Chapter 41

countries... and in this situation, the Islamic state has the discretion to accede to their request if it perceives an interest (maslaha) in doing so, just as it may offer them assistance, or resolve the matter by presenting the country with the three options... It shall do whatever the interest of the Islamic Da'wah dictates. This is what is said regarding the second point concerning the inability of those in power who are invited to Islam to maintain their authority, or their inability to effect revolutionary change immediately upon accepting the call. 3. The third point: The conversion to Islam of the leadership or the people of certain regions, while they are unable to protect their country from a neighboring enemy or from the state from which they separated. In this case, the decision-maker in the Islamic state has two options, from which he chooses what he sees as beneficial, in light of the resources available to the state. - The first option: To provide the country that has declared its Islam with an Islamic force, so that it may be able to repel aggression with its aid. - The second option: To offer advice to the people of the threatened country to migrate from it to the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). If they refuse to leave their land, they shall not be compelled to move, and they shall be left to what they have chosen for themselves! In this situation, the Hadith of Buraydah al-Aslami, narrated by Muslim, applies, which states: "... Then invite them to Islam; if they respond, accept from them and refrain from them. Then invite them to move from their home to the land of the Muhajirin (emigrants), and inform them that if they do so, they shall have the same rights and duties as the Muhajirin. If they refuse to move from it, inform them that they will be like the nomadic Muslims (A'rab), upon whom the ruling of Allah flows as it does upon the believers, and they shall have no share in the spoils of war (ghanima) or the fai' unless they perform jihad with the Muslims..." (1). Furthermore, it is well-known that the Prophet (PBUH) did not ask the people of the regions that entered Islam—such as Yemen, Mecca, Ta'if, Bahrain, and Oman—to move from them to the land of the Muhajirin. However, he did request the people of the Bedouin regions to move from their lands to the land of the Muhajirin. ¶

By studying the reality of these regions, we see that those capable of protecting themselves from enemies are not required to migrate from them, as they have become Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). It is stated in Sahih al-Bukhari: 'There is no migration after the Conquest (of Makkah).' Imam al-Suyuti states: 'There is no migration from Makkah after it became Dar al-Islam.' This applies to regions capable of protecting themselves from enemies. As for regions unable to protect themselves from their enemies, their inhabitants are requested to migrate to Dar al-Islam. This situation falls under the aforementioned Hadith of Buraydah regarding the request for migration to Dar al-Islam as a recommendation (istihbab), not as an obligation (wujub). It is stated in Sharh al-Nawawi 'ala Muslim: 'The meaning of this Hadith is that if they embrace Islam, it is recommended for them to migrate to Medina. If they do so, they are like the Muhajirun before them in entitlement to fay and ghanimah (spoils of war), and so on. Otherwise, they are like the desert Arabs living in the wilderness without migration or participating in ghazw (military expeditions); the laws of Islam apply to them, but they have no right to ghanimah or fay.' The intent behind this is that the legitimacy of migration remains for those regions unable to protect themselves, in order to gain that protection and other civil rights. In Nayl al-Awtar, Al-Shawkani says: 'Ibn Umar has clarified the meaning—referring to the aforementioned Bukhari Hadith—as narrated by Al-Isma'ili: 'Migration to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) ceased after the Conquest, but migration will not cease as long as the disbelievers are fought.' This means that as long as there are disbelievers in the world, migration from their lands is obligatory for anyone who accepts Islam and fears being tempted away from their religion. The implication is that if it were decreed that no disbelievers remained in the world, migration would cease due to the termination of its underlying cause.' ¶

Thus, regarding regions that enter into Islam, if their inhabitants are unable to protect themselves and are at risk of being subjected to fitnah (persecution) regarding their religion by the disbelievers who threaten them, then in such a case, it is obligatory (wajib) for them to migrate from there to the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). ¶

However, if they do not fear fitnah regarding their religion, but merely fear aggression from the Ahl al-Harb (those at war with Muslims) due to their inability to defend themselves, then it is recommended (mustahabb) for them to migrate, but they are not compelled to do so. ¶

In this regard, it is stated in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir' and its commentary: ¶

'If an army of Muslims enters the Dar al-Harb... and settles in one of their cities, and the Muslims call them to Islam and they respond to it, the Muslims shall accept it from them if they embrace Islam... for fighting was only legislated to accept Islam. Allah Almighty says: {You shall fight them or they shall become Muslims}. So, if they become Muslims, it is obligatory to accept it from them. The leader then leaves them in their land and appoints over them a leader from the Muslims to judge among them according to the laws of Islam, because the city has become a Dar al-Islam, and there must be a leader to implement the rulings of the Muslims among them. If these people, once the Muslim army departs, are unable to defend themselves against the Ahl al-Harb and refuse to move to the Dar al-Islam, then the leader leaves them to their own choice, as they have chosen poorly for themselves; thus, he leaves them to their poor choice and they are not forced to relocate...' ¶

