Chapter 7

And the opinion of al-Husayn ibn Ali, the opinion of Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, and all those among the Companions (Sahaba) and the Successors (Tabi'in) who rose up after the Battle of al-Harrah. ¶

It is clear that these various positions regarding a deviant ruler are limited to those whose deviance did not reach the level of 'open disbelief' (kufr al-bawwah) or similar acts. We continue to examine the opinions of the classical jurists on this subject and state: ¶

- It is stated in al-Nawawi's Sharh Sahih Muslim: 'As for rebelling against them - meaning the rulers - it is prohibited by the consensus (ijma) of the Muslims, even if they are immoral (fasiq) and oppressive (zalim), and the hadiths have consistently supported the meaning of what I have mentioned.' ¶

Then, al-Nawawi quotes Qadi Iyad's opinion regarding the appointment of an immoral person as a leader: 'He (Qadi Iyad) said: It is not valid to appoint an immoral person from the outset. If immorality (fisq) occurs in the Caliph later, some have said: It is mandatory to remove him, provided that it does not lead to civil strife (fitna) and war.' ¶

Most of the Ahl al-Sunnah, including jurists, hadith scholars, and theologians, hold that he is not removed due to immorality, oppression, or the neglect of rights. He should not be ousted, and rebellion against him on these grounds is not permissible. Rather, it is mandatory to counsel and warn him, in accordance with the hadiths narrated in this regard. Qadi Iyad said: Abu Bakr ibn Mujahid claimed a consensus (ijma) on this, but some have refuted this by pointing to the uprising of al-Husayn, Ibn al-Zubayr, and the people of Medina against the Umayyads, and the uprising of a great group of the Successors and those of the first generation against al-Hajjaj alongside Ibn al-Ash'ath. Then he said: 'The argument of the majority is that their uprising against al-Hajjaj was not merely due to immorality, but because he had altered the Shariah.' ¶

As for matters related to open disbelief (kufr al-bawwah) and the like, it is stated in al-Nawawi's Sharh Sahih Muslim: 'Qadi Iyad said: The scholars have reached a consensus that the Imamate (leadership) cannot be established for a disbeliever, and that if disbelief (kufr) is found in him (after taking office), he is dismissed. He said: The same applies if he stops establishing prayers and inviting people to them.' ¶

The Judge: If kufr (disbelief) occurs, or a change in the Shariah, or bid’ah (innovation) is committed, the ruler exits the status of wilayah (authority), his obedience ceases to be mandatory, and it becomes obligatory upon the Muslims to rise against him, depose him, and appoint a just Imam if that is possible.” (1) ¶

In the book *Dalil al-Falihin Sharh Riyad al-Salihin*, while explaining the Hadith: “...and that we do not dispute the matter [of authority] with its people, unless you see clear kufr regarding which you have proof from Allah.” It states: “The author—i.e., al-Nawawi, the author of Riyad al-Salihin—said: What is meant by kufr here is acts of disobedience... Al-Qurtubi interpreted kufr in its literal sense, saying: Its meaning is: unless you see kufr regarding which you have proof from Allah. That is, a proof and clear evidence, a matter about which there is no doubt, from which certainty is obtained that it is kufr; only then does it become obligatory to depose the one to whom the pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) was given, end quote.” (2) ¶

It also states therein, while explaining the Hadith: “...They asked: O Messenger of Allah! Shall we not fight them? He replied: No, as long as they establish prayer among you.” It says: “He only forbade fighting them for the duration they establish prayer, which is the symbol of Islam and the differentiator between kufr and Islam, to avoid stirring up fitnah (civil strife), creating disunity, and other matters that would be more harmful than enduring their reprehensible actions and the damage resulting from what they commit.” (3) ¶

In *Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari* by Hafiz Ibn Hajar, several narrations of the Hadith are mentioned: “...unless you see clear (bawahan) kufr, regarding which you have proof from Allah.” Among them are the narrations: “kufran barahan,” “kufran surahan,” “unless it is an act of disobedience to Allah that is blatant (bawahan),” and “as long as they do not command you to commit a blatant (bawahan) sin.” (4) All these different terms: “bawahan,” “barahan,” and “surahan” have the same or similar meaning, which is manifestness, clarity, and publicity. Ibn Hajar explains the word “burhan” by saying: “That is, a textual verse or an authentic report that does not admit any interpretation.” (5)... He then says: “And what appears to me is to interpret the narration of kufr as applying when the dispute is over authority, so he does not dispute him in a way that undermines that authority.” ¶

Except if he commits kufr (disbelief), and the narration concerning disobedience is interpreted as applying to disputes other than those involving wilaya (governance). If he does not compromise the wilaya, one should dispute with him regarding the disobedience by admonishing him gently and attempting to establish the truth without violence. This applies if one is capable. And Allah knows best. Ibn al-Tin quotes al-Dawudi as saying: The consensus of scholars regarding tyrannical rulers is that if it is possible to remove them without fitna (civil strife) or injustice, it is obligatory! Otherwise, patience is mandatory. ¶

