Chapter 46

The answer is that it has been narrated by Al-Qurtubi in this regard as follows: ¶

Al-Mahdawi and others mentioned on the authority of Al-Thawri that he said: 'Jihad is a voluntary act (tatawwu').' Ibn Atiyyah stated: 'In my view, this expression was only in response to a questioner who asked about jihad, so it was said to him: That is voluntary.' Based on this, Al-Thawri's view that jihad is voluntary is not absolute or applicable in every situation. It applies only when jihad has been established and the communal obligation (fard al-kifayah) has been fulfilled. Thus, anyone who undertakes jihad after that, once the communal obligation has been met, does so as a voluntary act, not as a mandatory one. ¶

There is a narration from Al-Thawri that supports this interpretation. Abu Ubayd mentioned that Sufyan al-Thawri used to say: 'It is not a mandatory duty (fard), but it is not permissible for the people to agree to abandon it, and the action of some suffices for others.' Al-Jassas comments on this narration, saying: 'If this is indeed the view of Sufyan, then his position is that it is a communal obligation (fard al-kifayah), which is in agreement with the school of our scholars that we have mentioned.' This concerns the idea that the ruling on jihad is recommendation (nadb) rather than obligation (wujub), and regarding those who hold this view, alongside a discussion of their evidence and the reconciliation of the 'recommendation' view with the majority's position that jihad is a communal obligation. ¶

B - As for the sphere in which the ruling of jihad being recommended (mandub) is established according to those who hold it? The answer is that it is solely in the sphere of offensive jihad (jihad al-hujumi). That is, the Muslims initiating combat against the disbelievers for the sake of conveying the call of Islam to them and implementing Islam upon them. This jihad is recommended, as has been attributed to Ibn Shubrumah, Al-Thawri, and those who share their opinion; it is not a mandatory duty for the Muslims to undertake it, contrary to the view of the majority who state that this type of jihad is also mandatory. ¶

As for the sphere of defensive jihad (jihad al-difa'i), those who hold that jihad is recommended agree with the majority that jihad in this field—the field of defense—is a mandatory duty for the Muslims to undertake, and not merely a recommended matter. ¶

It is stated in Al-Siyar al-Kabir: 'Al-Thawri used to say: Combat with the polytheists (mushrikin) is not an obligation (fard) unless the initiation comes from them; at that point, fighting them becomes mandatory for defense—based on the apparent meaning of His saying: ﴿But if they fight you, then kill them﴾ and His saying: ﴿And fight the polytheists all together as they fight you all together.﴾' ¶

Furthermore, it has been previously indicated that restricting the obligation of combat in these two verses to being a response to aggression was a stance specific to an earlier stage in the history of Islam in Medina. Subsequently, the legislation for Muslims to fight the disbelievers was revealed in an absolute sense in a later stage—that is, regardless of whether the disbelievers were aggressors (as was the rule in the earlier stage) or were not aggressors (as brought forth in the later ruling). This was for the purpose of implementing the Islamic system upon them if they refused to adopt it through peaceful means. ¶

However, the intent behind this jurisprudential text and the reasoning contained within it is that Imam al-Thawri, like all other Muslim jurists, affirms the obligation of jihad in the realm of defense. ¶

Accordingly, the point of disagreement between al-Thawri and those who hold his view, on one side, and the majority of scholars (jumhur), on the other, is confined solely to offensive jihad (jihad al-hujumi). ¶

Imam al-Jassas states: 'The point of disagreement between them is: when there is resistance against the enemy such that there is no fear of the enemy prevailing over them—is it permissible for the Muslims to abandon jihad against them until they accept Islam or pay the jizya? It was the view of Ibn Umar, Ata, Amr ibn Dinar, and Ibn Shubruma that it is permissible for the Imam and the Muslims not to attack them and to refrain from them. Others said: It is incumbent upon the Imam and the Muslims to fight them always until they accept Islam or pay the jizya...' ¶

This is the point of disagreement between the two groups, and this is the subject of the final paragraph of this point, which is: ¶

C— The implication of the view that offensive jihad is recommended (mandub) and not obligatory (fard) according to those who hold this view: The implication of this statement—as al-Jassas mentioned just before—is that for those who do not consider jihad obligatory, it follows that... ¶

