Chapter 29

The Third Issue: ¶

Motives for declaring Jihad during the Rashidun era, based on official statements, negotiations conducted, and treaties concluded with opposing states. ¶

In the second issue of this research, we focused on what has been said regarding the motives for declaring Jihad during the Rashidun era into six points. Therefore, we shall discuss these motives in light of what we presented in the first issue of this research—that is, in light of the official statements issued, formal negotiations held, and treaties concluded with the opposing states on various fronts along the borders of the Islamic state. Through this discussion, the true motive behind the declaration of Jihad on all fronts during the Rashidun Caliphate will emerge. Consequently: what is the role of other motives mentioned by Islamic writers, who claimed they were behind the Jihad movement that spread across all fronts of the Islamic state? ¶

Before addressing the motives mentioned by Islamic writers, we believe it is necessary to establish the following facts to evaluate those motives: ¶

1. The First Fact: It has been established from the excerpts we cited from historical sources—in the first issue of this research—that the Sahaba would offer the peoples on all fronts three options: The Islamic option (conversion to Islam); then the option of joining the Islamic state and having the Islamic system applied to them—which is represented by the 'Dhimma' contract and the payment of 'Jizya'; and finally, the military option. ¶

Whenever the first or second option was accepted, the legitimacy of war against the lands that accepted either option ceased. If both were rejected, the military option was resorted to, in order to impose the second option by force, without the first. ¶

This indicates that the motive behind the Jihad movement during the time of the Sahaba was always to invite people to Islam so they might embrace it, and to apply the Islamic system to them, even if they did not believe in it or enter the faith. ¶

2. The Second Fact: There is a distinction between the motive for something, and the utilization of that thing—which was created by that motive—in order to achieve other purposes. ¶

In our current subject, the matter to which people are urged is Jihad. The motivation towards Jihad is the dissemination of the Islamic Da'wah and the application of the Islamic system upon the people, as established in the first premise. There are many legitimate objectives that can be derived from Jihad: among them is the realization of economic benefits; among them is diverting people from internal conflict and directing their energies toward an external enemy; among them is repelling actual or expected aggression against Muslims or their lands; and among them is liberating lands and peoples from tyrants and oppressors. However, all these objectives achieved by Jihad are fruits produced by it, whether or not they were intended by those who entered the path of Jihad or those who prompted others to it. These are outcomes that are generated automatically as a result of fulfilling this obligation—the obligation of Jihad—regardless of whether they were observed or not. They are not the motive for Jihad, which has been established as the propagation of Islam and the application of its system upon the people. Here a question may arise: Since those results achieved by Jihad are fruits that are generated whether intended or not, why are they referenced? As we saw in the sermon of Khalid ibn al-Walid, enticing the Mujahideen with the lands of the Ajam (non-Arabs) due to their abundant wealth; and as we saw in the words of Umar ibn al-Khattab, alerting people to the difficulty of life in their lands in the Hijaz, and alluring them with the comfort and prosperity of life in the vast lands of Allah under the control of other nations? Furthermore, if Khalid ibn al-Walid’s enticing with the lands of the Ajam, or Umar ibn al-Khattab’s pointing out the prosperity in the lands of other nations is merely a matter of 'obtaining what is already obtained'—that is, drawing attention to things that will happen regardless of intent—then is the enticement of the Yemeni tribe of 'Bajila' by granting them a quarter of the fifth of the spoils that would result from fighting on the Persian front, in addition to their prescribed right like others, also of this nature? Does this additional reward (tanfil) not constitute an economic motive for this tribe, pushing them toward Jihad? ¶

The answer is as follows: ¶

First: Regarding the reference to the material benefits that result from performing religious duties, such a reference is a well-known matter in Shariah. It is part of explaining that Islamic rulings achieve people’s legitimate interests, satisfy their natural needs, and do not conflict with those interests or needs. For a Muslim, this reference represents "a motivation for compliance and is closer to the acceptance of the rulings"(1). This is as stated in the Hadith: "Whoever wishes for his life to be extended, his provision to be increased, and for him to be protected from a bad death, let him fear Allah and uphold family ties"(2). Thus, blessing in life—expressed as an increase in the lifespan—expansion in provision, and protection from a bad death are things desired by the human soul. Therefore, mentioning them in the context of urging the upholding of family ties is to show that what a human naturally desires has been guaranteed by the Shariah through adherence to its rulings. ¶