According to some: It is not permissible to contract the wilaya to a fasiq (sinner) initially. If he introduces tyranny after having been just, there is a difference of opinion regarding the permissibility of revolting (khuruj) against him. The correct view is that it is prohibited, unless he commits kufr, in which case revolting against him becomes obligatory.(1) ¶

This is a summary of the views of the classical jurists on the issue of revolution against a deviant ruler, whether the deviation is less than clear kufr (kufr bawwah) or has reached the level of clear kufr. The opinions of the classical jurists are centered on three positions: ¶

- The view that armed revolution is obligatory against every form of deviation by the ruler, whether it constitutes kufr or less. - The view that the obligation to revolt is limited to the manifestation of clear kufr and the like, while obedience is mandatory regarding lesser deviations, and it is prohibited to revolt against the ruler on those grounds. - The view that it is permissible to revolt regarding deviations less than clear kufr, based on the argument that some Sahaba (Companions) did not participate in the revolution against tyrants, yet they did not condemn those who did revolt.(2) This is the position of the classical jurists, so what is the view of contemporary thinkers regarding this issue? ¶

- The author of 'Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu' mentions the opinion of 'al-Dahlawi' regarding the obligation to fight the Caliph if he becomes a kafir by denying a necessity of the religion; fighting him at that time is part of Jihad in the way of Allah, and if he does not become a kafir, he is not to be fought.(3) ¶

(1) Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari 8/13. (2) Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah by Siddiq ibn Hasan al-Qanuji al-Bukhari 520/2; and Al-Difa' al-Shar'i fi al-Fiqh al-Islami by Muhammad Sayyid Abd al-Tawwab 476. (3) Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu - Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli: 707/6. ¶

It is narrated from Muhammad Asad that if a government takes a stance that constitutes an explicit challenge to the texts of the Quran, such a position is considered 'kufr bawwah' (manifest unbelief), which necessitates stripping the authority from its hands and overthrowing it. In cases other than the declaration of manifest kufr, the removal of authority from the government should not be carried out through an armed revolution by a minority of society, because the Shariah texts have warned against this. ¶

Then, the opinion of Dr. Muhammad Yusuf Musa is mentioned, wherein he favors the view of Ibn Hazm regarding revolution against a deviant ruler, whether they manifest kufr bawwah or something less, provided that the unity of the Ummah is preserved and unnecessary bloodshed is avoided. He adds: This view is close to the position of the Mu'tazila, who obligate rebellion against the ruler when one has the power and ability to do so. ¶

In the book 'Al-Difa' al-Shar'i fi al-Fiqh al-Islami' (Legal Defense in Islamic Jurisprudence) by Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Abd al-Tawwab, it is stated that the deviations committed by those in power are divided into two categories: - Deviations that are merely a violation of Islamic Shariah, falling below the level of kufr bawwah. - Deviations that constitute a nullification of Islamic Shariah, represented by kufr bawwah and matters that carry its ruling. The nullification of Islamic Shariah or kufr bawwah and its equivalents manifests in three forms. The author attributes the first two forms to Dr. Ali Muhammad Jarisha in his book 'Al-Mashru'iyya al-Islamiyya al-'Ulya' (Supreme Islamic Legitimacy), and regarding the third form, the author opines that it should be added to the first two. These are the forms he mentioned: - The first form: Implementing law other than Islamic Shariah, evidenced by the saying of the Almighty: 'And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the disbelievers.' - The second form: Implementing some Shariah rulings in certain areas while adopting non-Shariah rulings in other areas, for which he cites the verse: 'And judge between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not...' ¶

Do not follow their desires, and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from some of what Allah has revealed to you. ¶

- The third case: The alliance of a Muslim ruler with disbelieving states to commit aggression against Muslims, and this is supported by the Almighty's saying: 'O you who have believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies, extending to them affection while they have disbelieved in what came to you of the truth.' ¶

The author of the book 'Al-Difa’ al-Shar’i fi al-Fiqh al-Islami' (Legitimate Defense in Islamic Jurisprudence) states: '... Perhaps the correct approach is to distinguish between opposing the Shariah and discarding it. One should follow the hadiths regarding obedience when it is merely a matter of violating the Shariah, and implement the hadiths regarding power and force when the Shariah is discarded and the situation reaches the level of blatant disbelief (kufr bawwah).' ¶

- In the book 'Manhaj al-‘Awda ila al-Islam' (The Method of Returning to Islam) by Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, it is stated regarding the ruler: 'However, if he commands them to commit a sin or forbids them from any of the obligatory Shariah duties, they must not obey him in that; for there is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator... Yet, his commanding the people to commit sins does not justify their uprising against him.' ¶

After reviewing the opinions of ancient jurists and contemporary Islamic writers on the issue of the legitimacy of combat against a deviant ruler, and before I present my own view, I find it necessary to discuss both the opinion of Ibn Hazm in his claim that the hadiths regarding hearing and obeying the corrupt or tyrannical ruler have been abrogated, and the opinion of the Mu'tazila and those with them regarding the obligation to fight the ruler if he becomes corrupt or unjust, based on the absolute application of the hadiths concerning enjoining good and forbidding evil. ¶

