Chapter 17

stands in the ranks of the Islamic State. This is because it is forbidden to shed the blood of Muslims without a legitimate Shariah cause. 'Every Muslim is inviolable to another Muslim: his blood, his honor, and his wealth' (1). ¶

- As for fighting against these groups, it is an obligatory fight: because it is fighting against the rebellious (al-bughat) who have exited the obedience of the Imam, as discussed previously in the section on 'Fighting the Rebellious'. ¶

- If there is no danger in negotiating with them to bring them to obedience, then envoys of peace shall move between them and the Islamic State. However, if there is a risk in delaying the resolution of this matter, their affair shall be settled by combat (2). Whoever is killed among them from the Muslims is a Muslim, yet he is disobedient if he knew the truth and fought against it. Whoever is killed from the supporters of the nascent State is a martyr in the hereafter, as previously established in 'Fighting the Rebellious'. ¶

With this, we conclude the second issue of the research on 'Combat for the Establishment of the Islamic State' and move to the final issue of this research, which is: ¶

Third: Is fighting for the sake of establishing the Islamic State and protecting it considered Jihad in the path of Allah in its technical sense? ¶

The answer to this varies according to the different parties that move to strike the Islamic State upon the announcement of its establishment. ¶

- If these parties are internal and belong to Islam, then fighting against them is a type of fighting against the rebellious (bughat). The difference of opinion regarding the classification of this fight has already been mentioned, and we have favored the view that it is not Jihad in the path of Allah in the technical sense. ¶

- And if the parties that moved to strike the Islamic State are internal, but not Islamic, and are instead citizens of the Islamic State—the people of the covenant (ahl al-dhimmah)—who have broken... ¶

They cast off the yoke of obedience and began fighting the new state to restore the situation in the country to what it was—governance by other than what Allah has revealed. This has already been discussed under the topic of fighting the people of dhimma, that is: 'Fighting against those citizens who are non-Muslims and who revolt against the Islamic state.' ¶

- As for if this fighting is launched against the Islamic state by external entities: ¶

- If they are entities from the countries of the Muslim world—that is, from Muslim lands—then the ruling regarding them is the same as the ruling regarding those who revolt against the state from within. That is, the rebels who are Muslims have their ruling, and the rebels who are non-Muslims have their ruling. This is because the Islamic state considers all Muslim lands as one land, and considers the subjects of those lands as subjects of the Islamic state, and works to incorporate these lands and their subjects into the sphere of this fledgling state; because Islam obligates all Muslims, regardless of their countries, to have the pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) to the Caliph of the Muslims around their necks, due to the saying of the Prophet (ﷺ): 'Whoever dies without having a pledge of allegiance on his neck, dies a death of jahiliyyah.' Therefore, it is obligatory for them to send the pledge of allegiance or declare loyalty to the new Caliph. This means joining the Islamic state. Thus, countries that refuse to join are treated like the people of rebellion (ahl al-baghi); meaning, messengers of peace pass between them and the new Islamic authority before resorting to military resolution with them. ¶

- And if the external entities that launched the fight against the Islamic state are from countries outside the Muslim world—that is, from the lands of the disbelievers and the colonizers—then the fighting against them is jihad in the way of Allah in its technical sense; because it fits the definition of Sharia jihad, which is: 'Fighting against those disbelievers who have no covenant (dhimma), to elevate the word of Allah, the Almighty and Majestic.' ¶

Twelfth Section: Combat for the Sake of the Unity of Islamic Lands ¶

- An introduction to the aspects covered by this research and the fundamental issues it addresses. ¶

First Issue: The Islamic position on the subject of unity among Islamic lands. ¶

- First Part: The Islamic position on unity among Islamic lands within the Shariah texts. ¶

First: Prophetic Hadiths specifically concerning the subject of unity. Second: The method of deriving evidence from the aforementioned texts regarding the subject of unity, and what the jurists (fuqaha) have determined in this regard in light of those texts. ¶

- Second Part: The position held by some Islamic interpretations regarding the issue of unity, and our critique of these interpretations. ¶

First: The opinions of some early scholars (mutaqaddimin): - A rare (shadh) opinion alluded to by Al-Mawardi. - The opinion of Imam Al-Juwayni. - Imam Al-Nawawi’s commentary on the opinion of Imam Al-Juwayni. - Our discussion regarding the opinion of Imam Al-Juwayni. ¶

