Chapter 50

After him, [the Prophet] rejected him (i.e., due to his young age), so Samurah said, 'O Messenger of Allah! You permitted a boy and rejected me, yet if I were to wrestle him, I would throw him!' The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said to him, 'Then wrestle him!' He said, 'So I wrestled him and threw him!' Thereupon, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ permitted me to join the expedition. ¶

Having said this, we do not wish to prolong the discussion by citing the texts related to the various fields of training that the Prophet ﷺ attended to, even if it were on the level of encouragement and inciting desire for the works required in those fields, in a way that provides the army with sufficient diverse training that makes it qualified to undertake the tasks entrusted to it. I say: We do not wish to prolong the mention of the texts related to those training fields, except to point out that those trainings covered all the areas required by armies in that era, even those fields that were not familiar to the Arabs, such as the 'Engineering Corps,' which was manifested in the digging of the Trench, and as in the 'Navy' field, regarding which it was narrated from the Prophet ﷺ: 'A naval expedition is better than ten land expeditions.' This is what directed the efforts of the noble Companions toward this new field of combat, which drove them to attempt to train for it, in preparation for extending their military activity into it, in their endeavor to carry the message of Islam to nations beyond the seas. ¶

We repeat, we do not wish to prolong the narration of texts—though they are plentiful!—in this regard, and we shall suffice with what has been mentioned in this brief excerpt regarding the military trainings that the Prophet ﷺ cared for, so that we may move to the final point in this research. ¶

4 - Fourth Point: The benefits that accrue to the army and the Ummah from conducting the various trainings required by the army. We can highlight the most important benefits resulting from these various trainings in several matters: ¶

A - Ensuring the combat efficiency of the army. B - Achieving combat readiness, which means immediate preparedness for battle at any moment, whenever the situation demands. C - Reducing casualties and equipment loss during war. In justifying this benefit of training, Major General (Staff) Muhammad Jamal al-Din Ali Mahfuz states: 'A well-trained soldier is less susceptible to injury than his less-trained counterpart. This has been proven by the experiences of warfare, to the point that a principle known to military personnel everywhere has emerged, which states: (Sweat in training saves blood in battle).' (1) D - Training grants the fighter confidence in himself and his weapon, which strengthens his military spirit and fighting resolve (2). With this, we conclude the second section of this chapter and move on to the third section. ¶

(1) Al-Madkhal ila al-Aqidah, wa al-Istiratijiyya al-Askariyya al-Islamiyya: Muhammad Jamal al-Din Ali Mahfuz: p. 271. (2) See the previous source: pp. 271-272. ¶

Third Topic: Human Pillars (Resources) ¶

Introduction: Context of the discussion. First Requirement: Personnel of the regular or core army, and their role within it. Second Requirement: The reserve army. First Section: Popular armament and its limits. Second Section: Volunteer men in the army, and their role within it. Third Section: The ruling on the participation of women in the army, and their role within it. Fourth Section: The ruling on the participation of minors in the army, and their role within it. Fifth Section: The ruling on the participation of non-Muslim subjects in the army, and their role within it. Sixth Section: Foreigners in the Islamic army, and their role within it. ¶

142 ¶

Book of Divorce (Kitab al-Talaq) ¶

(Supplement) ¶

If a woman states, 'I have been divorced,' and she says this alone without the confirmation of her husband, the divorce will not take effect. However, if the husband confirms her statement, the divorce will take effect. ¶

Question: If a woman asks her husband, 'Divorce me,' and the husband replies, 'I have divorced you,' will the divorce take effect? ¶

Answer: Yes, these words are explicit (sarih) for divorce, and the divorce will take effect. ¶

(Supplement) ¶

If a husband takes an oath that he will not divorce his wife, but subsequently divorces her, he will be liable for the expiation (kaffarah) of the oath, and the divorce will take effect. ¶

Question: Does a divorce issued in a state of anger take effect? ¶

Answer: Yes, a divorce issued in a state of anger takes effect, provided that the anger is not so extreme that the person loses his senses and is unaware of what he is saying. ¶

(Supplement) ¶

If someone issues three divorces to his wife at once, they will be counted as three, and the wife will become unlawful (haram) for him until she marries another man and consummates the marriage with him. ¶