- As for Ibn Hazm’s opinion that the hadiths on obeying a corrupt or tyrannical ruler are abrogated on the grounds that they corresponded to the state of the religion before the commandment of jihad, and that the subsequent legislation of jihad abrogated this initial state, I say: This opinion appears to me to be clearly weak, because many of the hadiths... ¶

The injunction to obey the ruler, even if he is corrupt (fasiq) or oppressive (zalim), was issued only after the legislation of combat (jihad). Furthermore, the context of some of these hadiths indicates that the intent is to address future deviations by those in authority from truth and justice, and to determine what the Ummah must do regarding these deviations—in some instances requiring hearing and obedience, and in others permitting opposition (khuruj) against the ruler. ¶

It is recorded in Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah on the authority of Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman, who said: 'People used to ask the Prophet (ﷺ) about the good, but I used to ask him about the evil. I said: O Messenger of Allah! We were in this state of good, will there be any evil after it? He said: Yes. I asked: What will be the protection from it? He said: The sword. I said: O Messenger of Allah! Will there be anything left after the sword? He said: Yes, a truce (hudnah). I asked: O Messenger of Allah! And what is after the truce? He said: Callers to misguidance. If you see a Caliph, cling to him, even if he strikes your back and takes your wealth. And if there is no Caliph, then flee, even if you die while biting onto the root of a tree...' (1). ¶

It is clear from this hadith that the discussion pertains to what will occur in the future and what the Shariah ruling is in facing this reality; it does not refer to the initial state of Islam before the legislation of combat. Therefore, we state: The claim by Ibn Hazm that the hadiths regarding hearing and obeying a corrupt and oppressive ruler are abrogated is a claim unsupported by evidence. ¶

As for the opinion of the Mu'tazilah and those who agree with them regarding the obligation of fighting the ruler if he becomes corrupt or oppressive—based on the hadiths concerning enjoining good and forbidding evil—al-Shawkani refutes this view by saying: 'Those who argue for the obligation of revolting against oppressors, confronting them with the sword, and fighting them, have relied upon general texts from the Quran and Sunnah regarding the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil. There is no doubt or uncertainty that the hadiths the author has mentioned in this chapter—i.e., the hadiths on hearing and obeying the ruler even if he is corrupt or oppressive, of which we have cited many—are absolutely more specific (akhass) than those generalities (umumiyat), and they are mutawatir in meaning, as known to anyone familiar with the science of Sunnah. However, no Muslim should look down upon those from the righteous predecessors (Salaf al-Salih), from the Ahl al-Bayt (Itra) and others, who revolted against tyrannical leaders, for they did so...' ¶

(1) Musannaf Ibn Abi Shaybah: 8/15. The hadith is in Sunan Abi Dawud, no. (4244), Vol. 4/135–136. Al-Albani said: 'Hasan' [Sahih Sunan Abi Dawud], no. (3569), Vol. 3/798–799. ¶

They arrived at this through their own ijtihad, and they were more God-fearing and more obedient to the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) than many of the scholars who came after them. Some scholars, such as the Karramiyyah and those who agreed with them, were excessive in their literalism regarding the hadiths of this chapter, to the extent that they ruled that al-Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet (may Allah be pleased with him and grant him satisfaction), was a rebel against Yazid ibn Mu'awiyah—the drunkard, the debauched, and the violator of the sanctity of the purified Shariah. How strange are such statements, at which skins shudder and at whose hearing every hardened heart would shatter! The point is that the hadiths regarding hearing and obeying a sinful and oppressive ruler are specific (khass), while the hadiths regarding changing evil with the hand or repelling the oppressor through combat are general (aam). Therefore, the general hadiths are applied according to their generality except in those cases which the specific hadiths have excluded. Thus, general evidences are applied in one domain, and specific evidences in another. As the usuli scholars (jurists of legal theory) say: 'Acting upon two pieces of evidence is better than acting upon one and neglecting the other.' It is stated in books of Usul al-Fiqh regarding the arrival of evidences that appear contradictory in a single issue: 'Precedence between two evidences only occurs when it is impossible to act upon both together. If it is possible, even from some aspects, then acting upon both is mandatory. It is not permissible to give precedence to one over the other, because acting upon both is better than neglecting one, for the fundamental rule regarding evidence is its application, not its abandonment.' ¶

Following this, we mention the opinion we favor in this matter, which is that what is understood from the Shariah texts is as follows: ¶

A - The obligation of patience and the prohibition of fighting the ruler if he deviates through fisq (sin), injustice, or commanding disobedience, acting upon the hadiths we have cited extensively regarding this issue. However, there are specific cases of deviation in which fighting is legislated. Even if these do not reach the level of 'kufr bawwah' (manifest unbelief), the Lawgiver (al-Shari') has treated them as equivalent to manifest unbelief regarding the legitimacy of fighting the ruler, due to the danger the Lawgiver perceives for the Islamic society if these deviations are present. ¶

