verse indicates by linking the world of the soul with the external world. In matters of politics and governance, there are two things in the external world that cement deviation: First: Contentment with the deviated reality or a lack of concern for changing it. Second: A power that protects that reality. Changing this external world can only occur through the natural causes that lead to change. ¶

Meaning: Through two things in the psychological realm that have a natural relationship with what exists in the external world. First: Change begins by stirring indignation against the deviant status quo, by being concerned with changing it, and by having an awareness of the alternative and committing to it. Second: One must believe in the necessity of providing the force that supports change, which is sufficient to displace the oppressive force defending the reality one seeks to change, along with striving to provide that force, employing it in the process of change, or placing it in a state of readiness if necessary. - If we limit ourselves to the first aspect of psychological change—that is, changing satisfaction with the status quo to indignation against it, and aspiring to replace it with the alternative—then only a corresponding change occurs in reality. That is, change occurs in opinions, demands, and the commitment of individuals as individuals to what they can commit to from the desired situation. - However, if the second aspect of psychological change occurs—that is, the belief in the necessity of providing the force supporting change, sufficient to remove the hostile force from its path, and that force is actually provided—then the other type of change occurs. This is either: - The hostile force abandons confrontation out of fear of the new force, as happened in Medina when the forces of Shirk were suppressed before the power of the Ansar, turning into a group that practiced hypocrisy toward the new power for fear of its reach if they expressed their enmity or obstructed its path. - Or, a confrontation takes place, and God judges between the two parties according to His wisdom, may He be glorified and exalted. If the result is a victory for the proponents of change, then through God’s success and the following of His commands, God grants them this victory. - And if it is the other way around, then it is for a matter God wills, that the change be delayed. Those among the agents of change who return to their Lord are blessed with martyrdom, and those who remain must resume their journey on the legitimate and blessed path until God grants victory, for every term has a decree. This is what is said in discussing the arguments of those who forbid the use of weapons to establish the Islamic state and change the situation. ¶

We now move to a new section: D - A discussion of the affirmative evidence for the issue of combat to establish the Islamic State. 1 - Discussion of the evidence of apostasy (riddah): Meaning, the consideration of the states in Muslim lands today, along with their rulers, as being in a state of apostasy—excluding the Muslim subjects. Thus, the people of apostasy are to be fought in order to reach the establishment of the Islamic State, in the manner detailed previously when mentioning the evidence. I say: The discussion of this evidence covers two points: - Are Muslim rulers considered apostates if they rule by other than what Allah has revealed? - Is it permissible for a group of Muslims to kill or fight the people of apostasy when they do not possess legitimate authority? The answer to the first point: The basis for those who claim this is the Almighty’s saying: {And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers} (1). The truth is that those who judge by other than what Allah has revealed have been described by Allah, the Almighty and Majestic, with three attributes in three consecutive verses: {And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers} (1), {And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the wrongdoers} (2), {And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the defiantly disobedient} (3). Detailed accounts have been transmitted from the Companions and the scholars regarding the distribution of these descriptions among the various categories of those who judge by other than what Allah has revealed. Its summary is: That whoever judges by other than what Allah has revealed while rejecting what Allah has revealed, or... ¶

Or [if one] doubts its suitability for governance, or believes that ruling by other than what Allah has revealed is better than ruling by it—in this case, such a ruler is a disbeliever (kafir), and he is considered an apostate (murtad) if he was previously described as a Muslim. ¶

As for ruling by other than what Allah has revealed without being accompanied by the aforementioned factors, but rather motivated by other reasons such as following desires, negligence, or fear of opponents or enemies, then the one who issues such a judgment is a fasiq (transgressor) and a zalim (oppressor), but not a kafir (1). Consequently, such a ruler is not considered an apostate from Islam if he exercises authority on this basis. In any case, there must be conclusive evidence (daleel qati') that provides certainty that a Muslim ruler is indeed ruling by other than what Allah has revealed based on his doubt regarding the suitability of Islam for governance, or his belief that something other than Islam is better for governance, or other such matters that would cause him to exit the fold of the faith, in order for us to consider such a ruler an apostate. Without this conclusive evidence, it is not permissible to declare people or rulers as disbelievers based merely on doubt or strong suspicion. This is in accordance with the noble Hadith: '...unless you see clear kufr (disbelief) for which you have a proof (burhan) from Allah' (2). And 'burhan' is the conclusive proof that produces certainty (3). ¶