Their opinion implies that it is permissible for the Imam and the Muslims not to engage in jihad for the purpose of conveying the call of Islam (da'wah), or to offer the choice between Islam, jizya, or war. However, despite this, if the Islamic state wishes to undertake jihad and offer other states the choice between Islam or jizya—meaning joining the Islamic state and having the rulings of Islam and jizya applied to them—or war, aimed at annexing those states into the Islamic state by force after they refuse to join voluntarily, I state: If the Islamic state wishes to undertake this jihad for the aforementioned purpose, then such jihad is legitimate (mashru'), and in fact recommended (mandub). It is incumbent upon the Muslims—army, leaders, and individuals—to obey the holder of authority in this matter, and it is not permissible for anyone to refrain from it, even for those who hold the opinion that jihad is recommended and not obligatory, due to the obligation of obeying the Imam in what he commands. This is what is reported from the jurists who hold this view, as mentioned by Ibn al-Arabi, who stated: 'A group of jurists said: Jihad, after the conquest of Mecca, is not an obligation unless the Imam summons one of them. This was said by Sufyan al-Thawri, Sahnun inclined towards it, and some attributed the same thought to Ibn Umar'(1). Thus, the text indicates that the Imam's call (istinfar) for this recommended jihad—even according to those who say jihad is recommended—makes this jihad mandatory for those summoned, and it is not permissible for them to refrain from it. This is the implication of the statement that jihad for the sake of conveying the call, rather than for defense, is a recommended matter. With this, we conclude the second point of this research and move on to the third. 3 - Third Point: Modern writers who claim that jihad is defensive. (a) What is the reality of the idea they advocate? (b) A comparison between the traditional view that the ruling on jihad is recommendation (nadb) and the modern view that jihad is defensive only and cannot be offensive. (a) The reality of the idea that jihad is defensive only. ¶

We have already discussed this issue in detail in the previous sections of this treatise. It is appropriate here to present a summary of the perspective held by some Muslim writers to fix this concept in our minds, in preparation for comparing it with the traditional view which posits that jihad is merely recommended (mandub) and not obligatory, a view attributed to al-Thawri and those who held his opinion before and after him. ¶

- Tawfiq Ali Wahba states: 'It is not permissible for Muslims to commit aggression against non-Islamic nations without justification, unless these nations are working against Islam or preparing to attack it. Thus, it becomes necessary to stand against these nations and deter them from their intentions... He then adds: 'Thereby, the just nature of Islamic war becomes clear, as it is always a defensive war aimed at repelling or preventing aggression.' (1) ¶

- Abdullah bin Zaid Al Mahmud states: 'Islam makes peace with those who make peace with it, and it only fights those who fight it, or those who obstruct the spread of its message... for by preventing the delivery of the message, they are considered aggressors against the religion and all of humanity.' (2) ¶

- Prohibiting jihad except in the case of infidel aggression against Islam and Muslims, or preparations thereof, or in the case of preventing Muslims from spreading the Islamic call—I say: prohibiting jihad except in these two situations, and considering jihad in any other context as an act of aggression by Muslims against other states, implies that states which have not committed aggression against Islam or Muslims, and have not prevented the spread of the Islamic call within their lands, and whose stance toward Islam is limited to refusing to embrace it, refusing to hand over authority to Muslims, and refusing to join the Islamic state—such states, according to the idea that jihad is a defensive war in the broadest sense of defense, it would be forbidden for Muslims to wage jihad against them until their people pay the jizya while being humbled, that is, being subject to the Islamic system. This is because the three known choices presented to non-Islamic states and peoples... ¶

Islamic (state), namely: Islam, or jizya, or war—is not directed, according to this idea, except against those who are actual or potential aggressors. This is the reality of the concept advocated by proponents of the modern view that jihad is exclusively a defensive war. B - We now come to draw a comparison between this modern concept and the classical view, which states that jihad is prescribed only as a matter of recommendation (nadb), not obligation (wujub), a view attributed to Ibn Shubruma, al-Thawri, and others, contrary to the position held by the majority (jumhur). Upon comparing the two concepts, the following becomes clear: The modern concept, which holds that jihad is prescribed only for defense, allows the Islamic state to offer Islam or the jizya to other states; however, if those states reject both offers, the Islamic state is not permitted to declare jihad against them so long as they have not closed their doors to the Islamic call (da'wah) and have not opened the doors of aggression against Muslims. Meanwhile, the classical concept attributed to a minority of jurists, such as Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri, calls upon the Islamic state to offer Islam or the jizya to other states. If they reject both, the Islamic state has the right to declare jihad against them—indeed, it is encouraged to do so—but this is by way of recommendation (istihbab) rather than obligation, even if those states have not committed any aggression against Muslims or obstructed the progress of the Islamic call. If the authority figure commands the army and individual Muslims outside the army to join the ranks of this recommended jihad, it becomes obligatory for the army and the Muslims to obey him in that regard. Thus, it becomes evident that there is a vast gulf between the modern idea that jihad is solely defensive... ¶

