Chapter 31

In any case, this is not our primary concern here; rather, what is important is to point out the lack of precision in defining the conditions for the legitimacy of combat in Islam by some Islamic writers. The author of 'Falsafat al-Jihad' (The Philosophy of Jihad) also copied, without using quotation marks, referencing the source, or even indicating it was a citation, the entire topic of 'Jihad in the Way of Allah' from Sayyid Qutb's book 'Al-Salam al-Alami wal-Islam' (World Peace and Islam). We have learned from previous excerpts that in Sayyid Qutb's concept, Jihad is a declaration of war against all entities and systems in the world, because they are systems that embody injustice as long as they do not implement the Islamic system, and that Jihad is legitimate for the purpose of toppling them. Meanwhile, we see Jihad in the concept of Dr. Muhammad Abdullah Draz as restricted to two matters: - Defense against aggression. - Providing relief to a Muslim people or an ally unable to defend themselves. ¶

The author of 'Falsafat al-Jihad' further emphasized restricting the concept of Jihad to these two matters by adding, of his own volition: "And only that, nothing else!" with the intention of strictly tying Jihad to these two matters so that it would not be extended to others. ¶

It is glaringly obvious that there is a vast chasm between these two concepts of Jihad, which leaves one in endless wonder... how can a single perception of Jihad be formed from these two concepts in the mind of a writer who is aware of what he is writing or copying. ¶

What adds to the wonder is that the person who introduced and praised the book 'Falsafat al-Jihad' did not notice the lack of coherence in its thoughts and style. It was introduced by the Grand Imam, Dr. Muhammad Muhammad al-Fahham, Sheikh of Al-Azhar, who stated in his introduction: "I present to the entire world the virtuous scholar, the writer, the researcher, the professor, Sayyid Abd al-Hafiz Abd Rabbi, through his delightful and valuable book 'The Philosophy of Jihad in Islam'... I am presenting a new model of writers and a unique style of scholars..." ¶

This, and among the examples of the lack of precision in defining the conditions for the legitimacy of war in Islam, and the absence of a clear and defined concept of 'Jihad in Islam' in what has been written on this subject, is what is found in the book 'Islamic Military Art' by Brigadier General Dr. Yassin Sweid. Under the heading 'Islamic Military Doctrine: An Offensive Doctrine,' he writes the following: ¶

'The fighting of Muslims against the People of the Book—the Christians and the Jews—does not end until they enter into Islam or pay the Jizya. And the fighting of Muslims against the polytheists (meaning those other than the People of the Book and the Magians) does not end until they enter into Islam. This is in accordance with the saying of the Almighty: {Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid what Allah and His Messenger have forbidden, nor follow the religion of truth, from those who were given the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued} (Surah At-Tawbah: 29), and His saying: {And kill the polytheists wherever you find them} (Surah At-Tawbah: 5)... This is a clear and explicit transgression from the concept of preventive and preemptive war to the concept of purely offensive war.' - He then continues, emphasizing this trend in the author's concept of Jihad: 'Some historians believe that the Islamic doctrine is of a defensive nature, while some of them limit the permissibility of war in Islam to two cases: - the case of self-defense, defense of the religion, and freedom of belief, and - the case of responding to aggression, considering that the only legitimate war in Islam is defensive war. We, while disagreeing with these historians... in limiting the legitimate war in Islam to defensive war... believe that the Islamic doctrine is of an offensive nature.' ¶

I say: Up to this point, the threads of the discourse weave for us a unified concept regarding Jihad in Islam, the reason for its declaration, and the end goal it serves. For the People of the Book and those associated with them, there are two options: either Islam, or the Jizya, which symbolizes submission to the authority of the Islamic State and acceptance of Islamic governance; otherwise, it is war. ¶

For others, there is only one option, which is Islam alone; otherwise, it is killing. However, three pages later, regarding the same subject, the text states: ¶

'It was sufficient for the Da'wah (call) to achieve its objective, which is conversion to Islam, or a treaty, or financial obligation—that is, the Jizya—for the Muslims to refrain from fighting...' (1). ¶

In this passage, we find a new option available to other states for the Muslims to cease fighting them, which is the option of a 'treaty' with the Islamic State. The intent of this treaty is a peace treaty or good neighborliness, which stipulates that non-Islamic entities maintain their independence from the Islamic State in terms of political authority and internal governance. This contradicts the previous discourse. ¶