As for the answer to the second point: i.e., may a group of Muslims kill or fight against the apostates when they do not possess legitimate authority? The answer is: that the implementation of hadd punishments, including the hadd of apostasy—which is killing according to the saying of the Messenger (PBUH): 'Whoever changes his religion, kill him' (4)—as well as fighting the apostates until they are killed or repent; I say: all of this belongs solely to the Imam (the leader). Therefore, it is not permissible for individuals, nor for a group of them—without permission from the Imam—to carry out these rulings upon people (5). This is because the management of the affairs of the Ummah according to the Shariah, which includes the implementation of hadd punishments and matters of combat, is established by textual evidence. ¶

Shariah has limited this responsibility exclusively to the Imam, based on the evidence of his (peace be upon him) saying: 'The Imam is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects' (1), except in cases where Shariah evidence allows individuals to perform some aspects of this guardianship without the presence of an Imam or recourse to him. This is seen, for example, in the application of the hadd punishment for zina (adultery) and others by a master upon his slave or maidservant, without referring the matter to the Shariah authority (2). ¶

However, there is no evidence permitting the application of the hadd for apostasy (riddah) or fighting against apostates by individuals; thus, it remains restricted to the holder of Shariah authority. ¶

Therefore, the action of a group of Muslims rising up and taking up arms to apply the ruling of apostasy upon the authorities by labeling them as apostates—even if there exists definitive evidence that they are apostates—I say: that their taking such action, while they possess no Shariah authority, or before they have seized power and their authority has become legitimate, is considered an encroachment (ifti'at) upon the prerogatives of the Imam, because only the Imam, or those appointed by him, has the authority to execute such rulings. ¶

We conclude from this discussion on the evidence for apostasy with two facts: - It is impermissible to be hasty in declaring those who rule by other than what Allah has revealed to be apostates without definitive proof. - Fighting apostates is a ruling implemented by the legitimate Imam who holds authority; it is not a method for seizing power or establishing an Islamic state. ¶

2- Discussion on the legal maxim: 'That without which a wajib (obligatory act) cannot be completed is itself wajib' (3). Meaning: Ruling by what Allah has revealed is obligatory, and this cannot be fulfilled except through the establishment of an Islamic state; therefore, its establishment is obligatory according to the legal maxim: 'That without which a wajib cannot be completed is itself wajib.' ¶

I say: Using a legal maxim to reach a ruling on a specific issue without considering the specific texts (nusus) that govern that issue when they exist, or without looking at [context]... ¶

Other shari’ah principles [are applied] when there are no specific texts governing a particular issue. I maintain that such an approach to deriving shari’ah rulings leads to chaos, and even to contradictory rulings on the same issue. For example, regarding our current issue, 'the use of weapons to establish the rule of God,' some might argue: Raising arms against Muslims is forbidden, based on the Prophet’s (peace be upon him) statement: 'Whoever bears arms against us is not one of us.' Establishing the Islamic state is a mandatory duty, yet it cannot be achieved without bearing arms, which is forbidden as argued above. Thus, the permissible and the forbidden have converged on a single issue. The legal maxim states: 'Whenever the permissible and the forbidden converge, the forbidden prevails over the permissible,' meaning the ruling of the forbidden—the prohibition of bearing arms—must be implemented. Likewise, this party might also say: 'Bringing about the obligation, which is the application of God's law, is a benefit (maslaha), and committing the forbidden, which is shedding the blood of Muslims for that purpose, is a harm (mafsada). The legal maxim states: 'Warding off harm takes precedence over bringing about benefits.' In this manner, confusion spreads and chaos ensues in the process of deriving shari’ah rulings. The reasons for this include several factors, among them: - Some individuals hold a preconceived ruling in their minds and then attempt to hunt for evidence that supports that ruling. - The inability of others to master the art of deriving shari’ah rulings from their valid sources. ¶

Likewise, for others, the cause [of disagreement] may be the divergence among the schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) regarding foundational principles (usuli rules) and methods of deduction, which leads to different rulings on the same issue. ¶

However, it is not our intention here to enumerate the reasons for the disagreement among the jurists. We are concerned only with the fact that a rule such as: 'Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligatory act is itself obligatory' (ma la yatimmu al-wajib illa bihi fahuwa wajib) is only applied in matters where there is no disagreement, specifically when something has been commanded and cannot be achieved except through a means that is originally permissible and within one’s capacity. Thus, it is said here: 'Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligatory act is itself obligatory,' meaning that the permissible act which becomes a necessary path to fulfill the obligation becomes obligatory itself. ¶