Second: The opinions of some later scholars (muta'akhkhirin): - The opinion of Imam Al-Shawkani, and the opinion of Siddiq ibn Hasan Al-Qanuji. ¶

Our discussion regarding the opinion of Al-Shawkani and Al-Qanuji. Third: The opinion of some contemporaries: - The opinion of Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra. - Our discussion regarding the opinion of Sheikh Abu Zahra. ¶

Second Issue: The Shariah stance on fighting to impose unity among Islamic lands. ¶

- Cases of fighting in the past: - First Case: Fighting to respond to the withdrawal of allegiance (bay'ah) to the Caliph by some regions and the formation of a separate state. - Second Case: Fighting to thwart the attempt of a rebel claimant to the Caliphate who calls for himself in a separate region, in order to replace the incumbent Caliph and unify the Islamic lands under his own authority. - Third Case: Fighting against those aspiring to seize power in certain regions against the will of the Caliph, while remaining within the State of the Caliphate. ¶

- Cases of fighting in the present time: - First Scenario: The uprising in a region of an independent state to form a separate state, and fighting to suppress this attempt at secession. - Second Scenario: The secession of a region from the mother state and the formation of an independent state, without revolution or bloodshed, or after revolution and bloodshed, and fighting to restore the former unity. - Third Scenario: What if a state from the Islamic world today seized a favorable internal and international opportunity and annexed some regions to it—by means of fighting? ¶

- Cases of fighting in the hoped-for future: What if the Islamic State returned to existence in the future and then proceeded to annex Islamic countries to it by means of force, when peaceful means fail to achieve that? ¶

Third Issue: Is fighting for the sake of unity between Islamic lands considered Jihad in the path of Allah according to its technical (idiomatic) definition? ¶

Twelfth Section: Combat for the Unity of Islamic Lands ¶

Introduction to the aspects covered by this research and the fundamental issues it addresses. The subject matter of this research concerns the past, present, and future of the Muslims. ¶

As for the past: There was an Islamic state, from which certain regions of the Islamic lands seceded. What is the ruling (hukm) regarding fighting these separatists, and what is the legal characterization (takyif shar'i) of this combat? ¶

As for the present: The Islamic world today is plagued by numerous problems, including issues of fragmentation and unity. What concerns us here is that which relates to the subject of our research, namely combat. ¶

In this regard, we find several problems in our Islamic world that are closely related to our topic, as follows: - There are internal rebellions within Islamic lands led by insurgents who demand the secession of their region from the collective state and the authority that unites them, in order to form an independent state. This further fragments an already divided Islamic world into scattered pieces, and they bear arms to achieve their goals. - There are Islamic countries ruled by a single authority from which a region secedes, forming an independent state and a new authority. Fighting may break out between the mother country and the seceded region to restore unity, or fighting may not occur and the status quo is recognized, as has happened in some countries of the Islamic world, both Arab and non-Arab. - There are slogans in the Islamic lands today calling for unity, whether at the level of peoples or... ¶

At the level of those in power—what if it happens that weapons are taken up to implement these slogans, while specific countries refuse to respond to the call for unity? These are some of the problems currently afflicting the Islamic world that fall under the subject of our research, which is connected to the present we are living in. ¶

As for the hopeful future: when time completes its blessed cycle by the permission of Allah, and one of the Muslim states adopts the Islamic principle, establishes its authority upon it, rules by it in its internal and external relations, presents it as a message to the world, raises the banner of the Islamic Caliphate once again, and demands that all other countries of the Islamic world join under that banner—in this situation, what is the legal ruling (hukm) on taking up arms for the sake of bringing those countries under the banner of this Islamic Caliphate? ¶

This is the subject of our research—combat for the sake of the unity of Islamic lands, in the past, present, and future—is it considered Jihad in the path of Allah in its technical sense, or not? ¶

Before entering into addressing this subject, it is necessary to clarify the Shariah ruling on the unity of Islamic lands, that is: unifying them into a single entity, gathering them into one state, under one authority, and one leader. Is unity, in this sense, one of the Islamic obligations (fara'id) like prayer, fasting, and jihad, such that Muslims commit a sin by neglecting to strive seriously to achieve it? Or is it merely a recommended (mustahabb/mandub) matter? Or is it left to the choice of the Muslims—to achieve it through consent and agreement if possible, or not to achieve it if there is no consent or agreement among the Islamic countries, whether that refusal to achieve unity is at the level of the populace of those countries, or at the level of the rulers when they find that unity conflicts with their personal interests, or the interests of those who push them to adopt this stance of refusal, from within or from without? ¶

