Chapter 15

A man said: 'His reward is lost!' This was mentioned to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, and he said: 'SubhanAllah! There is no harm! And in another narration: 'And what harm is there if he is praised and rewarded?' (1). ¶

It is worth noting that there is another opinion regarding the legal ruling of this combat aimed at acquiring the enemy's wealth, specifically concerning whether it carries the honor of jihad or not. This opinion is found in the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, and it was reiterated by Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani in his book 'al-Siyar al-Kabir', which was commented upon by Imam al-Sarakhsi. ¶

This opinion is based on a specific criterion regarding whether combat on enemy soil constitutes jihad. We can extract this criterion from several places in the aforementioned great book: it is that every combat in which the elevation of the religion (i'zaz al-din) is realized is jihad. The wealth acquired through it is 'spoils of war' (ghanima), one-fifth of which belongs to those designated by Allah Almighty in the verse of ghanima in Surah al-Anfal (2)—as previously explained. The remaining four-fifths are to be distributed among the mujahidin according to the Shariah's division: two shares for the horseman and one share for the foot soldier, as is the school of Abu Hanifa, or three shares for the horseman and one share for the foot soldier, as is the school of al-Shafi'i. In the distribution of this wealth, both those who fought and those who did not fight but went out with the combatants with the intention of jihad are treated equally. ¶

Every combat in which the elevation of the religion is not realized is merely combat against an enemy whose blood is of no consequence (muhdar al-dam), or combat intended for survival against the enemy. The wealth acquired through such combat is merely the acquisition of permissible (mubah) wealth, akin to what is acquired through hunting, gathering firewood, or cutting grass from permissible sources. This wealth is not ghanima; therefore, it is not subject to the khums (one-fifth tax). The entirety of it belongs to the one who secured it, whether an individual or a group. Only those who actually participated in securing this wealth are entitled to it, not those who did not participate, even if they were with the combatants but did not perform any effective action in the combat or the acquisition. In this case, the horseman is not preferred over the foot soldier in the distribution of the wealth. ¶

Regarding the wealth between the participants, they are equal in division because the rule of 'tafdil' (preference/precedence) is specific to spoils of war (ghanima). And this wealth is not ghanima! This, and that by which the honor of the religion and the exaltation of the word of Allah is realized through combat in the enemy's land, is of two types: 1 - Combat by a group that possesses strength and defensive capability (mana'a) which entered the enemy's land with the intention of jihad, whether with or without the permission of the Imam; because as long as they possess strength and mana'a, the likelihood of achieving the honor of the religion through their combat is present, so the combat here is jihad, because the basis of jihad is fighting to honor the religion. 2 - Combat by an individual or a group that does not possess strength and mana'a, but they entered the enemy's land intending jihad with the permission of the Imam. As long as the exit occurred with the Imam's permission, it is incumbent upon the Imam - as stated in Hashiyat Ibn Abidin - 'to support them since he permitted them, just as it is incumbent upon him to support the group that has mana'a if they enter without his permission, to protect against the weakening of the Muslims and the religion. Thus, with the Imam's support, they are not considered bandits (mutalassisun).' This is the criterion for combat in enemy territory being jihad. However, if an individual or a group lacking mana'a and strength enters the enemy's land without the Imam's permission, their combat is not face-to-face combat to honor the religion. Rather, it is fighting to acquire wealth, to defend, and to survive - so it is merely combat against an enemy whose blood is wasted and whose wealth is permissible (mubah). At the conclusion of mentioning this criterion for when combat in enemy territory is jihad in the path of Allah or not, and what is considered ghanima and what is considered mere acquisition, we point out that the Hanafis term the wealth that is mere acquisition in this context as 'talassus' (banditry) and the theft of permissible wealth. It is stated in Al-Mughni regarding the ruling on wealth obtained by a group that does not possess mana'a and entered the enemy's land without the Imam's permission, according to a weak narration from Ibn Hanbal - the text states: ¶

The second (narrative)—referring to the second ruling regarding the aforementioned wealth—is that it belongs to them without the deduction of one-fifth (khums). This is the position of Abu Hanifa, because it is permissible acquisition without jihad; thus, it is analogous to gathering firewood. Indeed, jihad is only conducted by the permission of the Imam, or by a group possessing strength and defensive power (mana'ah). As for this (latter case), it is merely brigandage (tassassus) and simple acquisition. ¶