The author continues by emphasizing that Muslims should refrain from fighting the disbelievers if these disbelievers refrain from aggression against the Muslims and allow the Islamic Da'wah to spread without hindrance. This is the same argument made by many proponents of the 'defensive war' theory in Islam, including 'preemptive war' that ensures the protection of the dissemination of the Da'wah—a theory which the author rejects as being the sole scope of legitimacy, as he also asserts the legitimacy of 'offensive war.' This is the author's further elaboration in this regard: ¶

'We must not forget that war is not the foundation in the effort to spread the Islamic religion, nor in the relations of Muslims with others. If these relations lead to the desired objective—which is the spreading of the Islamic Da'wah, removing injustice from the Muslims, and repelling aggression against them—then war no longer has any justification' (1). ¶

(1) Al-Fann al-'Askari al-Islami (Islamic Military Art) by Brigadier General Dr. Yassin Sweid, p. 364. ¶

Yes, it is possible that the author’s intent was to say: Those who make decisions regarding peace or war in an Islamic state consider all relevant factors during the decision-making process when determining the options presented to this or that non-Islamic state. Thus, they may narrow the scope of choices for one state and broaden it for another, in accordance with the interests of the Islamic Da'wah and consideration of differing circumstances, all within the legitimate boundaries of choice. ¶

Yes, this may be what the author intended, and in doing so, the concept of Jihad retains its unity in the reasons for its declaration and the ultimate goal it reaches. However, the author's expression does not help in clarifying this intent, provided that this is indeed what the author of the book 'The Islamic Military Art' meant. Furthermore, it is not denied that the book has its useful place in the art it addressed, but that is not what we are currently discussing. ¶

In conclusion, we suffice with the summaries, deductions, and observations we have provided regarding the legitimate causes of combat in Islam according to Islamic writers, as our discussion here is not a critical study of the scientific works produced by these authors such that we should dwell in that direction. Rather, the brief observations we touched upon earlier were not intended for criticism or evaluation; the entire intent was to give an image of how Islamic writers approach the subject we are dealing with, in order for us to live in the atmosphere of the subject before delving into it, and to be more prepared and ready to study what lies ahead. ¶

With the conclusion of the excerpts we selected and recorded in their authors' own words, and with the conclusion of the focused summary, the deductions derived therefrom, and the passing observations we followed them with... ¶

I say: With this concluded, the time has come to bid farewell to this introduction and welcome the section we have dedicated to addressing the causes of combat in Islam. So, on to the first chapter of this section. ¶

Chapter One: Repelling Aggression ¶

Introduction: Aggression against Muslims is the primary cause for the obligation of declaring Jihad in the history of Islamic legislation. Section One: Aggression against Muslims as a cause for combat. 1. On the meaning of aggression. 2. Legal proofs regarding the legitimacy of combat to repel aggression. 3. On the general (amm) and specific (khas), the absolute (mutlaq) and the qualified (muqayyad), and the abrogating (nasikh) and the abrogated (mansukh) in the texts of combat. 4. Justifications for combat against aggression, between retribution and defense. a. Retribution for aggression that has occurred. b. Defense against ongoing aggression. c. Defense against expected aggression (preventive war). Section Two: Aggression against Muslims in terms of its forms, i.e., the target upon which the aggression occurred. 1. Occupation of a part of Muslim lands for any purpose whatsoever. 2. Aggression against the persons of Muslims for any purpose whatsoever. 3. Aggression against the honor of Muslims. 605 ¶

4 - Aggression against the wealth of Muslims. Third Topic: Aggression against Muslims based on the citizenship they hold. 1 - Shariah-based evidence regarding fighting against aggression committed against Muslims by those outside the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). 2 - What is Dar al-Islam? And what is Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Disbelief)? 3 - The ruling on Hijrah (migration) from Dar al-Kufr to Dar al-Islam. Fourth Topic: Aggression against the Ahl al-Dhimmah (protected non-Muslim subjects), those under their status, and the allies of Muslims who are not among the Ahl al-Dhimmah, is considered aggression against the Muslims themselves. 1 - Aggression against the Ahl al-Dhimmah and those under their status. 2 - Aggression against allies who are not from among the Ahl al-Dhimmah. Fifth Topic: Is the aggression or injustice inflicted upon groups of disbelievers—other than the Ahl al-Dhimmah and the allies—a valid cause for combat in Islam? ¶