This is what is said regarding the third point concerning the inability of lands that have embraced Islam to protect themselves from external aggression. ¶

With this, we conclude the first issue in this research, which is the issue of the response of states, entities, and peoples to the Islamic call, the acceptance of entry into Islam, and the consequences that follow according to the details previously provided. ¶

We now turn to the second issue, which is: ¶

The Second Issue: Acceptance of Entering into the Covenant (Dhimmah) of the Muslims. ¶

We learned in the previous section that the Islamic State is obligated first to invite other states, entities, and peoples to embrace Islam, and to spare no effort in this pursuit. If the response is a rejection of this invitation, then a second invitation is to be sent: to enter into the covenant (dhimmah) of the Muslims, to accept submission to the Islamic system, and to join the Islamic State, thereby fulfilling the words of the Almighty: '...until they pay the jizya willingly while they are humbled' (Quran 9:29). ¶

Furthermore, in subsequent discussions, we will address the opinions of the jurists regarding the acceptance of the dhimmah from followers of all religions and all races, as well as the differences of opinion on this matter. ¶

For now, what concerns us here is that if states, entities, and peoples respond to this second invitation—the invitation to enter into the dhimmah—it becomes incumbent upon the Muslims to accept that response and to implement its resulting consequences. Here, it is forbidden to wage war against the party that has accepted the invitation and consented to the dhimmah, in order to fulfill the noble Prophetic guidance in the hadith of Buraydah: '...If they refuse [to accept Islam], then invite them to pay the jizya; if they agree, accept it from them and withhold from them. If they refuse, seek the help of Allah and fight them.' ¶

Moreover, the status of lands or peoples that respond to the invitation to enter into the dhimmah of the Muslims varies depending on whether the Islamic State has the capacity to extend protection over them or not. Consequently, the position of the Islamic State regarding whether or not to annex these lands or peoples varies, as follows: ¶

- If the areas that have agreed to enter into the dhimmah of the Muslims are such that the Islamic State is capable of protecting them and their inhabitants—whether by deploying an Islamic force there, or by possessing a deterrent force within the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) that prevents hostile states from attacking these newly acquired areas under the dhimmah, or through other means of protection—provided that such protection relies on Islamic power. ¶

Independently, or principally in a sufficient manner, and without any harm resulting to the Muslims as a consequence of this... I say: If the state is capable of protecting those regions that have agreed to enter into the 'dhimma' (covenant of protection)... then in this case, it is incumbent upon the Islamic state to annex the mentioned regions to the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and to accept their inhabitants as Ahl al-Dhimma (protected people) and as subjects of the Islamic state. ¶

As for the regions that have agreed to enter into the protection of the Muslims, but the Islamic state is not capable of protecting them or their inhabitants, then there are two scenarios: ¶

The first scenario: If the inhabitants of those regions agree to relocate from their lands to the Dar al-Islam, then it is mandatory for the Islamic state to accept them into the protection of the Muslims upon their migration to the Dar al-Islam. ¶

The second scenario: If the inhabitants of those regions refuse to relocate from their lands to the Dar al-Islam, while still requesting to enter into the dhimma, and the state is unable to protect them and their regions, then the reality of this situation does not correspond to the reality of the status of Ahl al-Dhimma. This is because the status of Ahl al-Dhimma is defined by the state providing them protection and applying Islamic law upon them. In the case at hand, there is an absence of state protection due to its inability to provide the power necessary for that, and consequently, a failure in the application of Islamic law, given that this law requires a force to execute it... and the state, based on this premise, is incapable of providing the necessary force for it. ¶

Since this situation does not fit the definition of Ahl al-Dhimma, the request for dhimma from the inhabitants of these regions is, in reality, considered a request for 'muwada'a' (a request for a peaceful treaty with the Muslims). The Islamic state, in the face of such a request, is presented with two options: ¶

To accept such a request or to reject it based on what the Islamic interest dictates in this regard. ¶

In the event of rejecting what we have considered a 'muwada'a', the combat against these regions remains legitimate in this state. Then, after breaking the power held by those regions, the Islamic state has the choice to leave their inhabitants where they are, or to relocate them to the Dar al-Islam; it does whatever is in the interest as determined by the prevailing circumstances at that time. ¶

In 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir' and its commentary, what is mentioned is in connection with what we have stated, of which we have confined ourselves to what is necessary. ¶