This being said, the criteria mentioned for considering combat as jihad or otherwise—and the subsequent ruling on wealth acquired through such means—is derived from the Hadith: 'Whoever fights so that the word of Allah may be supreme, he is in the way of Allah.' ¶

Two matters are understood from this Hadith regarding the classification of combat as jihad in the path of Allah: 1. The intent that the fighting be for the exaltation of the word of Allah. 2. The necessity that follows from the goal of exalting the word of Allah, which is that the fighters must possess power and defensive capability (mana'ah), either in reality or through the guarantee of the Imam to provide them with support and protection when they set out with his permission and require aid. Without power and defensive capability among the fighters, the exaltation of the word of Allah cannot be realized; rather, on the contrary, their fighting may result in the weakening of the Muslims and the Religion. ¶

It appears that Imam al-Shafi'i did not take this necessity into account. Instead, he looked only to the intent of exalting the word of Allah in combat, as is explicit in the text of the Hadith. Furthermore, he permits—even if it is deemed disliked (makruh)—for an individual or a small group to risk themselves in combat, despite the danger and fear of destruction. For this reason, he considered the fighting of a lone individual, and those who possess no power or defense, to be jihad in the way of Allah, and the wealth acquired through this path to be spoils of war (ghanima). ¶

It is stated in Imam al-Shafi'i’s book, 'Al-Radd 'ala Muhammad bin al-Hasan': '...Since the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) established that a single person may set out alone, or with a few others, to catch the enemy off guard by strategy, or to perish in the way of Allah, and Allah has ruled that whatever was reached by galloping horses...' ¶

Upon which the Muslims have prevailed, it contains the khums (one-fifth), and the Messenger of Allah ﷺ established the sunnah that four-fifths of it belong to those who spurred their horses [in combat]—so it is the same whether the number of those who spurred their horses is small or large. However, we dislike that a small group should set out without the Imam’s permission towards a larger group. The status of what they seized without the Imam’s permission is the same as the status of what they seized with the Imam’s permission. ¶

And if we were to claim that whoever went out without the Imam's permission is in the category of a thief—we would be claiming that if armies went out without the Imam's permission they would be thieves, and that if an enemy came upon the people of a Muslim fortress and they fought them without the Imam's permission, they would be thieves. Yet, these people are not thieves; rather, they are obedient to Allah, striving (mujahidun) in the way of Allah, fulfilling what was ordained for them regarding mobilization (nafir) and jihad, and attaining the supererogatory reward and virtue (1). ¶

I say: This is the view we favor in this matter, as we have previously presented in this research numerous pieces of evidence from the biography of the Prophet ﷺ, which are considered an exposition of the legislation of jihad in the way of Allah the Almighty. ¶

As a final concluding remark: We close this research with the words of Imam al-Shafi'i, may Allah have mercy on him. ¶

Eleventh Topic: Combat for the Establishment of the Islamic State ¶

- An introduction to the fundamental issues that we will address in this research. - First Issue: The opinions of Islamic writers on the concept of combat for the establishment of the Islamic State. A - The First Trend: Refusal to use weapons to establish the Islamic State. - Al-Mawdudi. - Al-Albani. - Al-Buti. B - The Second Trend: The call for combat to establish the Islamic State. - The Jihad Group in Egypt, and their rebuttals to those who refuse the use of weapons to establish the Islamic State. - First Objection: The Islamic State is established only through peaceful proselytizing (Da'wah) by means of an Islamic party. - Second Objection: The Islamic State is established by secluding oneself from society, performing Hijrah (emigration) from it to gain strength, and then returning to it for combat to establish the state. - Third Objection: Engaging in politics causes hardness of heart. - Fourth Objection: The fear of failure when attempting to establish the state through combat. - Second Issue: The evidence of those who argue for or against the legitimacy of combat to establish the Islamic State, along with a discussion of the evidence, and an explanation of the opinion we favor, supported by proof. A - The evidence of those who argue for the illegitimacy of combat to establish the Islamic State. ¶

