Chapter 18

Based on the principle that there is no obligation to perform the impossible (taklif bima la yutaq), it is established that inhabitants of distant regions are not obligated to obey a distant Imam, because he is unknown to them. Since leadership (imarah) is mandatory for Muslims, and the presence of a pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) is a duty upon every Muslim, it is necessary for the people of distant regions to establish their own independent bay'ah to an Imam specifically for them. They must obey him to fulfill the obligation of leadership and the duty of having a pledge of allegiance upon every one of them. Thus, the reality of the vast Islamic world necessitates a plurality of Imams. Shariah principles support this view as we have explained. This is how we clarify Al-Shawkani’s reasoning for the permissibility of a plurality of Imams, and consequently, a plurality of Islamic states in the Islamic world. Now, we enter into a discussion of the aforementioned ideas of Al-Shawkani. Perhaps the final idea, which serves as the rationale for the permissibility of plural Imams, is the most important one requiring discussion, because upon it the argument for the plurality of Imams—and by extension, the plurality of states in the Islamic world and the subsequent ideas derived from it—is built. We examine this rationale from several aspects: A. It is true that the imposition of the unbearable (taklif bima la yutaq) is lifted in Islamic Shariah, but the application of this usuli (foundational) rule to our current subject is misplaced. This is because Muslims are only obligated to obey the Imam regarding what reaches them from him, not what does not reach them, even if it was actually issued by the Imam. Hence, the obligation of the inhabitants of distant Islamic regions to obey the Imam is limited to the news, commands, and prohibitions that reach them, because one of the conditions of taklif (religious obligation) is having knowledge of the obligation. ¶

Based on this, holding people accountable only for what they know among the orders and rulings issued by the Imam is an obligation within one's capacity (taklif bima yutaq), and it is by no means an obligation beyond one's capacity (taklif bima la yutaq)! Even if the Imam were to issue a thousand new decrees for the Ummah, and the people in distant regions only knew about a few of them, they would not be religiously obligated except by the small amount they came to know. If they knew absolutely nothing about them, they would not be religiously obligated except by what was previously known to them until they learned of something new that differs from what they were upon... We ask: Where is the obligation beyond one's capacity in this? ¶

B - When one Imam passes away and a new Imam arrives, the moment the new Imam's bay'ah (oath of allegiance) is legally established, his bay'ah becomes binding upon the neck of every Muslim in the Islamic world. It is not a condition for his bay'ah to be binding upon this or that Muslim that each one participates in the oath personally or learns of it the moment it occurs (1). This is evident from the reality of the bay'ah of the Caliphs during the era of the Sahabah. A Caliph would die or be killed while the Muslim armies were busy on fronts of conflict with the enemy in remote areas, and the news of the previous one's death and the appointment of the successor would not reach them until after a period that might be long or short depending on circumstances. It is possible that a number of Muslims were martyred on those fronts after the death of the previous Caliph and before they received the news of who succeeded him. This happened during the days of the Sahabah, and none of them ever said that someone who was martyred during that interval died without a bay'ah upon his neck, and thus his death was one of jahiliyyah (ignorance) - Allah forbid! - on the argument that his neck was freed from the bay'ah of the Caliph who died, and was not occupied by the bay'ah of the new Caliph because he did not know of his arrival. I say: None of the Sahabah said that. Their acceptance of this reality was their consensus that Muslims in distant regions, whether warriors or residents, are not obligated to know their new Imam until the news reaches them; any contrary view is precisely where the principle of exempting one from obligations beyond one's capacity applies! ¶

C - It is true for the people of distant regions that they are performing obedience to the Caliph no matter how far he is from them, even if they know nothing about him, provided they obey the emir whom the Caliph appointed or confirmed over them, and to whom he delegated the care of their affairs. This is evident in what Muslim narrated from Abu Hurairah. ¶

The Prophet ﷺ said: 'Whoever obeys me has obeyed Allah, and whoever disobeys me has disobeyed Allah; and whoever obeys my amir (commander) has obeyed me, and whoever disobeys my amir has disobeyed me.' (1). ¶

Based on this, it cannot be argued that the obedience of the Caliph is impossible if he is distant, and that because obeying the Caliph is obligatory, it is therefore necessary to appoint another nearby Caliph to be obeyed. This is invalid because the obedience of the Imam’s appointed amir is, in fact, obedience to the Imam himself. In this state, his obedience is not impossible. Consequently, it is not permissible to use this as a basis to argue for the creation of another nearby Caliph for the sake of obedience. Rather, if it occurs that a distant region becomes devoid of an Imam’s appointed amir for any reason, it is obligatory upon the people of that area to appoint one from among themselves, in accordance with the obligation of 'ta'mir' (appointing an amir) mentioned in the texts cited in a previous discussion: 'Because it is not permissible to leave the Muslims abandoned without someone to manage their affairs.' (2). ¶