And between the old idea attributed to a few jurists that jihad, outside the state of defense, is a matter of recommendation (nadb) rather than obligation (wujub). Thus, the precision of Dr. Arif Khalil’s statement in this regard is also revealed: 'Most contemporary jurists hold the view of al-Thawri and Ibn Shubruma...' (1). So, where is the concordance between the two views? These many contemporaries argue for the prohibition of jihad in non-defensive states, while that small number of ancient jurists argued for the desirability (istihbab) of jihad in non-defensive states. There is another matter mentioned earlier where Dr. 'Arif's precision failed him, which is his claim that al-Zamakhshari holds the view of Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri—meaning that jihad is recommended and not obligatory. This is what the author said in this regard: 'It was narrated from Ibn Shubruma, al-Thawri, and others that jihad is voluntary and not a fard (obligation)... and Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri have ancient supporters, among them al-Jahiz and al-Zamakhshari.' The author then cited the text provided by al-Zamakhshari and concluded from it that he goes toward the opinion of the desirability of jihad, not its obligation— 'Al-Zamakhshari says: The matter is left to what the Imam sees as the interest of Islam and its people, whether in war or peace; it is not definitive that they must always fight, or always accept a truce' (2). I say: This statement of al-Zamakhshari contains nothing that indicates his denial of the obligatory nature (fardiyyah) of jihad or limiting the ruling on it to desirability and recommendation (3), and following what Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri went to. ¶

This matter... in fact, it is what many fuqaha (jurists) (1) have stated, the details of which will be provided in subsequent research. It is astonishing that Dr. Arif Khalil, while rejecting the attempt by contemporary writers to confine jihad solely to a defensive concept, and their following the opinion of Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri in this—assuming that these two Imams restrict jihad to this concept—and while also rejecting the contemporary claim that this opinion represents the vast majority of classical fuqaha (in order to gain more support and promotion for this view), as if these two illustrious Imams represent that vast majority of jurists—I say: in this context, we see Dr. Arif Khalil retracting and expressing his admiration for the aforementioned statement of al-Zamakhshari, from which he had previously understood a validation of the view of Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri. That is: that jihad is recommended (mandub) and not obligatory (wajib), or according to Dr. Arif's understanding, that it restricts jihad to the defensive concept alone. This is what the writer himself rejects. ¶

And this is Dr. Arif's statement in this regard. He says verbatim: «May Allah forgive Sheikh Abu Zahra, for it is as if he saw the vast majority of fuqaha restricted to Sufyan al-Thawri and Ibn Shubruma, and that the minority are the followers of the four madhahib (schools of thought) and those who followed them among the jurists. He has strayed from the truth in this judgment (2)... Then he says: And the majority of contemporary jurists hold the opinion of Sufyan (3).» Then the writer attacks the attempts of some contemporary authors to manipulate Shariah texts to move in the direction stating that jihad is only defensive, saying: «This group has exhausted itself in searching for proofs and interpreting them in a forced manner to support its opinion, and interpreting the noble verses and hadiths that command the absolute fighting of the disbelievers... Then he says: I am pleased with what al-Zamakhshari went towards in his interpretation of the Almighty’s saying: «And if they incline to peace, then incline to it and rely upon Allah» (4), as he says: That the matter of the disbelievers, their near ones and their far ones, is such that the nearest ones are the most obligatory [to fight]... and thus it is incumbent upon the people of every region to fight those who are adjacent to them, as long as the people of another region are not forced to [assist] them...!» (1) See for example: Bidayat al-Mujtahid by Ibn Rushd (Al-Hidayah bi-Takhrij Ahadith al-Bidayah: 39/D). And Al-Mughni by Ibn Qudama: 10/517. And Al-Sharh al-Kabir by Abu al-Faraj al-Maqdisi: 10/422 and 573. (2) Al-Alaqat al-Kharijiyya li-Dawlat al-Khilafa, pp. 280-281. And see Al-Alaqat al-Dawliyya fi al-Islam by Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra, p. 52. (3) Al-Alaqat al-Kharijiyya li-Dawlat al-Khilafa, pp. 280-281. (4) Surah al-Anfal, verse 61. ¶