But if the means necessary to fulfill the obligation is something originally forbidden—such as brandishing weapons in the issue we are currently addressing—do we then declare it permissible to achieve that obligation based on this legal maxim? Certainly not, unless that obligation falls under the shade of another legal maxim: 'Necessities permit prohibited things' (al-darurat tubihu al-mahzurat)! ¶

Yes, if there comes a textual evidence (nass) that excludes this specific case—i.e., fighting for the sake of establishing an Islamic state—from the general prohibition against brandishing weapons, then the evidence here would be that exceptional text, not the legal maxim: 'Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligatory act is itself obligatory.' ¶

We are not currently in the process of adjudicating this issue—fighting to establish a state—but are merely discussing the arguments and the soundness of the reasoning used. ¶

In summary: Relying solely on the rule, 'Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligatory act is itself obligatory,' to establish the legitimacy of fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state—without citing evidence specific to the matter—is a position that cannot be accepted from its proponents. ¶

3. Discussion of the evidence regarding the obligatoriness of Jihad upon every Muslim whose land has been occupied by enemies, and the consideration that today’s Muslim rulers are enemies of the Ummah who have occupied their countries and seized power; therefore, it is necessary to declare Jihad against them. ¶

I say: This argument is predicated—according to its proponents—on the assumption that Muslim rulers have become apostates due to their ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, in the manner previously described regarding their perspective. However, even based on this perspective, does the situation in Muslim lands become equivalent to that of lands occupied by enemies? And consequently, is it necessary to declare a general mobilization (nafir) to cleanse the country of this 'occupation'? ¶

That is: does this or that Muslim country become like the situation of Palestine, which was occupied by the Jews? A situation where fighting to cleanse it from the occupying Jews is a matter upon which no one disagrees? ¶

The answer, according to those whose arguments we are discussing, is 'yes,' as their words suggest. However, my answer is that the rulings of Shariah are far too precise to treat both situations as one, and consequently apply the same ruling to both: the legitimacy of fighting to cleanse the country from the occupation of these enemies. ¶

At most, the situation in Muslim lands, if the ruler falls into kufr (disbelief) after having been Muslim—if we concede to his disbelief—is that he must be removed from power, as indicated by the Shariah text regarding disputing authority when 'clear disbelief' (kufr bawwah) appears, and as Qadi Iyad stated in what was previously quoted: 'If kufr occurs on his part—that is, the ruler... it is obligatory for the Muslims to rise against him and depose him... if they are able to do so.' ¶

However, no one has said that Muslim lands become legally equivalent to lands seized by disbelievers, and that the method of liberating them from this 'occupation' is to declare jihad as an individual obligation (fard ayn) upon every Muslim in those countries where a man who rules by other than what Allah has revealed has seized power. Rather, the reality here differs from the reality in countries that have fallen under the occupation of colonial enemies. In the case of a ruler's disbelief, the country remains a land owned by Muslims, and Muslims defend it against external aggression. If there are violations regarding non-Muslims obtaining certain government positions, those are transgressions that have their own corresponding Shariah rulings, but they do not strip the country of its status as an Islamic land. ¶

independent, and have instead fallen into an Islamic land that is occupied or under colonial rule! As for the lands occupied by enemies, they are no longer—in reality—lands owned by Muslims, nor do Muslims defend them against the external enemy anymore. Rather, their ownership—in reality—rests with those occupying enemies, and it is they who take charge of defending their occupation of these lands against others, whether Muslims or non-Muslims! Thus, fighting against these occupiers is fighting against colonialist disbelievers, and this is a type of jihad in the way of Allah. ¶

In summary: Considering today's Islamic lands to be 'occupied lands' by enemies simply because those in power there rule by other than what Allah has revealed—and subsequently, that jihad is an obligation upon every individual Muslim whose land the enemy has occupied—I say: viewing the situation in Islamic lands in this manner is an inaccurate description of reality! ¶

We now move on to discuss the final argument of those who hold the positive orientation regarding the issue of fighting to topple an authority that rules by other than what Allah has revealed, and to establish an Islamic state. ¶