Second: Regarding the granting of extra spoils (tanfil) to certain mujahideen from whom good performance is expected, this is also a legitimate matter. It is a form of material reward for performing what is required by Shariah. The principle of reward and punishment for adhering to what is required and avoiding what is forbidden is one of the established rules in religious, rational, social, educational, and military contexts, which no one denies. However, no one claims that reward and punishment are the underlying motive for ordering what is required and prohibiting what is forbidden; because there are specific purposes and interests that the Lawgiver (al-Shari') intended behind what He commanded and prohibited, and the matter we are addressing belongs to this category. ¶

In summary, the crux of this second fact we are discussing is that the motive for Jihad is one thing, and benefiting from Jihad to achieve other purposes—other than the original purpose which is the true motive for Jihad—is something else. It is not permissible to confuse what constitutes the motive for an action with the fruits generated by performing that action. ¶

The Third Fact: It is that the motive behind any activity carried out by the state is the purpose the state itself intends to achieve. Thus, if the state employs elements of the people to perform that activity, and their motive for participating is different from the motive that prompted the state to undertake it, then it is correct to assert that the motive for that activity is the state's own motive, not the motive of those individuals. This is as if, for example, the Islamic state employed non-Muslim elements in fighting enemies, as we previously discussed in the first issue. The motive of those elements for fighting, as we saw, is exemption from financial obligations or removing the sense of humiliation they feel when paying the jizya. Thus, they participate in the military activity with the motive of being exempted from the jizya and maintaining their dignity in their own eyes. ¶

But is this the state’s motive in managing the movement of Jihad and seeking the assistance of those elements in energizing its movement? ¶

Furthermore, in light of these three facts, we can evaluate the motives mentioned by Islamic writers, through which they explained the movement of Jihad and the Islamic conquests. ¶

1 - The Economic Motive: - It is possible that this motive is behind the fighting activities for non-Muslims who fight under the banner of the Islamic state, because they are not engaged in fighting for the sake of carrying the Islamic call and exalting the word of Allah Almighty. - It is possible that this motive is observed alongside the motive of carrying the Islamic call for some Muslim mujahideen—and there is no harm in that—as was detailed in the first chapter in the discussion on fighting for the sake of obtaining wealth. - However, for other Muslims, this economic motive is merely one of the fruits of Jihad. If realized, it represents one of the manifestations of the support of Islam and the exaltation of the word of Allah Almighty. Therefore, this fruit is desirable in this respect, without the soul being attached to it in a way that distracts it from the true motive behind undertaking Jihad. This is expressed by the statement of 'Ubada ibn al-Samit to the Muqawqis: "We did not fight those who fought Allah out of a desire for the world, nor out of a need for its abundance, but that Allah..." (p. 564) ¶

The Almighty has made this permissible for us and has rendered what we have acquired from it as lawful (1). ¶

Furthermore, this was the high standard of the Muslims: their deepest desire was for their enemies to enter Islam, after which they would seek no booty or benefit from the hardships and sacrifices of jihad. Proof of this is the statement of the Muslim delegation to Rustum shortly before the Battle of Qadisiyyah: 'By Allah, your conversion to Islam is dearer to us than your spoils of war' (2). ¶

As for the Islamic State, it never occurred during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate—which is the scope of our research—that it initiated a war against its enemies with the primary motivation being the attainment of material interests. Yes, economic benefits might be observed as one of the fruits of jihad, as mentioned above, but not as the true motive that explains the movement of jihad and conquest. Economic benefits are also considered a means of pressuring the enemy, known as 'economic warfare,' which ultimately serves the true purpose of jihad. Moreover, the fact that inviting non-Muslims to Islam is the first option presented to them confirms this reality. ¶

2- The Political Motive: That is, diverting the Arab tribes from their ancient vendettas by directing them towards fighting the enemies. This motive also cannot be considered the primary driver that explains the movement of jihad and conquest that took place during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. This is evidenced by the fact that Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, may Allah be pleased with him, issued an order to the commanders of the Islamic armies not to seek assistance from any Muslim who had previously apostatized from Islam (3). Even though the era of the Caliphate under Abu Bakr was in the greatest need of occupying those tribes—who had apostatized and then returned to Islam—in jihad on the borders of the Islamic State, to forestall any trouble they might cause against the authority in terms of disturbing security or destabilizing the internal situation. ¶