These deviations are: 1. The ruler abandoning prayer (Salah). 2. The ruler abandoning fasting (Sawm). ¶

The previous Hadith points to these two conditions, stating: '...Shall we not fight them, O Messenger of Allah? He said: No, leave them as long as they fast and pray.' (1) The implication of the Hadith is: fight them if they abandon fasting and prayer. ¶

3. The ruler failing to establish prayer within the Ummah: This state is indicated by the Hadith: '...We said: O Messenger of Allah! Shall we not then rise up against them? He said: No, as long as they establish prayer among you.' (2) The implication of the Hadith is: fight them if they do not establish prayer among you. The meaning of a ruler establishing prayer in the Ummah is to call the Ummah to prayer and hold them accountable for neglecting it, because the absence of accountability for its neglect renders the manifest call—if it exists—void of substance, a mere formality devoid of reality. In contemporary language, accountability for neglecting prayer means that the state’s penal code should include a specific punishment for it. Qadi Iyad considered the Imam’s abandonment of the call to prayer to be equivalent to the emergence of kufr (disbelief), by which he is removed from his position as Imam. (3) ¶

It does not mean that the ruler should appoint a guard or observer over every individual, waiting to pounce upon them when he finds them neglecting prayer; such a method was neither used during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) nor during the time of the Sahaba (RA). Rather, it suffices that there is no public manifestation of contempt or indifference toward this ritual of Islam among individuals or within society. ¶

4. There is a fourth state of deviation that is less than clear kufr (kufr al-bawwah), yet it carries the same ruling as clear kufr regarding the legitimacy of using armed force against the ruling authority if it becomes rampant in society: this is the state of 'Ma'siyah al-bawwah' (open disobedience). This refers to flagrant disobedience occurring openly among people that is neither challenged nor denounced. This is indicated by the narration cited by Hafiz Ibn Hajar in 'Al-Fath' regarding the Hadith of contention. ¶

Those in authority, i.e., '...and that we do not contest the matter [authority] with its people, unless you see clear, open disobedience to Allah' (1). The implication of this narration 'do not contest the matter with its people' means: fight the holders of authority if the disobedience to Allah is 'bawahan' (manifest/open). That is, it is a visible, public act which they do not confront with change or disapproval! ¶

E - There is a fifth state of deviation that carries the ruling of 'kufr bawahan' even if it is not inherently 'kufr bawahan', represented in the narration: '...as long as they do not order you with manifest sin' (1). The literal implication of this narration is the lack of legitimacy for armed conflict against the holders of authority as long as they refrain from ordering sin in a public and manifest manner. Even if they order sin and disobedience but in a hidden manner, or in a way that does not qualify as a 'manifest order' to sin, then contesting them in this situation is not permissible. ¶

However, when those in authority cast off the veil of shame from their faces and openly challenge the rulings of the Shariah, issuing orders to the people that are considered a manifest command to sin, immorality, and disobedience, the implication of this narration grants legitimacy to fighting in this situation. ¶

These five situations are cases where the Shariah texts have indicated the legitimacy of using armed force to remove the government when one of them appears. These cases do not necessarily reach the level of 'kufr bawahan' for the ruler or the system, provided they are not accompanied by anything indicating the kufr of the ruler or the ruling system. However, despite this, the Shariah texts have assigned them the ruling of 'kufr bawahan' regarding revolution against the ruler if they appear, due to their dangerous effects that threaten the Islamic society just as 'kufr bawahan' does. ¶

To clarify the difference between the immorality (fisq) of a ruler that does not permit revolution against him and the 'manifest disobedience' (ma'asiyah bawahan) that makes revolution legitimate, we provide the example of immorality occurring within the walls of the ruler's palace—such as the commission of prohibited acts and the violation of sanctity—while information about this leaks to the people without this immorality being visible and manifest to their own eyes. In this case, there is no room for revolution. ¶

However, when all of this occurs in a public ceremony, let alone when it is broadcast by audio and visual media without shame or modesty, we are facing 'manifest disobedience to Allah', even if the ruler did not attend this ceremony, but authorized it and did not denounce it. Yes! We are here facing 'manifest disobedience to Allah' for which action is taken... ¶

The Shariah texts have pointed to this in this regard. Naturally, this is after peaceful attempts at change have failed. Here we conclude paragraph 'A', in which we enumerated the forms of deviation that do not reach the level of blatant disbelief (kufr bawwah), yet they take its ruling regarding the necessity of revolting against those who commit them. ¶

B - The Shariah texts also pointed to the obligation of using armed revolt upon the appearance of blatant disbelief (kufr bawwah). This situation is evidenced by the Hadith which states: '...and that we do not dispute the command with its people, unless you see clear (blatant) disbelief regarding which you have proof from Allah'(1). ¶