285 ¶

Evidence 1: Expected harm from the use of weaponry. Evidence 2: The Shariah command to exercise patience regarding the tyranny of leaders, and considering contemporary rulers to be like deviant Imams. Evidence 3: Modern military coups are among the contemporary innovations (bid'ah)! Evidence 4: The Shariah method for changing situations is to change what is within one's own soul (nafs). B - Evidence of those who argue for the legitimacy of combat to establish an Islamic state. Evidence 1: The evidence of apostasy (riddah). Evidence 2: Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligation is itself an obligation. Evidence 3: The obligation of jihad upon every Muslim in any Islamic land occupied by a disbelieving enemy. Evidence 4: Manifest disbelief (kufr al-bawwah). C - Discussion of the evidence of the negative approach toward the issue of combat to establish an Islamic state. 1. Discussion of the harm argument. 2. Discussion of treating contemporary rulers as equivalent to legitimate Imams who are merely sinful or tyrannical. 3. Discussion of considering military coups for changing situations as modern innovations (bid'ah). 4. Discussion of limiting the legitimate method of changing deviant situations solely to internal change (changing what is within the soul). D - Discussion of the evidence of the positive approach toward the issue of combat to establish an Islamic state. 1. Discussion of the evidence of apostasy. 2. Discussion of the principle: "Whatever is necessary to fulfill an obligation is itself an obligation." 3. Discussion of the evidence of mandatory jihad upon enemy occupation, and the categorization of contemporary rulers as equivalent to enemies occupying Muslim lands! 4. Discussion of the evidence of manifest disbelief. E - The opinion we prefer, and its evidence. - The pledge (bay'ah) of the Ansar to engage in war on the night of al-Aqabah, and the terms upon which this pledge was made. - The method of establishing an Islamic state in our current era. - The Third Issue: Is combat for the sake of establishing and protecting an Islamic state considered Jihad in the path of Allah in its technical/idiomatic sense? 286 ¶

Eleventh Topic: Combat for Establishing and Protecting the Islamic State. An introduction to the fundamental issues we will address in this section. Let us enter the subject without any introductions, for we have had our fill of the introductions with which writers preface their topics—especially regarding sensitive subjects where such introductions are, at times, more likely to cause annoyance and resentment than to stir longing and engagement. Meanwhile, the reader's soul is often eager to grasp the specific thought and precise answer to every issue raised in such highly sensitive topics. Fearing that these words of mine might be of the type that stirs boredom, I hasten to cut them short, disagreeing with those writers who prefer to let their introductions run on indefinitely under the pretext of shedding more light on the subject they are about to embark upon. Yet, the reader often finds in such alleged illumination only further obscurity covering the very issues they are eager to see the author's intellectual stance on. I said: Let us enter the subject without introductions. So, let us do so; let us be sincere in what we say, and let us approach the research of this topic through three issues that I believe cover the significant points of our important subject, within the framework of combat, which is our primary concern in this chapter of the first book we are currently in. These three issues are: First: The opinions of Islamic writers regarding the idea of combat to establish an Islamic State. ¶

Second: The arguments of those who affirm or deny the legitimacy of combat (qital) for establishing an Islamic state, along with a critical discussion of those arguments, and the opinion we prefer supported by evidence. Third: Is combat for establishing an Islamic state — according to those who advocate it — considered 'Jihad in the way of Allah' in its technical sense? ¶

First: The opinions of Islamic writers regarding the idea of combat to establish an Islamic state. The opinions of Islamic writers on this first issue are divided into two trends: A- A trend that rejects the idea of 'combat, revolutionary violence, or the use of arms' to establish an Islamic state. It is worth noting here that the proponents of this trend do not necessarily use the term 'Islamic state' when expressing their views. Many of them prefer to avoid such an expression for various reasons; instead, they use terms like 'Islamic society,' 'changing the situation,' and similar phrases. This is acceptable, for when such expressions are used by those working in the field of Islamic Da'wah in our current era, their significance is confined to the term 'Islamic state'—meaning a government based on the foundations of Islam, applying its rulings, and carrying its message. B- Another trend that calls for the idea of 'combat, revolutionary violence, or the use of arms' to establish an Islamic state. In discussing this first issue, we will limit ourselves to presenting the opinions of a number of Islamic writers who support one trend or the other, and quote parts of their writings that manifest the view they hold and promote. We will leave the discussion of their views for when we research the second issue. A- The First Trend: 'Rejection of violence and prohibition of the use of arms' to establish an Islamic state. This trend was adopted by a number of Islamic writers, including: 1. Ustadh Abul A'la al-Mawdudi: This Islamic writer, who was the Amir of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, says at the conclusion of... ¶