This mutually agreed-upon amir is considered obligatory to obey, just like the amir appointed by the Imam, until the Imam’s confirmation or change arrives. In fact, his obedience is considered obedience to the Imam himself—even before the Imam’s confirmation of his leadership or his replacement of him. The Hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah from the Prophet ﷺ in Sahih Muslim applies to this: 'Whoever obeys the amir has obeyed me, and whoever disobeys the amir has disobeyed me.' (3). ¶

Thus, the word 'amir' in this text applies to the one appointed by the Imam as well as the temporary amir whom the people agree upon until the Imam confirms or changes him. This text considers the obedience of such an amir to be obedience to the Imam himself! Can it be said after this that charging Muslims in remote areas with the obedience of the Imam is a burden beyond their capacity (taklif ma la yutaq)? ¶

In conclusion, this is our rebuttal to the foundation upon which the argument for the permissibility of multiple Imams was built, which is the claim that the obligation to obey the Imam in remote areas is a burden beyond one's capacity. We have seen that this does not apply to the tangible reality or the shariah reality. Therefore, the argument for the permissibility of multiple Imams is unacceptable due to the incorrectness of the basis upon which it was built. And the true position is... ¶

This is the position established by Imam al-Nawawi, who stated: 'The scholars are in consensus that it is not permissible to appoint two caliphs in one era, regardless of whether the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) is vast or not.' (1) ¶

Before we move on from the opinion of al-Shawkani that we presented and discussed, it is necessary to mention the psychological impact his view leaves on the Islamic consciousness today—namely, the call for the people of every region to obey only their regional leader, and to consider any leader who attempts to unify the lands by force as an aggressor, disputing the rightful authority of others, whose judgment is execution. We must also be fair to al-Shawkani and prevent the exploitation of his aforementioned opinion to perpetuate the reality of fragmentation in which we live today. On this basis, we state: ¶

Al-Shawkani's opinion may perhaps shock the Islamic consciousness of a large segment of Muslims—the consciousness in which feelings of unity have become entrenched, yearning for the day when it sees the Islamic world, which colonialism separated into small states, restored by free-spirited Muslims into provinces of a single state, governed by the president of the united Islamic provinces. By this, I mean: the Caliph of the Muslims! ¶

It also yearns for the day when it sees the Muslim Ummah—which colonialism divided into larger or smaller peoples that have become estranged and do not recognize one another—melted by those free-spirited Muslims into the crucible of a single Islamic Ummah, becoming a single citizenry sheltered under the shade of one state, bearing what is known today as a single citizenship or nationality. ¶

I say: Al-Shawkani’s previous opinion may indeed shock that Islamic consciousness, as we mentioned, but it is only fair to state that al-Shawkani does not approve of a plurality of leaders expressing fragmentation, except within the limits he mentioned regarding the distance between Islamic regions, for which he gave the example: 'For the people of China and India do not know who holds authority in the land of the Maghreb.' (2) ¶

Therefore, al-Shawkani does not approve of the reality of fragmentation that we live in today; rather, he only approves of what falls within the limits of the distance we described between remote regions. The reason for this approval, according to his ijtihad (legal reasoning), is the inability of news of the Imam to reach distant regions in the manner previously detailed. ¶

(1) Sharh Sahih Muslim by al-Nawawi: 8 / 40-41. (2) Al-Sayl al-Jarrar by al-Shawkani: 4 / 512. ¶

Following this, and according to the fundamental Shariah maxim that 'a ruling revolves around its effective cause (illah), existing or ceasing with it,' we can say that the opinion of al-Shawkani—based on his own ijtihad—does not provide Shariah coverage for the reality of fragmentation that the Islamic world experiences today, nor does it approve of it in any way; for the cause (illah) of its validation in al-Shawkani’s ijtihad has ceased to exist. Today, modern communication technology can transmit the leader’s news to all corners of the Islamic world, in sound and image, immediately upon its occurrence. Thus, we posit that the ijtihad of al-Shawkani, his follower Siddiq Hasan Khan al-Qanuji, and before them Imam al-Haramayn, aligns with the consensus of the majority of scholars regarding the unity of the Islamic Caliphate, and consequently, the unity of the Islamic state. This is based on the disappearance of the cause (illah) that was relied upon to justify fragmentation and the multiplicity of leaders, due to modern era advancements in communication that have eliminated that cause. Thus, the voice of Islamic jurisprudence reunites, despite its varied recognized ijtihads, on the obligation of the unity of the Islamic Caliphate, and consequently, the unity of Islamic lands under the shadow of the Caliphate state. ¶