It is contingent upon what the Imam deems to be in the best interest of Islam and its people, whether it be war or peace. It is not mandatory that they must always fight, nor that they must always accept a truce. (1) I say: Perhaps it is not surprising that the author expresses admiration here for a statement he had previously rejected, based on his assumption that it aligns with the trend of restricting Jihad solely to the sphere of defense. This is because a second reading of al-Zamakhshari’s statement—wherein he expressed admiration for this view—is actually regarding the fact that Jihad is dependent upon the Imam’s judgment, and that it is a tool in his hands to be used according to the public interest (maslaha), regardless of what the ruling on Jihad is in the view of al-Zamakhshari. ¶

In summary, regarding the point we are addressing: when comparing the modern notion that Jihad is strictly defensive with the view held by a minority of classical jurists—that non-defensive Jihad is a matter of recommendation (nadb) rather than obligation (wujub)—the disparity between them becomes clear. They only agree that neither school advocates for the obligation of non-defensive Jihad; in fact, they argue for the prohibition of such Jihad. Consequently, there is no obedience to the Imam or the authority if he orders it, because there is no obedience to a created being in that which is forbidden by the Shariah. In contrast, the classical view held by the minority of jurists, while not claiming that non-defensive Jihad is obligatory, does assert that it is recommended (mustahabb). This results in the obligation to obey the Imam or the authority if he commands it, because obedience to the Imam in matters that are not sinful is mandatory—all the more so when he commands something that is recommended. (2) ¶

Based on this: - It is incorrect to claim that those who limit Jihad to the defensive sphere—even within a broad definition of defense—are following the path of Ibn Shubruma. ¶

(1) Al-Alaqat al-Kharijiyya fi Dawlat al-Khilafa: 280-283. (2) See: Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: 1/871. I say: We established the lack of obedience to the Imam if he commands non-defensive Jihad according to the modern perspective based on the premise that the Imam himself believes this Jihad to be forbidden, yet he commands it regardless, showing disregard for the Shariah in what he has adopted. However, if the Imam holds this Jihad to be legitimate, and the one commanded holds it to be forbidden, then the one commanded must execute the Imam’s order; for the Imam’s order settles the disagreement in matters that are subject to scholarly dispute. ¶

and al-Thawri; because it is erroneous to say that these two Imams restrict the concept of jihad to defense and prohibit non-defensive jihad. - It is also erroneous to say that al-Zamakhshari holds the view of these two Imams based on his previous statements. - Furthermore, it is erroneous to say that what Ibn Shubruma and al-Thawri assert regarding the matter at hand—under any interpretation—is the same as what the vast majority of classical jurists assert. Thus, we conclude the third point of this research, and move to the fourth and final point. ¶

4 - The Fourth Point: Is jihad or fighting the enemy sometimes considered mandub (recommended) by jurists other than the aforementioned minority? ¶

We have learned previously that non-defensive jihad is considered mandub, rather than obligatory, by a minority of jurists such as Ibn Shubruma, al-Thawri, and those like them, according to their well-known positions (although it is possible to interpret their view in a way that aligns with the majority of Muslim jurists, who argue that non-defensive jihad is a fard kifaya (communal obligation) if the Imam or the authority in charge deems it to serve a preponderant interest). ¶

However, in this final point of our research, we ask: Are there not cases or scenarios of jihad or fighting the enemy where such combat is considered mandub rather than obligatory by jurists other than those mentioned? ¶

Answer: Yes, and we will present below specific cases of jihad and forms of fighting the enemy regarding which jurists have stated that they carry the ruling of mandub or voluntary action, rather than obligation. However, in many of these cases, the ruling of being mandub does not apply to jihad per se, but rather to those specific situations. Nevertheless, jihad as such takes the ruling of fard 'ayn (individual obligation) if it occurs in a state of defense or general mobilization (istinfar) for those mobilized, or at the time of confrontation for those who have encountered the enemy. It carries the ruling of fard kifaya in circumstances other than those. These are some of the cases and forms in which jurists have stated that fighting the enemy takes the ruling of... ¶

Tatawwu' (voluntary act), Nadb (recommendation), or Istihbab (desirability), and other similar jurisprudential terms that are generally synonymous. ¶