Despite this, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq prohibited those tribes from participating in jihad, thereby achieving two objectives: First: He made it clear to the Muslims and the former apostates that jihad is an honor not deserved by those whose records were stained by previous apostasy. By depriving them of jihad, he presented it as a form of punishment. This served to motivate those who had previously apostatized to sincerely repent so that they could again become eligible to march in the caravans of the mujahideen. Second: He presented pure Islamic models to non-Islamic peoples on the battlefronts to provide a luminous image of Islam, thereby encouraging the peoples of those fronts to embrace this religion. This does not mean that the Islamic state is not permitted to open the door of jihad to certain elements of fighters who might be feared to negatively impact the internal situation if their combat energies are not directed toward the battlefronts. The decision on this matter rests with the authority, based on a consideration of all factors. Often, engaging sectors of the military and leadership on the front lines is the best remedy for the waywardness of the deviant, the best investment of their energies, and the most beneficial for them, for Islam, and for the Muslims. This is because nature abhors a vacuum; whoever is not occupied with the truth will be occupied with falsehood. Creating opportunities for people to be occupied with the truth is one of the matters that the state must prioritize. Hence, Umar ibn al-Khattab dispatched four thousand fighters, all from the 'Akk' tribe—which was among the Yemeni tribes that had initially defected after the death of the Prophet (PBUH)—to Egypt under the command of 'Amr ibn al-'As for its conquest (1). In reality, the consideration of such political remedies during times of tribulation and unrest was never far from the minds of the officials during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate. For when the opposition began to pressure the government with its demands during the era of Uthman ibn Affan (may Allah be pleased with him)... (1) Al-Nujum al-Zahira: 5/1 and Tarikh al-Tabari: 3/320. ¶

And observing the agitation among the people, Uthman gathered his advisors and said to them: 'Every person has ministers and well-wishers, and you are my ministers, my well-wishers, and those I trust. You have seen what the people have done, so exercise your judgment and advise me!' Abdullah bin Amir said: 'My opinion for you, O Commander of the Faithful, is that you command them to a jihad that will occupy them away from you!' (1). ¶

Yes! Resorting to such a remedy might be a solution to some problems at certain times, but it retains the character of a temporary remedy, as is the nature of such measures in general. ¶

Accordingly, it does not constitute a motive that can explain the movement of jihad and conquest. In contrast, the propagation of the Islamic call was a motive that possessed a permanent nature, which makes it correct to describe it as the true motive for the movement of jihad and Islamic conquests. ¶

3 - The Preventive and Defensive Motive: Dr. Akram Diya al-Umari accuses those who interpret the movement of jihad and Islamic conquest through this motive—and they are, as he says, most contemporary Arab and Muslim historians—of resorting to this interpretation due to their susceptibility to intellectual invasion and their lack of understanding of the reality of 'jihad'. ¶

The summary of his argument is: That Western civilization spread pacifist concepts and established international institutions concerned with reconciling the conflicting interests of states in order to establish international peace and replace wars with negotiations and dialogue for problem-solving. This generated a hatred for war among people due to its negative effects. Orientalist studies insisted on the idea of linking jihad with imposing the Islamic creed on people by force, and they obscured the reality of jihad with this deception. ¶