With this, we conclude the presentation of the views of some later scholars (muta'akhirin) regarding the issue of the multiplicity of leaders and, consequently, the multiplicity of Islamic states. We now move to present the views of some contemporary scholars on this issue: ¶

Third: The view of some contemporaries on unity between Islamic lands. ¶

We find this view in the work of Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra in his book 'Al-Wahda al-Islamiyya' (Islamic Unity). He first mentioned that unity between Islamic countries must be based on five duties about which there is no disagreement, and all Muslims must cooperate to fulfill them: ¶

1. Resolving disputes between Islamic regions. 2. Considering an attack on any Islamic region as an attack on all Muslims. 3. Cooperation between Islamic regions to expel colonialism from occupied Islamic lands. 4. Confining alliances (muwalat) exclusively to Islamic regions and severing them from others. ¶

non-Islamic states. 5. The formulation of policy for any Islamic territory must not be surrendered to non-Muslims (1). ¶

But what is the political form that achieves 'unity among Islamic countries' and consequently ensures the realization of these five meanings? ¶

Sheikh Abu Zahra, under the heading 'The Political Form of Unity,' states: 'The political form of unity must realize these meanings—that is, the five duties mentioned above—for they are the intended goal of forming this unity. It is not necessary for the realization of these meanings that the state be a single entity; rather, they may be realized in a strong form even if the state is not one. Therefore, our purpose for unity should not be the formation of a single united Islamic state incorporating all Islamic territories, for Islamic territories are scattered across all parts of the globe and are not contiguous. There is no capital in a suitable center that could serve as the pivot around which rulings revolve, from which commands and prohibitions emanate, and from which a single, consistent system flows. This is because every state has a geometric form where it is possible to draw lines and designs that make it a compact and coherent image, whereas the formation of a state with such geographical dispersion cannot be like that. ¶

Furthermore, the distance between regions and the remoteness of cities have given each territory customs and traditions that constitute the framework of its civilization and the elements of its entity. It is essential that the regulations enacted therein align with its civilization and be consistent with its customs and traditions, as long as they are good and not contrary to Islam. ¶

Beyond all this, it is not correct to call for a single state so that kings and heads of state are not alarmed! Each of them fears for his domain and his authority, and kings fear that their crowns might be snatched from their heads. Thus, they would dedicate themselves to opposing the idea and killing it in its cradle, and the hostility would cause it to dissipate. ¶

Therefore, political unity cannot take the form of a single state, as that is impossible. Even if it were possible in itself, it is not easy to achieve, and even if it were easy to achieve, it would not be in the interest...! ¶

Let us abandon the idea of forming an Islamic state with a unified government and turn toward another form.' ¶

(1) Al-Wahda al-Islamiyya by Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra, pp. 61-63. ¶

Forms of Union. Some writers have stated: 'It is valid for the form of unity to be like the British Commonwealth (1), whereby every territory is governed by its own government, with a unifying bond between them.' ¶

Sheikh Abu Zahra comments on this proposal—which he quotes from some writers regarding the form of unity between Islamic countries—saying: 'This opinion might be good in itself, and we have no reason to object to it, except that some Islamic states are linked to a commonwealth with Britain (2). The response to this objection is that the bond linking them to that state—which spares no effort to cause mischief for the Muslims—must be severed...' (3). ¶

This is the opinion of Sheikh Abu Zahra on the subject of unity between Islamic countries as it appears in the first reading of the text we have quoted. ¶

- No, to a single Islamic state; and yes, to the fragmentation of the Islamic world into multiple separate states, held together by a bond or league that oversees the realization of the five aforementioned objectives. ¶

However, we do not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of what was mentioned in the Sheikh's words, for that would take us away from our primary subject, which is: the legitimacy of combat (qital) for the sake of creating unity between Islamic countries in the form of a single state. But since the legitimacy or illegitimacy of combat for that purpose is contingent upon the Shariah ruling regarding such unity, it was necessary to present the jurisprudential (fiqhi) ijtihadat. ¶

Regarding this issue, we have reached in our discussion the opinion of some contemporaries, which is represented by the view of the Sheikh—as previously clarified. ¶

Although Sheikh Abu Zahra has enumerated the reasons that led him to adopt this position on the issue of unity, we do not find in his arguments a single Shariah text upon which he could rely to justify the idea of a plurality of states within the lands of Islam, and to deviate from the concept of a single state, or the Caliphate state. ¶