The text reads as follows: "If they refuse Islam, the Muslims invite them to pay the jizya; if they agree to this, but refuse to relocate from their territory... if the Muslims, by remaining with them, are able to maintain power over the people of war (ahl al-harb)... then there is no harm if the Amir grants them dhimma (protected status), appoints an Amir from among the Muslims over them to judge according to Islamic law, and stations with this Amir Muslims who are capable of remaining there and maintaining authority, because accepting the dhimma is obligatory. Allah the Almighty says: 'Until they pay the jizya willingly while they are humbled.' This constitutes a dhimma from them; for the Amir enforces Islamic law upon them, and by enforcing that law, they become dhimmis, and their city becomes a city of Islam; thus, this is accepted from them. ¶

However, if the Muslims would not have power over the people of war in that location, and they would be unable to rule therein by Islamic law, it is not permissible for the Muslims to agree to this... in this state, they would be in the position of those seeking a truce (muwada'a) with the Muslims. When the people of war seek a truce from the Muslims, the Muslims are not obligated to grant it unless there is an apparent benefit for the Muslims; therefore, likewise, it is not obligatory to accept this dhimma from them... If they agree to relocate to the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), the Muslims should not refuse them... If the Muslims left behind a group of Muslims there who would be powerful against the polytheists of the people of war provided the dhimmis assisted them, and the people of the city said, 'We will become your dhimmis, and you leave behind a group with whom we may fight,' it is not appropriate for the Amir to do this..." ¶

This is what the two Imams, al-Shaybani and al-Sarakhsi, stated in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir' and its commentary regarding the second issue we are addressing, which is: the acceptance of the disbelievers entering into the dhimma of the Muslims, and the illegitimacy of combat in such a circumstance, according to the details previously mentioned. We now move to the third issue. ¶

Third Issue: Concluding a peace treaty between the disbelievers and the Muslims: If the Islamic state extends an invitation to other states and peoples to enter into Islam, then extends an invitation for them to enter into the dhimma of the Muslims and join the Islamic state to apply the Islamic system upon them, and the response is negative—is it then permissible... ¶

Is it permissible for the Islamic State to request peace treaties with those nations and peoples, or to respond to them if they request such treaties? Does this result in the illegitimacy of waging war against those treaty-bound nations for the purpose of inviting them to Islam or subjecting them to Islamic rule? This is the subject of this issue. ¶

The answer is that it has already been established in the first chapter of this section, as well as on other incidental occasions, that the preferred opinion in this regard is that of the majority (jumhur), which is that resorting to peace treaties is not obligatory; rather, it is permissible if the interests of the Islamic da'wah dictate it. We have cited a number of statements from the jurists (fuqaha) in this regard. ¶

- Among them is the statement of Imam al-Jassas: "We do not know of any jurist who prohibits fighting those among the polytheists (mushrikin) who have refrained from fighting us; the disagreement is only regarding the permissibility of abstaining from fighting them, not the prohibition of it..."(1). ¶

Furthermore, according to the view that it is permissible to abstain from fighting the polytheists, this applies to both abstaining through a treaty and abstaining without a treaty. ¶

- Among them is the statement of Imam Ibn Kathir: "If the enemy is numerous, it is permissible to enter into a truce (muhadana) with them..."(2). ¶

- Among them is the statement of Imam al-Zamakhshari: "The correct view is that the matter is dependent upon what the Imam (the leader) deems to be in the best interest of Islam and its people, whether it be war or peace. It is not mandatory that they always be fought, nor that their request for a truce always be granted"(3). ¶

- Imam Ibn Hajar says in Fath al-Bari: "And if they incline towards peace, then you also incline towards it" (4). This verse indicates the legitimacy of reconciliation with the polytheists. The condition in the verse implies that the command to reconcile is contingent upon whether reconciliation is more beneficial for Islam. However, if Islam is dominant over disbelief (kufr) and there is no clear interest in reconciliation, then it is not required..."(5). ¶

According to Ibn Taymiyyah, a treaty is permissible (ja'iz) but not obligatory (wajib). If the Islamic State enters into an absolute treaty without a fixed duration, it implies, in his view, that the State is not bound by it and may terminate it at any time based on public interest (maslaha). However, if the treaty is concluded for a specific duration, it must be honored throughout that period as long as the enemy remains committed to it. Regarding this, Ibn Taymiyyah states in 'Al-Ikhtiyarat al-'Ilmiyya': 'Chapter on Truce: It is permissible to conclude it both absolutely and for a specified time. The temporary treaty is binding upon both parties and must be fulfilled unless the enemy violates it... whereas the absolute treaty is a permissible (non-binding) contract in which the Imam acts according to the interest (maslaha).' ¶

