Chapter 83

The raw materials that enter into the execution of military operations and assist in winning a war, which today include hundreds of raw and manufactured materials (1). That is: such as petroleum (2), and the like. This concerns strategic materials. With this, we conclude the first point and move to the second point. ¶

The second point: Are there specific Shariah texts that address the issues raised in this research? There are several Shariah texts that deal with some of the issues in this research—we will cite them, clarify the extent of their relevance to our topic, and determine their status in terms of authenticity or lack thereof.. ¶

A - There is a Shariah text regarding the prohibition of selling weapons to the people of war (Ahl al-Harb) - mentioned in the book 'Al-Hidayah' from the books of the Hanafis. Its text is: 'The Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, forbade the sale of weapons to the people of war and transporting them to them' (3). ¶

However, the Hadith cited by the author of 'Al-Hidayah' is not established.. Ibn Hajar said regarding it: 'I did not find it' (4). ¶

B - There is a Shariah text regarding the prohibition of selling weapons during sedition (fitna), which jurists use as evidence to forbid selling weapons to the people of war, due to the shared underlying cause (illah) that motivated this prohibition. ¶

It is: that such a sale acts as a means to commit the forbidden (haram), which is the killing of those whose killing is not permissible. Regarding this, the text referred to is: 'From Imran bin Husayn, that the Prophet ﷺ prohibited the sale of weapons during times of fitnah (civil strife).' ¶

This text, however, is also not established (thabit) from the Prophet ﷺ, as determined by the scholars of Hadith. ¶

C - There is a Shariah text, found in the Musnad of Ahmad bin Hanbal and the Sunan of Abu Dawud, from which one may potentially understand the permissibility of selling weapons to the people of war (ahl al-harb). It is: ¶

'From Dhu al-Jawshan, who said: I came to the Prophet ﷺ after he had finished with the people of Badr, bringing a foal of mine. I said: O Muhammad, I have brought you [the horse] Ibn al-Arja’, so that you may take it. He said: I have no need for it. But if you wish, I will trade you for it the finest of the Badr shields! I said: I would not trade it today for a ghurrah (a valuable thing)! He said: Then I have no need for it. Then he said: O Dhu al-Jawshan, will you not embrace Islam, so that you may be among the first in this matter? I said: No! He asked: Why? I said: I have seen that your people are obsessed with you! He asked: How has the news of their deaths at Badr reached you? I said: It has reached me! He asked: Do you think that if I conquer Mecca, I will cut it off? He said: Perhaps if you live, you will see that! Then he said: O Bilal, take the man’s bag and provide him with some Ajwa dates. When I turned to leave, he said: Indeed, he is among the best of Banu Amir. He said: By Allah, I was with my family at al-Ghawr when a rider approached. I asked: Where from? He said: From Mecca. I asked: What have the people done? He said: He (Muhammad) has prevailed.' ¶

Upon him Muhammad ﷺ said: I said: May my mother lose me! By Allah, if I were to accept Islam today, then ask him for Al-Hira, I would surely take it!! ¶

This is the point of evidence used from this Hadith to argue for the permissibility of selling weapons to non-Muslim peoples and other states: that armor is considered defensive weaponry, and the Prophet ﷺ offered it for sale to a man from the 'ahl al-harb' (people at war). ¶

I say: However, if we wish to be precise in our deduction from this Hadith, we see that the counter-value the Prophet ﷺ was to receive in exchange for the defensive armor he offered was another weapon considered to be offensive weaponry; for horses at that time played the role that armored vehicles play in our present day! It appears that the weapon offered by 'Dhu al-Jawshan' was more valuable than the weapon offered to him, and for that reason, he rejected the deal. On this basis, there is no indication in the Hadith of an absolute permissibility to sell weapons to the people of war, because the reality here is the exchange of a more valuable weapon for a less valuable one, and there is no objection to this. ¶

In any case, this Hadith is not authentic (sahih), and therefore it is not fit for use as evidence. ¶

D - Among the Shariah texts cited in the context of arguing for the permissibility of selling weapons to the people of war is what came in 'Nasb al-Rayah', where it says: 'Ibn Hibban said in his Sahih: It may be understood from the Hadith of Khabbab ibn al-Aratt...' ¶