The meaning of this Hadith—'dispute the command with its people'—is: fight the authorities to remove power from their hands if you see blatant disbelief about which there is no doubt. Blatant disbelief is manifested in three things: 1. Blatant disbelief by the ruler himself. 2. Blatant disbelief by individual Muslims, through apostasy from Islam without any rebuke from the ruler. 3. Blatant disbelief manifested in the ruling system—that is, the establishment of the system of government upon a foundation of disbelief, even if the ruler himself is not declared a disbeliever. ¶

1. As for the disbelief of the ruler himself, there is no issue with this; for the statements of the jurists (fuqaha) have been unanimous on the obligation of disputing [authority] in this case(2). 2. As for the implication of the aforementioned Hadith regarding dispute when blatant disbelief exists among individuals of the Muslims through apostasy from Islam without rebuke from the ruler—this is because this situation truly constitutes seeing blatant disbelief. The text of the Hadith did not restrict the existence of this disbelief to the ruler or anyone else. The only condition attached to this disbelief is that it must be 'bawwah' (blatant), meaning: apparent, widespread, and without any rebuke to stop it! - Naturally, the existence of disbelief among the Ahl al-Dhimma (protected non-Muslims) and the Musta'minin (those granted safe conduct) does not apply here, as this situation is excluded by the covenant of protection and safety. ¶

In any case, if some scholars prefer the interpretation of the Hadith as: "...unless you see—from the rulers—blatant disbelief (kufr bawwah)," then the matter is straightforward. The manifestation of blatant disbelief by individuals, while the rulers remain silent, is considered one of the forms of open disobedience mentioned in the previous paragraph. ¶

3. As for the implication of the Hadith regarding opposition when a system is established upon a creed of disbelief (kufr), it is because this Sharia text did not limit the opposition against authority solely to the disbelief of the ruler. Rather, it states: "...unless you see blatant disbelief." Seeing disbelief applies to the disbelief seen from the ruler, and it applies to the disbelief seen from those other than the ruler. It also applies to the disbelief seen in a system of government when it is established upon a creed of disbelief and is enforced upon the people. For example, if a system of government is established upon the creed that "there is no deity, and life is merely matter," and then the systems of the state and society are built upon this creed. Or, if the system of government is established upon the creed of "separating religion from life and the state," and then domestic and foreign policy are built upon the basis of this creed. ¶

Based on this, a ruler merely ordering people to commit a sin—while the system under which he governs considers it a deviation from the system—is not called disbelief, neither from the ruler nor in the system of government. However, when the ruler orders this same sin based on a system that deems it permissible and lawful—because it is founded, for example, on the creed of "separating religion from life"—then this sin is considered blatant disbelief. ¶

In other words: The state, with its systems, is considered a juridical person (shakhs ma’nawi), to which the same rulings apply as those of a natural person. ¶

A natural person is described as Muslim or Kafir based on their creed; that is, the foundation upon which their actions and their outlook on things and deeds are based. ¶

Thus, a person is a Muslim if they believe in Islam, even if they commit sins as acts of deviation. ¶

Likewise, the juridical or legal person—which in our current discussion refers to the state and its systems—is described as Islamic or Kafir based on the creed or foundation upon which it is established. Therefore, the state is Islamic... ¶

For example, if a state is established on the foundation of Islamic creed—even if deviations emerge under its shadow, as long as the foundation of the state considers these deviations illegitimate! ¶

In the case of a real person, we call such a person a 'kafir' (disbeliever), for instance, because he believes in materialism or in the separation of religion from life. If he commits acts contrary to Islam in such a state, he does not commit them as deviations that his creed disapproves of; rather, he performs them on the basis of legitimacy, built upon the creed he believes in. ¶

In fact, I would say here: that such a disbeliever—even if he adheres to all Islamic rulings in his conduct, we still judge him as a kafir; because he is not performing this adherence based on the creed that gave those Islamic rulings which he is observing. Rather, he performs this adherence perhaps out of interest, or by habit and custom, or driven by any other purpose—it does not matter. ¶

Likewise, we say in the case of a moral/juridical person, which is the state including its systems, we call such a state 'non-Islamic' if it is established on a foundation other than the Islamic creed, such as the creed of 'materialism' or the 'separation of religion from life.' If acts contrary to Islam are found under its shadow in such a situation, they do not exist there as deviations that the state's creed or system rejects; rather, they exist there as legitimate acts whose legitimacy is rooted in the creed established as the foundation for the state and the system derived from it. ¶

Furthermore, I would say here: that such a non-Islamic state—even if it adheres to Islamic rulings in many of its systems and affairs (and this is merely a hypothetical assumption, let us imagine this happening in America, for example, while its capitalist creed remains the foundation of the state)—we do not judge it as an Islamic state as long as it is based on a non-Islamic creed. This is because this adherence to Islamic rulings is not based on the Islamic creed; rather, it is based on a creed that permits the adoption of Islamic rulings just as it permits the adoption of others according to interest, and because it could be abandoned at any moment. ¶