Accordingly, if the Islamic State deems it in the superior interest to enter into peace treaties with other states, it may do so. In the context of Islamic proselytization (da'wah), these peace treaties may include conditions for the protection of those carrying the message, for the purpose of spreading Islam and inviting people to embrace it. ¶

Among the incidents in the Prophetic biography (Sirah) cited as evidence for such conditions is what is recorded in the Sirah of Ibn Hisham: 'Abu Bara' Amir ibn Malik ibn Ja'far, known as Mula'ib al-Asinna, came to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ in Medina. The Messenger of Allah ﷺ offered him Islam and invited him to it, but he did not embrace it, though he did not distance himself from Islam either. He said: O Muhammad! If you were to send some of your companions to the people of Najd to invite them to your cause, I hope they would respond to you. The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: I fear for them from the people of Najd. Abu Bara' said: I will be their protector (jar), so send them to invite the people to your cause! Thus, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ sent al-Mundhir ibn 'Amr... with forty of his companions from among the best of the Muslims...' ¶

Abu Bara', whom the Prophet ﷺ invited to Islam in this story and who did not respond... was one of the leaders of the mentioned region. His granting of protection (jiwar) to the carriers of the message so that they could spread the call... ¶

Islam in Najd is akin to granting modern-day states a visa for the carriers of the Da'wah to enter their lands and authorizing them to conduct Islamic activities therein. ¶

Although the tragic end of the mission dispatched by the Prophet (PBUH) to Najd prevented the achievement of its purpose—due to the treachery of the nephew of Abu Bara’, Amir ibn al-Tufayl, and his violation of his uncle’s protection (dhimma) granted to the companions of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) who were carrying the Islamic call—as is well-known in the story of the martyrs of Bi'r Ma'unah. ¶

It can be deduced from the Prophet's (PBUH) acceptance of the protection of Abu Bara’ for his companions sent for Da'wah in the lands of Najd that it is legitimate for an Islamic state to conclude peaceful treaties with other states, provided they include conditions for opening their doors to Islamic activity and protecting those who call to Islam there, if the Islamic state deems it in the interest of the Ummah. This is not to suggest that this method of spreading Islam to other nations is an obligatory alternative to Jihad—which aims at bringing others under the rule of Islam if they refuse to enter it—but rather it acts as a forced alternative when Jihad is not possible or would result in harm to the Muslims, or as an optional alternative when, despite the possibility of Jihad, the Islamic state deems it in the public interest, for specific considerations, to resort to such treaties instead of declaring Jihad against them. ¶

This relates to peaceful treaties that include conditions for the protection of the carriers of the Da'wah and the allowance of Islamic activity in the treaty-bound states. ¶

However, if it were to be assumed that those states... conditioned the conclusion of a peaceful treaty with the Islamic state upon its refraining from sending those who carry the Da'wah to the treaty-bound lands, and that it must prevent them... ¶

their Islamic diplomacy regarding Islamic activities among the subjects of those states — so is it permissible for the Islamic state to accept such a treaty with these conditions? ¶

My answer, in my estimation, is that if necessity compels one to enter into such treaties, there is no harm in that, because—as Imam al-Shafi‘i said—: "In cases of necessity, things become permissible that are not permissible in other circumstances"(1). Preventing Muslims from propagating Islam in other states is akin to preventing them from reaching power in those states. Just as necessity or public interest (maslahah) may dictate entering into treaties with those states that stipulate preventing Muslims from seizing power there by force, and leaving them to govern themselves under their existing system until such time as circumstances determine... likewise, necessity or public interest may dictate entering into treaties with those states that stipulate preventing Muslims from propagating Islam therein until a specific time determined by circumstances! ¶

The Prophet (peace be upon him) concluded the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah with the Quraysh, even though they were persecuting the Muslims for their religion and oppressing the weak believers among them. This continued even after the treaty, which led Abu Jandal, Abu Basir, and others to flee from Mecca, as is well known in the books of the Prophet's biography (Sirah). ¶

Furthermore, it has been mentioned in some hadiths related to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah that the Quraysh stipulated to the Prophet (peace be upon him) in this treaty that he should not direct his call (da'wah) to any of the people of Mecca. Al-Bukhari recorded in his Sahih in this regard, in the context of the hadith about the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, from Al-Bara' (may Allah be pleased with him) that when the Prophet (peace be upon him) intended to perform 'Umrah, he sent to the people of Mecca to ask their permission to enter. They stipulated that he should not stay there for more than three nights, that he should not enter except with swords in their sheaths(2), and that he should not invite any of them (to Islam)! He said: Ali bin Abi Talib began writing the condition between them, and he wrote: "This is what Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, has agreed upon." They said: "If we knew that you were the Messenger of Allah, we would not have stopped you, and we would have pledged allegiance to you..." (the rest of the hadith)(3). ¶