('I was a blacksmith (qayn) in Makkah, and I made a sword for al-As ibn Wa'il, so I came to demand payment from him...' - the Hadith). To infer from this the permissibility of selling weapons to the people of war (ahl al-harb) is a weak understanding; because this incident took place before the obligation of Jihad. The obligation of Jihad and the command to fight the polytheists only came after the people of Makkah expelled the Messenger of Allah ﷺ. (Nasb al-Rayah, 3/391).\n\n(H) - Furthermore, among the texts cited as evidence for the legitimacy of providing weapons to covenanted disbelievers (al-mu'ahadin) through certain lawful contracts, is the account found in Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim regarding the story of Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf. He was one of the covenanted Jews around Madinah, and the text describes how he broke the covenant, leading the Prophet ﷺ to incite the people to kill him and relieve the Muslims of his evil. In this context, it is narrated by Jabir ibn Abdullah: \n\n'The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: \"Who will deal with Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf? For he has offended Allah and His Messenger.\" Muhammad ibn Maslamah said: \"I will!\" He went to him and said: \"We want you to lend us a wasq or two of food.\" Ka'b replied: \"Pledge your women to me.\" They said: \"How can we pledge our women to you when you are the most handsome of the Arabs?\" He said: \"Then pledge your sons to me.\" They said: \"How can we pledge our sons to you, only for one of them to be insulted and told: 'He was pledged for a wasq or two'? That would be a disgrace for us! But we will pledge the 'lamah' to you\" (Sufyan said: meaning weapons). He promised to meet him, they killed him, and then returned to the Prophet ﷺ.' ¶

Thus, this story has been cited as evidence for the permissibility of providing weapons to those at war (ahl al-harb) in legitimate transactions if they are bound by a peace treaty with the Muslims. ¶

The basis for this deduction from the story is as stated in Fath al-Bari: 'Had pledging weapons with the people of the covenant (ahl al-'ahd) not been customary among them, they would not have proposed it—i.e., they would not have offered weapons to Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf the Jew. For if they had proposed something that was not their custom, he would have suspected them, and they would have failed in their intended stratagem. Since they were in the process of deceiving him, they made him believe that they were doing what was permissible for them to do in his view!' (1) That is, the deception by Muhammad ibn Maslamah and his companions against the Jew, Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf, lay only in making him believe that the Muslims still considered him a treaty-partner, and therefore it was permissible to pledge weapons with him; whereas in reality, he had become one of the 'people of war' (ahl al-harb) who had violated the covenant by causing harm to Allah and His Messenger. In this state, it is not permissible to provide him with weapons through sale or pledge. Rather, it is permissible to deceive him and kill him. This is what they hid from him until the deception was complete and they were able to overpower him. ¶

Furthermore, in 'Fath [al-Bari]', the opinion regarding the permissibility of selling and pledging weapons with an enemy, if he is in a peace treaty with the Muslims, is mentioned in what was narrated from Ibn al-Tin, who said: 'Ibn al-Tin said: ... It is only permissible to sell and pledge it with someone who has a dhimmah (covenant of protection) or 'ahd (treaty), by consensus.' (2) ¶

I say: The legitimacy of such conduct with the belligerents (muharibin) from among the people of the covenant is derived from the Hadith we are discussing, in the manner previously described. As for the legitimacy of such conduct with the people of the dhimmah (dhimmis), it is derived from a Hadith like that of Aisha, may Allah be pleased with her, as in Sahih al-Bukhari and Muslim: 'The Prophet (ﷺ) bought food from a Jew on credit and pledged his armor to him' (3). It is stated in Fath al-Bari: 'In this is the permissibility of selling weapons, pledging them, renting, and other such transactions with a disbeliever, provided he is not a harbi (an enemy at war).' (4) ¶

Ultimately, these are the Shar'i texts regarding the issue of selling weapons and the like to non-Muslims. With this, we conclude this point and proceed to the third point. ¶

Point Three: What is the general Shariah principle under which the issues raised in this research fall? What are the positions of the schools of jurisprudence (Madhahib) regarding this? And what is our preferred opinion in this regard? ¶