Chapter One: Repelling Aggression ¶

Introduction: Aggression against Muslims is the primary reason for the obligation to declare Jihad in the history of Islamic legislation. ¶

Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the stages of the legitimacy of Jihad, the circumstances of each stage, and how it was prohibited in Makkah—that is, before the establishment of the Islamic state in Madinah and before the existence of the military power necessary for combat. Then, it was permitted after the state was established as a mere permission; subsequently, defensive Jihad was made mandatory only when aggression was committed by the disbelievers against the Muslims, and finally, Jihad was made mandatory against all disbelievers absolutely. This is the statement of Ibn al-Qayyim, which we have truncated to the necessary parts for the sake of brevity. He states: ¶

«When the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) settled in Madinah and Allah supported him with His victory and His believing servants, the Ansar... and the Arabs and Jews attacked them in unison and girded themselves for enmity and warfare... and Allah (the Exalted) commanded them to be patient and to forgive until their strength increased. Then they were permitted to fight, but it was not made mandatory upon them. Allah the Exalted said: 'Permission (to fight) has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory.' Then, fighting was made mandatory upon them thereafter against those who fought them, but not against those who did not fight them. He said: 'Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you.' Then, fighting was made mandatory upon them against all the polytheists.» - Ibn al-Qayyim then returns to mention, in specific words, the stages that Jihad passed through in terms of its legitimacy. He states: ¶

“It was forbidden, then permitted, then commanded against those who initiated combat against them, then commanded against all the polytheists—either as an individual obligation (fard ayn) according to one of the two opinions, or a communal obligation (fard kifaya) according to the well-known view”(1). This is what Ibn al-Qayyim stated, summarizing the stages of the legitimacy of Jihad, including the stage where declaring Jihad becomes obligatory upon the occurrence of aggression against Muslims through combat. ¶

However, we have a note regarding some of the steps outlined by Ibn al-Qayyim in the sequence of these stages: his mention that the permission for combat was only granted after a period of stability in Medina and after the Muslims had gained strength. Yet, we have established in previous research that the permission for combat was granted while on the way from Mecca to Medina. This is something that Ibn al-Qayyim himself confirmed during his discussion on the stage of permission for combat when he cited the hadith of Ibn Abbas in this regard, saying: “Ibn Abbas said: When the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) left Mecca, Abu Bakr said: They have driven out their Prophet! Truly, to Allah we belong and truly to Him we shall return, they will surely be destroyed. Then Allah the Almighty revealed: {Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged...}(2), and this is the first verse revealed regarding combat”(3). ¶

After this excellent summary of the stages of the legitimacy of Jihad and clarifying the position of the stage of the obligatory declaration of Jihad for defense against aggression within the context of this legitimacy, we proceed to address the topics of the chapter in which we are currently engaged. ¶

(1) Zad al-Ma'ad by Ibn al-Qayyim: 3/69-71. (2) Surah Al-Hajj, verse 39. (3) Zad al-Ma'ad by Ibn al-Qayyim: 3/71. The hadith is found in Mustadrak al-Hakim 2/66, and he declared it authentic based on the criteria of the two Sheikhs (Al-Bukhari and Muslim), with which Al-Dhahabi agreed; it was also recorded by Ibn Jarir al-Tabari and Ahmad 1/216. See Tafsir al-Tabari 17/123. ¶

Section One: Aggression as a Cause for Combat in Islam ¶

Clarifying this section is best achieved by addressing the following issues: 1. What is the definition of aggression (al-'udwan) against Muslims? 2. The Shariah evidence for the legitimacy of combat to repel aggression. 3. Regarding the general and specific (al-'amm wa al-khas), the absolute and qualified (al-mutlaq wa al-muqayyad), and the abrogating and abrogated (al-nasikh wa al-mansukh) in the texts concerning combat. 4. Justifications for combat against aggression: between retribution and defense. a. Retribution for aggression that has occurred. b. Defense against ongoing aggression. c. Defense against anticipated aggression (preemptive war). ¶