A lecture of his titled 'The Duty of Muslim Youth Today,' delivered in Makkah during the Hajj season in 1381 AH. This Islamic writer says in his lecture, and I quote: 'O honorable brothers... I would like to offer you a piece of advice in closing, which is: Do not engage in clandestine activities to achieve your goals, and avoid the use of violence and weapons to change conditions, for this path is also a form of haste that is of no avail, and an attempt to reach the objective by the shortest path... Indeed, the true and sound revolution is to propagate your call openly and to reform the hearts and minds of people on the widest possible scale... As for those who hasten in this matter and carry out a coup using violent means, and then succeed in this endeavor to some extent, their example is like wind that entered through the door only to exit through the window. This is the advice I wished to direct to everyone engaged in the work of the Islamic Da'wah.' (1) ¶

Among the Islamic writers who hold this view is: ¶

2- Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani: This is found in his commentary on a passage in Al-Aqidah al-Tahawiyyah, item 72, which states: 'We do not view rebellion against our leaders and those in authority over us as permissible, even if they act unjustly, nor do we pray against them, nor do we withdraw our hands from their obedience...' Commenting on this, Sheikh al-Albani says: 'I say: In this is an explanation of the path to salvation from the injustice of the rulers who are "from our own people, and speak our language," which is for Muslims to repent to their Lord, rectify their creed, and raise themselves and their families upon the correct Islam, in fulfillment of His Almighty's saying: {Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves.} (2) ¶

This was also alluded to by a contemporary preacher who said: 'Establish the Islamic state in your hearts, and it will be established for you on your land.' The path to salvation is not what some people imagine, which is revolting with weapons against rulers through military coups, for while being one of the innovations of the present age, it is also contrary...' ¶

For the texts of the Shariah that command the changing of that which is within the souls, the reformation of the foundation is also essential in order to build upon it. ¶

Among the Islamic writers who follow this trend and advocate for it: ¶

3 - Dr. Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buti: His position can be understood from numerous indications in his booklet 'Hakadha Falnad’u ila al-Islam' (Thus We Must Invite to Islam), including his assertion: 'The establishment of society upon the pillars of Islam, its rule, and its system, is nothing but a reward from Allah Almighty, which He creates for them from where they expect or do not expect, in exchange for their application of Islam upon themselves first, then upon their families, their children, and those dependent upon them second, and thirdly, through the abundance of the remembrance of Allah, devotion to Him, and supplication to Him.' ¶

This limitation of the establishment of an Islamic society to being a reward from Allah, which He creates for the Muslims in exchange for their application of Islam upon themselves and their kin, and in exchange for their frequent remembrance of Allah and devotion to Him, is evidence of the rejection of the idea of combat (qital) to rectify conditions and establish an Islamic society. ¶

This trend, which rejects the idea of combat to establish an Islamic society, is further emphasized by the author's guidance to the Muslim to limit his concern to Da'wah (invitation) and not to preoccupy himself with changing circumstances; because the causes of such change are in the hand of Allah alone. He states in this regard: 'So, when a Muslim performs the duty incumbent upon him regarding the call, he should leave the results to Allah Almighty, entrust the matter to Him, not burden himself with things for which Allah has not given him the keys, and not strive in the matter like one who imagines that the reins of all affairs are in his hands; for it is He who drives the causes, brings about the results, and changes the states...' ¶

This is the first trend regarding the idea of combat for the establishment of an Islamic state in our time, or, in the words of some, 'the establishment of an Islamic society and the changing of conditions.' ¶

B - The Second Perspective: The Call to Combat for the Establishment of the Islamic State. ¶

Perhaps the 'Jihad Group' in Egypt is the most prominent representative of this trend among Islamic movements in recent years. It has published writings clarifying its views, defending them with the evidence it has presented, and attacking the other trend that rejects the idea of combat to establish an Islamic state, accusing it of one of two things: either ignorance of Islam, or cowardice... as will be discussed later. ¶