First: The issues raised in this research revolve around the military aid provided to non-Muslims in other countries, and matters related to it, such as facilities within Islamic lands for storing weapons, airports used for war or military training, the sale of arms, or strategic materials used in military affairs. Is it permissible for Muslims to provide these matters, and others like them, to the enemy? ¶

We learned in the previous point that there is no textual evidence (Nass) in Shariah that can be used as proof in this regard, except for what is understood from the Hadith of 'pledging weapons' in the story of 'Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf' reported by Bukhari and Muslim. Even so, some scholars deny that the story even indicates the permissibility of pledging weapons to the people of war (ahl al-harb). It is stated in 'Fath al-Bari': 'Ibn Battal said: Their statement, "We will pledge our armor (weapons) to you," does not imply the permissibility of pledging weapons. It was merely a form of 'ma'areed' (ambiguous speech)—a permitted form of speech during war and otherwise.' ¶

In any case, even if we assume the validity of using this story as evidence for the permissibility of providing weapons to enemies in legitimate transactions, and assuming the authenticity of the 'Dhu al-Jawshan' Hadith—which Abu Dawud recorded in his Sunan under the chapter 'Carrying weapons to the land of the enemy'—there still exists a general Shariah principle to which all legitimate transactions are subject. This is the principle mentioned in the previous discussion: the rule of 'La darar wa la dirar' (There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm). ¶

Based on this, anything that is likely to result in harm—whether it be actions or objects—is prohibited by Shariah, even if those actions or objects are originally permissible. Consequently, specific instances that lead to harm, even if derived from permissible things or lawful actions, are excluded and prohibited under the legal maxim of 'preventing harm' (qa'idat al-darar). Everything else that does not lead to such harm remains permissible and lawful, as is the original status. ¶

This is because, although the general principle is the permissibility of sale, leasing, and providing assistance to others—even if they are non-Muslims—in all services or materials that are lawful to trade, nevertheless, when it involves any contract with the disbelievers (kuffar), or any material they seek to purchase, or any service or assistance offered to them: ¶

- Whenever any of these matters leads to harm inflicted upon the Muslims, it becomes prohibited by the rule of harm. - As for situations where these matters do not lead to harm, there is no restriction in proceeding with them. ¶

In light of the aforementioned definitions of military regulations and strategic materials, we find that entering into contracts with major powers regarding these matters—as is the reality in international relations today—is likely to lead to extreme risks, through which the existence of the Muslims may be exposed to the most grievous calamities and damages. Hence, contracting with those states to provide them with such specified items is haram (forbidden) according to Shariah. ¶

This relates to the legal Shariah principle under which the issues presented in this research fall. ¶

Second: Regarding the opinions of the schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) on these issues: - From the Hanafi school, we cite these excerpts: Abu Yusuf said in Kitab al-Kharaj: 'It is not appropriate for the Imam to allow anyone from the Dar al-Harb...' [Page 1647] ¶

He (the disbeliever) enters with security, or as an envoy from their king bringing out some captives (1), or weapons, or anything that serves as a source of strength for them against the Muslims. As for clothing and trade goods, these and similar items are not forbidden (2) (3). ¶

It is stated in 'al-Bidayah' and its commentary 'al-Hidayah': "It is not appropriate to sell weapons to the people of war (ahl al-harb), nor to supply them, because the Prophet (ﷺ) forbade selling weapons to the people of war and transporting them to them (4). And because it strengthens them in fighting the Muslims, it must be prohibited. The same applies to cavalry (kura') (5) based on what we have explained, and likewise iron, as it is the foundation of weaponry (6). This also applies even after a truce, because such a truce is subject to being broken or expiring, thus they remain as people of war against us" (7). ¶

It is stated in 'al-Siyar al-Kabir' and its commentary: "When a merchant goes to them to bring what is needed in our lands, he must inevitably carry with him some goods found in our territories. Therefore, we have granted Muslims permission for that, except for cavalry, captives, and weapons, as it is not permissible to transport any of these to them. This is narrated from Ibrahim al-Nakha'i, 'Ata ibn Abi Rabah, and 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (may Allah be pleased with them). This is because they gain strength through cavalry and weapons to fight the Muslims, and we have been commanded to break their power and kill their combatants to repel the fitnah (strife/trial) of their hostility, as Allah the Almighty said: {And fight them until there is no more fitnah} (8). Thus, we know there is no license/exemption to strengthen them against the Muslims in war" (9). ¶