As for what he mentioned regarding the geographical distance between Islamic regions, this has already been discussed, so we shall not repeat it. Regarding his mention of the differences in customs and traditions between those regions, or the lack of a capital city that would form a geometrically symmetrical shape with the Islamic world—we do not believe that the esteemed Sheikh would consider this a reason strong enough to invalidate the aforementioned Shariah texts regarding the necessity of the unity of the Caliphate, and consequently, the unity of the Islamic state across the regions of the Islamic world. Our esteemed Sheikh—may Allah have mercy on him—knew better than we do that the Caliphate state, whether during the era of the Rashidun, the Umayyads, the Abbasids, or the Ottomans, was a major, powerful state among the nations of the world during many periods of this long history, and perhaps even stood alone as the premier global power(1). It was not harmed by the differences in customs and traditions between its regions, as long as they remained within the framework of what is permissible in Shariah, nor was it harmed by the shifting of its capital from one place to another, or its existence at times on the periphery of that vast world! ¶

Furthermore, why is the non-Islamic world able to establish major states consisting of multiple regions or provinces whose boundaries are vast, despite the differences in customs and traditions between those regions and provinces, and despite the fact that the capitals of those states do not conform to the preferred geometric shape? As we observe when looking at the maps of those states and the customs of their peoples. ¶

I ask: Why can the non-Islamic world establish major states despite these two factors—which the Sheikh views as contradictory to political unity between regions—while the Islamic world cannot? ¶

Will he establish that one great state on the pretext of differing customs between its regions, and the lack of a suitable capital for that single state? Are the concepts of unity in that non-Islamic world stronger enough to overcome the factors of fragmentation, while the Islamic concepts related to unity in the Islamic world are too weak to withstand the factors of fragmentation? SubhanAllah! Is there any ideology in the entire existence that unites its followers as it does in Islam? Did we not see at the beginning of this research some Shariah texts regarding unity, which make the idea of unity and the sentiment toward unity take on a deep-rooted role at the core of the Islamic mentality and the Islamic psyche among Muslims? Is there any parallel to such Shariah texts in the entire human intellectual heritage? 'Perhaps the Sheikh and those like him have been influenced by the reality of Muslims from centuries ago until today, with the Muslim mentality occupied by a narrow framework... and matters of political, intellectual, and legislative independence...'(*). That said, we do not wish to dwell here for long, for it is not appropriate to make what Sheikh Abu Zahra mentioned—only in passing—the sole basis upon which to construct the idea of a league between states in the Islamic world as an alternative to the idea of a single Islamic state, and then hold him accountable on that basis. It seems to us—and to every reader, we presume—that the most important reason for the stance the Sheikh took regarding the issue of unity is the final reason he mentioned, which is contained in his statement: 'It is not correct to call for a single state so that kings and presidents are not disturbed, and each of them fears for his dominion and worries about his authority... so they mobilize to fight the idea and bury it in its cradle'(1). I say: Just as we were fair to Imam al-Shawkani previously regarding the opinion he adopted concerning the multiplicity of Islamic states following the multiplicity of Imams, we are likewise fair to the noble Sheikh 'Abu Zahra' here. We say: A second, third, and fourth reading of his words shows that he is not arguing for the idea that the Islamic world should remain fragmented into dozens of states, tethered only by the bond of an Islamic league, based on the assumption that this is the final Shariah ruling his ijtihad reached. Rather, he intends to say: That any form of... ¶

The cooperation that can be achieved between Muslims and Muslim regions must be established. As long as the idea of state independence while maintaining a link through a common union is possible—because it does not provoke the fears of kings and presidents—one must work towards achieving that bond. This bond is merely a form of unity and cooperation that falls under the Almighty’s saying: {And cooperate in righteousness and piety} (1), and {And We have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another} (2). ¶

It is true that the Sheikh’s words indicate an objection to complete unity between Islamic countries in the form of a single state, but he bases this objection on the premise that the idea of a single state is not feasible and is against the public interest (maslaha). ¶

As for it being 'not feasible' in the Sheikh’s view, it is because kings and presidents in the Islamic world, driven by fear for their realms and power—as he stated—will not leave the path open for the call to such unity until it reaches the desired success. What is the use of calling for something when the path to achieving it is closed by the command of Muslim kings and rulers? ¶

As for it being 'against the interest', it is because kings and presidents, driven by fear of this call for complete unity, will dedicate themselves to fighting the idea and burying it in its cradle, as he said. ¶

Since it is known what means kings and rulers employ to fight ideas they perceive as a threat to themselves and their rule—such as oppression and persecution of the proponents of these ideas and their families—this reality, in the Sheikh’s estimation, appears to align with what the jurists have mentioned regarding fitna (strife), harm, and the corruption that results from performing an obligatory act. In such a case, the interest lies in abandoning the obligatory interest of complete unity to prevent the greater evils that those in power would not hesitate to commit to protect their private interests. This is in accordance with the Shariah principle: 'The prevention of harm takes precedence over the acquisition of benefits' (3). Especially since the proposed call for unity... ¶