I ask: Is the acceptance or rejection of unity left to choice—regardless of the motive underlying that acceptance or rejection? ¶

This is what we must clarify the Shariah ruling upon before addressing the subject of combat for the sake of unity in the past, present, and future, because this subject only finds its solution and answer in light of the clarification of the Shariah ruling on the issue of unity among Islamic lands. ¶

Based on this, the research before us is divided into three issues: 1. The issue of the Islamic position on the subject of unity among Islamic countries. 2. The issue of combat for the sake of unity — in the past, present, and future. 3. The issue: Is combat for the sake of unity among Islamic countries considered jihad in the path of Allah in its technical sense, or not? ¶

First Issue: The issue of the Islamic position on the subject of unity among Islamic countries. The discussion on this issue is divided into two parts: Part One: Explaining the Islamic position on unity among Islamic countries, as stated in the Shariah texts specifically addressing this subject. Part Two: Explaining the position held by some Islamic interpretations regarding this, along with our discussion of these interpretations. ¶

Discussion on Part One: The Islamic position regarding the unity of all Islamic countries into a single state, as indicated by Shariah texts, is that: establishing this unity is mandatory, as is preserving it, and it is prohibited to divide it into separate entities and multiple states. We understand this Islamic position or Shariah ruling from several hadiths narrated from the Prophet (PBUH). We shall now present these hadiths to you, then clarify the reasoning for using them as evidence for the subject of unity, and what the jurists (fuqaha) have determined in light of those hadiths. First: The hadiths specific to the subject of unity. 1. Among those hadiths is what was narrated in Sahih Muslim from Abdullah bin Amr bin al-Aas from the Prophet (PBUH) that he said: "...And whoever dies without having a pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) on his neck, he dies a death of ignorance (jahiliyyah)"(1). ¶

(1) Sahih Muslim: No. (1851) Vol. 3/1478. ¶

2 - Among them: From Abu Sa'id al-Khudri who said: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "When bay'ah (allegiance) is taken for two caliphs, kill the latter of the two." (1) ¶

3 - Among them: From Abu Hurairah who said: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "The Prophets used to govern the Children of Israel; whenever a prophet died, another would succeed him. But there will be no prophet after me, and there will be caliphs and they will be many." They asked, "What do you command us?" He said, "Fulfill the bay'ah to the first, then the next. Give them their due rights, and ask Allah for your rights, for Allah will question them about what He entrusted to their care." (2) ¶

4 - Among them: From Abdullah ibn Amr ibn al-Aas from the Prophet ﷺ: "...And whoever gives bay'ah to an Imam, giving him the clasp of his hand and the fruit of his heart, let him obey him if he is able. Then if another comes to dispute with him, strike the neck of the latter." (3) ¶

5 - Among them: From Arfajah from the Prophet ﷺ, who said: "There will be fitnas (tribulations/disturbances). So, whoever intends to divide the affair of this Ummah while it is united, strike him with the sword, whoever he may be." (4) ¶

6 - Among them: From Jundub ibn Abdullah al-Bajali who said: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: "Whoever is killed under a blind banner (rayah 'ammiyyah), calling to partisanship (asabiyyah) or supporting partisanship, his killing is that of Jahiliyyah." (5) ¶

Regarding the meaning of 'ammiyyah: It refers to a blind affair whose direction is not clear; this is what the majority have stated. Ishaq ibn Rahwayh said: It refers to a people fighting for the sake of partisanship (asabiyyah). (6) ¶

7 - Among them: The hadith of Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman regarding the fitna. He said: "People used to ask the Messenger of Allah ﷺ about the good, while I used to ask him about the evil, fearing that it might overtake me. So I said: O Messenger of Allah! We were in a state of Jahiliyyah and evil, and Allah brought this good. Will there be any evil after this good? He said: Yes. I said to him: Will there be after..." ¶