4. Discussion of the 'Open Disbelief' (Kufr Bawwah) Argument Perhaps this argument is the strongest one used by proponents of the idea of fighting to establish an Islamic state, due to the clarity of the legitimacy of challenging authority when 'open disbelief' (kufr bawwah) appears, as evidenced by: 'And do not dispute the matter with its people, unless you see open disbelief (kufr bawwah) regarding which you have a proof from Allah' (1). There are also other evidences that preceded in the discussion of 'Fighting Against the Deviation of the Ruler,' so there is no need to repeat them. However, we have already discussed this argument in that study and concluded that this text: '...unless you see open disbelief...' does not apply to Islamic countries today where open disbelief is apparent. This is because the context of the hadiths indicating the legitimacy of fighting upon the appearance of open disbelief, as well as their phrasing, only points to a specific situation for the legitimacy of such fighting, which is the state of transformation and transition from a rule that operates according to the laws of Islam to a subsequent transformation marked by the appearance of open disbelief. This specific condition is what the Shariah texts brought the legitimacy of fighting for. ¶

As for when the rule of disbelief has stabilized, the appearance of open disbelief has persisted, and the situation is no longer a 'transformation'. ¶

As for the texts concerning combat against manifest disbelief (kufr al-bawwah), they do not apply to such a stable state of manifest disbelief in the manner previously detailed in the research specific to this issue; therefore, we shall not repeat the discussion on it. ¶

Thus, we conclude the discussion of the evidence for both the negative and positive trends regarding the issue of combat for the establishment of the Islamic State. ¶

The general observation regarding all these arguments is that they reach out to grasp this issue, yet they are unable to hold onto it because they are far removed from it. Hence, they have been unable to treat it with the precision of one who possesses a thing, scrutinizes it, examines it from all sides, and then issues a judgment upon it! Yet, this is among the most critical issues upon which Islam in society and governance is founded: the issue of the Islamic State and the method of its establishment in life, for the sake of ruling by what Allah has revealed. ¶

Here, we proceed to present the opinion we favor in this matter, accompanied by the evidence that addresses this specific issue. The Prophetic Sunnah has detailed it in such a way that it fits this issue like a garment tailored to a body—it is suitable only for this, and this is suitable only for it. ¶

E - The Opinion We Favor and its Evidence: The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) says: “Pray as you have seen me praying.” He also says: “Take from me your rituals (of Hajj).” And Allah the Almighty says in a general text that encompasses prayer, Hajj, and all other Islamic rulings: “There has certainly been for you in the Messenger of Allah an excellent pattern for anyone whose hope is in Allah and the Last Day and [who] remembers Allah often.” ¶

Based on the preceding, we state: Just as it is incumbent upon us to perform our prayer as the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) performed it, and to perform our Hajj as he performed it, so too must we establish the Islamic State as the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) established it. This is because the Shariah text has designated for us the direction of the exemplar and model in every aspect of our lives, including the issue of establishing the Islamic State. ¶

How, then, did the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) establish it? And did he authorize war and combat for the sake of its establishment or not? This is the issue, this is its scope, and from here its evidence is sought. ¶

As for the discussion on the legitimacy of establishing the Islamic State in principle, before discussing the manner of its establishment, there is no need for lengthy research or deliberation on it, because this legitimacy is a settled matter that no one who possesses any reasonable argument or acceptable proof can dispute. ¶

Dr. Fathi al-Durayni responded to the skepticism of some modern writers(1) on this issue, stating: "Politics in Islamic legislation is not a transient matter that circumstances forced to be adopted as a way to manage the affairs of Muslims in their new society in 'Medina' after the Hijrah. Rather, it was a continuation of what began initially in Mecca before the Hijrah, at the time of the emergence of the Da'wah; this is confirmed by the First and Second Pledges of al-Aqabah(2). Both were true historical contracts between the Messenger (PBUH) and the delegations of Medina, upon which the Islamic State was founded, and the Hijrah was one of the consequences that followed, by the command of Allah the Almighty... As for after the Hijrah, we have seen from the manifestations of state sovereignty, from a practical standpoint, what proves the actual establishment of the state. There is no greater evidence for this than the availability of its elements: society, legislation, territory, and ruling authority, for it is not proven that anyone other than the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) held authority in this new society, or managed the affairs of governance within it..."(3). ¶