Section Three: Human Foundations ¶

Introduction: Before beginning the research: We have mentioned that the army, which is the instrument of Islamic Jihad in its combat sense, consists of human and material foundations. Its human foundations are all Muslims who are obligated to perform Jihad, as they are all encompassed by the divine address in the words of the Almighty: 'Fighting has been ordained upon you...' (1). However, it is not natural for all these Muslims to participate in the army deploying to the battlefields, while leaving their cities and villages—including their factories, facilities, interests, farms, and the like—in a state of suspension and stagnation, waiting for the return of those mujahideen so that their activity and movement can be resumed. While such a scenario might have been possible, or may have actually occurred to some extent before the modern era without exposing the nation and the country to danger, this—namely suspending normal life in cities and villages and mobilizing everyone for combat—cannot be achieved without resulting in consequences that lead to the opposite of the intended results of mobilizing the entire nation for combat. This is due to the changes that have occurred in modern life, including its specific organizations. ¶

The administration of state affairs and the interests of the people, including cities and villages with their factories, institutions, and facilities, serve as the 'rear' (logistical and administrative support) for an army heading into combat. If life in this rear area is suspended and its movement paralyzed because those responsible for its administration depart for battle, this effectively means striking the rear of the army—and when an army’s rear is struck, its entire existence is placed in jeopardy! ¶

Indeed, it is possible for such a general mobilization (nafir 'amm) to occur in our modern era, but only under temporary and contingent circumstances, provided the situation does not last long for the rear area while it awaits the return of normal life. Otherwise, the army—which is the nation itself—will reap nothing but the direst consequences from such an action. ¶

It is for this reason that the original ruling on jihad is that it is a collective obligation (fard kifayah). It may become an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) for every mukallaf (legally competent) Muslim, but only in the specific contingent circumstances discussed in the previous chapter of this book. ¶

From this also comes the Divine address guiding Muslims that general mobilization—that is, calling the entire nation to participate in the active fighting force—is not the normal state of affairs in the life of Muslims. This is evidenced by the words of the Almighty: 'And it is not for the believers to go forth all at once. For there should separate from every division of them a group [remaining]...' (Surah At-Tawbah: 122). ¶

Just as it is not normal for all Muslims obligated to perform jihad to participate in the active fighting force, it is likewise not normal for all such Muslims to be enrolled in the standing army, dedicate themselves entirely to military life, and sever ties with the various necessary activities—awaiting opportunities for combat. Indeed, this is neither a natural state nor a legally valid one... And we have already established in the definition of the collective obligation (wajib kifa'i) in the previous chapter that every... ¶

The activities of life, which the nation and the country require, are among the 'fard kifayah' (communal obligations). It is incumbent upon the nation to prepare a group from among its sons who dedicate themselves to performing each of these activities, to the extent that the requirement is fulfilled. ¶

From all of this, it becomes clear to us that although all Muslims burdened with the duty of jihad are considered part of the Islamic army, it is not permissible for the entire army to dedicate itself to only one activity that is considered a fard kifayah—namely combat or preparation for it (dedicating oneself to military service)—while neglecting other activities, even though performing them is also among the communal obligations. ¶

Hence, the Islamic army—that is, all those burdened with the duty of jihad—must be divided into two parts: ¶

- A regular primary army (al-jaysh al-nizami al-asasi): This is the force dedicated to combat or preparation for it, such that this communal obligation is covered on a permanent basis. ¶

- A reserve army (al-jaysh al-ihtiyati): This consists of all Muslim civilians, as they are called in these days, and those who are permitted to participate in combat but are not obligated to do so. These individuals must attend to private and public interests that are, for them and for the entire nation, either 'fard ayn' (individual obligations), 'fard kifayah' (communal obligations), or otherwise matters that are religiously permissible. However, they must be in a state of constant readiness to bear arms and engage in combat whenever the need arises. This naturally requires that they have previously fulfilled the duty of preparation for such a situation—that is, having previously performed mandatory service in the army, as is said today. ¶

Accordingly, the research we are studying now must address the issue of the regular or primary army and the reserve army: who constitutes each army, and what role do individuals play in both? ¶

This will be done in accordance with the structure presented in the outline of this research, and we begin with the first section, in which we discuss the regular army in the Islamic State. ¶