Is there any evil after that good? He (ﷺ) said: Yes, and it will have 'dakhan' (impurities/obscurity). I asked: What is its impurity? He said: A people who follow a guidance other than my guidance and adopt a sunnah other than my sunnah; you will recognize some of their deeds and reject others. I asked: Is there any evil after that good? He said: Yes, callers at the gates of Hell; whoever answers their call, they will cast him into it. I asked: O Messenger of Allah, describe them to us! He said: Yes, they are a people from among ourselves, and they speak our language. I asked: O Messenger of Allah, what do you see if I reach that time? He said: Stick to the group (jama'ah) of the Muslims and their Imam. I asked: And if they have no group and no Imam? He said: Then stay away from all those sects, even if you have to bite onto the root of a tree until death overtakes you while you are in that state. ¶

These are, firstly, some of the Shariah texts related to the subject of (unity between Islamic countries). Secondly: We now enter into the aspect of deriving evidence from these texts regarding the subject of (unity), and what the jurists have established in this regard in light of these texts. It is evident from these noble Hadiths that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) obligated several matters upon the Muslims: 1. That every Muslim must have a bay'ah (oath of allegiance) upon their neck. That is: obedience to an Imam whom the Muslims have sworn allegiance to, regardless of whether all Muslims participated in pledging allegiance to him, or only the majority, or those who represent the majority. This is because once the bay'ah for an Imam is validly established, that allegiance becomes binding upon the neck of every Muslim, even if that individual or group did not participate in the formal contract of allegiance. Just as the bay'ah of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, which was contracted by the majority of the Sahabah, became binding upon the neck of Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him), even though he refrained from the bay'ah for a period of time, shorter or longer, according to the variations in the narrations. Similarly, his bay'ah became binding upon the neck of Sa'd ibn Ubada. ¶

Like Ubadah (may Allah be pleased with him), even if he refrained from the bay'ah (pledge of allegiance) entirely. ¶

2 - The bay'ah on the neck of all Muslims must be for only one Imam, meaning one Caliph, as indicated by the two hadiths: 'If bay'ah is taken for two Caliphs, kill the latter of them,' and 'If another comes to dispute with him, strike the neck of the latter.' ¶

This is an address to all Muslims that there should not be two Caliphs over them—whether this second Caliph emerged through the consent and approval of the Muslims via their bay'ah to him while the first existed, or whether the second Caliph emerged through usurpation (taghallub) and dispute against the authority of the first. Whether the second Caliph came by consent or by dispute—based on sharing with the first Caliph in his full authority over all Islamic lands in the world, similar to what is called today 'collective leadership,' or based on the separation of each of the two Caliphs in ruling a portion of the Islamic world, forming two separate states, with each Caliph overseeing his respective state. ¶

I say: Both the hadith regarding bay'ah to two Caliphs and the hadith regarding the second Caliph disputing the first have explicitly stated the prohibition of the plurality of the Caliphate and the obligation that the Caliph of all Muslims must be one. Likewise, they have stipulated the measure that Muslims must take regarding the second Caliph, whether he was pledged allegiance to by consent or seized power through dispute. That measure is killing: 'Kill the latter of them,' 'Strike the neck of the latter.' ¶

This is what the Shariah texts determine with absolute clarity. And on this, the statements of the jurists have converged in their commentary on those hadiths. ¶

Al-Nawawi says in the commentary of Sahih Muslim: 'If bay'ah is taken for a Caliph after a Caliph, the first bay'ah is valid and must be fulfilled, and the second bay'ah is void and forbidden to fulfill, and it is forbidden for him [the second] to seek it, whether...' ¶

Whether they pledged allegiance to the second while knowing of the first, or in ignorance, and whether they are in the same country or one of them is in the separate territory of the Imam while the other is elsewhere. The scholars have agreed that it is not permissible to appoint two Caliphs at the same time, regardless of whether the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) is vast or not. ¶

It is stated in Fath al-Bari: 'The meaning is: if a Caliph is pledged allegiance after another Caliph, the first pledge is valid and must be fulfilled, while the second pledge is void.' Then Ibn Hajar quoted the aforementioned statement of al-Nawawi and added: 'Al-Qurtubi said: In this hadith—meaning the hadith "fulfill the pledge of the first"—is the ruling on the first pledge and the obligation to fulfill it, while he remained silent regarding the second pledge. However, it has been explicitly addressed in the hadith of 'Arfajah in Sahih Muslim, where it says: "Then strike the neck of the other." ¶