First Issue: What is the meaning of aggression against Muslims? In this regard, Professor Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli states the following: “We can—as a general rule—define the meaning of aggression that justifies combat in Islam as follows: Aggression: A state of direct or indirect assault upon Muslims, their wealth, or their lands, in such a way that it affects their independence, subjects them to persecution, tempts them away from their religion, threatens their security and safety, suppresses their call (dawah), or the occurrence of anything that indicates ill intent toward the Muslims.”(1). I say: This definition presented by Dr. al-Zuhayli sheds light on the comprehensive meaning. ¶

(1) *Athar al-Harb* (The Effects of War) by Professor Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli, pp. 75-76. ¶

Regarding aggression, it manifests in various forms that qualify as an act of aggression against Muslims. ¶

It should be noted that we must not understand the aforementioned definition as being all-encompassing of every form of aggression, nor as exclusive of forms not mentioned therein. No, rather we must understand that those manifestations cited in the definition are merely by way of example and to clarify the meaning of aggression, not by way of limitation (hasr). ¶

This is because the word 'al-udwan' (aggression) in the language carries a general meaning that is not restricted to specific manifestations. It is stated in Mukhtar al-Sihah: 'Al-udwan: Al-zulm al-surah (Aggression is blatant injustice).' ¶

It is also stated therein: 'The root of injustice (zulm) is placing a thing other than in its proper place. It is said: He who resembles his father has not done injustice (ma zalam). And in the proverb: He who makes a wolf a shepherd has done injustice (zalam).' ¶

Furthermore, the root of 'udwan' denotes transgressing from one state to another; you say 'ada tawrahu,' meaning he transgressed his limits. Likewise, placing a thing outside its proper place—which is the meaning of zulm—indicates that the thing has transgressed beyond its designated station. Thus, these two terms, 'udwan' (aggression) and 'zulm' (injustice), revolve around the same axis of meaning. ¶

It is for this reason that Shirk (polytheism) is considered zulm, because it is a transgression from the state in which a created being ought to exist regarding belief in its Creator alone. This belief is what is described as 'placing a thing in its proper place,' in terms of it being an affirmation of the truth applied to reality; therefore, transgressing from that is considered injustice. ¶

Evidence for this is found in the Holy Quran: 'Indeed, shirk is a great injustice.' ¶

Similarly, disbelief (kufr) and denying the Messengers of Allah apply as aggression (udwan) or transgression (i'tida') because it is a transgression from the state in which people ought to be regarding faith and belief in the Messengers. Proof of this is that Allah named those who denied His Messengers as 'the transgressors' (al-mu'tadin) in His saying: 'Then We sent after him messengers to their people...' ¶

Then they came to them with clear signs, but they would not believe in what they had denied before; thus do We seal the hearts of the transgressors. (1) ¶

This said, the injustice or aggression (udwan), which is one of the legitimate causes of combat in Islam, does not merely refer to the disbelievers being involved in any act of injustice or any act of aggression. ¶

Rather, the aggression we are addressing is the aggression committed by the disbelievers against the Muslims. The evidence that specifies the meaning of aggression as being directed against the Muslims is the saying of the Almighty: 'Then whoever transgresses against you, then transgress against him in the same way he has transgressed against you' (2). This is also evidenced by the saying of the Almighty: 'Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged' (3). ¶

The first text states: 'transgressed against you,' meaning the aggression was committed against those being addressed, i.e., the Muslims. The second text informs us of the Muslims who were permitted to fight that they were wronged because of the combat occurring against them. ¶

Thus, if injustice or aggression is committed by disbelievers against non-Muslims who are not under the protection of the Muslims, it does not fall within the concept of aggression we are discussing here. ¶

Similarly, injustice or aggression in the absolute sense, which disbelievers are characterized by due to their disbelief—which is an injustice and aggression in the sense mentioned in the two previous verses: 'Indeed, shirk (polytheism) is a great injustice' (4) and 'but they would not believe in what they had denied before; thus do We seal the hearts of the transgressors' (5)—neither this injustice nor this aggression is the intended meaning of the aggression that serves as a legitimate cause for combat in Islam (6). Rather, the intended meaning of aggression in this research—as previously mentioned—is the aggression committed by the disbelievers against the Muslims. And this aggression, linguistically, means... ¶

"Al-zulm al-surah" (blatant oppression) means: the manifest [injustice] that is free from any ambiguities that would deflect it from being blatant oppression. Thus, when this explicit aggression against the Muslims occurs on the part of the disbelievers, one of the legitimate causes for combat (qital) in Islam is established. ¶