All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and peace and blessings be upon the Master of the Messengers, and upon his family and all his companions. To proceed: This is the first volume of the book 'Mafatih al-Fiqh' (Keys to Jurisprudence), which comprises the chapters on purification (taharah) and prayer (salah). In it, I have relied upon the statements of the Imams of the four schools of thought, while striving to determine the most correct (rajih) opinions and deriving evidence from the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah. We ask Allah for success, correctness, and acceptance; indeed, He is the All-Hearing, the Ever-Responsive. ¶

Written by: The Servant of the Shariah Muhammad ibn Abdullah Al al-Sheikh ¶

Section One: Members of the Regular or Primary Army and Their Role ¶

Introduction: Regarding the origins and organization of the Islamic army. First Point: Who is religiously obligated (mukallaf) to perform Jihad? Second Point: Who is accepted into the regular army in the Islamic State? ¶

Introduction regarding the beginnings of the formation and organization of the Islamic army: We stated in the discussion on 'the various organizations required by the army' that the Shari'i ruling on these arrangements is that of permissibility (ibaha), as they represent the selection of specific methods through which a mandatory duty is fulfilled, which in our current subject is Jihad. Thus, if necessity dictates the selection of a specific method over others to fulfill the obligation of Jihad, that method alone becomes the mandatory organizational structure to be adopted in this regard. ¶

During the era of the Prophet (PBUH), the Islamic army operated according to the same method the Arabs followed before Islam, in terms of being called to combat whenever the need arose. For this reason, there were no dedicated military camps for their permanent residence, nor did the individuals abandon the trades they pursued for their livelihood and sustenance. Rather, the fighters lived with their families in their homes and continued the work that served as their source of income, such as trade, manufacturing, and services. When they were called to fight, they would leave everything behind and gather at a specific location outside their city, thus forming an army that marched under the banners of their leaders to confront the enemy. Once the fighting ended, everyone returned to their home, their family, and their work. ¶

Following this methodology in managing the affairs of the army and combat was sufficient during the Prophetic era. However, as the Muslim fighters expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula after the era of the Prophet (PBUH), conquering lands previously held by the Persian and Roman kings and incorporating them into the Dar al-Islam, that previous style of managing military affairs was no longer sufficient to achieve the desired objectives. ¶

Indeed, Muslim leaders feared that the kings of disbelief might regain control over the lands from which they had been expelled, especially after sensing the serious attempts by those kings to mobilize forces, prepare equipment, form alliances, and draft plans to advance in this direction. ¶

Thus, Muslim leaders realized that to avert the impending danger, it was necessary to adopt a 'conscription' system, meaning that a portion of the Muslims obligated to engage in Jihad should devote themselves to military life, remain under arms permanently, and receive stipends in exchange for their commitment to military service, such that it would suffice for them and their families, freeing them from the anxieties of seeking a livelihood. ¶

Furthermore, these Muslim fighters, or this great Islamic army, were to be distributed across various provinces of the expanding Islamic state, with cities or military centers built for them to reside in with their families. They were to serve as striking forces, standing in a state of readiness at the first signal to head to the battlefields—whether for defense or offense, in light of the legitimate causes for war in Islam. ¶

From here, Kufa, Basra, and other cities were established as military camps for Muslim fighters, forming a 'regular army' to counter the regular armies of other nations. Regarding what was previously mentioned, the book 'Al-Nuzum al-Islamiyya' (Islamic Systems) states: ¶

'In the Jahiliyyah, the Arabs had no special system for soldiers. Tribal men would go to fight... when the call was made... and once the fighting ended, they would return to their homes and occupy themselves with their work. ¶

When Islam arrived, it united the hearts of the Arabs, and they began to fight for the sake of spreading this religion. Then the Arabs began their conquests. Umar ibn al-Khattab was the first to designate soldiers as a specific class and established the 'Diwan al-Jund' (Department of the Army) to oversee them, by registering their names, descriptions, and the amount of their stipends.' ¶

their provisions, and the census of their deeds... When the Muslim armies succeeded in conquering Iraq, the Levant (al-Sham), Palestine, and Egypt, the soldiers settled in these regions in their own special garrisons. They turned to agriculture, accumulating wealth, and acquiring fixed property. In doing so, they turned away from military life, and the martial spirit waned. 'Umar realized this danger and ordered them to return to Jihad, guaranteeing their provisions and the provisions of their families. To 'Umar goes the credit for establishing fortresses and permanent garrisons for the rest of the soldiers along the routes. Consequently, capitals were built, and garrisons were established in several places to repel sudden enemy attacks (1). ¶