3- Among the matters established by these Shariah texts is that a single Caliph is a metonym for a single authority. The word "al-amr" (the matter) here means sovereignty and leadership. It is stated in Fath al-Bari, in the explanation of the phrase "and that we do not dispute the matter with its people," that it means: "the kingdom and the leadership." ¶

If the single Caliph over all Muslims is a metonym for a single authority over all Muslims, and a single authority is a metonym for a single state, then this means that Muslims in all their lands are one community and subjects belonging to one state. Consequently, any attempt to fragment the "matter" of the Muslims—that is, their sovereignty—is an attempt to fragment the Muslim community and disperse their unity under multiple authorities, i.e., multiple states. This is what the Shariah texts have warned against, and they have clarified the decisive action to be taken against anyone who attempts such sinful and criminal acts. ¶

It is narrated in Sahih Muslim from 'Arfajah that the Prophet (PBUH) said: "Whoever comes to you while your affair is united..." ¶

upon one man, who wants to break your staff (unity/authority), or split your community; so kill him (1). ¶

The term 'Asa' (staff) is a metaphor for authority (sultanah), because authority is the entity that compels people to obey it through the use of force. Formidable power is symbolized by the staff, hence the saying: 'People are slaves to the staff' (2)—a metaphor for the domineering power that people fear because it harms those who oppose it. ¶

Based on this, whoever intends to 'break the staff'—that is, to split one authority into two or more, and consequently, to divide one community into two or more, each following a different authority—the penalty for this, as stated in the Hadith, is death: 'Kill him!' ¶

This applies equally whether the division of authority and the community, or the fragmentation of the state and the nation, is driven by specific calls foreign to Islam, or by regional or ethnic factionalism, or the like. All of these fall under the 'breaking of the staff'—that is, breaking the single authority and scattering the single Muslim community. It is forbidden for Muslims to respond to or support such attempts. They are obligated to deter those who make such attempts, even if it leads to their elimination, in order to spare the Muslims from their evils. Indeed, there are Hadiths specifically warning against partitioning authority or the state and dividing the Muslim community on the basis of ideologies foreign to Islam, as we have indicated. In the Hadith of Hudhayfah—narrated by Muslim, previously mentioned—it states: '...I said: Is there any evil after that good? He said: Yes, callers to the gates of Hell; whoever answers them, they will cast him into it. I said: O Messenger of Allah, describe them to us! He said: Yes, they are a people from our own skin, and they speak our language. I said: O Messenger of Allah, what do you command me if that happens to me? He said: Stick to the group (jama'ah) of the Muslims and their Imam. I said: What if they have neither a group nor an Imam? He said: Then withdraw from all those sects... (3)' ¶

This Hadith warns against those who advocate intellectual movements, raising slogans that are not of Islam, in order to divide the Ummah into warring factions, each gathering under one of those slogans with the objective of contesting authority from its rightful holders—meaning, with the goal of each faction seizing power. ¶

Authority, even if over a specific region of the Islamic lands, and separating it from the single body of the Islamic world to form what are called states enjoying autonomy and a distinct international entity, is prohibited. ¶

Similarly, Hadiths have warned against the fragmentation of authority and the state, and the division of the Muslim community based on tribalism (asabiyyah), whether regional, ethnic, or similar. As in the Hadith narrated by Muslim on the authority of Jundub ibn Abdullah al-Bajali from the Prophet (PBUH): 'Whoever is killed under a blind banner, calling to asabiyyah, or supporting asabiyyah, his death is a death of jahiliyyah (ignorance).' ¶

Thus, it becomes clear to us through the aforementioned Shariah texts that we have presented what the Islamic stance is regarding the issue of the unity of Islamic lands. We restate this position in these words for emphasis: That the Islamic lands must be one state, under the authority of one Imam, and that the Muslims in the world under that authority must be one community and one citizenry, holding one allegiance, not divided by multiple authorities into states separated from one another. ¶

All of this is what is necessitated by the previous Shariah texts which came to forbid the existence of two caliphs over the Muslims, even with consent and bay'ah (allegiance), and forbid challenging the ruler, and forbid responding to calls to divide the Muslims into groups under different authorities, and mandate that the Muslims remain one community under the command of one man. ¶

Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him) warned against the division of authority that governs the Muslims because it means the division of the Muslims themselves. When he warned against the Muslims having two emirs each possessing the final word, he enumerated the dangers arising from that and issued the Shariah ruling on that division, saying: 'It is not permissible for the Muslims to have two emirs; for whenever that happens: their affairs and rulings will differ, their community will scatter, and they will dispute among themselves. In that state, the Sunnah will be abandoned, innovation will appear, the fitnah (strife) will become great, and no one will have the capacity to rectify that.' ¶

We have previously cited from Imam al-Nawawi what the majority of jurists (fuqaha) have established, based on the aforementioned Shariah texts, regarding the prohibition of having two Caliphs for the Muslims in one era, whether they are in two different lands or in one, and whether the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) has expanded or not. The statements of the jurists have converged to confirm the unity of the Caliphate, which necessitates the unity of the Islamic lands and the unity of the Islamic community (jama'ah). It is stated in Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya by al-Mawardi: 'Section: If the Imamate is contracted for two Imams in two lands, their Imamate is not valid, because it is not permissible for the Ummah to have two Imams at the same time.' Similarly, it is stated in Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya by al-Farra: 'It is not permissible to contract the Imamate for two Imams in two lands...' ¶

With this, we conclude the first part of the issue regarding the Islamic stance on the unity of Islamic lands, as dictated by the Shariah texts that address this subject specifically. We now proceed to the second part of this issue: ¶

Discussion on the second part of this issue, which is: The ijtihadi opinions regarding the subject of unity between Islamic lands under one state, or their fragmentation into multiple states based on the issue of the unity of the Imam or the multiplicity of Imams. ¶

We can categorize these ijtihadi opinions into three views according to their emergence in the history of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh): First: The opinion of some early scholars (mutaqaddimin). Second: The opinion of some later scholars (muta'akhkhirin). Third: The opinion of some contemporary scholars (mu'asirin). ¶

First: The opinion of some early scholars on this subject is that which al-Mawardi indicated in his saying: ¶

"It is not permissible for the Ummah to have two Imams (Caliphs) at the same time, even if some have adopted a strict position and permitted it." (1) Imam al-Nawawi likewise conveyed this opinion, stating: "The scholars have reached a consensus that it is not permissible to contract the caliphate for two leaders in one era, regardless of whether the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) is vast or not. Imam al-Haramayn said in his book *Al-Irshad*: 'Our companions said: It is not permissible to contract it for two people.' He added: 'In my view, it is not permissible to contract it for two in the same region, and this is unanimously agreed upon. If, however, there is a great distance between the two Imams, and vast expanses lie between them, then there is no room for probability in this, and it falls outside the realm of definitive (Qawati') matters.' Al-Maziri (2) attributed this view to some later scholars of Usul (principles of jurisprudence), intending thereby Imam al-Haramayn; however, this is a corrupt opinion, due to the position held by the Salaf and the Khalaf, and because of the manifest, unrestricted nature of the Hadiths. And Allah knows best." (3) End quote. ¶

From what we have conveyed, we can extract the following: 1. There exists an opinion regarding the permissibility of a plurality of Imams at one time. This is what al-Mawardi mentioned, and it appears that this permission relates to the condition that they are in two different countries, where each is independent in his own land, based on the text provided by Imam al-Haramayn regarding the consensus on the prohibition of contracting the Imamate for two persons in one region. It is worth noting here that al-Mawardi precedes Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (4) in time. Thus, the consensus that he conveys... ¶

Al-Juwayni’s reasoning extends to his own era and the eras preceding it; thus, it encompasses the opinions narrated by Al-Mawardi and refreshes their conceptual meaning. ¶

Furthermore, Al-Mawardi passed judgment on the opinion permitting the contract of Imamate for two individuals—meaning each in a country other than the other—as is the implication of the consensus narrated by Al-Juwayni. Al-Mawardi labeled this opinion as 'shadh' (anomalous/isolated). ¶

2. The possibility of permitting the contract of Imamate for two individuals on the condition of distance between the two Imams and the existence of vast space between them. That is, the presence of immense distances separating the regions or territories governed by each of the two caliphs. 'Al-Juwayni' did not specify what constitutes the vast distances that would render the contract of Imamate for two caliphs permissible. It appears that this relates to situations where the reach of the Imam's authority and his care cannot extend to remote areas. In such a case, these remote regions should not be left without an authority to govern them and care to encompass them; therefore, the contract of Imamate for another caliph may take place therein, with his authority restricted to the regions under his control. ¶