With this, we conclude the first issue and move to the second issue. ¶

Second Issue: The Shariah evidences for the legitimacy of combat to repel aggression. ¶

We will content ourselves here with citing the Shariah texts related to this subject. As for the practical Sunnah regarding the action of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in fighting the disbelievers in response to their aggression, an examination of his military campaigns (ghazawat) has already preceded, in which the response to aggression was represented, such as the battles of Uhud, al-Khandaq, Tabuk, and others... so we will not prolong the discussion by mentioning them. ¶

As for the Shariah texts in this regard: ¶

1. Among them is the saying of the Almighty: "Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you" (1). ¶

2. Among them is the saying of the Almighty: "And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them" (2). ¶

3. Among them is the saying of the Almighty: "So whoever has assaulted you, then assault him in the same way that he has assaulted you" (3). Meaning: "Repel the aggression from yourselves; whoever fights you in the Sacred Mosque or during the Sacred Month, fight him, and requite him with the like" (4). ¶

4. Among them is the saying of the Almighty: "So if they do not withdraw from you or offer you peace and restrain their hands, then seize them and kill them wherever you overtake them. And those - We have made for you a clear authorization against them" (5). Ibn Kathir says in his Tafsir: "If they do not withdraw from you, and do not offer you peace (ceasefire and reconciliation), and do not restrain their hands..." ¶

(their hands), i.e., from fighting. (Then seize them) as captives. (And kill them wherever you find them), i.e., wherever you encounter them. (And for them, We have given you a clear authority), i.e., a manifest and clear evidence (1). ¶

5 - Among them is the saying of the Almighty: {And fight the polytheists collectively, just as they fight you collectively...}(2). Ibn Kathir says: "Meaning: just as they unite to wage war against you when they fight you, you too must unite when you fight them, and battle them in a manner similar to what they do. It is also possible that He granted the believers permission to fight the polytheists in the Sacred Month, if the initiation came from them"(3). It is stated in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir': "Al-Thawri says: Fighting the polytheists is not an obligation unless the initiation is from them, in which case fighting them becomes a duty as a means of defense, based on the apparent meaning of the verse: ... {And fight the polytheists collectively as they fight you collectively}(4)." ¶

These are some of the Shariah texts in which the declaration of Jihad against the disbelievers is manifested due to their aggression and their initiation of combat against the Muslims. Among these are texts revealed during the phase of Jihad for defense against aggression, and to counter the disbelievers' initiation of fighting against Muslims, as in the verse of Surah Al-Baqarah: {And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you}(5). Others were revealed in the phase of declaring Jihad against the disbelievers generally when they stand in the way of the Call (Da'wah) and refuse to accept it, or refuse to submit to Islamic rule, as in the verse of Surah Al-Tawbah: {And fight the polytheists collectively as they fight you collectively...}(6). This is based on the second interpretation to which the verse may be subject, as mentioned by Ibn Kathir and Al-Thawri, which indicates that Jihad for defense against aggression is an independent factor observed in the texts of legislation, even in this final phase of the stages of the legitimacy of Jihad. ¶

Thus, we conclude the second issue in this section and proceed to the third issue. ¶

The Third Issue: Regarding the General (Aam) and the Specific (Khas), the Absolute (Mutlaq) and the Restricted (Muqayyad), and the Abrogating (Nasikh) and the Abrogated (Mansukh) in the texts concerning combat. ¶

The resolution of this issue is as follows: There are specific verses that command fighting only against those aggressors among the disbelievers who initiated combat against the Muslims, and they prohibit fighting those who did not initiate aggression, such as the statement of the Almighty: 'And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors' (1). There are also general verses that command fighting the disbelievers absolutely, whether they are aggressors or not, such as the statement of the Almighty: 'O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let them find in you harshness...' (2). These two texts appear contradictory, as the first text prohibits fighting non-aggressors who did not initiate combat, while the second text commands fighting the disbelievers neighboring the lands of the Muslims absolutely, even if they are not aggressors. This is the issue: ¶

Scholars have discussed this: Some have stated that the verses of Surah Bara'ah (At-Tawbah), which mandate fighting the disbelievers generally without the specification of them being aggressors, have abrogated (naskh) the verses that specifically command fighting only those aggressors who initiated combat against the Muslims, such as the aforementioned verse from Surah Al-Baqarah. ¶