This is what has been transmitted from the Hanafis regarding the issue under discussion. - As for the Malikis, Sahnun asked his teacher, Ibn al-Qasim, about Imam Malik's opinion on this matter. It is stated in 'al-Mudawwanah': "I said to Ibn al-Qasim: What is your view regarding the people of war (ahl al-harb) - may we sell them anything, such as horses, goods, weapons, saddles, copper, or other items, according to Malik's opinion? He said: Malik said: 'As for everything that serves as a strength for the people of Islam, which they utilize in their wars, such as horses, weapons, household clutter (khurthi), or anything known to be a source of strength in war, such as copper or others, they are not to be sold such items.'" In 'Qawanin al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyya', it states: "If the people of war come to our lands, it is permissible to buy from them, except that they are not to be sold anything that assists them in war and intimidates the Muslims, such as horses, weapons, banners, iron, and copper..." - Regarding the Shafi'is—as found in al-Nawawi's 'al-Majmu''—the following is stated: "As for selling weapons to the people of war, it is prohibited by consensus. If one were to sell it to them, the sale would not be valid according to the correct madhhab. The majority of the scholars are firm on this... They argued that the people of war prepare weapons to fight us, so handing them over is an act of disobedience (ma'siyah), and the seller becomes someone who is selling something that is legally forbidden to deliver! Thus, it does not hold valid... As for selling weapons to the dhimmis (protected non-Muslim citizens) within the Dar al-Islam, there are two approaches: The first, which Imam al-Haramayn and the majority uphold, is that it is valid; because they are under our jurisdiction, it is like selling to a Muslim... The second is that there are two views on its validity. As for selling iron to the people of war, the scholars agreed on its validity, because it is not exclusively designated for weapon manufacturing; they may use it for trade tools, such as shovels and the like." ¶

This is what has been stated by the Shafi’is. As for the Hanbalis, it is stated in Ibn Qudamah’s 'Al-Mughni' as follows: 'The ruling regarding everything intended for a forbidden purpose—such as selling weapons to those at war (ahl al-harb), to highway robbers, or during times of civil strife (fitnah), and similar instances—is that it is haram (forbidden), and the contract is null and void.' ¶

Furthermore, Ibn Hazm has also decreed the prohibition of trading by carrying weapons and the like to the lands of the disbelievers. He said: 'It is not permissible to carry weapons, horses, or anything to them with which they may gain strength against the Muslims. This is the opinion of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, Ata’, Amr ibn Dinar, and others.' He then argued based on the generality of the texts, saying: 'Allah the Almighty said: {Cooperate with one another in righteousness and piety, and do not cooperate in sin and aggression} (Surah Al-Ma'idah: 2). And He said: {And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy} (Surah Al-Anfal: 60). Thus, He made it obligatory upon us to terrify them. Whoever aids them by carrying [these items] to them does not terrify them; rather, he aids them in sin and aggression.' ¶

Moreover, modern Islamic thought has addressed the issue at hand. Among this is what was stated in the book 'Al-Shakhsiyyah al-Islamiyyah' (The Islamic Personality) by Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, regarding the ruling on selling to belligerent disbelievers (kuffar harbiyeen) items that strengthen them: 'It is forbidden to sell them weapons and war materials because this results in strengthening the enemy against the Muslims. If the permission to sell them weapons and war materials is mentioned in a treaty, this condition shall not be fulfilled, as it contradicts the Shariah. Every condition that contradicts the Shariah is invalid and does not constitute a binding contract.' ¶

In conclusion, this is the essence of what has been said regarding the issue of selling weapons, strategic materials, and similar items that serve to strengthen the enemy against the Muslims. ¶

