Chapter 6

The texts indicate this. As for the obligation to work towards his removal through peaceful means, it is because when a ruler deviates in a way that removes him from the state of 'adala (probity/justice), he loses one of the conditions for the validity of his authority. One of the conditions for the establishment of a ruler's authority is that he must be 'adil (just/upright). This is evidenced by the fact that Allah (SWT) stipulated that a witness—in order for their testimony to be accepted—must be 'adil, in His saying: "O you who believe! When death approaches one of you, at the time of making a bequest, let the testimony be taken from two just men ('adlayn) from among you..." (Surah Al-Ma'idah: 106). A ruler is of greater status than a witness, thus it is even more mandatory that justice be a condition for him. Furthermore, Allah (SWT) has stipulated that whoever judges the penalty for hunting game killed by a muhrim (one in ihram) must be 'adil. This is in His saying: "O you who believe! Kill not game while you are in a state of ihram. And whosoever of you kills it intentionally, the penalty is an offering, brought to the Ka'bah, equivalent to the one he killed, as adjudged by two just men ('adlayn) among you..." (Surah Al-Ma'idah: 95). Certainly, one who judges for the entire Ummah is more deserving of the condition of justice than one who judges in a matter of hunting killed by a person in ihram! ¶

According to the jurists, an 'adil (just person), as Al-Jurjani mentions in his book 'Al-Ta'rifat', is: "One who avoids major sins, does not persist in minor sins, whose righteousness prevails over his errors, and who avoids ignoble actions." ¶

Moreover, what is a condition for the initial validity of authority, such as 'adala, is also a condition for its continuity. Al-Mawardi says regarding an Imam whose 'adala has been compromised by "committing prohibitions and daring to perform forbidden acts," describing his state and the obligation regarding him: "This is fisq (immorality) that prevents the establishment of the Imamate and its continuation. If it occurs after the Imamate has been established, he is removed from it. If he returns to 'adala, he does not return to the Imamate except through a new contract. Some theologians have said: He returns to the Imamate upon returning to 'adala without the need for a renewed contract or bay'ah (allegiance), due to the generality of his wilaya (authority) and the hardship involved in renewing his bay'ah." ¶

In 'Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya' by Al-Farra, an opinion contrary to this is mentioned. He states: "If these attributes—that is, the conditions for the validity of the Imamate—are found at the time of the contract, and then cease to exist after the contract..." ¶

Consider this: if the issue involves a deficiency in his integrity ('adalah)—namely, immorality (fisq)—it does not necessarily prevent the continuation of his leadership (imamah). This applies whether the immorality relates to physical actions, such as committing prohibited acts and pursuing forbidden deeds due to whims, or if it relates to belief, such as someone who interprets matters based on a doubt that has arisen, leading them away from the truth (1). ¶

Our view is that integrity ('adalah) is a condition for the authority holder, both at the inception of their rule and for its continuation. The legal text we cited explicitly requires the judge to be righteous ('adl) even in a minor matter like the 'compensation for hunting' (jaza' al-sayd) for his judgment to be accepted. A ruler of the ummah acts as a ruler in every moment he manages its affairs; therefore, he must possess integrity at all times for his rulings to be valid and for him to remain in office. ¶

Furthermore, our perspective—reconciling the view that a ruler should be removed from power when the condition of integrity is lost, with the evidence mandating obedience to him even if he is immoral—is that obedience to this ruler remains mandatory in accordance with the aforementioned legal texts, while simultaneously working to remove him from power based on the deficiency in his integrity. This removal should be achieved through peaceful means, in adherence to the legal texts that forbid drawing the sword against a deviant ruler. ¶

Muhammad Asad holds that the authority that decides on the removal of the Imam from power, if a dispute arises among the shura members representing the ummah in this regard, is a neutral Supreme Arbitration Board, specialized in constitutional affairs and composed of eminent judges and jurists of Islamic law within the state (2). ¶

Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani believes that the body which adjudicates this matter is the 'Court of Grievances' (Mahkamat al-Mazalim). This is because when a Caliph commits an act that warrants removal from power, such as immorality, he has effectively committed a grievance (mazlimah) that must be redressed. The Court of Grievances is specialized in redressing such wrongs; it is the court that oversees disputes between the ummah and the state authorities. Moreover, whether an event constitutes a grievance or not requires proof, which is within the jurisdiction of the Judge of Grievances. ¶

Upon consideration, if the injustice is proven to him, the court shall issue a decree to depose the Caliph, or any authority holder in the state whose remaining in power constitutes an injustice (1). ¶

Having said that, we find these two opinions to be quite close, although the words of Sheikh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani are closer to Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in the derivation of rulings and the reasoning behind them. ¶

Thus, we conclude this point, which concerns the rulings on denouncing evil (munkarat) under different circumstances, and we move to the second point: ¶

Second: The Legitimacy of Combat in Denouncing Munkarat, and the Degrees of Denunciation Preceding Combat ¶

There are degrees in denouncing evil that a Muslim must observe while on the path to eradicating the evils encountered in his Islamic society. This is to preserve the ship of this society from the saboteurs, the people of corruption and evil, who, if not restrained, will create holes in that ship from which evil will gush forth, eventually sinking the ship along with everyone on board—both the corrupt and the righteous. ¶

This image of the effects of evil in society is what was drawn by the Prophetic hadith narrated by al-Bukhari on the authority of Nu'man ibn Bashir, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: The parable of the one who is indulgent (mudahin) (2) regarding the limits of Allah and the one who falls into them is like a group of people who drew lots for places on a ship. Some were in the lower deck and some in the upper deck. When those in the lower deck needed water, they had to pass by those in the upper deck, causing them inconvenience. So, one of them took an axe and started to pierce the lower part of the ship. They came to him and asked, 'What is the matter with you?' He replied, 'You have been bothered by me, and I must have water.' Now, if they restrain his hands, they will save him and save themselves, but if they leave him, they will destroy him and destroy themselves" (3). ¶

Yes, there are degrees on the path to eradicating evils from the Islamic society, and these degrees are: 1. Identifying evils without spying, due to the Almighty's saying: "And do not spy" (4). And due to His (peace be upon him) saying... ¶

Peace and blessings: 'If you follow the faults of the people, you will corrupt them or come close to corrupting them' (1). ¶

It is narrated that Ibn Mas'ud—while he was in Kufa teaching people the matters of their religion—was told: 'This person,' meaning 'Al-Walid ibn 'Uqbah,' 'his beard is dripping with wine.' The speaker meant that it was Al-Walid’s habit and custom to drink wine, and that if we were to investigate it now, we would find it so. Ibn Mas'ud replied: 'We have been forbidden from espionage (tajassus), but if something becomes manifest to us, we shall take action upon it' (2)! ¶

2 - Defining to those who commit forbidden acts that they are performing an unlawful deed, offering them exhortation with gentleness of speech, and then employing sternness in tone if such a method is effective in removing a vice that is undisputed among the mujtahidun as being a forbidden act. It is stated in *Al-Adab al-Shar'iyya*: 'There is no rebuke in matters where there is valid difference of opinion (ikhtilaf) among the branches of law, against one who has exercised ijtihad in them or followed a mujtahid in them... They exemplified this with drinking a small amount of nabidh (3) and marriage without a wali.'... Then he says: 'Sheikh Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi mentioned that there is no rebuke in matters involving difference of opinion. He said: However, if one advises him to exit the state of difference, that is good, beloved, and recommended to be done with gentleness. Other Shafi'i scholars mentioned two views regarding this issue, and they mentioned the issue of rebuking someone who uncovers his thigh, stating that there are two views regarding it as well' (4). The meaning of 'two views' in this context is that there is a view that permits rebuke in disputed matters, and another view that maintains non-rebuke. ¶

It is stated in *Al-Adab al-Shar'iyya* regarding the issue of rebuking a woman for uncovering her face in the street: 'Qadi Iyad said: Regarding the hadith of Jarir (may Allah be pleased with him), he said: I asked...' ¶