(1) Tarikh al-Tabari: 4/333. ¶

Here, educated Muslims felt a contradiction between Jihad—as portrayed to them by Orientalists—and Western civilization with its slogans of peace. Faced with this contradiction, and from a position of feeling weak before the West and its civilization, those educated Muslims set out to justify everything in Islam that conflicted with Western civilization and its concepts. They emerged before the people with this interpretation of the conquest movement: 'The movement of conquest is defensive in nature, and it utilized offense to defend the Islamic state against its powerful adversaries.' This is the impact of intellectual invasion, including the distortion of the concept of Jihad, in interpreting the Islamic conquest movement as being defensive, including preemptive war. Then, Dr. Al-Umari clarifies that the lack of understanding of the true nature of Jihad among those educated Muslims who succumbed to intellectual invasion was one of the factors leading to this interpretation of the conquest movement. He determines that 'Jihad does not aim at all to impose creed upon people, but rather aims to remove the obstacles to the spread of Islam on earth, whether by weakening contemporary political powers or eliminating them, so that Muslims may achieve supremacy on earth and the trial (fitna) that prevents anyone from embracing Islam ceases to exist wherever it may be.' This is the summary of what Dr. Al-Umari stated in his criticism of those who hold that the defensive motive—responding to actual or expected aggression—is the motive that lay behind the declaration of Jihad on all fronts, and is the motive by which the Islamic conquest movement is explained. It is also worth noting that Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani had previously established in his pamphlet on Jihad—referred to by Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali in the second discussion of this chapter—what Dr. Al-Umari later adopted in this regard. In the book 'International Relations in the Quran and Sunnah,' it is narrated from Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani what he said in the Jihad pamphlet: 'This is the origin of the emergence of the idea that Jihad is a defensive war.' ¶

(An attack by Orientalists to vilify the ruling of Jihad, and a defense by Muslims that Jihad is merely a defensive war. We have no evidence to suggest that this defense by Muslims was planted among them by the West for them to adopt. However, we do not rule out that some Orientalists, during their ideological onslaught, may have planted this under the guise of trying to be fair to Islam, and the Muslims were deceived by it. This is because Orientalists, in their cultural invasion, divide themselves into two camps: one that attacks Islam, and one that defends it under the pretext of impartiality. Thus, it is not unlikely that some Orientalists articulated this view and Muslims imitated them. In any case, this concept, whether it was planted among the Muslims or originated by them, did not exist before the campaign of cultural invasion. ¶

This is what is stated in the book 'International Relations' in its citation of what Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani said. Similarly, in 'Fiqh al-Sirah' by Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, there is confirmation of what Sheikh al-Nabhani decided regarding this matter. 'Fiqh al-Sirah' states: 'Fallacies have infiltrated the concept of Jihad from many Orientalists... These fallacies have proceeded through two paths: The first path: Claiming that Islam did not spread except by the sword, and that the Prophet and his companions used coercion, making the Islamic conquests ones of tyranny and oppression, not of culture and intellect. The second path: ... its proponents claim that Islam is a religion of love and peace, and that Jihad is only legislated to repel the evil of aggression... They first spread the rumor that Islam is a religion of violence... then they waited until this rumor bore fruit in the reactions of Muslims and their rejection of this injustice against Islam. While the Muslims were seeking to refute this falsehood, some of those very skeptics arose to fabricate a defense of Islam... refuting the accusations by saying: ... Islam is only a religion of love and peace, and Jihad is not legislated in it except for the necessity of repelling imminent aggression... Thus, the simple-minded [Muslims] applauded...' ¶

Muslims prepared for this defense for a long time, and so they began to support and confirm that Islam is indeed, as they claimed: a religion of peace and reconciliation, having no business with others unless they infiltrate its home and attack it! These simple-minded people failed to realize that this is exactly the conclusion that those who propagated the first rumor and spread the second falsehood intended to attach to Islam... (1). ¶

This is what is stated in 'Fiqh al-Sirah' by Dr. al-Buti, which confirms what was stated in the book 'International Relations' regarding this issue, as cited from Sheikh al-Nabhani in his publication on Jihad which he issued in the early sixties. Having said that, what is our opinion on this matter? ¶

I say: Given that the research we are engaged in addresses the motives behind the declaration of Jihad on all fronts during the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphate, meaning the interpretation of the Islamic conquest movement in the early history of Muslims—due to this, we resorted in the first issue of this research to presenting sufficient representations of the responsible statements, official negotiations, and treaties that took place between Muslims and others while they were in the midst of the Jihad movement; so that we may derive from them the opinions we issue regarding this matter. Upon referring to these representations and specific excerpts, we observe the following: ¶

A - The states neighboring the Islamic State did not actually launch an attack on the Islamic State that would have necessitated the Islamic armies to respond with a counter-attack under the pretext of defense against this type of aggression. ¶

B - On the other hand, these neighboring states had been in a state of war with the Islamic State since the time of the Prophet (PBUH). These states were the ones that initiated and declared war on the Islamic State, and no treaty of reconciliation was concluded between the Muslims and those states that would have ended the previous state of war. ¶