Thirdly, my view on this issue is as follows: As long as there is no specific, established textual prohibition regarding transactions with the people of other lands—through any of the shariah-compliant contracts concerning lawful goods, services, or aid—the rule that governs this matter, as previously stated, is the principle of harm (darar). Therefore, whatever leads to harm is forbidden, and whatever does not lead to harm has no restriction. This is also the import of what the jurists mentioned earlier, as they made the reason for the prohibition of selling weapons and the like to belligerent (harbi) infidels the fact that it leads to strengthening the enemy against the Muslims; in other words, it leads to inflicting harm upon the Muslims. Accordingly, if the element of harm is absent in certain cases of dealing with infidels in this matter, it is permissible to provide them with weapons and other items. We will now cite some jurisprudential texts that support what I have mentioned: It is stated in 'Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir', regarding a situation where people of war (ahl al-harb) request the Imam of the Muslims to provide them with weapons in exchange for releasing the Muslim captives they hold, that this is permissible. The text states: 'If they ask the Imam of the Muslims to ransom them—i.e., the Muslim captives in the belligerent lands—with a number of polytheists, or with horses, or with weapons, it is permissible for him to do so in order to liberate them from captivity, even if they gain strength against the Muslims by what they take.' This means that the interest (maslaha) in such a transaction outweighs the harm in it; therefore, it is permissible and lawful. Regarding contracts with the people of war for the extraction of resources and minerals from beneath the earth in Islamic lands—which includes what is called strategic materials—it is also stated in 'al-Siyar al-Kabir': 'If a harbi musta'man (a belligerent granted safe conduct) asks the Imam for permission to seek treasures and minerals, and the Imam grants him permission...' ¶

On the condition that the Muslims receive half and they (the harbi) receive half—he acted upon this, and he found rikaz (buried treasure) or a mine; the Imam takes half of what was found, and the harbi takes half. ¶

Regarding the contract between the people of the Dar al-Harb and the Muslims to use Islamic lands as a transit route for their military forces to reach other enemy non-treaty combatants (kuffar) in order to wage war against them—regarding such a contract, it is also stated in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir' as follows: ¶

'If a group of people from the Dar al-Harb enter the Dar al-Islam under a pledge of security, with the condition that they pass through the Dar al-Islam to another Dar al-Harb, and they would not be able to achieve victory against their enemies except by passing through the Dar al-Islam, and they wish for it to be via the Dar al-Islam so that it would be more intimidating to the enemy! If the Imam grants them permission on the condition that the Muslims get half of what they acquire and they get half, and they then acquire war booty—the Imam takes the half, and what remains is theirs.' ¶

Furthermore, perhaps these jurisprudential (fiqhi) texts—along with those previously cited from various schools of thought regarding contracts with other lands concerning military affairs, the facilities provided to the people of the Dar al-Harb, and the like—clarify that the rationale (manat) for imposing a prohibition on such contracts with non-Islamic peoples and states is the harm that would befall the Muslims as a result. ¶

Therefore, if there exist special circumstances in which no harm is realized, or where the interest (maslaha) outweighs the harm involved, then there is no objection (haraj) to such a contract. This is similar to a case where the state with which such a contract is to be formed is a weak state, and public opinion therein leans in favor of the Muslims against their enemies among non-Islamic peoples and states. ¶

The other [possibility], and there are indicators regarding the possibility of the subjects of that weak state entering into Islam, or joining the Islamic State based on a dhimma contract, and other matters in which there is an overwhelming benefit for Islam and the Muslims. ¶

Furthermore, it is worth noting here that those in authority in Muslim countries must—when they are in the process of assessing whether there is harm in dealing with this state or that regarding the issues raised in this research—not be hasty in judging the absence of harm in any such interaction simply because they do not perceive any harm behind that interaction in the present time or in the near future. Rather, they must possess a keen sensitivity in this matter, and they must also possess foresight and a breadth of vision, so that they do not become entangled in any contracts or agreements that would bring disasters and calamities upon the Muslims. ¶

Indeed, what protects those in authority from poor judgment in these matters is the presence of the fear of Allah (taqwa) in their souls and sincerity toward their Ummah. Likewise, an aware and courageous public opinion is among the things that compel those in authority to act with wisdom in making decisions regarding all political affairs, including those we are currently addressing. ¶

Perhaps the majority of jurists (fuqaha) were not confident in the availability of these aforementioned guarantees—neither on the part of those in authority nor on the part of public opinion among Muslims. For this reason, they issued the ruling prohibiting the sale of weapons, and the like, to the people of war (ahl al-harb), without elaboration! Naturally, when the reins of control slip from the hand of the Ummah, and whims prevail over those who hold the levers of power, and there is a fear of recklessness in concluding suspicious deals with the disbelievers, then the ruling is: what the majority of jurists have said. ¶