Following this commitment to legislate new systems that contradict Islam, whose legitimacy is based on the capitalist creed which is the foundation of the state. Based on what has been presented, it becomes clear to us that 'kufr buwah' (manifest unbelief) may be observed in the governing individual, and may be observed in the governing system or the state that rules by a specific system, in view of the creed adopted by either the individual or the state. ¶

Furthermore, the Shari'ah texts have stipulated for kufr buwah, in order for it to be considered as such, that there must be definitive evidence proving it to be manifest kufr... '...unless you see manifest kufr regarding which you have proof from Allah.' And 'burhan' (proof) is the definitive evidence through which certainty is attained that it is kufr. ¶

Hence, it is not appropriate for any person or group of people to be hasty in judging the head of state or his system as having manifested kufr buwah, except with definitive evidence. ¶

Since this matter is one in which views differ, and it is among the issues of contention between the ruler and the ruled, the Shari'ah text has directed a return to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (PBUH) in this regard. Allah the Almighty says: 'O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day.' ¶

Referring to Allah and the Messenger is a referral to the speech of Allah the Almighty and the speech of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH)—that is, the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Referring to the Qur'an and the Sunnah is a referral to the authority that issues rulings based upon them; this is the referral that resolves the contention indicated by the verse. Because failing to designate an authority whose rulings everyone is bound to observe would keep the contention existing between the ruler and the Ummah. Everyone relies on Shari'ah evidences that support their own stance, as they understand it from their own perspective. This would render the verse—which commanded a referral to Allah and the Messenger that resolves contention—ineffective. Therefore, it is necessary to designate an authority to which both parties refer and whose rulings they abide by. ¶

It is well-known that the authority that issues rulings in such disputes within the Islamic state is the 'Wilayat al-Mazalim' or 'Qada al-Mazalim' (The Office of Redress of Grievances). If this judicial body issues a ruling regarding the appearance of 'kufr bawwah' (manifest unbelief), the ruler is to be removed from power based on that ruling, and he is to be prosecuted for his crime. If he clings to his position and is supported by military force, it becomes inevitable for other military forces to mobilize to fight this ruler and those who support him until matters are restored to their proper order. ¶

Likewise, regarding those deviations that the Lawgiver (Shari') has determined to hold the same status as 'kufr bawwah' in terms of the legitimacy of using force to confront them, it is necessary that a shari' ruling be issued by the Qada al-Mazalim, clarifying their establishment or lack thereof. Since these are situations in which disputes arise, there must be a specific authority to resolve such conflicts and issue a binding ruling; it is upon this ruling that the legitimacy of combat depends—or does not. ¶

Before we move on from this point, one might ask: In cases of deviation where the use of force is not permitted to rectify the situation, such as non-manifest immorality (fisq ghayr bawwah), injustice, and the like, does this mean that the Islamic system protects such deviant conditions by obligating the Ummah to listen and obey, while prohibiting them from fighting to correct the situation? ¶

The answer to this question is: - There are some early and modern Islamic jurisprudential views that obligate fighting a deviant ruler to correct the situation—as previously stated—regardless of whether the deviation is minor or major. - However, the majority (jumhur) forbids this—that is, in cases of deviation below the level of 'kufr bawwah'. ¶

It is stated in Sharh al-Nawawi 'ala Sahih Muslim: 'The scholars said: And the reason for his non-removal...' ¶

Meaning: The immoral (fasiq) or tyrannical ruler — and the prohibition of rebelling against him is due to the discord (fitna), bloodshed, and social corruption that ensues; therefore, the harm in deposing him outweighs the harm of keeping him in power. ¶

Meaning: Remaining silent regarding deviated and tyrannical conditions — that is, the lack of religious legitimacy for combat — is not a matter of the Islamic system being pleased with or accepting this situation. Rather, it is a matter of choosing the lesser of two evils. ¶

In any case, the comprehensive answer that covers all facets of this inquiry, as I see it, is: The emergence of these deviations for which combat has not been legislated requires the Ummah to bring them before the 'Qada al-Mazalim' (The Judiciary of Grievances) to rectify them. Here, the Qada al-Mazalim evaluates the following: ¶

- If the ruler complies with the judicial ruling to step down, then he is removed. ¶

- If he does not comply, and the matter leads to the eruption of fighting between the ruler’s supporters and his opponents, then the Qada al-Mazalim must weigh two scenarios: ¶

- The state of patience regarding the deviated situation and the damages resulting from it. ¶

- The state of ruling to depose the ruler, risking the eruption of combat between the supporters of the authority and those who oppose it, and the damages resulting from that. If the scale of the damages of combat is heavier, or the success in toppling the ruler is unlikely, the judiciary must refrain from issuing a ruling to depose the ruler, and the obligation to obey this ruler remains — except, of course, in matters of sin — along with the continuing obligation to admonish, warn, and hold him accountable. ¶