Thus, in this treaty, a pact was concluded between the Islamic state in Medina and Mecca to cease hostilities between them for ten years(4). Among the conditions imposed upon the Prophet (peace be upon him), as mentioned in the Sahih, were those stated above. ¶

Al-Bukhari narrates that he [the Prophet ﷺ] would invite them [to Islam]. The invitation that was restricted for the Prophet ﷺ in Makkah was compensated by inviting the disbelievers therein to Islam, just as it was compensated by inviting the Muslims therein to leave with him to Madinah when he came for the Umrat al-Qada in the year following the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. ¶

We have previously pointed out that the persecution of Muslims for their faith continued in Makkah after the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, compelling Abu Jandal (al-'As ibn Suhayl ibn 'Amr), Abu Basir, and other oppressed Muslims to flee with their faith from Makkah to a region on the road to the Levant (al-Sham) through which the caravans of Quraysh passed. They cut off Quraysh’s supplies, killing anyone they encountered and seizing every caravan that passed by, until the Quraysh wrote to the Prophet ﷺ, appealing to the ties of kinship, asking him to shelter them, as they had no need for them. ¶

All of this indicates that the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was limited to a ceasefire and ensuring the safety of people on both sides. According to the famous narrations, it did not include permission for Islamic da'wah (missionary activity) within Makkah; otherwise, the pressure on the oppressed therein would have ceased, which did not happen. Thus, regarding the armistice period during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, al-Zuhri says: 'Fighting took place where people met. Once the armistice occurred, war was put aside, people granted each other safety, and they mingled, conversed, and debated. No one was spoken to about Islam but that they entered it, and during those two years, as many people entered Islam as there were before it, or more.' ¶

I say: Al-Zuhri’s statement should be understood as follows: If his words, 'No one with intellect was spoken to about Islam but that he entered it,' refers to da'wah in Makkah, it was the activity of Muslims who were concealing their faith or those who had declared it due to their strength and the protection of their kin, such as Nu'aym al-Nahham from Banu 'Adi. In this state, the Islamic State is not responsible for their da'wah activity because they do not hold its citizenship; they are subjects of Makkah. Similarly, the State was not responsible for the rebellious Muslims from among the people of Makkah—the group of Abu Basir—when they left Makkah and threatened the caravans and men of Quraysh. ¶

What occurred in Medina when the infidels of Mecca passed through it as visitors or travelers signifies that the concept of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah was to restrict the practice of that invitation (Da'wah) to Mecca and not elsewhere. ¶

Based on this, it is permissible for the Islamic state to conclude a peace treaty or a temporary non-aggression pact with another state, and to refrain from fighting them for the purpose of inviting them to embrace Islam or submit to Islamic rule. It is also permissible for it to commit to not carrying out any activity on its part in the field of Islamic Da'wah on the territory of that treaty-bound state if the interest of Islamic Da'wah requires such a commitment. Entering into such a treaty is a result of the pressure of circumstances and is based on the rule of necessity (darurah), in which actions that are otherwise impermissible become permissible. ¶

With this, we conclude the third issue in this research and proceed to the fourth issue. ¶

Fourth Issue: Rejection of Islam, rejection of submission to Islamic rule, and the legitimacy of declaring Jihad. ¶

We have established that the Islamic state sends official delegations to other states, entities, and peoples, inviting them to Islam, exerting its utmost capabilities, and utilizing all available means and methods to persuade people to embrace Islam. If they refuse Islam, they are called to pay the Jizya—that is, they are called to submit to the Islamic state with all the associated costs and obligations. If they refuse, and the Islamic state does not see any benefit in concluding a peace treaty with them... then it is permissible to declare war upon them in order to implement Islamic rule over them by force, on the basis that the application of Islamic rule upon people is a form of Da'wah through action, as the virtues of Islam are tangibly manifested in this implementation, which leads people toward embracing Islam. ¶

As for the duration granted to the states and peoples invited to Islam or the Jizya—upon the expiration of which war is declared if there is no response—it is subject to the discretion of the decision-maker in the Islamic state, depending on the circumstances and developments that may dictate accelerating the war or exercising restraint. ¶