1. When Jihad is a Fard Kifayah (communal obligation) and some Muslims are already performing it in a way that suffices and renders the participation of others unnecessary, the burden of sin is lifted from the rest of the Muslims despite their absence from the battlefields. However, if individuals or groups of Muslims desire to join the caravan of Mujahideen, does the Jihad of these newcomers—whose participation is dispensable—take on the ruling of Fard Kifayah, or does it take on the ruling of Tatawwu' and Nadb? ¶

- A similar scenario exists when the Fard Kifayah of Jihad is discharged because the Muslims have performed the minimum requirement for the year, which is once according to the majority of scholars. What, then, is the ruling for additional instances thereafter? Do they take on the ruling of Fard Kifayah as well, or do they take on the ruling of Tatawwu' and Nadb? ¶

I say: Both these scenarios can be derived from these two rulings. Jurists have mentioned regarding the funeral prayer (Salat al-Janazah), which is a Fard Kifayah, that according to the soundest opinion, if one male performs it, the obligation is met; if more people pray it, or one group prays after another, the entire act counts as the obligation. ¶

There is also an opinion that maintains that whatever exceeds the fulfillment of the Fard Kifayah counts as a Nafl (supererogatory) act. Thus, it can be argued here that whatever exceeds the fulfillment of Fard Kifayah in Jihad can be considered Fard Kifayah as well, just as it can be considered Nafl and Tatawwu'. Some are inclined to favor the view that the surplus amount is Fard Kifayah because the reward of an obligatory act exceeds the reward of a supererogatory act, as previously established. ¶

We are not here to present the foundational (Usuli) background of every opinion or to adopt a specific stance on the issue. Rather, we are here to mention specific cases and forms of Jihad which jurists have stated fall under the category of Nadb (recommendation) rather than Wujub (obligation). ¶

Furthermore, jurists have utilized terms such as 'tatawwu' (voluntary act), 'tabarru' (volunteering), and 'istihbab' (desirability) to describe such cases and scenarios in jihad, all of which signify recommendation (nadb) rather than obligation (wujub). - It is stated in al-Muhadhdhab regarding the ruling of jihad: 'It is recommended to engage in it frequently . . . and the minimum that suffices is once every year'(1). - In Abu al-Faraj al-Maqdisi's al-Sharh al-Kabir: 'The most virtuous of voluntary acts is jihad'(2). - And in Ibn Qudamah's al-Mughni, in the context of interpreting the action of Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak in leaving the fight against the Persians (from among the disbelievers) while they were near him, and moving to the Roman front to fight there, even though it was far from him . . . it says: 'And this, Allah knows best, Ibn al-Mubarak only did because he was a volunteer (mutabarri') in jihad, and sufficiency (kifayah) was already achieved by others from the diwan (army register) and the soldiers of the Muslims. A volunteer has the option to abstain from jihad entirely, and he is free to fight wherever he wishes and with whomever he wishes'(3). - Also in al-Mughni: 'If his parents are Muslims, he shall not engage in voluntary jihad except with their permission'(4). - It also states: 'And if he sets out for voluntary jihad with their permission, and they forbid him from it after he has traveled, and before it becomes an obligation upon him, then he must return'(5). These are some of the jurisprudential texts in which terms were used indicating that whoever performs acts beyond the minimum threshold that fulfills the communal obligation (fard al-kifayah) is considered a volunteer (mutatawwi') in his jihad. 2 - When a Muslim mujahid faces a situation during combat where he is trapped between two dire choices: - Either to fight until death, as it appears, or to surrender himself to captivity . . . the ruling is: ¶

It is recommended (mandub) to continue fighting until one attains the honor of martyrdom, even though the second option (surrender) is permissible. ¶

- In 'Al-Sharh al-Kabir' by Abu al-Faraj al-Maqdisi, it is stated: "If one fears captivity, it is better for him to fight until he is killed rather than surrendering himself, because he will attain the reward of martyrdom... and will be spared from the oppression of the disbelievers through torture, enslavement, and fitnah (tribulation)"(1). He then provided evidence for this from the incident of al-Raji' in the Prophetic biography, where some companions surrendered to the disbelievers, taking the concession (rukhsah), while others refused captivity and continued fighting until they were all martyred, adhering to the resolve (azimiyyah)(2). ¶

3 - Similarly, if the siege of the disbelievers intensifies upon an Islamic city—may Allah forbid—and its people have no option left but surrender, which ends in collective liquidation, or death under siege, or going out to fight until death... in this case, it is recommended to go out to fight and attain martyrdom. ¶

- In 'Qawanin al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyya', it is stated: "When a city is besieged and they become weak, Rabi'ah said: 'Going out to fight is more beloved to me than dying of hunger'"(3). ¶