The Messenger of Allah ﷺ (was asked) about an accidental glance, so he commanded me to turn my gaze away. Narrated by Muslim (1). The scholars, may Allah have mercy on them, said: This is proof that it is not obligatory for a woman to cover her face while on the road; rather, it is a recommended sunnah for her. (2) He then says regarding the prohibition of looking at the face of a non-mahram woman: "As for our position, and the position of a group of Shafi'is and others, it is that looking at a non-mahram woman is permissible without desire or seclusion. Therefore, it is not appropriate for such objection (inkar) to be valid." (3) ¶

Yes, if the head of the Islamic State adopts a specific Shariah ruling on disputed issues—such as drinking nabidh, listening to or using musical instruments, or women's hijab—this adopted ruling becomes the basis upon which objection is made or not made, because: "When the Imam of the Muslims commands the specific application of a view in matters of ijtihad, it becomes binding, and it becomes obligatory to act according to his instruction." (4) However, if the Imam has not adopted a specific view, the matter is as Al-Ghazali stated in 'Ihya': "Everything that is a matter of ijtihad, there is no hisbah (enforcement/objection) regarding it." (5) ¶

3 - Among the degrees of changing a wrong (inkar al-munkar) is the use of physical force with hands or feet, provided no weapon is brandished. Al-Ghazali says regarding this: "It is permissible for individuals, on the condition of necessity and limiting oneself to the degree of need in defense." (6) In reality, this method is covered by the saying of the Prophet ﷺ: "Whoever among you sees a wrong, let him change it with his hand..." (7) Imam Al-Ghazali provides an example of this, saying: "As if a corrupt person grabs a woman... and between him and the muhtasib (the official responsible for accountability) there is a river or a wall, he takes his bow and says to him: 'Let her go, or I will shoot you.' If he does not let her go, it is permissible for him to shoot, and he should avoid vital areas, aiming instead at the leg, the thigh, or similar areas. All of this constitutes repelling the wrong, and repelling it is obligatory by every possible means." (8) ¶

4 - Then Al-Ghazali discusses the final degree of removing a wrong when the person of zeal is unable to... ¶

To see the sanctity of Allah violated while witnessing a munkar (evil) before one's eyes necessitates changing it with one's own hand, 'and this requires helpers who brandish weapons; often the corrupt person also seeks the aid of his own associates, and this leads to the two sides confronting one another.' (1) ¶

Imam al-Ghazali states on this matter: 'Differences have emerged regarding the need for the Imam's permission: Some have said: Individual citizens may not act independently in this, because it leads to the stirring of fitnah (strife), the escalation of corruption, and the ruin of the land.' ¶

Others have said: Permission is not required, and this is more consistent with qiyas (analogy). Because if enjoining good is permissible for individuals, its initial stages lead to secondary ones, and secondary to tertiary, inevitably ending in physical struggle, and struggle invites cooperation; therefore, one should not be deterred by the consequences of enjoining good! Its ultimate goal is mobilizing troops for the pleasure of Allah and repelling His disobedience. We permit individual ghazis (warriors) to assemble and fight whichever groups of disbelievers they choose in order to suppress the people of disbelief; thus, suppressing the people of corruption is likewise permissible! For there is no harm in killing the disbeliever, and if a Muslim is killed, he is a martyr. Likewise, the corrupt person who fights to defend his corruption, there is no harm in killing him, and the righteous muhtasib (the one enjoining good) who is killed unjustly is a martyr... He then adds: Whoever has the ability to repel a munkar may do so with his hand, his weapon, his own person, and his associates.' (2) ¶

Regarding this issue, the matter of combat when necessary for the defense of public sanctities and the removal of evils: Is this permissible for individuals without state permission, or is state permission mandatory, or should this task be restricted to the state, with individuals prohibited from it? I say: On this issue, the author of 'I'anat al-Talibin' states: 'If someone proceeds to commit a haram (forbidden) act, is it permissible for individuals to stop him, even by killing? The usulis (legal theorists) said: No. The fuqaha (jurists) said: Yes! Al-Rafi'i said: This is the transmitted view, to the extent that they said: Whoever learns that alcohol is being consumed... in someone's house may raid it and put an end to it; if they refuse, he may fight them, and if he kills them, then...' ¶