The detail of this is: The Romans had previously declared war on the Islamic State since the time of the Prophet (PBUH), as mentioned earlier, and this allows the Islamic State to initiate combat against the Romans in all of their provinces, if we adopt the logic of defense, which includes offensive defense. Furthermore, Syria and Egypt were [under Roman influence]... ¶

(1) Fiqh al-Sirah: Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, pp. 151-152. ¶

And North Africa up to the Atlantic Ocean—all of it was among the provinces subject to the Romans, just as 'Cyprus' was also under Roman influence and paid tribute to them. ¶

Likewise, the Persian Empire had previously declared war on the Islamic State during the time of the Prophet (ﷺ), as previously mentioned. This allows the Islamic State to initiate combat against the Persians in all provinces subject to them, adopting the logic of defense, as explained earlier. Furthermore, the eastern regions of the north—where 'Azerbaijan', 'Armenia', and their surroundings exist—to the south—where the regions of what was called the 'Sea of Persia' (i.e., the Arabian Gulf) are found—all those regions were provinces subject to the Persians. This fact allowed the Islamic State to wage war against them according to the aforementioned logic. ¶

C - However, we have not observed in the images and excerpts that recorded what was happening on the battlefronts that the Muslims indicated their reliance on the state of war that Persia and Rome had previously declared against the Islamic State when declaring Jihad against Persia and Rome on all fronts. ¶

Questions were explicitly directed by officials of non-Muslim states to the Muslim officials: 'What has brought you here?' ¶

The answer was not: 'You are the ones who started by declaring a state of war against us, the Muslims, and we are merely countering that with a defensive attack,' or anything conveying this meaning, directly or indirectly. Rather, the answer was as it appears in the History of al-Tabari, where the Persian commander 'Rustam' asked 'Rib'i ibn 'Amir': 'What brought you here?' Rib'i ibn 'Amir replied to him in the following words: 'Allah has commissioned us, and Allah has brought us here to bring whomever He wills out of the worship of servants into the worship of Allah, out of the narrowness of the world into its vastness, and out of the tyranny of religions into the justice of Islam. So He sent us with His religion to His creation to invite them to it. Whoever accepts that from us, we accept it from him and return from him, leaving him and his land for him to manage. And whoever refuses, we will fight them forever until we reach the promise of Allah.' (1) ¶

... Then he presented the three options to him. ¶

(1) Tarikh al-Tabari: 3/520. ¶

Thus, it becomes clear that the driving force behind the declaration of Jihad during the era of the Rashidun in all directions was indeed carrying Islam to the nations, not responding to an actual or expected aggression! ¶

D - It may be said: Yes, carrying Islam was the original motive for the movement of Jihad and conquest, but there must exist a state of war between Muslims and others beforehand, and it must be the non-Muslims who initiate and declare a state of war against the Muslims. This situation subsequently justifies the Muslims responding to the state of war declared against them with Jihad and conquest, according to the logic of offensive defense mentioned earlier. ¶

It is possible to cite the reality of the state of war initiated by Persia and Byzantium (Rome) against the Islamic State as support for this argument. ¶

Persia and Byzantium resorted to initiating a declaration of war against the Islamic State in response to Islamic activity, which, in the case of Byzantium, was represented by the conversion to Islam of some Arab subjects and commanders belonging to the Roman Empire. For Persia, this Islamic activity was represented by the letter the Prophet ﷺ sent to 'Chosroes' (Kisra), inviting him to Islam! ¶

Based on this, it may be said: Before mobilizing armies for Jihad towards any state, there must be Islamic activity within that state. This may lead to ideological conflict, then political conflict, and the existence of what is called a state of 'Cold War', and tension in relations between the two states, which might prompt the state of disbelief to assault Muslims, whether they are its own subjects or others. This would constitute a declaration of war by that state against the Muslims, thereby justifying for the Islamic State, thereafter, to respond to that state which assaulted the Muslims by declaring Jihad against it. ¶

The answer to this is that this statement is correct in its general sense. Inviting nations and states to Islam so they may enter it, or accept the implementation of the Islamic system upon them even if they do not enter it—this invitation, which is religiously mandatory (wajib shar'an), along with preparing power to support it, is sufficient to lead to the creation of the aforementioned state. ¶

towards it, which the proponents of this view emphasize is necessary before initiating the declaration of jihad against states that reject this call and commit aggression against the Muslims who carry it. ¶