In conclusion, this is what we see regarding the previous issues raised. With this, we reach the end of this research and move—with the help and guidance of Allah—to another topic. ¶

In compliance with your instruction, this humble servant has translated certain sections of this book, 'Tadhkirat al-Awliya'. It is hoped that the readers will find it agreeable. The Translator ¶

Section Three: Wars between Islamic Countries ¶

The purpose of this discussion is not to enumerate the events related to armed conflicts and wars that have occurred in the modern era between countries in the Islamic world, including the Arab world. Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this research to study the causes and factors that led, or lead, to wars between those countries. This is because this subject is far-reaching and multifaceted, requiring an independent treatise on one hand, and delving into it would take us away from the issues we are addressing in this final chapter—issues revolving around what has been said about Jihad in the modern era and the military practices associated with Jihad in the way of Allah. We have established since the beginning of this treatise that Jihad in the way of Allah, according to the Shariah terminology we have adopted, is the fighting of disbelievers to elevate the word of Allah and matters related to that. However, since some Muslim leaders in the wars we are addressing call what they commit against their Muslim brothers—of killing and destruction—'Jihad in the way of Allah,' with the intent of bestowing legitimacy upon the wars they are waging and winning over Islamic public opinion, it has become necessary to address these wars incidentally to clarify that the field of Jihad in the way of Allah is the conflict between Muslims and disbelievers, not among the Muslims themselves. ¶

Therefore, we will limit the treatment of this discussion, briefly, to the requirements mentioned in the research plan, which are: Requirement One: The Shariah qualification of wars between Islamic countries. Requirement Two: The position of non-combatant Muslims regarding these wars. Requirement Three: The position of those compelled to fight in these wars. ¶

Allah Almighty says in the Holy Quran: 'Say, [O Muhammad], if you should love Allah, then follow me, [so] Allah will love you and forgive you your sins. And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.' (Al-Imran: 31). It is narrated from Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him) that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: 'Whoever obeys me, obeys Allah; and whoever disobeys me, disobeys Allah.' (Sahih al-Bukhari: 2957). Allah Almighty also states: 'He who obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah; but those who turn away - then We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], over them as a guardian.' (An-Nisa: 80). ¶

Section One: The Shariah Classification of Wars Between Islamic Countries ¶

The closest classification for the fighting that occurs between Islamic countries today—in a general sense—is that it is 'Qital al-Fitna' (strife-driven warfare). The reality of 'Qital al-Fitna' has been explained in the first chapter of this treatise, and we shall not repeat that discussion here. We have established there that this type of fighting occurs in the following situations: ¶

A. A state where the party of truth cannot be distinguished from the party of falsehood. B. A state where both conflicting parties are oppressive (zalim). C. A state of involvement in fighting alongside one of the two conflicting parties without a clear proof (bayyinah), where there is no Imam calling to fight one of them. D. A state of fighting for the pursuit of dominion or authority. ¶

Indeed, it is rare for the wars emerging today between Islamic countries to be devoid of one or more of these meanings, as previously detailed in our separate discussion on Qital al-Fitna. This is especially true given that in our current era, there is no Caliph for the Muslims who can issue a binding Shariah ruling regarding the necessity of supporting one faction against another when efforts toward reconciliation reach a stalemate, and when it becomes clear to him which of the two factions is just and which is transgressive, or at the very least, which is closer to justice and which is closer to transgression. ¶

Added to this is the reality of our current situation: the absence of the authority that issues binding Shariah rulings in such circumstances—namely, the Caliph of the Muslims—has caused the Shariah decision tasked with resolving these conflicts and distinguishing the rightful party from the wrongful one to become fragmented and contradictory, equal in number to the various parties involved in the conflict or those sympathizing with one faction or another. ¶