Thus, the legitimacy of establishing the Islamic State is an indisputable matter, and we are not here to discuss it! Our inquiry here concerns the method of establishing the Islamic State, and whether it is legitimate to use combat, or to prepare to use combat, for the sake of its establishment or not? ¶

The preceding discourse by Professor Dr. Fathi al-Durayni indicates that the Islamic State was established on the basis of the 'Bay'ah' (pledge of allegiance), as a contract concluded between the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and the delegations of Medina at al-Aqabah. ¶

In another book of his, while discussing the text of the 'Great Pledge of al-Aqabah', he states: "... From the content of this text, which the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) approved—and which thus became a Shariah rule established by the 'Sunnah Taqririyyah' (tacit approval of the Prophet) (1)—principles of the utmost importance and gravity are derived, which we present as follows: ... (He then says): Sixth: Indeed, the Great Pledge of al-Aqabah, having been established as the key to victory... and for the establishment of the Islamic State shortly thereafter, has rendered this covenant and charter a binding obligation upon the neck of every Muslim throughout the eras and generations until the Day of Resurrection..." (2). ¶

If the Great Pledge of al-Aqabah—as Professor Dr. Fathi al-Durayni asserts—was the key to victory and the key to the establishment of the Islamic State, then it follows that the evidence regarding the method for establishing the Islamic State lies within what was contained in this pledge. Hence, we must examine what was stated therein: was there any indication of utilizing war and combat for its establishment or not? ¶

Therefore, we must return to the deliberations that took place during the Pledge of al-Aqabah and the conditions upon which the pledge was based, in order to search therein for the Shariah ruling on this issue of ours. ¶

1 - It is stated in Ibn al-Qayyim's 'Zad al-Ma'ad' as follows: "Narrated Jabir: The Prophet (ﷺ) remained in Mecca for ten years, following people in their dwellings during the seasons, at Jannahl (3), and 'Ukaz (4), saying: 'Who will give me shelter? Who will support me so that I may convey the messages of my Lord, and for him is Paradise?' Yet he would not find anyone to support him or give him shelter, to the extent that a man would travel from Mudar or Yemen to his kin, and his people would say to him: 'Beware of the boy of Quraysh, lest he tempt you away from your faith.' Yet he (the Prophet) would walk among their men, calling them to Allah (Azzawajal)." ¶

And they were pointing at him until Allah sent us from Yathrib. One of us would come to him, believe in him, and he would recite the Quran to him. Then he would return to his family, and they would embrace Islam through his Islam, such that there was no house among the Ansar except that there was a group of Muslims in it, manifesting Islam. Allah then sent us to him; we consulted, gathered, and said: How long will the Messenger of Allah be driven out in the mountains of Makkah, living in fear? We departed until we reached him during the season (of Hajj), and he appointed a meeting with us for the Pledge of Aqabah. His uncle, al-Abbas, said to him, 'O nephew, I do not know who these people are who have come to you; I have knowledge of the people of Yathrib.' We gathered before him one or two at a time. When al-Abbas looked at our faces, he said, 'These are people we do not know; these are youths!' We said, 'O Messenger of Allah! On what terms shall we pledge allegiance to you?' He said: 'You pledge to me to listen and obey, in enthusiasm and laziness, to spend in hardship and ease, to enjoin good and forbid evil, and that in the cause of Allah, you will not fear the blame of any critic. You shall support me when I come to you, and protect me just as you protect yourselves, your wives, and your children, and for you is Paradise.' We stood up to pledge, and As'ad ibn Zurarah—the youngest of the seventy—took his hand and said, 'Slow down, O people of Yathrib! We have not crossed the deserts to reach him except because we know he is the Messenger of Allah. Taking him out today means parting from all the Arabs, the killing of your elite, and that swords will bite you. If you can endure that, then take him, and your reward is with Allah. But if you fear for yourselves, then leave him, for that is more excusable for you before Allah.' They replied, 'O As'ad, remove your hand from us; by Allah, we will not abandon this pledge nor renounce it.' We stood to him one by one, and he took our pledge and set conditions, promising us Paradise in return for that.' ¶

It is stated in the authentication of this text: It was recorded by Ahmad and al-Bayhaqi, authenticated by al-Hakim, and al-Dhahabi agreed with him. Ibn Kathir said in 'Al-Sirah' that this chain of narration is Jayyid (good) according to the criteria of Muslim, and Ibn Hibban also authenticated it. (1) ¶