Regarding the justification for guaranteeing the provisions of the army members and dedicating them to military life to protect the Muslims and the Islamic lands from the aggression of aggressors and the scheming of disbelievers—'Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) says, while announcing the policy he was resolved to implement concerning the lands that came into the possession of the Muslims and employing their production for the aforementioned purpose: 'I have decided to keep the lands with their non-Arab cultivators (ʿuluj) (2), and I will impose the Kharaj (land tax) on them and the Jizya (poll tax) upon their necks, which they shall pay as Fay' (spoils) for the Muslims—the fighters, their progeny, and those who come after them. Do you see these border outposts (thughur)? They must have men who remain stationed in them! Do you see these great cities, such as the Levant, al-Jazira, Kufa, Basra, and Egypt? They must be garrisoned with armies, and stipends must be provided for them... If these border outposts and cities are not garrisoned with men, and they are not provided with the means by which they can sustain their strength, the people of disbelief will return to their cities!' (3). ¶

It is also stated in the History of al-Tabari in this regard: 'Umar designated the stipend when he designated the Fay' for those whom Allah had bestowed it upon, who were the people of al-Mada'in; they moved later to Kufa, relocating from al-Mada'in to Kufa, Basra, Damascus, Homs, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt. He said: 'The Fay' belongs to the people of these garrison towns, and to those who joined them, assisted them, and resided with them... It is among them that the cities and villages were inhabited, upon them the peace treaties were concluded, and to them (it returns).' ¶

The collection of jizya was organized, by which the frontiers were protected and the enemy was subdued, then the disbursement of stipends to those entitled to them was ordered. ¶

Regarding the distribution of Muslim fighters across various Islamic provinces—that is, dividing the Islamic army into several armies, each residing in a specific region and adopting it as its base from the lands of Islam, in order to protect them from internal uprisings or external aggression—it was with this intent that Ali ibn Abi Talib offered his advice to Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with them both), through which he dissuaded him from setting out personally to fight the Persians, as some reports state. This occurred after the Caliph received news that the Persians had rallied around Yazdegerd and gathered an army of 150,000 fighters to wage war against the Muslims! ¶

In some reports, according to the History of al-Tabari regarding this matter, it is stated in summary: "...When Umar informed them of the news [i.e., the news of the mobilization gathered by Yazdegerd] and consulted them, saying: 'Be brief and do not prolong your speech. Know that this is a day that will determine what follows it!...' Talha ibn Ubayd Allah stood up... and said: 'O Commander of the Faithful! You have governed affairs wisely... This matter is yours, so command us and we shall obey!' Umar replied again: 'This is a day that will determine what follows it! So speak.' Uthman ibn Affan stood up and said: 'I see, O Commander of the Faithful, that you should write to the people of Syria to march from their territory, and write to the people of Yemen to march from their territory, then you should march with the people of the two Sanctuaries [meaning: Mecca and Medina] to the two garrison cities: Kufa and Basra. So that the assembly of the Muslims may meet the assembly of the polytheists!' ... Then he sat down... Then Ali ibn Abi Talib stood up and said: 'O Commander of the Faithful! If you remove the people of Syria from their territory, the Romans will march upon their families. If you remove the people of Yemen from their territory, the Abyssinians will march upon their families. And if you...' ¶

If you depart from this land (meaning Makkah and Madinah), the earth will rise up against you from its fringes and regions! In another narration: The Arabs will rise against you! To the point that what you leave behind will become more critical to you than what lies before you regarding your vulnerable ones (women and children). Leave these people in their cities, and write to the people of Basra that they should divide into three groups: One group should remain in their territory for the protection of their sanctity and their offspring. Another group should remain among those under their covenant (the Dhimmis, so they do not contemplate rebelling against the Muslims). A third group should march to their brothers in Kufah to reinforce them. Ali bin Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) proceeded to explain the reasoning behind his advice against the Caliph personally leading the war against the Persians, saying: If the non-Arabs (Ajam) see you tomorrow, they will say: 'This is the leader of the Arabs! The root of the Arabs!' This would increase their ferocity and their determination against you! Umar bin al-Khattab grasped the truth in everything Ali bin Abi Talib said and decided to act upon his advice, saying: 'Indeed, by Allah! If I depart from the city, the earth will rise up against me from its outskirts and sides! And if I face the non-Arabs, they will not depart from the battlefield, and those who did not support them before will surely reinforce them! They will say: 'This is the root of the Arabs; if you sever him, you have severed the root of the Arabs!'' Then, Umar turned to his advisors among the Sahabah, saying: 'Advise me of a man who can lead that front (the Persian front) tomorrow... and make him an Iraqi!' Then, Umar’s choice fell upon al-Nu'man bin Muqarrin al-Muzani, and they all said: 'He is the one for it!' I say: From these narrations, we see how the formation of a professional army began in the Islamic State. The emerging circumstances necessitated dedicating them to the affairs of Jihad, distributing them across the country, and relieving its members from the burdens of seeking provision for themselves and their families. It has been previously stated: Every permissible organization, without which the obligation of Jihad cannot be performed in the required manner, becomes one of the necessary organizations to adopt, in accordance with the Shariah maxim: 'That without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself an obligation.' Thus it was... It remains to know: Who are those being recruited into the professional army of the Islamic State? Meaning, dedicating them to a military life, away from being preoccupied with other activities. ¶