- However, if the scale of the damages of patience regarding the deviated situation is heavier, and it is highly probable that the forces opposing the authority will succeed in toppling the ruler, then the ruling for his deposition shall be issued. If the ruler does not relinquish power of his own accord, he shall be considered a usurper of power, and combat shall be waged against him on the basis of his usurpation of authority, just as any usurper is fought so that what was usurped may be returned. This is the subject of a future discussion. ¶

As for this balancing act, and the implementation of what it dictates in terms of combat or abstaining from it, the foundation lies in the Shariah principle of 'committing the lesser of two evils' (irtikab ahwan al-sharrain), which has already been established. Through this answer, we see that we have not nullified any of the Shariah texts pertaining to this issue; rather, all the texts remain applicable, each within its specific sphere, in accordance with the usuli (jurisprudential) principle: 'Implementing all texts is better than implementing some while neglecting others.' ¶

Another question may arise before we move on from this point: Do we judge the conditions of our Islamic countries today through the lens of the legitimacy of combat against 'kufr buwah' (manifest/explicit disbelief) and matters of a similar nature? ¶

The answer is: Some hold this view, as they do not raise the issue of the difference in legal ruling between countries that were once governed by Islam, then witnessed attempts to remove them from Islamic rule and saw the emergence of 'kufr buwah' within them, and other Islamic countries that have long been governed by non-Islamic systems, with conditions having stabilized under that state. As long as they do not address this distinction between the two realities, their opinion on inciting revolution against deviant authorities for the sake of correcting conditions applies to both cases. ¶

Conversely, there are other Islamic ijtihads (juridical interpretations) that do not hold this view. Rather, they believe that the difference between the two realities is a matter that should necessitate a difference in the ruling. The Beirut-based 'Majallat al-Wa'i' stated, in clarifying that the hadiths regarding drawing the sword upon the appearance of 'kufr buwah' were specific to countries that were governed by Islam, not others. It is stated in this magazine: 'The hadiths do not speak of the original Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Disbelief), nor of the abode that transitioned to disbelief and has long since stabilized upon it. Therefore, scrutinizing the context of the hadith reveals its framework.' ¶

Regarding the subject you are discussing (1): We would have wished for the author of this article in the magazine to conduct the verification (tadqiq) he alluded to before us, so that we might see, through this verification within the context of the texts, that the ruling regarding confrontation with the sword (munabadhah bil-sayf) is specific to lands that were governed by Islam and then began to transition toward governance by non-Islam, resulting in the emergence of 'kufr bawwah' (manifest unbelief) within them. In any case, let us conduct this aforementioned verification ourselves; what do we see? We see that the previous texts speak of imams followed by the worst of imams. They also speak of caliphs who acted upon what they knew and did what they were commanded to do, followed by caliphs who act upon what they do not know and do what they were not commanded to do. They also speak of situations where hearing and obeying those in authority is mandatory, and contention (munaza'ah) against them is forbidden, until a condition arises that justifies such contention. Let us take one of these Shariah texts that represents the others in highlighting the transition from one state to another. Ubada ibn al-Samit said: 'We pledged allegiance to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) to listen and obey, in difficulty and ease, in times of pleasure and dislike, and when preference is given to others over us, and that we would not dispute the command with those who hold it, unless you see manifest unbelief (kufr bawwah) for which you have proof from Allah' (2). We are here facing a situation where it is not permissible to dispute the command with those who hold it, then the justification for this dispute came with the words: '...unless you see manifest unbelief.' That is to say, we were not seeing manifest unbelief, and then we saw it; so in this state of transition, the justification for the contention indicated by the hadith occurred. Based on this, the reality of the Islamic lands where manifest unbelief is seen in our time—the generations of this era have never seen them ruled by Islam, followed by the appearance of manifest unbelief therein. Hence, the texts regarding contention due to the appearance of manifest unbelief and the like do not apply to them. Yes, this transition of state and the beginning of the appearance of manifest unbelief did occur in the generation that lived through the period of the abolition of the Islamic system of governance and the adoption and imposition of the doctrine of separating religion from state and life. ¶

Western governance systems dominated the lands when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk abolished the Caliphate and Islam from the state in 1924 AD. ¶

Atatürk and the Abolition of the Caliphate: It is stated in the book 'Dawlat al-Khilafah' (The Caliphate State) by Dr. Abd al-Rashid Abd al-Aziz Salim: '... It became clear to everyone that Mustafa Kemal was on his way to permanently abolishing the Caliphate, and even the religious manifestations in Turkey. Consequently, two major delegations of influential figures from Egypt and India hastened to request that Mustafa Kemal appoint himself 'Caliph,' but he refused with persistence and stubbornness. On March 3, 1924, he presented a decree to the National Assembly aimed at abolishing the Caliphate, expelling the Caliph, and separating religion from the state. He addressed the opposing deputies, saying: "At any cost, the threatened Republic must be preserved and made to advance on solid scientific foundations. The Caliph and the remnants of the House of Osman must go; ancient religious courts and their laws must be replaced by modern courts and laws, and religious schools must vacate their place for non-religious government schools." The Assembly approved the law without debate.' ¶