As understood from the Sheikh's words, this is an appeal from those thinkers of Islamic thought who do not possess the executive power necessary to enforce the mandatory, complete unity. It was in the interest of the cause not to allow the leaders of Islamic opinion to be destroyed over an issue that would not be accepted by those who hold the power to crush whoever they perceive as a threat. Hence, Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra shifted his advocacy from a call for a single state to a form of union that falls under the category of cooperation commanded by the Shariah. ¶

This interpretation of Sheikh Abu Zahra's words on the subject of 'unity' is dictated by the reality of the coercive authority (al-sulta al-adood) in our Islamic world today, which is currently undergoing a transitional phase. Consequently, this reality does not possess a permanent character, and thus, views contingent upon that reality cannot be considered definitive Shariah rulings. ¶

I say: This interpretation of Sheikh Abu Zahra's words is befitting of his jurisprudential stature, which cannot possibly stand in opposition to the Shariah texts that decree unity among Muslims and Islamic lands through the unity of the Caliphate. ¶

As for the fear raised by Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra regarding the authorities in Islamic countries—that they would abort the call for a single Islamic state before it sees the light of day—the Messenger of Allah ﷺ had already addressed such expected concerns from kings and rulers as he proceeded to incorporate territories into the Islamic state. He did this by confirming the rulers in their authority so long as they embraced Islam and accepted it as the system governing their regions, thereby linking them to the single Islamic state on that basis. ¶

It is stated in 'Zad al-Ma'ad' by Ibn al-Qayyim: 'The Messenger of Allah ﷺ sent Al-Ala' ibn al-Hadrami to Al-Mundhir ibn Sawa and wrote him a letter inviting him to Islam. Al-Mundhir wrote back to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ: "To proceed, O Messenger of Allah! I have read your letter to the people of Bahrain. Some of them loved Islam, were pleased with it, and entered it, while others disliked it. In my land, there are also Majus (Zoroastrians) and Jews, so instruct me in this matter." Thereupon, the Messenger of Allah ﷺ wrote to him: "In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. From Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, to Al-Mundhir ibn Sawa, peace be upon you." ¶

I praise Allah, besides Whom there is no deity, and I bear witness that there is no deity but Allah, and that Muhammad is His servant and messenger. ¶

To proceed, I remind you of Allah, the Almighty and Majestic; for whoever gives advice, he gives it for his own benefit. Whoever obeys my messengers and follows their commands has indeed obeyed me, and whoever acts with sincerity toward them has acted with sincerity toward me. My messengers have spoken well of you, and I have accepted your intercession regarding your people. Therefore, leave for the Muslims what they held upon their conversion to Islam, and I have pardoned the sinners, so accept from them. As long as you remain righteous, we will not remove you from your authority, and whoever persists in his Judaism or Magianism, then upon him is the jizyah. (1) ¶

In this manner, the Prophet (PBUH) alleviated the fears of kings and rulers regarding the annexation of their territories as provinces within a single Islamic state by keeping them in charge of those regions. Instead of their previous subservience to the hegemony of the Persians in the East or the Romans in the West and North—in a state of humiliation—they were given a new status of honor by pledging allegiance to Islamic sovereignty. ¶

Likewise, the holders of authority in Muslim lands today can be reassured when a new Islamic order calls upon them to unite under the banner of a single Islamic state. ¶

Indeed, the matter may not be as easy or simple with some rulers when they are invited to this 'blessed unity.' Matters may escalate with them to the point of using weapons, and this is the crux of the problem addressed in this research: 'Combat for the sake of the unity of Muslim lands.' The time has now come to address this problem, having finished the first issue, as we stand at the threshold of the second issue of the research in our hands. ¶

Second Issue: The Shariah ruling on combat to impose unity among Muslim lands. We learned at the beginning of this research that this issue manifests in various forms throughout the past, present, and future. ¶

- In the past: This issue manifested in the form of the secession of some regions of the world... ¶