Others have stated that there is no abrogation in the verses. The specific verses are muhkam (decisive/established), not abrogated, and they operate within their sphere, which is fighting the aggressors among the disbelievers who initiated combat against the Muslims; this ruling remains and is not abrogated. The general verses are also muhkam and operate within their sphere, which is fighting the disbelievers generally, even if they are not aggressors. ¶

Furthermore, some have framed the issue around the fundamentalist (usuli) principle of carrying the absolute (mutlaq) upon the qualified (muqayyad) when the ruling and the cause of the ruling are identical in the absolute and qualified texts. Therefore, we will study this issue from two aspects: - From the perspective of general and specific texts, and whether there is abrogation (naskh) among them. - From the perspective of absolute and qualified texts, and whether the absolute should be carried upon the qualified. ¶

A - The First Point: Specific and General Texts on Combat, and whether they contain Abrogating and Abrogated (Nasikh and Mansukh) verses. It is stated in Tafsir al-Alusi: '﴿And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you﴾ means: those among the disbelievers who engage you in combat. This was... before they were ordered to fight all the polytheists, both those who engage in combat and those who refrain. Thus, this becomes a generalization (ta’mim) after the specification (takhsis) derived from this command, affirming its literal wording (mantuq) while abrogating its implied meaning (mafhum), i.e., do not fight those who refrain. Likewise, the subsequent literal wording [i.e., 'and do not transgress'] is, based on this interpretation, inclusive of the prohibition against fighting them as well.' Accordingly, the verses specific to fighting those disbelievers who initiate combat against the Muslims are not entirely abrogated. What is abrogated is their 'implied contrary meaning' (mafhum al-mukhalafa), which is the non-combat with those who are not fighting. Similarly, what is abrogated is the literal text of 'and do not transgress' if we interpret this prohibition as meaning: 'Do not initiate combat against those among the disbelievers who have not initiated combat against you.' However, if we interpret this prohibition to mean: 'Do not transgress by fighting those you have been forbidden to fight, such as women, the elderly, children, and those with whom there is a treaty, or do not transgress by mutilation (muthla), or by surprise attack without an invitation to Islam.' I say: If the prohibition in 'and do not transgress' is interpreted according to these latter meanings, then there is no abrogation (naskh) of the literal text of this verse. The abrogation would be confined to the 'implied contrary meaning' of the phrase 'those who fight you' for those who accept the validity of 'implied contrary meaning.' As for those who do not accept 'implied contrary meaning,' the non-combatant disbelievers are merely 'remained silent upon' (maskut 'an hum)—according to them—until the general text arrived ordering their combat. In this case, there is no abrogation in the verse of Surah Al-Baqarah at all, i.e., ﴿And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you﴾, neither regarding the meaning of 'those who fight you'—since it has no 'implied contrary meaning' in this school of thought—nor regarding the literal wording of 'and do not transgress,' because this school interpreted this prohibition as... ¶

The second meaning that was previously explained, and not the meaning of: 'Do not initiate combat against the disbelievers.' ¶

In this regard, it is stated in 'Tafsir Ayat al-Ahkam' by Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Sayis: 'Although Fakhr al-Razi holds the view that the verse ﴿وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ﴾ (Surah Al-Baqarah: 190), even while conceding that it refers to the obligation of fighting only those who fight, does not necessarily mean it is abrogated by his saying: ﴿وَاقْتُلُوهُمْ حَيْثُ ثَقِفْتُمُوهُمْ﴾ (Surah Al-Baqarah: 191), assuming the generality of this verse; for the furthest extent required is that the statement ﴿وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ﴾ indicates fighting those who fight, without addressing fighting others, while the statement ﴿وَاقْتُلُوهُمْ حَيْثُ ثَقِفْتُمُوهُمْ﴾ provides for the generalization of the ruling after specification. Mentioning the general after the specific establishes an additional ruling to that of the specific without abrogating it.' ¶

Al-Naysaburi's phrasing is: 'He commanded in the first verse jihad under the condition of the disbelievers initiating combat, and in this verse, He added to the obligation, commanding jihad against them whether they fought or did not fight.' ¶