4 - Among the rulings of individual combat (mubarazah) between Muslims and disbelievers in war is that some of its forms fall under the category of recommendation (istihbab)... It may be useful on this occasion to present its rulings across its various forms. ¶

- In 'Al-Mughni', it is stated: "Mubarazah is divided into three categories: recommended (mustahabb), permissible (mubah), and disliked (makruh). As for the recommended: When a strong disbeliever (ilj) challenges to a duel, it is recommended for one who knows he possesses strength and courage to duel him with the permission of the commander; because it serves as a defense for the Muslims and demonstrates their strength. The permissible: For a brave man to initiate the challenge, it is permissible but not recommended; because there is no necessity for it, and there is a risk that he might be defeated, which would break the hearts of the Muslims. However, since he is brave and confident in himself, it is permissible for him because, according to appearances, he is likely to be victorious. The disliked: For the weak—meaning weak in strength—who lacks confidence in himself to go out for a duel." ¶

Therefore, he is discouraged from single combat (mubaraazah) because it may lead to the demoralization of the Muslims should he be killed. ¶

5. Furthermore, a single Muslim fighter engaging a large number of enemy troops and confronting them—this includes what is termed 'inghimas' (plunging into the enemy ranks). The majority of jurists (fuqaha) consider this 'inghimas' and such single combat commendable if it results in a benefit for the Muslims, even if the outcome is martyrdom, as is often the case in such situations. ¶

- In 'Subul al-Salam', regarding the issue of one person attacking a large number of enemies, it is stated, quoting Ibn Hajar: 'The majority have explicitly stated that if it stems from extreme courage and the belief that it will strike fear into the enemy, or embolden the Muslims against them, or other valid objectives, then it is good. However, if it is mere recklessness, it is forbidden, especially if it leads to the weakening of the Muslims.' ¶

- In 'Qawanin al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyya': 'Single combat by one against an army is deemed commendable. Others have said: It is makruh (disliked), as it constitutes casting oneself into destruction.' ¶

We have detailed the Shariah rulings concerning the various conditions of 'inghimas' or a single person charging at a large number of enemies in the discussion on 'Qital al-Gharah' (Raiding Combat) in the first chapter. ¶

6. Among the scenarios in which fighting the enemy is recommended without reaching the level of obligation (wujub) are the following: ¶

- In non-defensive Jihad, while war is ongoing between Muslims and disbelievers, if it becomes clear that the balance of power has tipped in favor of the enemy by more than double... in this case, it is permissible for the Muslims to withdraw from the battlefield, provided that their withdrawal does not result in a greater harm than the harm of standing firm, as will be detailed in a future discussion... but in this situation where withdrawal is permissible... ¶

It is recommended (mustahabb) to remain steadfast and continue fighting when the Islamic leadership, in light of its calculations, prioritizes any of the following possibilities: ¶

- The Muslim army winning the battle, or preserving the army and preventing its annihilation. - Or, if it is highly probable that the Muslim army has fallen into a trap where its end is inevitable, whether it fights or withdraws, and there is no way to save it. In all these cases, it is recommended for Muslims to exercise patience by remaining firm on the battlefield, standing against the enemy, and confronting the forces of kufr no matter how great they may be, even though withdrawal is permissible for them. ¶

In these situations, the books of Fiqh state the following: ¶

- Al-Shirazi said: 'If the number of disbelievers exceeds twice the number of Muslims, they are permitted to turn away... but if they strongly suspect that they will not perish, it is better to remain steadfast so that the Muslims do not become demoralized.'(1) - Abu al-Faraj al-Maqdisi said: 'If the enemy is more than twice the number of Muslims and the Muslims strongly suspect victory, it is better for them to remain steadfast due to the benefit (maslahah) in doing so, although it is permissible for them to withdraw... And if they strongly suspect annihilation whether they remain or withdraw, it is better for them to remain steadfast.'(2) ¶

In conclusion, these are some of the situations and scenarios in which the ruling of mandub (recommended) and mustahabb applies to fighting enemies, as stated in the books of Islamic Fiqh. ¶

Furthermore, our intention in this final point of our research is not to conduct an exhaustive survey of all such states and scenarios; indeed, that is fundamentally impossible. The decision regarding the merit (maslahah) of entering a battle or continuing it is subject to a vast number of considerations, especially in modern warfare and its complexities. These considerations can only be known in light of current realities and the changes that occur within them. Hence, it is difficult to limit the cases and scenarios in which the ruling on fighting is one of recommendation (nadb) and preference (istihbab). ¶