Islamic, and the renunciation of obedience to the Caliph. In this case, this scenario is divided into three states: - The first state: Renouncing obedience to the Caliph on the basis of nullifying his authority in that particular separated region only, and forming an independent state that does not fall under the obedience of the Caliph. - The second state: Renouncing obedience to the Caliph absolutely, calling for a revolt against him, and using the region that renounced obedience as a staging ground to launch from it to incorporate the territories of all Islamic countries under the new authority. - The third state: In which obedience to the Caliph is not renounced in the breakaway region, but rather a powerful figure takes control of it against the will of the Caliph, while still considering it a province of the unified Islamic state. - As for the present: We have presented at the beginning of the discussion several scenarios related to the issue, which are: - The scenario of a single Islamic country in which an internal revolt occurs in one of its regions, where those who ignite it demand separation and the formation of a new state. - The scenario of a single Islamic country in which one of its regions separates to form an independent state (1). - The scenario of countries that raise slogans of unity, assuming that those slogans have moved beyond their framework as mere slogans into the realm of practical implementation, and unsheathing the sword to impose unity by force. This is what relates to the present regarding the issue of 'combat for the sake of unity'. - As for the future: Our hope has flown to the time that will complete its blessed cycle by the permission of Allah, in which one of the Islamic countries adopts the Islamic principle as the basis for authority and governance in internal and external relations, carrying it as a message to the world, announcing the birth of the Islamic Caliphate anew, and demanding that all other regions of the Islamic world join under the wing of that state. In this case, matters may evolve between some regions and this Islamic state to taking up arms... ¶

I say: These are the scenarios in which the issue of combat for the sake of unity may arise. The objective is to determine the Shariah ruling for this issue across all such scenarios: ¶

States of combat in the past: ¶

As for the first state, which is the renunciation of allegiance to the Caliph, based solely on abolishing his authority from a specific region to form an independent state that does not fall under the Caliph’s obedience—this state is covered by the ahadith mentioned at the beginning of this research, including: 'Whoever comes to you while your affair is united under one man, intending to break your staff or divide your group, then kill him.' ¶

It is also true that he is disputing the Caliph’s authority, even if only in one of the regions of the Islamic lands, and his ruling is execution if he does not refrain from his attempt. ¶

In this situation, if extremists support this dissident and he gathers enough power to rival the state’s strength, then we are dealing with rebels (bughat) who have raised the sword against the Imam and refused to submit to his obedience. It has previously been stated in the discussion of 'Combat against the People of Rebellion' (Qital Ahl al-Baghy) that it is mandatory for the Imam to fight them until they return to obedience and their region enters [the fold] as a non-separable part of the Islamic State, provided the state army is capable of doing so and peaceful means have proven ineffective in bringing them back under the banner of the Caliph's obedience and the shade of the Islamic State. Furthermore, it is mandatory for the Muslims to support the Imam in his efforts toward this end. ¶

As for the second state: The emergence of a dissident caliph who calls for allegiance to himself in order to remove the authority of the current Caliph whose legitimacy is established, using certain regions as a base to launch into the entire Islamic world to unify it under his own authority—in this case, the same applies as in the first state, and its ruling is the same. It is also subject to the hadith: 'If allegiance is pledged to two caliphs, kill the latter of the two.' Combat is lawful against this dissident—as previously mentioned—insofar as it is combat against the people of rebellion (Ahl al-Baghy). ¶

The matter of this rebel comes to an end, and if the breakaway region returns to unity, then that is well and good. However, if the fighting against him continues, and it happens that the revolution led by this rebellious caliph succeeds, and he manages to gain the support of public opinion and receives the bay'ah (allegiance) from the representatives of the ummah, then from that moment on, he becomes the holder of legitimate authority. His success does not absolve him of the sin he incurred by rebelling against his legitimate imam, nor the sin of the blood he shed—in the sight of Allah! Even though, in this world, the rebels are not held accountable for the damage caused during the state of rebellion, provided they had a semblance of evidence for the revolution they declared (as previously discussed regarding fighting the rebels). ¶

In this situation, it is mandatory for the supporters of the old regime to enter into the bay'ah of the new authority. It is not permissible for them to continue fighting against it, provided the old authority has become incapable of maintaining power and has lost the support of the public, who have turned away from it. It applies to its officials and supporters that the obligation of allegiance to the imam chosen by the public, or those representing the public, has settled upon them, and they must obey him in this situation. As for the bay'ah for the previous caliph, the defeat he suffered has rendered it null and void. Although here too, the public is not absolved of accountability before Allah when they fail to support the previous legitimate caliph, thereby clearing the way for the triumph of the rebellious force, and then granting it bay'ah and loyalty, as long as the old authority had not committed deviations that would forfeit its right to obedience. ¶

This pertains to the second scenario of rebellion against the holder of authority and the secession of some provinces from the obedience of the imam. ¶

As for the third scenario: It is when a usurper seizes control of a region of the Islamic state, not with the intention of creating an independent state separated from the body of the state—thereby becoming one who works to fragment the Islamic state—nor with the intention of replacing the imam and seizing the entire Islamic state while keeping it a single entity, but rather with the intention of seizing power only in that region while remaining within the unity of the Islamic state. This is what occurred during the second phase of the Abbasid Caliphate. ¶