In 'Ahkam al-Quran' by Ibn al-Arabi, it is stated, affirming that the verses pertaining to fighting specifically those among the disbelievers who initiate combat are not abrogated, and their ruling remains after the command to fight the disbelievers in general. He writes: 'A group said: This verse, i.e., ﴿وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ﴾ is abrogated by the verse of Bara'ah, i.e., ﴿وَقَاتِلُوا الْمُشْرِكِينَ كَافَّةً﴾. This is not correct, because He commanded here to fight those who fight, and likewise, He commanded thereafter, for the Almighty said: ﴿وَقَاتِلُوا الْمُشْرِكِينَ كَافَّةً كَمَا يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ كَافَّةً﴾.' ¶

We conclude from this that the ruling on fighting the aggressors among the disbelievers who initiate combat against the Muslims is a remaining ruling that has not been abrogated. ¶

Indeed, the one who understands from restricting the ruling of combat to only the aggressive disbelievers that others... ¶

Regarding those who hold that it is not permissible to fight those who do not commit aggression, they argue that this concept has been abrogated by the command to fight the polytheists in general. - As for those who do not hold this view, their position is that the ruling regarding non-aggressive disbelievers was initially silent, and then the command to fight them was revealed, as indicated by the verses commanding combat against disbelievers generally, without the condition that they must have initiated aggression against Muslims. Thus, we conclude this point and move to the second point of this issue. ¶

B - The Second Point: Restricted (Muqayyad) and Absolute (Mutlaq) Texts on Combat - Should the Absolute be construed as the Restricted? The clarification of this issue is as follows: The command to fight disbelievers came initially in Shariah texts restricted by the condition that those disbelievers were committing aggression against the Muslims, as in the Almighty's saying: 'And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you...' (1), and other verses that stipulate the condition that the disbelievers must have initiated combat or aggression for it to be permissible for Muslims to wage war against them. Then, Shariah texts came commanding combat against disbelievers absolutely, without the aforementioned condition of the disbelievers having engaged in aggression against Muslims. - So, should we construe the absolute Shariah texts regarding this condition in light of the aforementioned texts that are restricted by it? In other words: Did the Legislator (the Lawgiver) intend for the absolute texts to be restricted by the condition mentioned in the restricted texts? This would be in accordance with the usuli (jurisprudential) principle of construing the absolute (mutlaq) as the restricted (muqayyad) when the ruling—which is the obligation of combat—is the same, and the cause of that ruling—which is that those we are fighting are disbelievers who have neither accepted Islam nor submitted to Islamic rule (2)—is the same? If we construe the absolute as the restricted, the result is: ¶

Limiting the legitimacy of fighting the kuffar (disbelievers) to the condition of their refusal to submit to Islamic rule versus limiting it solely to cases where they are the aggressors. ¶

If they do not commit aggression against the Muslims and permit Islamic activities among them without any molestation—neither towards the bearers of the da'wah (call) nor towards those among their own people who respond to it—then it is not permissible to fight these kuffar for the purpose of seizing power from their hands and subjecting them to Islamic rule. This is what is implied by the legal principle of applying the general (al-mutlaq) to the specific (al-muqayyad) in the texts concerning combat. ¶

However, if the general is not applied to the specific—meaning that the specific case (fighting the kuffar because they are aggressors) is considered merely one state of the general (fighting the kuffar absolutely, whether they are aggressors or not, as long as they have not accepted Islam nor submitted to Muslim rule)—then the result is the legitimacy of fighting all kuffar, whether they are aggressors (acting upon the specific texts) or are not aggressors (acting upon the general texts). Their combat continues until they declare their Islam or announce the dismantling of their authority and their submission to Islamic rule. In this view, the legitimacy of fighting them does not cease, even if they permit Islamic activity without any interference. ¶

Nevertheless, in such a situation, the one who possesses decision-making authority retains the right to hasten the dismantling of the authority of kufr and the establishment of Islamic rule in the lands of the kuffar, or to delay this step to observe how the affairs of Islam evolve in those lands. This depends on what the decision-maker perceives as being in the interest of the Islamic da'wah regarding which stance to adopt (1). ¶

Following this necessary clarification of the issue, we return to the question: Should the general texts of combat be applied to the specific texts? Or should the general remain in its generality, with the specific texts falling under its framework in accordance with their literal implications, as previously explained? ¶