2- In 'Sirah an-Nabi' by Ibn Hisham: 'Ibn Ishaq said: In the pledge of war—when Allah permitted His Messenger to engage in combat—there were conditions other than those stipulated in the first Aqabah... This is because Allah the Almighty had not previously permitted His Messenger to engage in war. But when Allah granted him permission, and the Messenger of Allah pledged with them at the final Aqabah to fight the red and the black (all of mankind), he took a commitment for himself and stipulated conditions upon the people for their Lord, and in return for fulfilling them, he promised them Paradise.' (1) Zad al-Ma'ad by Ibn al-Qayyim, edited by: Shu'ayb al-Arna'ut and Abd al-Qadir al-Arna'ut, Vol. 3 / 45-46. ¶

Then he narrates from Ubadah bin al-Samit (may Allah be pleased with him), who was one of the leaders (nuqaba) at the Second Pledge of Aqaba. He narrates from him saying: ¶

'We pledged allegiance to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ for war... to listen and obey, whether in our hardship or ease, in our pleasure or our displeasure, even if others are preferred over us, that we will not dispute the authority of those who possess it, and that we will speak the truth wherever we are, fearing no blame for the sake of Allah from any critic.'(1) ¶

3. It is mentioned in some narrations that which 'As'ad bin Zurarah' said during this pledge while addressing the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, the text of which is: '...You have invited us while we are a group of honor and strength; no one can covet that a man from outside us should rule over us. You have been isolated by your people and forsaken by your paternal uncles, and that is a difficult position; so we have responded to you in this.'(2) ¶

This is some of what came regarding the Pledge of Aqaba and its clauses, as it relates to our issue, the issue of: 'The method of establishing an Islamic state, and the ruling on the use of combat for that purpose?' ¶

We conclude several points from the above, including: 1. That the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, during the Meccan period, used to seek 'nusrah' (support/aid) from the leaders of the Arab tribes and their men who came for Hajj, so that he could convey the Islamic call to the people, and they could embrace it without fear of tribulation or oppression. 2. That the request for support for the Islamic call was responded to by some of the people of power and influence from Yathrib. They supported the Islamic call in their lands, while the Messenger of Allah ﷺ remained in Mecca. Soon, Islam spread in Medina, and its atmosphere resonated with the Islamic call, 'until there remained no house among the homes of the Ansar but that it contained a group of Muslims who manifested Islam,' as mentioned in the first narration. Such an expression does not imply that all the people of Medina had become Muslims, nor even that the Muslims had become the majority; rather, it indicates that the atmosphere in Medina had become one of receptivity to the Islamic call. ¶

(1) Sirat al-Nabi ﷺ by Ibn Hisham (al-Rawd al-Unuf: 206/2). (2) Kanz al-Ummal fi Sunan al-Aqwal wal-Af'al, Vol. 1/326 - Hadith No: 1525. ¶

3. The awareness of those representing the Muslims in Medina—the people of power and influence—that they could bring the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) to their city, provide him protection, offer support (nusrah) for the Da'wah, and establish the Islamic state on their land, even though they were not among the famous leaders. In fact, as al-Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet (ﷺ)—who was an expert on the people of Yathrib and their leaders—described them: "We do not know these people; they are youngsters!" Yet, despite this, he felt the tone of sincerity in their speech, the current of strong determination in their souls, and their commitment to fulfill the purpose for which they had come, even if it meant the killing of their own senior leaders and notables. ¶

4. Implementing the covenant of support (nusrah) for the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) as the leader of Medina—meaning, as the head of the Islamic state that would rule by Islam—begins from the moment of the Messenger of Allah’s (ﷺ) arrival in Medina: "And that you support me when I come to you," meaning, from the time of his establishment of the Islamic state in Medina. ¶

5. Naming this pledge the 'Pledge of War' (Bay'at al-Harb), because it contained a mandate for the obligation of war and combat against anyone who opposed the new situation to be established in Medina, even if the forces hostile to this new order belonged to the 'red and black' of people (all humanity). It is stated in al-Sirah al-Halabiyyah: "Meaning: to war against whoever wars against him, whether from the non-Arabs or the Arabs." ¶