However, in any case, this will not be of much benefit to the proponents of the logic of 'preventive war' or 'offensive defense' in order to apply this logic to the situation at hand. For this situation—which is intended to be created and then used as a pretext for declaring jihad—would be considered, from the perspective of the opponents who also subscribe to the theory of offensive defense, as an initiation of a state of war by the Islamic state itself against the state to which the call was carried. This is because it constitutes interference in the internal affairs of other states by broadcasting Islamic thought within them, which conflicts with the ideology upon which the regime in those states is based. It is only natural that such states would resort to striking at every thought that threatens their ideology and system, just as the Islamic state itself resorts to striking at every thought that contradicts Islamic thought which others might propagate within it. ¶

Therefore, the claim that it is necessary for other states to be the ones to initiate the declaration of war against Muslims so that it may serve as a justification for Muslims to mobilize armies for jihad against those states under the pretext of offensive defense—this claim will not avail its proponents before those who use the same logic to prove that the Islamic state is the one that initiated the declaration of war against them, whether under the pretext of the Islamic state’s interference in the affairs of other countries when it broadcasts the Islamic thought that conflicts with the prevailing thought and the ruling system in those countries. ¶

Or, if those states themselves broadcast their ideas into the Islamic state, the latter would resort to striking at those ideas, considering them ideas of kufr (disbelief), standing against them, and punishing their proponents. This is something that other states could consider an initiation of a state of war by the Islamic state against them, just as the Islamic state would consider it so if its own da'wah (call) were met with the same treatment it accords to other calls. ¶

Hence, I say: The argument that it is necessary for other states to be the ones to initiate the declaration of war against Muslims so that Muslims may use it as a pretext to declare jihad against them under the plea of defense... ¶

Regarding offensive jihad—as previously detailed—this argument will not serve its proponents much, because adversaries will use the same weapon to confront the Muslims, as has been noted. ¶

As for relying on the historical reality of the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate—that Muslims only declared jihad on fronts that had initiated a state of war against them (even if only from the Muslims' perspective), and that those fronts were all dependencies of Persia or Rome—as previously explained. ¶

I say: Reliance on this reality is invalidated by the accounts and excerpts that recorded the state of the battlefronts, which we presented in the first issue. Some of these indicate that there was no necessity for a pre-existing state of war initiated by the disbelievers against the Muslims in order for it to be a justification for launching jihad against them and presenting the three options to them. ¶

We will not repeat those accounts and excerpts, as they have already been presented; rather, we will suffice with pointing to them and their implications. ¶

Among those instances is that when Khalid bin al-Walid marched to the Persian front in Iraq and advanced towards al-Hira, the leaders of al-Hira came out to receive him, not desiring war. It is true that al-Hira was a dependency of the Persian state, which was in a state of war with the Muslims, and therefore al-Hira was also technically in a state of war with the Muslims. However, the emergence of the leaders of al-Hira—according to the account previously cited from the History of al-Tabari—to meet Khalid bin al-Walid in a peaceful manner is considered equivalent to their declaration of secession from the Persian state. Consequently, there was no state of war existing between them and the Muslims. ¶

Abd al-Masih, one of the leaders of al-Hira, clearly stated the position of his city regarding peace and war when Khalid asked him: 'Are you for peace or for war?' Abd al-Masih replied: 'Rather, for peace.' (1) Nevertheless, Khalid presented to him and the people of al-Hira the three options: Islam, jizya, or war. This indicates that it is not necessary for other lands to be in a state of war with the Muslims in order for the Muslims to launch jihad against them if they do not accept Islam or submit to the Islamic order. ¶

Another example pertinent to our discussion is the letter written by Khalid ibn al-Walid to the Persian kings: 'Accept our cause (Islam), and we shall leave you and your lands, and pass through you to others' (1). ¶

In this scenario—even if we were to argue that a state of war previously existed with the Persian kings, and that it was because of this state of war that the Muslims mobilized armies against them and offered them the three options—what of the nations and peoples behind the Persian kings that Khalid intends to reach by passing through Persian territory? Beyond the lands subject to the Persian kings, there were only the lands of the Afghans, and then China; nations we have never heard had any prior contact with the Muslims, let alone attacked them or declared a state of war against them! ¶