It is worth noting that Imam 'Al-Juwayni' did not definitively rule for the permissibility of contracting the Imamate for two persons in the event of distance between them—according to the text we quoted from Al-Nawawi—as might appear at first glance, but rather he only established the possibility of it being permissible! His specific wording is: 'There is room for this possibility.' It is as if he intended by this phrase to leave the door open for jurists to discuss this issue within the framework he defined, without settling it with a specific opinion. However, Imam Al-Nawawi was not content with leaving this door open for discussion—as Al-Juwayni desired—but rather closed it firmly in his commentary on Al-Juwayni’s opinion, stating: 'This is a corrupt opinion, due to the position of the predecessors (Salaf) and successors (Khalaf), and due to the explicit meanings of the Hadiths' (1). ¶

Furthermore, if we are permitted to engage Imam Al-Juwayni on the possibility he mentioned—without citing the statements of the scholars who refuted him—we would challenge his denial that the texts prohibiting the plurality of... ¶

The Caliph’s (authority) definitively encompasses the situation mentioned—namely, the state of distance between two Imams. Here, we ask Imam al-Juwayni: What is the evidence, or the semblance of evidence, that excludes this situation from the scope of the texts? We find no answer to this question other than what we previously mentioned in our reasoning for the permissibility of contracting the Imamate for two persons on the condition of distance between them (according to those who hold this view), which is: the impossibility of the Imam’s authority and care reaching regions far from him, and the necessity for those regions to be under an authority that governs them and care that encompasses them. Hence, it is possible to hold the contract of Imamate for another Caliph there, due to the necessity of establishing such authority and care. The response to this doubt is: The texts prohibiting the contracting of the Imamate for two persons are absolute—as Al-Nawawi stated—meaning they encompass all cases, including the state of distance between two Imams. This is one point. Another point is that it is not necessary for the Caliph’s authority and care to reach distant regions directly for it to be considered under his authority; rather, it is considered under the Caliph’s authority even if that authority only reaches them indirectly—that is, through governors and emirs whom the Caliph sends to those regions, granting them the right to manage affairs in their territories according to the system upon which the state and authority are based, and within the broad guidelines set for them. The Caliph then monitors the conditions of those regions through his envoys and assistants, according to his capacity, as per: 'Allah does not burden a soul beyond that it can bear' (Surah Al-Baqarah: 286). It is not a requirement of the encompassing nature of the Caliph's authority that no minor or major matter in the country passes without his direct permission, nor is it contrary to the scope of that authority for governors delegated by him to manage affairs without referring to the Caliph in every matter. Rather, the principle is that governors manage the country’s policy according to Islamic rulings without referring to the Caliph, except in unprecedented matters, where they seek the Imam’s opinion before taking action. ¶

They address these matters except when there is fear of corruption in waiting for the Caliph’s opinion; thus, they act according to what is appropriate and subsequently inform the Caliph of what transpired. ¶

For this reason, Umar ibn al-Khattab rejected the practice of governors and emirs referring every minor and major detail back to him. He reminded them that the one who is present (on the ground) sees what the absent one cannot. By doing so, he encouraged them to adopt wise policies suitable for the situations and developments they encountered, provided they remained, by nature, within the bounds of Islamic rulings. ¶

Here, we are not arguing based on the absence of the presumption of the authority’s inability to directly reach remote areas—we do not argue based on the absence of this presumption in our current era, where transportation and communication means have advanced. This is because the discussion here concerns the debate among the early scholars regarding the potential validity of establishing the Imamate for two individuals based on the presumption that the authority at the center of the Caliphate was unable to reach remote areas—in those past eras when modern means did not exist. ¶

This is what is said in presenting the view of some of the early scholars and discussing it regarding the issue of the plurality of the Caliphate, and consequently, the plurality of states in the Islamic world. This is because, as previously stated, the unity of the Caliphate is a metonym for the unity of the state, and its division into two or more is likewise a metonym for the plurality of states. ¶

Second: The view of the later scholars (al-muta'akhkhirin) on the issue of unity and plurality regarding the Imamate, which necessitates the unity of the Islamic state or its plurality in the Islamic world, accordingly. ¶