other things that occupy their interests and distract them from a life of jihad in the path of Allah. - And what are the conditions that must be met for them to be accepted into this regular army? To answer this question, we must first mention who those are who fall under the obligation of jihad (al-mukallafun), by way of duty (wujub) (1). Then, secondly, we mention who those are who are accepted into the regular army in the Islamic state, because these individuals are all, or mostly, chosen from those addressed by the obligation of jihad. Thus, having finished the introduction regarding the early formation and organization of the regular army in the Islamic state, we proceed to address matters concerning the members of this army and their role in two points, in answer to the two aforementioned questions. First Point: Who are those obligated—by duty—to perform jihad? The jurists (fuqaha) have determined the conditions for the obligation of jihad on the legally responsible individuals (al-mukallafun) as follows: 1. Islam (2): This is because the shariah texts have specified the believers in the obligation of jihad. Among these are the words of the Almighty: 'O Prophet, urge the believers to battle...' (3) and His words: 'And it is not for the believers to go forth [all] together. For there should separate from every division of them a group...' (4). (1) The subject of those obligated to perform jihad and the conditions of this obligation has a relationship with the first chapter of this book, in which we discussed the rulings of jihad when it is a communal obligation (fard kifayah) or an individual obligation (fard ayn), etc. It also relates to the second chapter we are currently in, due to its connection to the human foundation of the Islamic army and who the individuals are that constitute the regular army or the reserve army. We have chosen to address the subject of those obligated to perform jihad and the conditions of this obligation in the second chapter here, because these obligated individuals are the ones who constitute this army or that, according to the conditions met within them, which makes treating this subject here more appropriate, in accordance with the plan we are following. (2) Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: 3/339; Al-Qawanin al-Shar'iyyah: p. 164; Mughni al-Muhtaj: 4/216; Al-Mughni by Ibn Qudamah: 10/366; Al-Sharh al-Kabir by Al-Maqdisi: 10/366; Al-Muhalla by Ibn Hazm: 7/291. (3) Surah Al-Anfal, verse 65. (4) Surah At-Tawbah, verse 122. ¶

2 - Puberty (Bulugh): This is because puberty is fundamentally one of the conditions for taklif (legal accountability) regarding Shariah rulings. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: "The pen is lifted from three: the sleeper until he wakes up, the child until he reaches puberty, and the insane person until he regains his reason." ¶

Regarding the justification for the condition of sanity in the obligation of Jihad, the author of Al-Mughni states: "Jihad is not possible from one who is insane!" ¶

4 - Freedom (Hurriyya): The evidence for this condition is the report that the Prophet (peace be upon him) would accept the pledge (bay'ah) from a free person on Islam and Jihad, but would accept the pledge from a slave only on Islam, not on Jihad. ¶

In explaining the rationale for this condition, the author of Mughni al-Muhtaj states: "... due to the Almighty's saying: {And strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives}. A slave has no wealth, nor does he possess his own life; thus, the command does not encompass him. Even if his master orders him, it is not obligatory upon him, as the Imam stated, because he is not among those qualified for this matter, and combat is not among the services the master is entitled to, for ownership does not imply subjecting someone to destruction." ¶

However, it is mentioned in Hashiyat Ibn Abidin that there is a possibility for Jihad to be obligatory upon a slave if granted permission by the owner, on the grounds that the prohibition of Jihad's obligation upon him is solely for the right of the master; thus, when permission is granted, the obstacle is removed. ¶