6. Taking the oath from those of power and influence who prepared to bear arms to protect the new situation. I say: taking the oath from them to hear and obey the new leadership, and not to dispute the authority with those to whom it belongs. Whoever the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) appoints, or whomever the Muslims choose to govern and hold positions—even if they were not from the Ansar—they must not dispute with the people of authority on the pretext that they are more entitled than others to hold the reins of power; because it was through their support that the Islamic state was established, and through their readiness to die that the Islamic Da'wah was victorious. "We pledged to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) in the Pledge of War... to hear and obey in our hardship and our ease, in our pleasure and our displeasure, even if others are preferred over us, and that we shall not dispute the authority with its people..." ¶

These are the most important matters upon which the Islamic state was founded during the time of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ), and from them, the legitimacy of combat and the use of force against all who stand in its way is clearly manifested. ¶

Its establishment takes place simply upon the arrival of the one who has received the bay'ah (oath of allegiance) for the leadership of this state in the country where it has been decided to establish the Islamic State. While it is true that not a single drop of blood was shed during the establishment of this Islamic State, this was not due to a prohibition on fighting for the sake of establishing the Islamic State. The Shariah texts related to the Pledge of Aqabah affirmed the legitimacy of fighting for this purpose, leaving no room for the slightest doubt regarding its lawfulness. What actually happened was that when the hostile powers realized that the ground had been swept from beneath them without them noticing, and they saw that the new leaders of the country were determined to crush any suspicious movement or counter-revolution—and were indeed prepared to stand against all the Arabs, and even against all of mankind (the red and the black) should they threaten the Islamic Da'wah and the new state—I say: when these hostile powers sensed this resolve from the new leaders of the country, they were suppressed against their will. They retreated into themselves, ruminating on their animosity within their sick, darkened hearts, and even resorted to hypocrisy toward the new Da'wah and the new authority. The authority was well aware of them and of what their hearts concealed, yet it showed generous tolerance, extending them every form of honor and indulgence so long as they did not manifest what they kept hidden and did not engage in any activity that would put the Da'wah or the state in danger. Based on this, the method for establishing the Islamic State today—after it has ceased to exist and a period of time has passed since its disappearance—is the same method that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) followed for its establishment. This is achieved through several matters: 1. Creating an atmosphere in a Muslim country that is responsive to the Islamic Da'wah, until there is a public opinion that believes in this Da'wah and demands the ideas and systems it calls for, while being prepared to support it and sacrifice for its cause. 2. Once this occurs, or if such responsiveness to the Da'wah is already present in any country that possesses the foundations of a state—as was the situation in Medina during the time of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) in relation to the circumstances of that era—then the search begins for the 'Ahl al-Nusrah' (people of support) capable of handing over power to the one for whom the bay'ah has been taken as the leader of the Islamic State, so that the power possessed by the Ahl al-Nusrah may... ¶

The responsibility of these 'Ahl al-Nusrah' (people of support) is to crush any rebellion against the new order, and to confront any potential external force attempting to strike this new order. ¶

3. Once these Ahl al-Nusrah are assembled, the Bay'ah (oath of allegiance) shall be taken for the person selected as the head of authority, the establishment of the Islamic State shall be proclaimed, the existing system shall be transformed into an Islamic system, and the forces possessed by the Ahl al-Nusrah shall be placed on high alert for a decisive blow against anyone who dares to fight against the governance by what Allah has revealed, which is the demand of the public opinion in the country. ¶

Here: - If all other forces remain silent on this new situation and pledge their loyalty to it, the transition will be peaceful, just as the transition was during the time of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), and everyone in positions of authority shall remain in their places in light of the rulings of Islam and the interest of the Islamic State. - However, if some forces rebel to strike at this state, then the text of the Second Bay'ah of Aqaba establishes the legitimacy of combat to ensure the protection of the new order. In this case, the transition becomes a bloody one, for which a text has been provided to justify it. ¶

This is the method for establishing the Islamic State today. This is the Shariah ruling on the issue of combat for the establishment of the Islamic State, as indicated by the Second Bay'ah of Aqaba, upon which the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) established the Islamic State. ¶

At this point, a question may arise: Military units might stand in the way of the establishment of the Islamic State, and their commanders might order them to fight, and they will inevitably include Muslims. So, what is the Shariah ruling on fighting in their ranks or fighting against them? ¶

The answer is: Fighting in their ranks is prohibited (Haram), because they are a rebellious force that has revolted against the authority of the Islamic State. Therefore, every Muslim in those military units must withdraw from them, and if they are forced to remain, they must not perform any role that leads to the shedding of the blood of the Muslims who are the people of justice (those on the side of truth). ¶