We find this view in the works of Imam al-Shawkani in his book, 'Al-Sayl al-Jarrar'. It was also advocated after him by Siddiq ibn Hasan al-Qanuji al-Bukhari, the author of 'Al-Rawdah al-Nadiyyah', as he quoted from the very 'Al-Sayl al-Jarrar' in which al-Shawkani presented his opinion on this issue. ¶

We present this text exactly as it is. Al-Shawkani stated: '...As for the expansion of Islam, the broadening of its territories, and the remoteness of its boundaries, it is known that in every region or set of regions, authority has come to rest with an Imam or Sultan, and likewise in other regions. The commands and prohibitions of one do not extend to the region of another, nor to the territories that fall under his authority. Therefore, there is no harm in the multiplicity of Imams and Sultans, and obedience is mandatory for the people of each region to their respective leader after the pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) has been sworn to him, in the domain where his commands and prohibitions are effective. The same applies to the leader of another region. Thus, if someone rises to challenge the leader in a region where his authority is established and acknowledged by its people, the ruling is that he should be killed if he does not desist. It is not obligatory for the people of another region to obey him or enter under his authority, due to the distance between these regions. Often, news of an Imam or Sultan does not reach the distant areas, and it remains unknown who among them has risen to power or who has died. To impose the obligation of obedience in such circumstances is to impose that which is beyond one's capacity (taklif ma la yutaq), and this is obvious to anyone with knowledge of the conditions of people and lands. For example, the people of China and India do not know who holds authority in the lands of the Maghrib (the West), let alone be able to obey him, and vice-versa. Likewise, the people of Transoxiana (Ma Wara al-Nahr) do not know who holds authority in Yemen, and vice-versa. So, understand this, for it aligns with the Shariah principles and corresponds to the evidence. Ignore what is said in opposition to this, as the difference between the state of Islamic authority in the early days of Islam and its state now is clearer than the midday sun. Whoever denies this is obstinate and unworthy of being addressed with argument, for he cannot comprehend it.' This is the text in which al-Shawkani presented his opinion regarding the unity of Islamic lands being contingent upon the unity of the Caliph or Imam. This opinion was adopted and transcribed word-for-word by Siddiq bin Hasan al-Qanuji in 'Al-Rawdah al-Nadiah', though he added at the end: 'And Allah is the source of help!' The text is clear in its implications; however, before discussing it, we wish to identify the core ideas it points to, so that the discussion may revolve around specific points. The ideas of the text are: 1. The existence of a difference between the nature of authority in the early period of Islam and what it is today. ¶

Meaning: In the era of Al-Shawkani. Before presenting this text, he affirmed what the majority of jurists had established regarding the obligation of the unity of the Caliphate, and the ruling that anyone who contests the Caliph’s authority must be killed if they do not repent. He also affirmed the impermissibility of contracting the Caliphate for two men simultaneously. Thus, he was in agreement with what the majority had established regarding leadership (wilayah) in the early days of Islam, limiting it to the first three centuries (1). ¶

2 - The permissibility of having multiple Imams and Sultans after the spread of Islam, the expansion of its territory, and the remoteness of its regions. ¶

3 - The obligation of obedience for the people of every region to the legitimate Imam holding authority in that specific region only, based on their pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) to him, and the lack of obligation for the people of one region to obey the Imam of another region. ¶

4 - If an Imam of one region attempts to annex another Islamic region, this act is considered an aggression against the ruler of the other region, and a dispute over the authority established for him through the pledge of allegiance in that attacked region. In this case, the ruling for an Imam who attempts to unify other Islamic regions by force and annex them under his authority without the consent of the rulers and people of those regions is that he must be killed if he does not repent! ¶

5 - The rationale for the permissibility of multiple Imams in the Islamic regions—in the manner indicated after the first three centuries—is the great distance between Islamic regions, such as the distance between China and Morocco, such that news regarding the Imam—who has risen or who has died—does not reach remote regions. Based on this, to obligate remote regions, for example, to obey a new Imam who has assumed power—while they are unaware of the new authority that has come to power—is to obligate them to obey something unknown to them. Obligating one to an unknown is among the tasks that are 'beyond one's capacity' (taklif bima la yutaq). Such obligations are lifted from the Ummah, as established by the scholars of Usul al-Fiqh (2), in accordance with the Shariah text: 'Allah does not charge a soul except [with that within] its capacity' (3). ¶