5 - Being Male (Dhukura): The evidence for this condition is what is narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari from Aisha. ¶

The Mother of the Believers, may Allah be pleased with her, said: I sought permission from the Prophet (ﷺ) for Jihad, and he said: 'Your Jihad is the Hajj.' (1) ¶

It is stated in Fath al-Bari: 'Ibn Battal said: The Hadith of Aisha indicates that Jihad is not obligatory upon women. However, the statement "Your Jihad is the Hajj" does not mean that women are prohibited from performing voluntary Jihad. It is only that it was not made obligatory for them because it contradicts what is required of them regarding modesty and avoiding free-mixing with men.' (2) ¶

Regarding the issue of the requirement of being male for Jihad, Major General Mahmoud Sheet Khattab, under the heading 'Conditions for Enlistment,' writes: ¶

'Recruitment is not limited to adult males, but includes adult females as well. The Messenger (ﷺ) used to take women along on his military expeditions, and he would even take his wives by drawing lots. No one objected to the participation of women in war during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the Umayyads. But when the Abbasids came, some stagnant jurists appeared and added a fifth condition to military service: "maleness." Thus, they deprived the army of an active element that increases its numbers and morale.' (3) ¶

I (the author) say: It appears that the writer has confused two distinct matters and failed to differentiate between them: 1. Jihad as a 'fard kifayah' (communal obligation): Does it include women in its primary scope, or is it specific to men only? 2. Is it permissible for a woman to go out for Jihad or be accepted into the military—in the author's terms—if she is not included in the obligation of communal Jihad? And this, of course, within the Shariah framework. ¶

Furthermore, setting aside the inappropriate description the author used for those he called 'stagnant jurists' of the Abbasid era—a description we wish had been absent from his text—what the jurists mentioned regarding the condition of 'maleness' was in the context of whom Jihad is obligatory upon when it is a communal obligation. They did not state it as a condition for those who undertake Jihad when it becomes an individual obligation (fard ayn), or... ¶

When it is voluntary. This, and further details regarding this issue, will be addressed when we discuss (The Issue: Women in the Islamic Army and their role therein). ¶

6 - Physical soundness and the ability to perform Jihad(1): It is stated in Kitab al-Umm, the text of which reads: "Al-Shafi'i, may Allah have mercy on him, said: If he is physically sound, strong, and possesses sufficient means for himself and those he leaves behind, he is included among those upon whom Jihad is obligatory..."(2). ¶

The author of al-Mughni expresses this condition by saying: (Safety from harm): He then explains the meaning of this expression, saying: "It means: safety from blindness, lameness, and sickness. This is a condition due to the saying of Allah Almighty: ﴿There is no blame upon the blind, nor any blame upon the lame, nor any blame upon the sick...﴾(3); and because these excuses prevent him from Jihad. As for blindness, it is well-known. As for lameness, the one that prevents [Jihad] is the severe kind that hinders proper walking and riding, such as chronic infirmity and the like. As for the minor type with which one is able to ride and walk, and only finds difficulty in running fast, it does not preclude the obligation of Jihad; for he is capable of it, thus resembling the one-eyed person. Similarly with sickness—the prohibitive kind is severe sickness. As for the minor kind that does not prevent the possibility of Jihad, such as a toothache or a mild headache, it does not preclude the obligation, because Jihad is not impossible with it." (4). ¶

It is stated in Bada'i' al-Sana'i': "Jihad: is the exertion of effort, which is the capacity and energy in fighting, or the intensity in the act of fighting. And how can one who has no capacity exert capacity and action? Therefore, it is not obligatory upon the blind, the lame, the chronically ill, the crippled, the aged, the sick, and the weak." (5). ¶

I say: ¶

- Insofar as these excuses, which prevent the obligation of jihad from applying to those who possess them, are reasoned by the fact that they contradict the condition of capability required to perform jihad, as Ibn Qudamah indicated in his previous statement: 'Because these excuses prevent him from jihad.' And a ruling that is based on a rationale (illah) revolves with its rationale, both in existence and non-existence. ¶

- And insofar as the developments of the modern era in the field of combat, its organization, and its tools have made some who possess these excuses suitable for fighting, or suitable for tasks related to fighting. I say: As long as the situation is as we have described, it should be left to the authority in this matter to estimate the fitness required for participation in combat, and to estimate the excuses that exempt their holders from the imposition of the obligation of jihad. ¶