Despite this, Khalid ibn al-Walid intended, had the Persian kings accepted Islam or submitted to the Muslims, to pass directly through them to reach those nations and peoples beyond them in order to offer them the three options, as was his practice on every combat front. ¶

This proves that it is not necessary for a state of war to have existed—initiated by other states against the Muslims—for the Muslims to direct armies toward them and present them with the three options. ¶

A third example pertinent to our discussion is the land of Nubia, in the south of Egypt. It does not appear to have been a province subject to the Romans, like Egypt and North Africa, for it to be said that it was, by extension, in a state of war with the Islamic State. Furthermore, the land of Nubia did not initiate aggression against the Muslims, nor did it declare war on them. ¶

Nevertheless, the Muslims directed their military operations toward it. When the Muslims realized their inability to bring it under Islamic rule, or that doing so would require the sacrifice of significant forces—which would weaken the Muslims on that front and lead to great harm to them, to the Da'wah (call to Islam), and to the Islamic State—the governor of Islamic Egypt concluded a peace treaty with the leaders of Nubia. This treaty stipulated the exchange of gifts between the two sides, symbolizing the confirmation of a state of peace. ¶

And its continuity follows the same manner as previously presented in the first issue (1). ¶

In this instance, there is evidence that there is no necessity for a pre-existing state of war initiated by other lands against Muslims in order to declare Jihad against those lands. ¶

Thus, we conclude our discussion on the preventive and defensive motive that was claimed to be behind the declaration of Jihad on all fronts during the era of the Rashidun Caliphate. We now move to the discussion of a new motive. ¶

4 - The Humanitarian Motive: This is represented, as previously explained, in liberating oppressed peoples from the injustice of their tyrannical rulers, whether those rulers were from the local population or foreigners. ¶

I say: This motive does not constitute a separate motive from that of conveying the Islamic call (Da'wah) and implementing the Islamic system in the lands toward which the armies of Jihad were directed. ¶

This is because Islam itself, when oppressed peoples enter it or submit to its system (even if they do not convert), liberates them from the injustice of their tyrannical rulers, whether those rulers are from the local population or otherwise. ¶

Therefore, this humanitarian motive that prompts Muslims to liberate peoples from injustice and oppression is a fruit of the motive of conveying the Islamic call, which moves the Mujahideen to dismantle systems of tyranny and eliminate the symbols of oppression. ¶

Or as Rib'i ibn Amir (may Allah be pleased with him) said: 'Allah has brought us to bring whom He wills from the worship of servants to the worship of Allah, from the narrowness of this world to its vastness, and from the injustice of (other) religions to the justice of Islam.' (2) ¶

5 - The Liberating Motive: This motive is seen—as it is claimed—in the recovery of Arab lands and their liberation from Persian and Roman occupation. ¶

I say: Those who advocate this motive as being behind the movement of Jihad and conquest that was launched during the era of the Rashidun Caliphate—it appears that they, whether knowingly or... ¶

They are unaware, influenced by modern nationalist concepts in interpreting the movement of jihad and conquest which we are currently examining. There are several points that refute the notion that this motive (nationalism) was the driver behind the jihad campaigns declared during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs: - Firstly, the Muslims did not stop at the borders of the Arab lands they had liberated from Roman or Persian rule, such as the frontiers of Iraq and Syria. Rather, they advanced beyond that until they brought the entirety of Persia under Islamic rule. - Secondly, Egypt and the countries of North Africa were not Arab lands such that one could say: liberating them from Roman control and influence was merely the liberation of Arab lands from foreign occupation. - Thirdly, after the Muslims liberated the Arab territories occupied by foreigners, they did not expel these foreigners from the land. Instead, they gave them the choice to either remain in the country under Islamic rule—on equal footing with the Arab inhabitants—or to depart wherever they wished. In the treaty of peace written by Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah for the people of Baalbek, it is stated: 'In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. This is a document of security for so-and-so, and for the people of Baalbek—their Romans, Persians, and Arabs—regarding their lives, their wealth, their churches, and their homes, both inside and outside the city. The Romans are permitted to graze their livestock within a radius of fifteen miles, provided they do not settle in any populated village. Once the months of Rabi’ al-Awwal and Jumada al-Ula pass, they may depart wherever they wish. Whoever among them accepts Islam shall have the same rights and obligations as we do. Their merchants are permitted to travel wherever they wish within the territories with which we have made peace, and those who remain shall be subject to the jizya (poll tax) and kharaj (land tax). Allah is witness, and sufficient is Allah as a witness.'(1) I say: This indicates that the claim that the motive of liberating Arab lands from foreigners was the driving force behind the movement of jihad and conquest during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs is merely a byproduct of the nationalist concepts that have prevailed in this era. (1) Sayf Allah Khalid ibn al-Walid: by Umar Rida Kahhala, pp. 177–178. ¶