Dr. Muhammad Imara says: 'And because this issue—the issue of the sword—and the use of violence and revolution... in establishing the Islamic state, or in re-establishing it—since this is a controversial issue—the Jihad Group has been keen to exhaustively refute all the objections that have been and are being raised regarding the adoption of combat and violence as a means to establish the Islamic state and return Islam to the Muslims'(1). ¶

It is appropriate to mention these objections and their responses briefly, so as to shed more light on these two perspectives regarding this issue: ¶

- The First Objection: This comes from a trend that calls for Islamic work through an 'Islamic Party' that operates within the limits of the laws prevailing in society, rejecting the idea of combat to seize power and implement Islam. ¶

The 'Jihad Group' responds to this trend by stating that any regime—any regime whatsoever—will not allow an effective tool that would destroy it. Since the destruction of the current corrupt regime is the goal, there is no way to reach it through 'legal' tools, whether a party or a parliament. Those who say, 'We must form an Islamic party within the list of existing parties,' their efforts will lead to nothing but an increase in 'charitable associations!' and their party will not be able to reach the 'goal for which it was established, which is the demolition of the state of disbelief (kufr).' On the contrary, it would be a contribution to 'building the state of disbelief! For they share their views and participate in the membership of legislative councils that legislate in contradiction to God!'(2). ¶

I say: Mawdudi has already warned against this line of action, which the 'Jihad Group' also warns against. He states: 'For instance, our participation in a cabinet that is improper and does not believe in our principles—in the hope that our participation in it is a step that brings us closer to our goals—is a wrong approach. Because practical experience confirms that such an action never yields good results; as those who control power are the ones who draw up their internal and external policies, and they implement them according to what their interests and whims dictate. As for those who participate with them with the intention of achieving noble goals that they set before their eyes, they must inevitably follow them. This means that, in the end, they become mouthpieces for them and tools in their hands, doing with them whatever they wish and exploiting them as they desire.' ¶

- Second Objection: This is presented by a group that claims—in the words of the author—that they are currently in the stage of weakness (istid'af), and they call for withdrawing from society and migrating from it, in the hope of gaining strength, then returning to it to fight and establish the Islamic state. ¶

The Jihad Group responds that these people should save their efforts for themselves: they should establish the Islamic state in their own land and then emerge from it as conquerors. 'The example of such people is like one who says: I will migrate to the mountain, then return to confront Pharaoh, as Moses did, and thereafter God will cause the earth to swallow Pharaoh and his hosts. All these delusions have only resulted from abandoning the correct and Shariah-compliant method for establishing the Islamic state,' which Allah Almighty defined by His saying: 'And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah.' ¶

- Third Objection: This is put forth by a group that restricts Islam to the boundaries of righteousness, piety, worship, and asceticism. They say: 'Politics' brings hardness to the hearts that distracts them from the remembrance of Allah! ¶

The Jihad Group responds by stating that Jihad—and they mean here fighting the rulers in Islamic lands and taking authority from them to implement Islam—is to them a 'political act' and the pinnacle of worship in Islam. 'And whoever truly wishes to engage in the highest degrees of obedience, and to be at the pinnacle of...' ¶

is worship, then he should engage in jihad for the sake of Allah. This is to be done without neglecting the other pillars of Islam. The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) describes jihad as the peak (sanam) of Islam. ¶

Those who claim that preoccupation with politics hardens the heart and distracts from the remembrance of Allah seem to ignore the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'The best jihad is a word of truth spoken in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.' Whoever speaks with such philosophies either does not understand Islam or is a coward who does not want to stand firmly with the command of Allah. ¶

Fourth Objection: This is raised by a group that does not advocate fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state out of fear of failure. The Jihad organization responds to this group by stating that they are falling into two errors: First: Shying away from carrying out Allah’s command to establish the state. A Muslim is required to implement this command, regardless of the outcomes! Second: Failing to grasp the attractiveness of the justice of Islam, which will bring many supporters to its state, even from among those who had no prior knowledge of Islam! In response to those who say, 'We fear that we might establish the state, and then after a day or two, a counter-reaction will occur that destroys what we have achieved,' the Jihad organization replies: 'The establishment of the Islamic state is the implementation of Allah’s command, and we are not responsible for the results. Anyone who utters such words—the only purpose of which is to discourage Muslims from fulfilling their Shariah obligation of establishing Allah's law—has forgotten that once the infidel rule collapses, everything will be in the hands of the Muslims, making the fall of the Muslim state impossible. Furthermore, the laws of Islam are neither deficient nor...' ¶