Finally, it is worth noting that the ruling of desirability (istihbab) in combat, which allows for the possibility of withdrawal, applies only to those who hold military decision-making authority. As for those subject to such decisions—whether they are commanders, regular soldiers, or irregular fighters—they are obligated to adhere to the directives issued, whether to stand firm or to withdraw. However, if the decision leaves the choice to the individual fighters to withdraw or fight due to certain circumstances that necessitate such an option, then the judgment in that instance rests with the fighter himself. ¶

This obligation we have mentioned, to abide by the military or warfare decisions issued by the leadership, falls under the principle of the obligation to obey the Imam. ¶

It is stated in Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: 'It is appropriate for the Imam... to appoint over them [- i.e., the mujahideen -] someone who is insightful regarding the affairs of war and its strategies... and they are obligated to obey him, for disobeying the commander is haram (forbidden), unless the majority agree that it causes harm, in which case the majority is to be followed' (1). ¶

With this, we conclude the discussion on whether jihad is considered recommended (mandub), and we move on to a new topic. ¶

(1) Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: 3/361. ¶

It is narrated on the authority of Abu Hurairah (may Allah be pleased with him) that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: 'Allah the Almighty has said: Whosoever shows enmity to a Wali (friend) of Mine, then I have declared war against him. And My servant does not draw near to Me with anything more loved to Me than what I have made obligatory upon him. And My servant continues to draw near to Me with optional deeds (nawafil) until I love him. And when I love him, I become his hearing with which he hears, his sight with which he sees, his hand with which he strikes, and his foot with which he walks. If he asks Me, I will surely give to him; and if he seeks refuge with Me, I will surely grant him refuge.' (Reported by Al-Bukhari). ¶

Fourth Discussion: Jihad - Is it Mubah (Permissible)? ¶

We will address this discussion through the following points: ¶

1 - First Point: What is the definition of 'Mubah' (permissible) in Islamic legal terminology? 2 - Second Point: Is it possible for the legal ruling (hukm) in some cases of jihad to be that of 'ibahah' (permissibility)? 3 - Third Point: A review of some of those cases in which combatting the enemy takes on the ruling of permissibility. ¶

1 - First Point: What is the definition of 'Mubah' in Islamic legal terminology? Dr. Muhammad al-Zuhayli cited two definitions of 'Mubah' from the scholars of Usul al-Fiqh, stating the following: 'The first definition is that which the Lawgiver (al-Shari') has given the mukallaf (legally responsible person) the choice between doing and leaving... He then said: The second definition: Al-Shawkani defined Mubah as that for which one is neither praised for doing nor for leaving.' Dr. al-Zuhayli commented on this, saying: 'The Noble Lawgiver intended to give the mukallaf the choice between action and inaction; thus, whatever the mukallaf does is consistent with the intent of the Lawgiver. This is due to the equality of harms and benefits in the Mubah, or the equality of benefit and harm therein, or because human nature, innate disposition, and the sound intellect created by Allah Almighty are naturally inclined toward it, such as the permissibility of eating, drinking, types of clothing, walking on the roads, and enjoyment.' ¶

like standing in the air or standing in the sun; therefore, the one who does it is not deserving of praise, and the one who leaves it is not deserving of praise. (1) Then he said: 'Al-Ghazali and others reconciled the two definitions, stating: The Mubah (permissible) is that for which permission to act or abstain has come from Allah the Almighty, without the act or abstinence being associated with blame or praise.' He then identified the terms synonymous with 'Mubah' according to the Usuli scholars (legal theorists), stating: 'Synonymous with Mubah are: Halal, Ja'iz (permissible), and Mutlaq (absolute/unrestricted).' (2) I say: It is not the intention of this research to detail the discussion on the Mubah, nor the objections raised against each definition, nor the responses to each objection. It suffices for us here to know that the Mubah is that which the Shariah has permitted to be performed without demanding it by way of obligation (wajib) or recommendation (nadb). Naturally, it cannot be from among those things which the Shariah has forbidden, neither by way of makruh (dislike) nor by way of tahrim (prohibition). This is what the aforementioned definitions imply. 2 - Second point: Can the Shariah ruling in some states of Jihad be 'permissibility' (ibaha)? The answer to this is that the taklifi (legal) ruling, as Dr. Al-Zuhayli states, is: 'Categorized by the majority into five types: Wajib (obligatory), Mandub (recommended), Haram (forbidden), Makruh (disliked), and Mubah (permissible)... These taklifi rulings relate to the actions of the mukallaf (legally responsible person)... and these rulings may relate to a single act, to which all five or some of these rulings may apply, depending on the circumstances and conditions surrounding it. For example, marriage is obligatory (wajib) for the mukallaf if he can afford the costs of marriage and is certain that he will fall into sin if he does not marry. It is recommended (mandub) in normal conditions with the ability to provide for a spouse. It is forbidden (haram) if he is certain that he will oppress his wife and fail to fulfill her rights. It is disliked (makruh) if he fears this, and it is permissible (mubah) if the benefits and harms are equal. Like marriage, many of the actions of the mukallaf are subject to these five rulings, or some of them, depending on the surrounding circumstances.' (3) ¶