The authority of the Caliphs had weakened, and it became the custom for the Caliph to recognize whoever seized control of a territory in order to win them over to obedience and to legitimize the situation in that territory from a Shariah perspective. In the 'Ahkam al-Sultaniyya' (Principles of Governance), this is known as 'Imarat al-Istila' (Emirate by seizure). However, this leniency of the Caliphs toward those who usurped power, combined with the fact that an Emir would remain a governor of a certain region for a long time—until he felt his authority was solidified and the impulses of sovereignty began to stir within him—were among the factors that weakened the Caliph’s authority over the provinces, eventually making them resemble separate, small states during certain periods of Islamic history. It would have been prudent for the Caliph to possess the necessary power to discipline the rebels, thereby blocking the path for those greedy for power who worked to fragment the unity of the state. ¶

Yes, it is permissible for the Caliph to remain silent regarding such a rebel and to appease him by delegating authority to him, provided that this appeasement and delegation keeps him subservient to the Caliph's authority, thereby preventing bloodshed between Islamic regions. However, in such a situation, we are merely pushing away a limited harm only to open the door to a much greater harm, which is the fragmentation of the state, ultimately leading to its weakness and inability to withstand invading enemies. This is, in fact, what occurred in our Islamic history. ¶

Consequently, the Caliph's silence toward every usurper who jumped into power in the provinces, and appeasing them by delegation, turned those provinces into a theater for constant power struggles by those ambitious for authority on one hand, and left the entire country unable to stand against an invading enemy on the other. ¶

Therefore, it was a duty to strike the hands of every sinful rebel in accordance with the Shariah ruling on fighting rebels (bughat), to eradicate the desire for power through illegitimate means from the souls of those individuals, to compel them to obey, and to seek legitimate authority through the proper channels if they were qualified for it. This was necessary to ensure the preservation of unity among Islamic lands within a single, strong state, shielded from the greed of the ambitious and the aggression of the transgressors! This is what is said regarding fighting for the sake of unity in the past. ¶

As for the present era, we have identified three scenarios in which combat may occur for the sake of unity. ¶

The first scenario consists of a civil insurrection in a region of a state existing in the Muslim world, with the objective of seceding from the parent state and forming a separate state with its own independent international entity. The armed forces of the parent state then move to thwart that insurrection and subdue its leaders, leading to combat between the two parties—the former striving for secession, and the latter striving to maintain the unity of the country and the state. ¶

The Shari'ah ruling on this combat is based on the principle that unity is a general Islamic obligation, and division and secession are forbidden crimes, as indicated by the Shari'ah texts cited at the beginning of this research. When a group intends to disrupt the continuity of this obligation and commit what is forbidden in Shari'ah, the Shari'ah ruling is to restrain them from that attempt. If they are not deterred except by fighting, it becomes obligatory to fight them according to the rule of Islam. The legal classification (takyif) of this combat falls under the category of fighting those who attempt to commit a 'munkar' (evil/forbidden act), which in this case is secession, or those who commit aggression against a sacred boundary of the Shari'ah, which here is the 'unity' that is being assaulted. We have previously detailed the legitimacy of this type of combat in the discussion titled 'Combat against Aggression upon General Sanctities.' ¶

We have chosen this specific legal classification for such combat and have refrained from placing it under the chapter of 'fighting the bughat' (rebels), because, according to the majority of jurists, fighting the bughat specifically applies to those who revolt against an Imam of the Muslims who rules by Islam. Since there is no Imam with this description in our current times, and in order to avoid falling into the problematic question of whether those who revolt against current authorities qualify as 'bughat'—which is not at the core of our research—or whether it is applicable that they are disputing legitimate rulers for their authority; I say: to avoid that dilemma—given that it is clear that the combat is taking place to prevent the 'munkar' of secession and fragmentation by the insurgents and to preserve the obligatory unity by the authorities of the state—for all these reasons, the Shari'ah classification for this situation is: the obligation to fight the insurgents who advocate for division and secession, even under the banner of authorities who do not rule by Islam. This is because it is a struggle to prevent a 'munkar' and to preserve a mandatory duty, and whoever fights the separatists with the intention of preventing this evil in the religion and is subsequently killed is considered a martyr. ¶

This combat is validated by the Hadith: 'And whoever is killed defending his religion is a martyr,' and in this situation, he is considered among the martyrs of the Hereafter. ¶

- The second scenario: Among the forms of combat for the sake of unity in our present time is the case of Islamic lands governed by a single authority, from which one region secedes to form a separate, independent state, either without revolution or bloodshed, or following a revolution and the shedding of blood. ¶