incapable of subjugating every corruptor on earth who has stepped outside of God’s command. Furthermore, all of God’s laws are based on justice, and you will find them welcomed even by those who do not know Islam.” (1) These are the most significant objections raised by the Jihad organization regarding their proposed concept—namely, “combat for the establishment of the Islamic state”—along with their responses to them. Perhaps, in this presentation of the statements of both sides on this issue, we have clearly grasped the dimensions of the idea represented by each faction. Here, we proceed to the second issue in this research, which is: Second: The arguments of those who assert the legitimacy or illegitimacy of combat for the establishment of an Islamic state, accompanied by a discussion of these arguments and an explanation of the opinion we consider most sound, along with its evidence. A- The arguments of those who believe that combat for the establishment of an Islamic state is illegitimate. Proponents of this view base their position on several pieces of evidence, including: 1. The first argument: It is based on the harm resulting from the use of weapons. That is, harm is prohibited in Shariah according to the saying of the Prophet (peace be upon him): “No harm and no reciprocating harm” (La darara wa la dirar) (2). After warning against the use of violence and weapons to change situations, Maududi says: “This path is worse in its outcome and more harmful than any other form.” (3) Maududi merely gestures towards the aspect of harm in pursuing this path, from which it is understood that he fears the opposition of hostile forces to a change based on force, as if he means the resulting strife and bloodshed. ¶

He indicates that success in achieving change through force, if achieved, is only temporary. If we wish to clarify what Mawdudi pointed to but refrained from explicitly stating, we would say: the hostile forces, upon such success, will not remain silent! This success would be followed by failure, and the result in the field of the Islamic Da'wah would be nothing but the killing of its men, the persecution of its youth, the stifling of its message, the waste of its efforts, and a regression of its progress by many years! This is if the matter does not escalate to other scandals and atrocities committed by hostile forces against the private sanctity of those who sought change by force, which would make one blush with shame, with the intent of stripping them of their resolve to stand firm. ¶

2. The Second Argument: This is based on considering the holders of authority in Muslim lands today as legitimate Imams (leaders) who have deviated due to immorality or tyranny. The Shariah ruling regarding them is to exercise patience, as previously explained in a prior study (1). This is the position held by Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani in his commentary on the *Aqidah al-Tahawiyyah*, which states: 'We do not believe in rebelling against our Imams and those in authority over us, even if they are tyrannical.' ¶

Sheikh al-Albani says in his commentary on this statement: 'Rather, in exercising patience over their tyranny lies the expiation of sins, for Allah only empowered them over us because of the corruption of our own deeds, and the recompense is of the same nature as the deed. Therefore, we must strive in seeking forgiveness, in self-education, and in rectifying our actions. Allah the Almighty says: {And thus We cause some of the wrongdoers to overcome others because of what they were earning} (2). So, if the subjects wish to rid themselves of the injustice of a tyrannical ruler, they should abandon injustice themselves' (3). The Sheikh's words in this commentary clearly refer to the rulers of today, as he discussed in this context the military coups against Muslim rulers in our current era and prohibited them based on the duty of patience toward the Imams. ¶

3. The Third Argument: This posits that military coups to change conditions are among the innovations (bid'ah) of the present age (4). That is, the Shariah has prohibited innovations and newly invented matters, as per the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): ¶

And beware of innovations in matters, for every innovation is a bid'ah (innovation), and every bid'ah is misguidance." (1) ¶

4 - The Fourth Argument: This is that the Shariah has determined a specific method for changing conditions, which is changing what is within oneself: "Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves" (2). Therefore, seeking to change conditions through any method other than this is a violation of this Shariah text (3). These are the most important arguments of those who reject fighting for the establishment of the Islamic state. ¶

B - The Arguments of Those Who Assert the Legitimacy of Fighting to Establish the Islamic State ¶