Regarding this, Ahmed Shawqi says about this man — who manifested clear disbelief (kufr bawwah) — while he used to praise him before this heinous act of his: I apologize to morality, I am not a denier of the one I used to defend and argue for. I say: Whoever revived the group is a heretic, and I say: Whoever revoked rights is a libertine. ¶

Then he speaks about the change he brought to the system, the people, and society: He moved the Shariah, beliefs, villages, and people, as one moves battalions on the battlefield. And this sudden shift and change brought by Mustafa Kemal is what the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) described in his words: '...unless you see clear disbelief (kufr bawwah)...' ¶

At that time, it was incumbent upon the Muslims in all parts of the Islamic state to... ¶

They should rise to fight the authority of Mustafa Kemal, considering that it had manifested blatant disbelief (kufr bawwah) which did not exist before. Since this duty was not fulfilled by those who lived during that period, this situation persisted, and most Islamic countries were governed directly by colonialist systems of disbelief. These systems continued to rule even after the colonialists departed from most of the Islamic lands, leading us to the era we are currently in. ¶

I say: Given that a long time has passed since the existence of blatant disbelief in Islamic lands, it cannot be said of the blatant disbelief we see today that we did not see it before and then we saw it. Rather, we were born into its tribulation and lived in its quagmire, and we hope to God that we do not die until He cools our eyes with the return of His Shariah and the establishment of His state. ¶

Based on this, proponents of this school of understanding the Shariah text do not see the legitimacy of fighting against the existing authorities in Islamic countries that commit blatant disbelief in this time. Furthermore, I see that the Shariah texts support this understanding, as we have seen from examining their context and phrasing. ¶

This does not mean that Muslims today should not work to establish the Islamic society, build the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), establish the Islamic state, and revive the Islamic Caliphate, and so on—all of which means: the resumption of the Islamic way of life. ¶

Yes, the lack of legitimacy of fighting today against the deviant conditions in Muslim lands does not mean that Muslims should not work to resume the Islamic way of life. Indeed, working to restore Islamic life is the most important duty imposed upon all Muslims. However, the method for this is the one followed by the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) to build the Islamic society, establish the Islamic state, conduct all aspects of life according to Islamic systems, and take the pledge (bay'ah) for war in the path of that goal. ¶

The clarification of this method is the subject of a future discussion: combat in the path of establishing the Islamic state against those who oppose it. Let us postpone the discussion on this subject to its appropriate time. ¶

Let us come to the final point in the discussion of fighting against the deviation of the ruler and blatant disbelief, which is: Third: Is this fighting part of Jihad in the path of Allah? The answer is: ¶

If the ruler has truly committed kufr (disbelief) and is supported by forces aiding him in his falsehood, then fighting to remove and kill him is Jihad in the path of Allah; because it qualifies as fighting a disbeliever to raise the word of Allah Almighty. It is stated in Al-Rawdah al-Nadiah: 'In summary, if the Caliph commits disbelief by denying something necessarily known of the religion, fighting him becomes permissible, nay, obligatory; otherwise not. This is because at that point, the benefit of his appointment is lost, and indeed, his mischief is feared for the people, so fighting him is part of Jihad in the path of Allah' (1). ¶

Whoever among the rebels is killed fighting the disbelieving ruler is a martyr (shaheed) in this world and the hereafter, even if killed by a Muslim who supports that disbelieving ruler. Regarding this, it is stated in the book Al-Minhaj and its commentary Mughni al-Muhtaj: 'The martyr is neither washed nor is the funeral prayer performed over him, and he is one who dies in the fighting of the disbelievers due to it,' i.e., due to the fighting. Mughni al-Muhtaj details the instances of a Muslim being killed who is considered a martyr in this world and the hereafter due to fighting the disbelievers, stating: 'Whether killed by a disbeliever, or struck by a Muslim's weapon by mistake, or his own weapon rebounded on him, or he fell into a well or a pit, or his mount kicked him and he died, or he was killed by a rebellious Muslim whom the people of war (ahl al-harb) utilized as help...'(2). ¶

Accordingly, the apostate ruler has become one of the people of war (ahl al-harb). And the Muslims who fight in his ranks have become rebels (bughat) whom the people of war utilize as help. Thus, whoever is killed at their hands is killed in a war against a disbeliever, making him a martyr in the ruling of this world and the hereafter, and this war is Jihad in the path of Allah. ¶

However, if the ruler has not apostatized from Islam, but has committed deviations warranting his removal, yet he clings to his authority, and fighting ensues with him and his supporters, then the fighting here is the fighting of rebels (qital al-bughat), just as Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) fought Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan after his removal from the governorship of Al-Sham, and Muawiyah refused to relinquish his authority (3). ¶

Therefore, this fighting is not Jihad in the path of Allah in the technical sense of Jihad, as we have determined in the discussion on the fighting of rebels (qital al-bughat). ¶