In this situation, it is obligatory to fight the separatists to restore unity, even if they did not initiate a revolution or violence to bring about the secession, as mentioned in the previous scenario. This is because secession is a munkar (a reprehensible act/evil) and unity is a shari'i obligation. Combat in this situation is an obligatory and legitimate struggle, provided that international conditions are favorable and the capacity to undertake it exists, in order to prevent the continuation of that munkar and to restore the obligation to its previous state—namely, unity between two parts of the lands of Islam. ¶

- The third scenario: Among the forms of combat for the sake of unity between Islamic countries in our present time. This is a hypothetical scenario represented by a case where one of the countries of the Islamic world today seizes a local or international opportunity to pounce on a neighboring Islamic country and annex it, through minor or major combat against those who oppose this act of unification. ¶

- Is it permissible to confront this state calling for unity, to fight it, and to prevent it from imposing such unity by force? - And is it permissible to fight on the side of the state calling for unity against those who reject it and cling to the reality of fragmentation? ¶

The reality here in this scenario differs from the realities in the previous two. There, a pre-existing unity existed, and then an attempt was made to impose the munkar of secession through revolution, or the munkar of secession had already occurred—with or without the use of arms—and we were witnessing this munkar taking place. ¶

is before us. Therefore, it was a duty to stand against this wrong (munkar) to prevent it from occurring, or to remove it after it had occurred! However, in our hypothetical scenario, the prominent aspect of the situation is not the initiation of the wrong of fragmentation and separation before our eyes—for this wrong is old—but rather, the prominent aspect is the attempt to fulfill the duty of unity. This is what is happening before us now, while on the opposite side, there is a force taking a stance of opposition and rejection toward fulfilling this duty—according to the hypothetical scenario. ¶

So, what is the ruling on fighting alongside the force that has risen to fulfill the duty of unity? And what is the ruling on fighting against this force? The answer varies according to the actual situation of the two countries in which unity is sought to be established, and the varying results that follow from their unity, as follows: 1. If both countries are liberated from colonialism and established foreign influence, then the ruling for unity here is 'obligation' (wujub), as it is the fulfillment of a duty without any harm resulting from it. Fighting for the sake of performing this duty is a 'fard' (obligatory duty). Those who stand in the way of establishing this duty are committing one of the forbidden acts (munkarat), as they are preventing others from establishing what is obligatory upon Muslims to perform; thus, fighting them is like fighting those whose wrongs can only be repelled by combat. This has been clarified previously. Furthermore, it is a fight in which the fighter is truly fighting for the sake of the religion, as they are fighting here to implement a ruling that the religion has made obligatory, which is 'unity'. The Hadith states: 'Whoever is killed defending his religion is a martyr.' 2. If both countries are subject to colonialism, or subject to foreign influence... ¶

Both being controlled, for example, through the economy of the countries, or through an international treaty that makes them dependent on the influential state, or similar circumstances—here, unity between them is legitimate (mashru') because it constitutes the fulfillment of an obligatory duty (wajib), and no harm results to either country because of this unity; for the harm of colonialism looming over them or the foreign influence entrenched within them already exists prior to the unity. ¶

Furthermore, undertaking this unity and fighting for its sake does not exempt the Muslims from the duty of fighting to expel colonialism and uproot foreign influence. Carrying out one of these two duties is not a prerequisite for the other. Therefore, whichever duty is easier to perform, one should proceed with it, then begin preparing for the other duty. If both can be performed together, then both must be performed. ¶

3. If one of two countries is under colonialism and the other is under entrenched foreign influence, the ruling on establishing unity between them is subject to the following: ¶

- If unity between them liberates the country under colonialism from that colonial control, then unity here is legitimate; because it is the performance of a duty without resulting in any harm. On the contrary, it leads to liberation from colonialism. Thus, establishing this unity is the performance of a duty, and fighting for the sake of performing a duty is also a duty if it is the established path for that performance and does not result in a harm greater than the harm of neglecting the duty—as previously explained. Moreover, fighting in this case is fighting that results in the expulsion of colonialism, and fighting to expel colonialism is also among the duties. ¶

- However, if unity between the aforementioned countries causes the country that is under foreign influence to fall under colonialism due to this unity with the state subject to colonialism, then in this case, establishing this unity is forbidden (haram) because of the harm it inflicts upon the Muslims; for the harm of colonialism brought about by the unity is greater than the harm of mere foreign influence, which already existed before the unity in one of the two countries intended for unification. ¶

The Shariah rule established in this regard is: Preventing the performance of a duty if it results in... ¶