The duration of da'wah (invitation to Islam) may be open-ended, without a fixed time limit, and combat therein is not permitted except in the nature of self-defense. At other times, the duration of da'wah may be restricted to a specific period. Regarding all these scenarios, traditions and reports have been narrated. It is stated in the Sirah of Ibn Hisham: 'Ibn Ishaq said: The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) sent detachments (saraya) to the areas surrounding Makkah to invite people to Allah (the Almighty and Majestic), and he did not command them to fight.' It is mentioned in Fath al-Bari, citing Ibn Ishaq via Abu Ja'far al-Baqir: 'The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) sent Khalid ibn al-Walid when Makkah was conquered to the tribe of Judhaymah as a caller (da'i), and did not send him as a combatant.' Furthermore, it is stated in Zad al-Ma'ad by Ibn al-Qayyim: 'Al-Bayhaqi narrated with a sound chain... from al-Bara' that the Prophet (peace be upon him) sent Khalid ibn al-Walid to the people of Yemen to invite them to Islam. Al-Bara' said: I was among those who went out with Khalid ibn al-Walid, and we stayed for six months inviting them to Islam, but they did not respond. Then the Prophet (peace be upon him) sent Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) and commanded him to relieve Khalid, except for any man among those with Khalid who wished to stay (ta'qib) with Ali, in which case he could stay. Al-Bara' said: I was among those who stayed with Ali. When we approached the people, they came out to us. Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) led us in prayer, then formed us into a single rank, then stepped forward before us and read the letter of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) to them; consequently, all of Hamdan accepted Islam! Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) wrote to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) regarding their conversion. When the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) read the letter, he prostrated in gratitude, then raised his head and said: 'Peace be upon Hamdan, peace be upon Hamdan.' The basis of this hadith is in Sahih al-Bukhari.' ¶

It is narrated in Kitab al-Amwal by Abu Ubayd: 'Umar ibn al-Khattab wrote to Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas: I have written to you to invite the people to Islam for three days; whoever responds to you before the fighting, he is a man among the Muslims, having the same rights as the Muslims, and he has a share in Islam...' ¶

In Al-Nujum al-Zahira, in the context of the conquest of Egypt, it is mentioned regarding the dialogue between 'Amr ibn al-'As and the two monks of Egypt, Abu Maryam and Abu Maryam, concerning the three options—Islam, Jizya, or war—which 'Amr ibn al-'As presented to them... It is stated in Al-Nujum al-Zahira that the negotiators of Egypt said to 'Amr: 'Give us time until we return to you.' 'Amr replied: 'One like me is not deceived, but I will grant you three days to reflect and consult your people; otherwise, I will engage you in battle.' They asked: 'Grant us more,' so he added a day. They asked again: 'Grant us more,' and he added another day, then they returned to the Muqawqis. ¶

I say: These narrations and reports indicate, as mentioned previously, that the one in authority is the one who determines the period granted to nations and peoples when they are invited to Islam or to submit to the rule of Islam, based on various considerations in light of the interests of the Islamic Da'wah. If that period expires and no response is given, the Islamic state may then declare Jihad against those who have rejected Islam and refused to enter under the rule of the Muslims, in order to apply the Islamic system upon them by force, make them subjects of the Islamic state, and annex their lands to Dar al-Islam. ¶

With this, we conclude the fourth and final issue in this research, and with its completion, we reach the end of the third section of this chapter. ¶

Miscellaneous issues related to the causes of declaring Jihad: We mentioned in the introduction to this third chapter, which we are now concluding, that we would present at the end of the chapter issues related to the causes of declaring Jihad, some of which pertain to what has already been discussed. ¶

treating them, or part of treating them. However, their emergence as controversial issues around which much debate has circulated makes us dedicate independent headings to them, and then address those aspects which we have not previously treated. As for what has already been treated, in whole or in part, we shall limit our discussion to providing a focused image of them and indicating the place of their study in the preceding research. ¶

Furthermore, among those mentioned issues are the following: 1. The First Issue: Is Jihad only a defensive war, or can it also be an offensive war? 2. The Second Issue: Is Jihad an interference in the affairs of others? 3. The Third Issue: What is the basis of the relationship between Muslims and others, peace or war? ¶

These are the most important issues that were discussed during the previous sections. However, as mentioned, their emergence as independent subjects and the significant debate surrounding them compels us to assign them independent headings, briefly indicating our view on them. ¶

1. The First Issue: Is Jihad only a defensive war, or can it also be an offensive war? We have learned from the previous discussions of this chapter and the one before it that Jihad, when it was first legislated, was a defensive war against those who initiated aggression and fighting against the Muslims. Therefore, it is correct to say that Jihad in this stage was only a defensive war. Then came the permission for Muslims to initiate fighting against the disbelievers after conveying the call (Da'wah) to them and their rejection of it, even if no aggression had been committed by the disbelievers against the Muslims. Accordingly, it is correct to describe Jihad in this second stage as being both defensive and offensive. - It is a defensive war against aggressors, as was the case in the first stage of the legislation of Jihad. This remained the case in the second stage. To it was added the initiation of fighting against the disbelievers after their rejection of the call and their rejection of the rule of Islam, as previously explained. From here, we understand that the meaning of Jihad being an offensive war is the Muslims initiating combat against the disbelievers, subject to the mentioned condition. That is: on the condition of conveying the call clearly and warning the disbelievers of the three options, which are: Islam, or Jizya, and if he... ¶