In the recent past, the conflict that occurred in the Gulf clearly demonstrated—with deep regret—how every side had its own conferences and its own scholars who issued their Shariah-based decisions, distributing the labels of 'truth' and 'falsehood' upon the two warring factions. We found a decision issued by a conference branding as 'false' the very side that another conference declared to be 'in the right,' just as it would assign the label of 'truth' to a party that the other decision declared to be 'in the wrong.' Each decision called for supporting the faction deemed to be in the right, in its view, and fighting the other—a matter that caused a painful shock in the souls of Muslims, the repercussions of which led to a loss of trust in Islamic institutions and their rulings that should not have occurred. ¶

In any case, we are not here to delve into this specific issue. Rather, the purpose is to clarify that the contradictory stance of Muslim scholars regarding what transpired suggests that the fighting which broke out was, in fact, a 'fitna' (strife/civil strife) in which the side of truth could not be distinguished from the side of falsehood. This is the nature of fitna-based conflict, as previously discussed, even if each side had its own rationalization (shubha) for being the party of truth, fighting to preserve or attain it. ¶

This is explained by the reality of the fragmentation imposed by colonialism upon the Islamic world, which intended, among other things, for these tragic results to occur—as they did and continue to do. This reality, along with other factors, was the cause that ignited the spark of conflict. It is the reason why every party—at least from its own perspective—had a right held by the other side, a right that the detestable reality created by colonialism prevented it from accessing. This was a reality that colonialism established and which its successors sought to preserve because they found in it the realization of their own self-serving interests, even at the expense of the interests of the Muslim Ummah they rule. ¶

Hence, it is a matter of human nature that any party prevented from reaching its right, or what it perceives to be its right, due to this reality—whether that right is natural wealth, a necessary outlet to the sea, or potable water—would resort to force to seize what it perceives as its right, or to defend it. ¶

The attempt to reclaim it, when one possesses the capability to do so, and when one perceives that there is no path to achieving one's desired end except through the use of force. In my view, this is the basis of the doubt (shubha) that drove both factions to take up arms against one another. Hence, as we observe, their combat was a 'combat of fitnah' (sedition/strife), because each faction was an aggressor against the other in usurping some of their rights. We have established that part of the 'combat of fitnah' is for the two conflicting parties to both be aggressors. This is if we choose to leave the veil drawn over the reasons that were being prepared in secret to ignite the war that occurred, in order to realize many agendas that concerned those with vested interests both within the Islamic world and outside it, and if we content ourselves with the apparent and immediate causes of this war. However, looking at those hidden causes only strengthens the consideration that the fighting that took place was also a 'combat of fitnah'! Incidentally, those Muslims who stepped forward to attempt reconciliation and resolve matters before the final explosion—whether on the political level or the Islamic level—should have examined the causes that triggered this conflict and made them the focus of the resolution. It was the duty of sincere, aware individuals to reveal to the Ummah who those people were who were pushing matters toward greater tension with their rigid stances, and who those were who were pushing them—consequently—toward this rigidity so that the conflict would evolve from bad to worse. This would allow them to insert themselves between the conflicting brothers and steer the direction of the conflict to serve the interests of the intruders at the expense of the interests of the Ummah governed by those conflicting brothers. This is what happened, and this is what matters reached. I say: the Muslims who stood up to address that crisis should have clarified all of this to public opinion; for it is known regarding conspiracies and machinations that people only fall into their traps when they are deceived as to their true nature. But when they are revealed to them, the masses refrain from accepting them or following them; indeed, even the perpetrators themselves abandon them to seek new conspiracies and machinations that might potentially deceive the people. This is the nature of conspiracies and machinations that are plotted and managed in secret, and when they are exposed to... ¶

the Ummah? And when is it not permissible? Hence, exposing it is what blocks its path... Do you perceive that we have reached a state where—as the saying goes—the game is being played openly among those with vested interests, both their ringleaders and their lackeys, to the point that neither the Ummah nor public opinion is taken into account anymore?! ¶

I say: As previously indicated, it is not our purpose in this section to pass judgment on the specific event that led us into this digression... Just as it is not our purpose here to analyze any specific incident of the wars that have occurred between Islamic countries in exhaustive detail. Rather, the purpose is to explain the Shariah classification of those wars—in a general sense—and we have already clarified that the most appropriate classification for them is that they fall under the category of 'Qital al-Fitnah' (fighting of discord), for the reasons we have pointed out... ¶

With this, we conclude the first section of this chapter, and we move on to the second section. ¶