I state: Among the acts of the legally responsible (mukallafin) which are subject to the five categories of Shariah rulings depending on the surrounding circumstances, is fighting the enemy. Although the original ruling regarding this fighting is that of fard kifayah (communal obligation), as previously discussed in earlier research. ¶

Accordingly, the Shariah ruling on Muslims fighting their enemies may shift from obligation (wujub) to permissibility (ibahah), depending on the specific circumstances surrounding that fighting. This is the primary subject of this research, which we will address in the following point: ¶

3. Third Point: Reviewing cases of Muslims fighting their enemies where the ruling is permissibility (ibahah). - We have previously established that the original ruling on fighting the enemy is that of collective obligation (fard kifayah). - We then understood when fighting becomes a personal obligation (fard ayn), and when it becomes recommended (mandub), depending on specific circumstances surrounding the combatants. - Now, we will identify some cases where the Shariah ruling for this fighting is permissibility (ibahah). ¶

These cases, which render fighting the enemy permissible, may pertain to the act of an individual fighter due to specific considerations surrounding him alone. ¶

- Or, they may apply to the act of the entire fighting group in their military conflict with the enemy due to certain considerations that encompass the whole group, as determined by the high command or the direct leadership of that group. Here, we will present examples of such cases where the ruling of permissibility applies to the fighting, in accordance with what is indicated by Shariah texts and what the jurists (fuqaha) have determined regarding them. ¶

1. Fighting the enemy for purposes other than exalting the word of Allah, and without the intent of showing off (riya). We previously established that Jihad is fighting the disbelievers to exalt the word of Allah Almighty, and it is either a collective obligation, a personal obligation, or recommended, as has been detailed previously. This is because the fighting required by Shariah is that which is 'in the way of Allah', and this applies to the fighting... ¶

For the purpose of strengthening the Muslims, exalting the religion, weakening the disbelievers, and opening the path for the Islamic Da'wah... and other such objectives. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) says: 'Whoever fights so that the word of Allah may be supreme, then he is in the way of Allah' (Bukhari). Fighting for these and similar purposes is the exaltation of the word of Allah the Almighty. Fighting to exalt the word of Allah is the combat requested by Islam, and what Islam has commanded regarding such combat ranges between being a communal obligation (fard kifayah), an individual obligation (fard 'ayn), or a commendable act (mandub), depending on the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the combat. ¶

Furthermore, we have previously established in the discussion of 'Raiding combat for the sake of capturing enemy wealth' that fighting with the intention of fame, reputation, recognition, or showing off (riya') is a type of combat that the Shariah has strictly forbidden, and has categorized as minor shirk (shirk al-asghar). Shaddad bin Aws said: 'During the time of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ), we used to consider showing off as minor shirk.' It is stated in Sahih Muslim from the Prophet (ﷺ): 'The first of the people to be judged on the Day of Resurrection is a man who was martyred... He will say: I fought for You until I was martyred. Allah will say: You lie, but you fought so that it would be said that you are brave, and it was said. Then he will be ordered to be dragged on his face until he is thrown into the Fire.' ¶

Consequently, combat that is neither for the purpose of exalting the word of Allah nor for the purpose of reputation and showing off... such combat is neither the combat required by the Shariah nor the combat prohibited by it. Whatever falls under this category takes the ruling of permissibility (ibahah), for which there is no praise or reward, just as there is no blame or punishment for the one who does it or leaves it. The jurists have determined that fighting the enemy for the sake of obtaining wealth or worldly benefits, while being free from showing off, is a matter that cannot be denied. Imam al-Qarafi states: 'A distinction is made between his fighting so that people might say...' ¶