One of the proofs of the invalidity of this claim is that there is no prohibition in Islam against authority in Arab lands occupied by foreigners remaining in the hands of those same foreigners, provided they declare their Islam, join the Muslims, and sever ties with their motherland—as long as they are fit for it. This occurred during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) regarding Arab Yemen, which was under Persian occupation; the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) maintained the authority of Yemen in the hands of its Persian governor, 'Badhan,' after he embraced Islam (1). This confirms that the nationalist motive had no role in the movement of jihad and conquest during the early history of the Muslims. ¶

Finally, we conclude from the discussion of the motives proposed as being behind the declaration of jihad in the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the following: ¶

1. The primary and true motive behind the jihad movement in the era we are discussing is the motive of carrying the Islamic call (Da'wah). Other motives were either fruits of this primary motive, purposes that were permissible to pursue alongside carrying the Islamic Da'wah, or rejected motives, as detailed previously. ¶

2. We also conclude from this research that the declaration of jihad during the Rashidun era for the sake of carrying the Islamic Da'wah may have been preceded by a state of war initiated by the disbelievers against the Muslims, as happened on most fronts. ¶

- It may also not have been preceded by such a state of war; rather, the Muslims would initiate the carrying of the Da'wah to the people of other lands and offer them the three choices, as occurred on some fronts. ¶

3. We also conclude from this research that the Sahaba, while carrying the Islamic Da'wah and deploying armies for jihad, took different stances toward other lands according to what the interests of the Islamic Da'wah and the Islamic State dictated, depending on the varying circumstances and conditions. ¶

- Some lands they would bring under the Islamic system through peace or force, incorporating them into the Islamic State—as was the predominant practice. ¶

(1) See: Tarikh al-Tabari: 656/2. ¶

• With some countries, they would conclude an external peace treaty on the condition that they pay a specified jizya (tribute) to the Islamic State. • In some countries, they shared influence with their enemies, so the country would pay jizya to both them and their enemies. • With some countries, they would conclude a treaty of peace and good neighborliness based on the equality expressed through mutual 'muhada'ah' (peaceful pacts) between the two sides—as was the case with the land of Nubia in southern Egypt. Now, the motive behind adopting these various stances regarding all the countries that the armies of Jihad entered or reached the gates of was purely to convey the Islamic Dawah (call), provide protection for it, and utilize all possible means to spread it throughout the world. This was done while taking into account the power available to the Islamic State—or the power that could be mustered—relative to the forces confronting it, so that adopting any particular stance would result in neither negligence in the cause of the Dawah (when the path is open, conditions are favorable, and strength is available!), nor recklessness (when the path is blocked, conditions are adverse, strength is insufficient, or the losses and sacrifices are beyond the limit of endurance). The conduct of the Sahaba (Companions) during the Rashidun era, in their Jihad movement on all fronts, demonstrated that they were of the utmost sincerity, courage, and sound judgment in their warfare when they fought, and in their peace-making when they reconciled. Thus, Allah blessed their progress and granted them victory over their enemies. May Allah be pleased with them, and may He make us seek light from the same light they were guided by, so that we may walk the path they walked and achieve what they achieved! With this, we conclude the fourth and final section of this second chapter of the second part of this treatise, and we now proceed toward the third chapter with the help and guidance of Allah. ¶

In this book, you will find information on the following topics: Part One: Islamic Creed and its introduction. Part Two: Exposition of acts of worship (Salah, Fasting, Zakah, Hajj). Part Three: Ethics and social etiquette. Part Four: Glimpses into Islamic history. Studying this book will acquaint you with the fundamental teachings of the upright religion (Deen al-Mateen) and will become a source of positive change in your life. In every section of the book, rulings and issues have been discussed in the light of the Quran and Sunnah. ¶