Without going into the details of this issue, is it not clear that the manifest lameness that used to exempt its holder from the obligation of jihad in ancient wars does not appear to prevent a fighter today, while sitting at a missile base, for example, from accurately aiming at the desired target? ¶

In any case, whoever possesses the authority in this matter, with the assistance of military experts and in light of the characteristics that distinguish each of the various weapons in these days, is capable of determining who among those with these excuses is suitable for one field of combat rather than another, and who is not suitable for any of them at all! ¶

We now come to the final condition mentioned by the jurists regarding what we are addressing: ¶

7. The presence of financial provision (nafaqah): Ibn Qudamah clarified the evidence for this condition and the limits of the required provision, stating: 'As for the existence of provision, it is a condition based on the saying of Allah the Almighty: {There is no blame on the weak, nor on the sick, nor on those who find nothing to spend, if they are sincere to Allah and His Messenger.} And because jihad is not possible...' ¶

Except when it requires equipment, in which case the ability to acquire it is considered. If the jihad is at a distance where prayer is not shortened (i.e., a short distance), it is conditional that he possesses the provisions, the maintenance for his family during his absence, and a weapon to fight with. A mount (rahilah) is not considered necessary because it is a short journey. But if the distance is one where prayer is shortened, then the mount is also required, due to the saying of Allah Almighty: "Nor [is there blame] on those who, when they came to you for you to take them along, you said, 'I can find nothing for you to ride upon.' They turned back while their eyes overflowed with tears out of grief that they could not find something to spend [for the cause of Allah]" (9:92). ¶

I say: In light of the modern organization of armies and warfare, the problem of the cost required for weaponry does not arise, as the state provides the weapons. Nor do the personal expenses of the combatant for provisions or a mount—that is, the means of transport—as these are also provided by the state. ¶

The only remaining issue is the maintenance for the family whom the combatant is legally responsible to provide for during his absence or his preoccupation with military duties, if this causes a loss of his source of income, and he has no savings or other resources to cover their needs. ¶

In this case, if the state provides this maintenance, the combatant is among those for whom jihad al-kifa’i (collective obligation) is mandatory. If the state does not provide this maintenance, he is not among those for whom jihad al-kifa’i is mandatory. ¶

The basis for this condition is that providing for those whose maintenance is obligatory upon a person is an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn), whereas jihad, outside of the states where it becomes an individual obligation, is a collective obligation (fard kifaya). Engaging in an individual obligation—which, in our case, is striving to earn a livelihood for one's family—takes precedence over engaging in a collective obligation, which is the aforementioned jihad. ¶

It is stated in Hashiyat Ibn Abidin: "It is not correct to abandon an individual obligation (fard ‘ayn) in order to attain a collective obligation (fard kifaya)." This has been explained repeatedly. ¶

Here we conclude the discussion on the first point of the subject we are addressing. We now proceed to the second point. ¶

The Second Point: Who are those to be accepted into the regular army in the Islamic state? ¶

The answer to this question is that most of these recruits are taken from those upon whom the obligation of jihad is incumbent. I used the word 'most' here to clarify that the authorities in charge of the army have the latitude to include elements who are not originally subject to the obligation of fard kifayah (collective duty) of jihad, should the public interest (maslahah) require it—such as women, children, and non-Muslims, although their place is usually in the reserve forces, as will be explained later. ¶

It has been previously indicated that it is not natural for all those responsible for jihad to be enlisted in the regular army and fully devoted to military life. Rather, the natural approach is to select from these individuals the best and most suitable for recruitment and military service. ¶

On this basis, it is left to those in authority to establish the necessary criteria for those accepted into this regular army, provided these conditions are legitimate, objective, and ensure equal opportunity. This is to ensure that the Islamic army progresses in efficiency and readiness, reaching the highest level possible among the world’s armies, while continuing to strive toward the legal 'illah (rationale/objective) set by the Holy Quran, which marks the limit of the 'preparation' required in all forms of power. This legal objective is to terrorize the enemies abroad and all those connected to them among the hypocrites and conspirators from within. This is evident in the words of the Almighty: 'And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows...' (Al-Anfal: 60). ¶

Furthermore, whoever the public interest does not require to be enlisted in the regular army—that is, to be fully dedicated to military life... ¶