There is no liability upon him, and he shall be rewarded for it. It is evident that this applies as long as there is no fear of fitna (strife/sedition) from a tyrannical ruler, for endangering oneself and exposing oneself to the punishments of tyrannical rulers is prohibited. ¶

Ibn al-Jawzi prioritized the prohibition of using weapons to forbid evil (al-amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa-al-nahy 'an al-munkar) except with the permission of the state, labeling the opposing view as weak. He states: 'Striking with the hand, foot, or similar means that do not involve brandishing weapons or swords is permissible for individuals, provided there is a necessity and it is restricted to the extent of the need. However, if one requires assistants who would brandish weapons because he is unable to forbid the evil by himself, then the correct view is that this requires the permission of the Imam (the ruler), because it leads to fitna and the outbreak of corruption. Another opinion holds that the permission of the Imam is not a condition for this.' ¶

Our view on this matter—while keeping in mind that we are still discussing an Islamic society and a legitimate Islamic authority in which evils have emerged, compelling individuals to use weapons to remove them—is that this issue is divided into two cases: ¶

A - A specific case: This is the situation of an incipient evil that cannot be rectified otherwise, such as a man attempting to assault a woman. We have the right to repel him from her gradually. If the transgressor uses a weapon to commit his crime, we have the right to use weapons to repel him from the evil by force. Here, there is no need for state authorization, because the evil is on the verge of occurring. Attempting to notify the authorities or obtaining permission to repel this imminent evil would result in missing the objective and causing the feared harm. Among the proofs for the permissibility of combat here is the hadith, 'Whoever is killed defending his religion is a martyr.' The logic of this deduction is that since the one killed in this situation is considered a martyr, it indicates the permissibility of combat that leads to killing. There is no doubt that defending a woman being assaulted is a defense of the sacred principles of the religion. ¶

B - A general case: This manifests when removing evil requires the force of those forbidding evil to clash with the power of the evildoers using weapons, which leads to fitna and bloodshed. In this case, we believe that the role of those forbidding evil should be limited. ¶

It is incumbent to inform the competent authorities in the Islamic state so they may fulfill their duty in removing evil (1)—such as a shop selling liquor, a gambling club, or a venue for dance and corruption. If the officials in the Islamic state fail to remove this evil, it constitutes one of the injustices occurring within Islamic society that should be brought before the 'Qada al-Mazalim' (the Court of Redress of Grievances). The authority must either remove this injustice from society through the force of the state, or issue authorization to those who forbid evil to remove it by force. Otherwise, the issue of withdrawing the carpet of legitimacy from beneath him must be brought under consideration due to his inability to oversee affairs according to the rulings of the Shariah, as previously discussed regarding the loss of the condition of 'adalah' (probity) in a ruler. Here, one of the conditions for the validity of a ruler's authority has been breached, namely, the ability to oversee the affairs of the Ummah according to the rulings of the Shariah. It is stated in 'Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya' by Al-Farra regarding the conditions of the Imamate: 'Third: That he be capable of managing matters of war, politics, the implementation of penal laws (hudud) without being overcome by leniency in that, and the protection of the Ummah' (2). Furthermore, one who is incapable of establishing the hudud of Allah and curbing the hands of the corrupt has breached a condition for the validity of his authority from the beginning, as well as a condition for its continuation. The 'Qada al-Mazalim' in the Islamic state is the competent authority to investigate this case and is the one that issues the ruling. As for individuals resorting to fighting on their own to prevent evils behind the back of the state, this is a matter that would open the door to fighting between factions of the Ummah, and it is a type of 'Qital al-Fitnah' (fighting of sedition), regarding which we have cited many Shariah texts prohibiting it in the discussion on 'Qital al-Fitnah' (3). We now leave this point to discuss the final point in this research: Third: Is fighting for the purpose of removing evil to defend public sacred boundaries (hurumat) considered Jihad in the path of Allah? This question arises regarding the legitimate situations in this regard. ¶