The proponents of this trend rely on several arguments, including: ¶

1 - The First Argument: This is the argument of apostasy (ridda). It is argued that "after the final abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 CE, the eradication of all Islamic rulings, and their replacement by laws set by disbelievers" (4), an apostasy occurred within the state and among the rulers. "For the state apostatized from the Shariah when it replaced it with the laws of the disbelieving West; likewise, the Muslim rulers of today have become apostates from Islam, as they judge by other than what Allah has revealed." Furthermore, they were raised at the tables of colonialism, whether Crusader or Communist; they carry nothing of Islam except the names, even if they pray, fast, and claim to be Muslims. Thus, the 'Dar' (land) became dominated by the laws of disbelief, even if the majority of its people are Muslims. Therefore, peace is for the Muslims, while war and jihad—in the sense of combat—are against the disbelieving state and the land of the apostate rulers! It is incumbent upon the Muslims to mobilize and rise to fight in order to change this miserable, disbelieving reality!" (5). ¶

Meaning: It is as if the proponents of this argument want to say that the ruling issued regarding lands where the rulers apostatized and stopped the implementation of the Shariah applies to the Islamic countries of today and their rulers. ¶

The rulings of Islam during the time of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him), as many people apostatized under his rule. Since the majority of people today are Muslims who have not apostatized, each is granted their own status; Muslims are not to be fought, rather, the apostate state and the apostate rulers are to be fought, for the sake of restoring the land to being a Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) and restoring the state to being an Islamic state. ¶

2. The second proof: This is the legal maxim (Shari'ah rule): 'That without which an obligatory act cannot be fulfilled is itself obligatory.' This is because Allah (Mighty and Majestic is He) has obligated upon us Shari'ah rulings whose implementation is not possible except through the Islamic state, therefore the establishment of the Islamic state is obligatory; and because the establishment of the Islamic state cannot be achieved except through combat (qital), the ruling of combat for its establishment is obligatory by the evidence of the same Shari'ah rule: 'That without which an obligatory act cannot be fulfilled is itself obligatory.' ¶

3. The third proof: This is the evidence for the obligation of Jihad on every Muslim in every Islamic land occupied by the enemy. 'For the enemy, in relation to the Islamic regions, resides in their homes; indeed, this enemy has come to possess the reins of power. This enemy is those rulers who have usurped the leadership of the Muslims, and hence, Jihad against them is an individual obligation (fard ayn).' Like prayer and fasting; for just as Allah Almighty said: 'Fasting is prescribed for you,' He said regarding combat: 'Fighting is prescribed for you.' Meaning: It is obligatory to fight this enemy that has occupied the lands, in order to wrest leadership from them and establish the Islamic state. ¶

4. The fourth proof: This is the evidence of 'Kufr al-Bawah' (evident, manifest disbelief), regarding which, if it appears from the ruler against the subjects, listening and obedience are binding, in accordance with the Hadith: 'Do not dispute the command with its people, unless you see manifest disbelief (kufr bawah) regarding which you have proof from Allah.' ¶

Dr. Muhammad Amara states: 'The Jihad group believes that disbelief refers to sins, and they have spread...' ¶

Thus, the rulers of today no longer have any claim to the hearing and obedience of the subjects, and they find support in this matter in the words of Qadi Iyad (476-544 AH / 1083-1149 CE): 'If kufr (disbelief), or alteration of the Shariah, or bid’ah (innovation) occurs in him, he ceases to be eligible for wilayat (authority), his obedience lapses, and it becomes mandatory upon the Muslims to rise (i.e., revolt and armed exit with violence) against him, depose him, and appoint a just Imam if they are able to do so'(1). And since removing rulers who possess power and base their government upon it cannot be achieved except through 'revolutionary violence,' there is no other way to remove these rulers and establish the Islamic state'(2). ¶

These are the proofs of those who hold the view of the legitimacy of combat to establish the Islamic state. With this, we conclude our review of the arguments of both sides regarding this issue. We now enter the chapter of discussing these arguments. ¶

C - Discussion of the arguments of the negative tendency regarding the issue of combat to establish the Islamic state ¶

1 - Discussion of the argument of 'harm' (darar): What is strange about those who cling to this argument is that they are people submerged in a sea of pessimism and despair. One can barely feel in them, amidst the depths of their immersion, any pulse of will or determination to change the deviant conditions they are in, nor even a glimmer of hope for salvation that might come through men who believed in their Lord, sold their souls to Allah, and prepared themselves for the support of His religion, so that Allah might ordain, by their hands, the honor of Islam and the establishment of its state. Thus, they refrain from action under the pretext of 'harm,' and with the same argument, they want to prevent others from acting! ¶