(1) It is stated in Al-Jassas's 'Ahkam al-Qur'an': '...It is permissible for the Muslims to abstain from fighting those kuffar who do not fight them... and we do not know of any jurist who prohibits refraining from fighting those among the polytheists who have detached themselves from fighting us. The disagreement is regarding the permissibility of refraining from fighting them, not regarding the prohibition of doing so!' Vol. 3 / 191. ¶

To answer this question, we first present the views of some Islamic writers who advocated applying the 'Absolute' (al-Mutlaq) to the 'Restricted' (al-Muqayyad) in the texts concerning combat (qital). That is: to the effect that it is forbidden to fight the disbelievers if they have not committed aggression against the Muslims. ¶

Then, we present the words of those who argued against applying the 'Absolute' to the 'Restricted' in those texts. That is: to the effect that it is legitimate to fight the disbelievers in order to subject them to Islamic rule, even if they have not committed any aggression against the Muslims. ¶

Then, we clarify our own opinion on this matter: ¶

The opinion that supports applying the 'Absolute' to the 'Restricted' in the texts of combat: Among the writers who hold the view of applying the 'Absolute' to the 'Restricted' in this issue is Sheikh Abdul Wahhab Khallaf (1). He states in his book 'Al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya' the following: ¶

"Why not reconcile the absolute verses with the restricted verses by applying the absolute to the restricted? The meaning is that Allah (SWT) permitted combat to repel fitna (strife) and protect the Dawah (the call to Islam). Sometimes He mentioned it alongside its cause, and other times He mentioned it absolutely, being satisfied with the knowledge of the cause from other verses. If there were a contradiction between the verses, the later ones (referring to those absolute of the cause of combat, i.e., aggression) would be abrogating the earlier ones (referring to those restricted by the mention of the cause, i.e., aggression). Why, then, was the reason for which combat was permitted not mentioned at the end, as it was mentioned at the beginning? And how can the restricted verses be abrogated when the obligation to fight to repel aggression is a matter of consensus, and no one has claimed the abrogation of this obligation?" (2). This is what Sheikh Abdul Wahhab Khallaf mentioned. ¶

We hasten to provide answers to Sheikh Khallaf's questions regarding the issue of abrogation and the cause. ¶

(1) Among the writers who hold the view of applying the absolute to the restricted here is Professor Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli in his book 'Athar al-Harb' (pp. 101-102), and he pointed in the footnote to the opinion of Sheikh Khallaf. Before him, 'Tafsir al-Manar' (10/167) supported the view of applying the absolute to the restricted in this issue. I say: Also among those who leaned towards adopting this rule in this issue is Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah in his book 'Al-Islam wa Mantiq al-Quwwa' (p. 202). (2) Al-Siyasa al-Shar'iyya by Sheikh Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, p. 77. ¶

We shall continue the fight so as not to return to that state again, and we defer the issue of 'carrying the absolute upon the restricted' (haml al-mutlaq 'ala al-muqayyad) until we have clarified our opinion on it. ¶

He asks: 'Why was the reason for which combat was permitted later not mentioned, as was the reason for its permission in the first place?' ¶

I say: The preceding texts command us to fight the aggressor disbelievers. Thus, the command to fight was contingent upon two attributes: that those we fight are, firstly, disbelievers, and secondly, aggressors. ¶

Then, texts arrived commanding us to fight the disbelievers regardless of whether they were aggressors or not. This means that the command to fight was contingent upon the mere fact of them being disbelievers who refused to accept Islam or submit to its governance, as the texts indicate. ¶

Thus, the command to fight was initially dependent on two attributes or two combined causes: disbelief (kufr) and aggression (i'tida'). ¶

Then, the command to fight became dependent on a single attribute or cause, which is disbelief (kufr)—whether or not it is accompanied by aggression. This applies when those possessing this attribute refuse to submit to Islamic rule. ¶

Based on this, there is no room for the question: 'Why was the reason for which combat was permitted later not mentioned, as was the reason for its permission in the first place?' ¶

There is no place for this question, nor for the deduction that combat devoid of an explicit reason must have a reason, which in this case would be the one mentioned in the previous restrictive (muqayyid) verses, namely, aggression. I say: There is no basis for this question or that conclusion, because the reason is indeed mentioned in the later verses, namely, disbelief and the refusal to submit to Islamic rule, as in the Verse of Jizya: 'Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day...' until His saying: '...until they give the jizya willingly while they are humbled.' ¶