1. A specific situation, for example, restraining an individual from attempting to commit an irreversible evil, such as an attempted assault on a woman’s honor. 2. A general situation, if the state authorizes individuals who oppose evil to confront perpetrators with force if necessary. 3. Or if the state mobilizes a military force to carry out this task. ¶

Is this legitimate combat for the defense of the sanctities of Allah and the eradication of evil considered 'Jihad in the path of Allah' in its technical Shariah sense? In reality, the Shariah texts regarding the condemnation of evil in an absolute manner—without specifying whether it involves combat or otherwise—have labeled all of this as 'Jihad' in several Hadiths: - Among them is the saying of the Prophet (PBUH): 'The best Jihad is a word of justice before a tyrannical ruler or a tyrannical leader.' - Among them is the saying of the Prophet (PBUH): 'Jihad is of four types: enjoining good, forbidding evil, truthfulness in places of patience, and hatred of the corrupt.' - Among them is what is narrated in Sahih Muslim from the Prophet (PBUH): 'Never was there a prophet sent by Allah to a nation before me, but he had disciples and companions from his nation who followed his Sunnah and obeyed his command. Then, after them, successors came who said what they did not do, and did what they were not commanded to do. So, whoever strives (jahada) against them with his hand is a believer, whoever strives against them with his tongue is a believer, and whoever strives against them with his heart is a believer; and beyond that, there is not even a mustard seed’s weight of faith.' ¶

It has already been established in the first chapter of this section that Jihad in its Shariah, customary, and technical sense is 'combatting the disbelievers to elevate the Word of Allah,' and matters pertaining to that. If the term 'Jihad' is used in a meaning other than this, it is Jihad in the linguistic sense, which is any effort exerted for the sake of something. ¶

Or in a metaphorical sense, as previously explained. Based on this: labeling the act of forbidding evil (al-nahy 'an al-munkar) in Islamic society to prevent the corrupt from committing sins as 'jihad' is only in the linguistic sense or the metaphorical sense. ¶

The choice of the term 'jihad' to apply to combat, or to non-combat Islamic deeds that do not fall under the meaning of Shari'i jihad, is intended to suggest that this Islamic act resembles jihad in its impact and reward, and that those who perform it are like the Mujahideen in their exertion of effort, their risking of themselves, and the attainment of a great reward as a result. It does not necessarily imply equality between any given Islamic act and jihad, nor between those engaged in such Islamic acts and the Mujahideen. ¶

Section Six: Combat against the deviation of the ruler. - First: What constitutes the deviation of a ruler? - Second: The opinions of jurists and Islamic thinkers regarding the use of force to overthrow a deviant ruler. - Third: Is combat against a deviant ruler considered 'Jihad in the way of Allah' in its formal Shariah-defined sense? ¶

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Sixth Topic: Combat Against the Deviation of the Ruler. This combat has been given several designations in the works of both classical and contemporary scholars who have addressed this subject. Among these designations are: Khuruj (rebellion/exiting) (1), armed rebellion (2), revolution (3), Islamic revolution (4), armed revolution (5), uprising (nuhud) (6), great battle (malhama) (7), fitna (strife/civil discord) (8), combat against oppressors (9), combat against commanders/princes (10), rising against rulers (11), the sword (12), coup d'état (13), liberation movement to rectify conditions (14), and civil war (15). ¶