Following a negative response to these two options, the third option emerged: war. This is the meaning of jihad being an offensive war. ¶

Hence, it is permissible to describe jihad as an offensive war according to the aforementioned meaning. ¶

- Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani says: "Jihad is the absolute and general combat against enemies. It includes offensive, defensive, preemptive, limited, and unlimited war..."(1). ¶

- The author of 'Al-Fann al-Askari al-Islami' (The Islamic Military Art) states: "The Islamic military doctrine is an offensive doctrine..."(2). He also says: "Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was not a prophet sent only to the Arabs, but he was the bearer of a universal human message that he was to spread to all people. Therefore, it was necessary for him and his successors after him to set out carrying the message of Islam to the world and beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and this undoubtedly required advancement, proactiveness, and initiative to impose sovereignty. These are all offensive positions by their nature"(3). He further states: "Jihad in Islam was not so much for repelling aggression as it was for spreading the principles of the upright religion..."(4). He then adds: "The offensive character of the Islamic military doctrine does not in any way mean 'aggression,' as long as jihad, in its essence and in the Islamic concept, has a specific and clear goal: to spread the Islamic call..."(5). Having said this, there is another group of Islamic writers who denied that jihad should be described as an offensive war, interpreting the word 'offensive' (hujum) as implying injustice and aggression. ¶

- Professor Dr. Wahbah al-Zuhayli says: "It is not correct to describe jihad as offensive because 'offense' implies injustice, whereas jihad is, in reality, justice..."(6). ¶

Professor Zafir al-Qasimi says: 'The verses used as evidence, such as the words of the Almighty: "The polytheists are unclean"(1) and the words of the Almighty: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the Last Day... until they give the jizya..."(2)—these verses contain no indication of 'hujum' (offensive warfare), which is merely a soft expression for 'udwan' (aggression).'(3) I say: The reason why this group of Islamic writers denies describing jihad as an offensive war is that they adopt the view that jihad is exclusively a defensive war, despite their varying perspectives on the breadth or narrowness of the scope of defense. However, they agree that it is forbidden to fight those disbelievers who have withdrawn from fighting the Muslims, have committed no aggression against them, and have not obstructed the path of the Dawah (call to Islam) in their lands—neither by persecuting those who embrace it, nor by attacking its proponents. Based on this concept, they consider it forbidden to present these peaceful disbelievers with the three options: Islam, jizya, or war. Thus, if they are presented with these options and they refuse Islam and jizya—that is, submission to Islamic rule—and the Muslims, based on this, attack them with combat... this offensive war is considered injustice and aggression by this group of Islamic writers. As for the earlier Islamic writers who advocate for the legitimacy of jihad against disbelievers, even if they have refrained from fighting the Muslims and have opened the doors of their states and countries to the Islamic call without obstruction, neither against it nor against its proponents or those who believe in it, but they—or the rulers of those states—refused to enter into Islam or submit to Islamic rule—these Islamic writers, who assert the legitimacy of jihad against such people in order to implement the Islamic system upon them, justify describing jihad as an offensive war in the sense previously explained. ¶

We have mentioned more than once that the majority of jurists (fuqaha) affirm the legitimacy of initiating combat against disbelievers who have refrained from fighting the Muslims for the aforementioned purpose. We have cited the opinions of many jurists in this regard, including the statement of Imam al-Jassas: 'We do not know of any jurist who prohibits fighting those of the polytheists who have refrained from fighting us. The disagreement is only over the permissibility of leaving them unmolested, not over its prohibition!'(4) That is, there is a consensus, and there is... ¶

There is a disagreement among jurists regarding the issue of fighting peaceful disbelievers; that is, for the purpose of subjecting them to Islamic rule in fulfillment of the Almighty's saying: { ...until they pay the jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued} (1). ¶

- The scope of disagreement among the jurists is: - Is it obligatory to fight peaceful, non-aggressive disbelievers, and is it forbidden to refrain from fighting them, implying that it is forbidden to let them govern themselves under systems of disbelief? Or is it permissible to fight them, and permissible to refrain from fighting them... according to what the public interest (maslaha) dictates? In any case, based on this statement of Imam al-Jassas, no Islamic jurist denies the legitimacy of attacking peaceful disbelievers who have refrained from fighting the Muslims, after they have been invited to Islam (da'wah) and warned with the three options (Islam, jizya, or war). Hence, it is correct to describe jihad as an offensive war in this sense. ¶