There is no objection to the Shariah maxim: 'Repelling harms takes precedence over bringing benefits'(3). Nor to the noble Hadith: 'There should be no harming nor reciprocating harm'(4) — God forbid; let the one who rejects something brought by Islam be failed, ruined, and disgraced. The objection is directed solely at applying Shariah rulings in contexts other than their intended ones. ¶

And placing it in other than its proper context, much like the objection raised against inflating the whispers of fear and panic in some souls to the extent that they imagine harm as a beast of prey—hidden from sight, yet ever-present like a phantom, poised to pounce upon anyone wishing to move toward an activity that causes suspicion among the proponents of falsehood. The fear of harm is the cause of the negative stance regarding the issue of combat to establish an Islamic state. So be it; therefore, if the balance of probability suggests benefit and public interest (maslahah) in adopting a positive stance on this issue, then this positive stance should be considered legitimate (mashru'). Thus, the matter returns to the application of objective criteria. When the aspect of harm outweighs, there is prohibition; when the aspect of benefit and interest outweighs, there is legitimacy. I say: if the one who used the argument of harm to prohibit combat in this matter had presented his argument in this way, it would have been more consistent with the logic of the argument he himself employs. However, to judge categorically that raising weapons in this path is destined to always invite the winds of harm from its window is a denial of reality! Yes! If there were a Shar'i text (scriptural evidence) whose application to this issue we accepted, prohibiting the raising of weapons, we would say: 'We hear and we obey,' for all benefit lies in what the Shariah has brought, and all harm lies in what the Shariah has forbidden—even if our limited human reasoning sees otherwise! This is because we believe that our insight into matters is limited, while the insight of the Shariah is unlimited. Based on this, we echo the words of the companion Rafi' ibn Khadij regarding another matter: 'The Messenger of Allah ﷺ forbade us from a matter that was beneficial to us, and obedience to Allah and His Messenger is more beneficial and more profitable to us.' However, framing the issue solely on the basis of the argument of harm, devoid of any other Shar'i evidence, leads to what was previously stated: that is, the prohibition of weapons when the expectation of harm from their use is predominant, and the legitimacy—indeed, the obligation—of using weapons when the expectation of benefit is predominant, or when the expectation of harm from not using them is predominant! There is no dispute in this; rather, this extracts this argument from its constant one-sided employment. ¶

Prohibition of using weapons. This is precisely what we want to emphasize here. ¶

We do not want it to be understood now that we advocate the use of weapons in this matter if the benefit of using them outweighs the harm; because we hold a specific view on this issue which we will present at the conclusion of the discussion on the evidence, God willing. ¶

2. Discussing the consideration of those in authority in Muslim countries today as legitimate Imams who have deviated due to immorality (fisq) or tyranny (jawr), and that the Shariah ruling regarding them is the obligation of patience. As mentioned in Al-Nawawi's commentary on Sahih Muslim regarding the hadith: 'There will be favoritism after me, and matters you will disapprove of. They asked: O Messenger of Allah! What do you command those of us who reach that? He said: You fulfill the right that is upon you, and ask Allah for what is yours.' Al-Nawawi stated in the commentary: 'It contains an exhortation to listen and obey, even if the ruler is oppressive and harsh; his right of obedience is to be granted, one should not revolt against him, nor depose him, rather one should beseech Allah Almighty to remove his harm, repel his evil, and reform him' (1). ¶

I say: The obligation of patience towards legitimate Imams if they deviate through immorality or tyranny, and the prohibition of revolting against them, is based on a Shariah proof, and we have addressed this issue in a previous study (2). However, do we consider the rulers in Muslim countries today, who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, as legitimate Imams regarding the obligation of patience and the prohibition of unsheathing weapons against them? ¶

I believe the situation is different between these and those, and for this reason, the ruling should also be different. ¶

I mean that the evidence that mandated patience and prohibited revolt in the case of immorality or tyranny from the ruler only applies to those who acquired Imamate through a legitimate path and then the mentioned deviation occurred. The acquisition of Imamate through a legitimate path is only by way of allegiance (bay'ah) based on consent and choice, in accordance with the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger, as previously detailed in a previous study (3). So, as long as these two matters are not fulfilled, namely: consent and choice... ¶