Second Issue: Is Jihad interference in the affairs of others? I say: There are absolute expressions that carry undefined meanings, but due to various factors, when people use them, they adopt a position of sympathy and support, or hatred and refutation. However, when they think about the varying circumstances in which these expressions can be used, they realize that it is naive to apply a single judgment to them, and they realize consequently that a single expression may be good and acceptable in one context, and bad and rejected in another. Among such expressions to which our description applies is: 'Interference in the affairs of others.' For some reason, people have adopted a stance of rejection towards the idea of 'interference in the affairs of others,' but they rarely perceive the error of this rigid stance until the idea clashes with their own interests. If a person finds themselves, for example, under threat or aggression, and needs help from others, and someone refuses to offer assistance under the pretext of 'non-interference in the affairs of others'—here, one feels the magnitude of the atrocity carried by that idea when placed in an inappropriate context, and one feels that it is a mistake to generalize a judgment on something or an action that must vary according to its circumstances and conditions. ¶

(1) Surah At-Tawbah, verse 29. ¶

In order to ensure that personal desire (hawa) does not dominate the judgment of things, actions, and ideas based on their shifting circumstances and conditions, the Shariah has reserved the authority to issue rulings regarding them for the Muslim. ¶

Accordingly, intervention in the affairs of others may be considered ugly and unacceptable in one situation, yet good and required in another, depending on what the Shariah dictates. ¶

For example, if there is a non-aggression treaty between the Islamic state and another state, and the Muslims who are subjects of that treaty state seek the assistance of their Muslim brothers in the Islamic state against oppression they are facing, then intervention in the affairs of that state to support those Muslims is ugly and unacceptable in Shariah. This is because the legal proof (dalil) has provided this ruling in the words of the Almighty: 'And if they seek your help in religion, then you must help them, except against a people between whom and you is a treaty.' ¶

Conversely, if there is no non-aggression treaty between the Islamic state and that state, and the message of Islam has been clearly conveyed to that state, and they have been presented with the three options: Islam, Jizya, or war, and they have refused Islam as well as joining the Islamic state and accepting Islamic governance, then intervention in the affairs of that state to break the material barrier—represented by its military forces that prevent the application of Islamic law—is a good and required act in Shariah. This is because the legal proof has provided this ruling in the words of the Almighty: 'Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day... until they pay the Jizya willingly while they are humbled.' ¶

Furthermore, the world has felt the error of the idea of 'non-intervention in the affairs of others' in certain circumstances within the sphere of international relations, thus permitting intervention to establish truth, annul falsehood, and defend humans in cases where a state persecutes its minority subjects. However, the reality remains that in such cases, personal desire still plays its part in that intervention for the aforementioned purposes. ¶

This intervention continues to play its role in governing others, with supporters and opponents divided over it, as long as it is not based on a ruling issued by an authority free from whims and biases. ¶

Hence, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported on Friday morning, January 3, 1990, citing British newspapers as saying: 'Bush—the American President—does not enjoy the support of the entire world to restore democracy to any country in the world.' This was in the context of the American forces' invasion of Panama to arrest its ruler, General Noriega, and bring him to America to stand trial for his crimes. ¶

Since America has granted itself the right to interfere in the affairs of others to implement the democratic system it believes in—supported by some, even though no one, not even its proponents, claims that the democratic system is the one God has chosen for His creation—how brazen is it, then, to criticize Muslims for interfering in the affairs of others by God's command—even if only in the Muslims' own conception—in order to implement the Islamic system upon those others, knowing that over a billion human beings believe this system is the one God has chosen for His creation? And if others deny this, why not open the field for the system and its creed to be discussed at the international public and official levels through modern media, so that the world may realize through free research how close or far this claim is from the truth, given that this world is the one primarily concerned with this claim? ¶

In summary: when the question is asked, 'Do Muslims interfere in the affairs of others in the name of Jihad?' the answer, without hesitation, is 'Yes!' And praise and thanks be to God for that, in the name of the humanity that understands its true interests... for the Muslims' interference in the affairs of others is not like that of foxes and wolves interfering in the affairs of the weak of God's creation to satisfy their urge to prey... but rather, it is like the intervention of parents in the affairs of their children to establish truth and justice among them, and to plant love, affection, and mercy in their hearts, even if the parents spend much of their effort, comfort, and wealth in this path. ¶

We now move on to another issue... ¶