All these labels and others pointing to the same meaning imply one thing: the use of arms for the purpose of overthrowing a deviant ruler who, in the opinion of those revolting against him, has deserved such action. It is not the purpose of this treatise to address this topic from all its aspects. Therefore, we will limit our discussion to what pertains to our subject, which is combat (qital) and the aspects of this topic that it necessitates, and whether this combat is considered jihad in the path of Allah. Accordingly, we will address the following points: - First: What constitutes the deviation of a ruler? - Second: The opinions of jurists (fuqaha) and Islamic thinkers regarding the use of arms to overthrow a deviant ruler. - Third: Is the combat against a deviant ruler considered jihad in the path of Allah? At the outset, it is appropriate to clarify that the basis we rely upon in addressing this subject is not to defend the system of government in Islam against the disparagements of Orientalists, such as: Margoliouth, who claimed that Muslim subjects have no rights against the ruler; or Macdonald, who claimed that the Imam is not a constitutional ruler in the sense known today; or Thomas Arnold, who claimed that the Caliphate is a form of oppressive, despotic government (1). I say: The basis we rely on is not these disparagements and their refutation. This is because some Islamic thinkers follow a specific method in their research: they examine the suspicions or disparagements raised by Orientalists or their students from the perspective of Western thought, then they search the Islamic heritage for ijtihad (legal reasoning) and opinions that the attackers would agree are suitable for refuting those suspicions and disparagements because they align with their own views. Often, such ijtihad and opinions are not based on strong evidence from accepted Shariah proofs. This conduct by these Islamic thinkers amounts to placing trust in Western thought and making it the standard for truth and falsehood in opinions and ideas—a matter that leads them into distortion or tampering. ¶

to align Islamic thought with Western thought, which has captivated their souls and dominated their minds. Indeed, this deviant method of research is not what we follow in addressing our subject. The methodology we rely upon is: examining the Shariah texts related to the issue under consideration, understanding them according to linguistic and usuli (jurisprudential) principles, then applying them to the particulars of the issue, and resolving any apparent contradictions between these texts under the umbrella of established Islamic principles, without resorting to relying on specific texts while discarding others, or judging them as abrogated (mansukh) or weak merely because they contradict the opinions one has adopted. ¶

Regarding the reliance on Shariah texts to treat reality in their light, seminars and lectures are frequently held that revolve around studying reality and its problems in contemporary Arab thought. In these, the 'Usuli' (fundamentalist) approach to treating reality is criticized—by which they mean the Islamic approach. They claim that this approach views reality through ancient texts rather than viewing reality directly as it is. Consequently, there is a disconnect between the observed, lived reality and the perception of those who hold this view; hence, the treatment is unrealistic and inappropriate, and so on. ¶

What I wish to clarify here is that the Islamic method of treating occurrences is not—as these people claim—viewing these occurrences through the texts; rather, it is viewing them first as they are, without distortion or alteration, and then treating them with the Shariah texts that apply to them. ¶

It is said that the intent of those who criticize the Islamic trend is precisely what has been mentioned, and it is the very point of contention for them. That is, that ancient texts should be used as tools to address current events. This is because this ancient text perhaps addressed ancient events, as the authors of that text witnessed those events and addressed them accordingly... whereas today's events are different from those of yesterday. Thus, this ancient text does not possess the capacity to address emerging events that it did not foresee and did not perceive. ¶

The sufficient answer to this doubt might be so long that it would take us off-topic, but we will suffice with a brief word: Every ideology, ancient or modern, and from any school of thought, views reality—meaning it addresses it—through a text. The difference between Islamic thought and others is that Islamic thought views reality through a text that has come to us from the One who sees this reality in all its details, complexities, the premises that led to it, its current state, and the potential effects it may produce. I mean, this text came to us from Allah the Almighty, and thus we address reality based upon it. ¶

As for every ideology other than Islamic thought, it also views reality through a text brought forth by the founders of that ideology; however, it is a text produced by the mind of a human being who is incapable of encompassing reality in all its details and complexities, and incapable of seeing the sources of this reality and the effects it may produce. So, which of the two texts is more suitable to view reality through? That is, to address reality with? The text provided to us by the Creator of all events and the One who dominates them? Or the text put forward by a creature who is too weak to encompass himself or dominate his own self, let alone encompass with knowledge the events around him and the solutions and ideas suitable to address them? I say: After this illumination of the Islamic method of addressing the events of life, we proceed to address the points we mentioned at the beginning of this research. ¶

First: What constitutes the deviation of a ruler? The deviation of a ruler occurs by abandoning the commitment to Islam, whether in his personal conduct or in the internal or external policies through which he manages the affairs of the Ummah. Several Shariah texts have been revealed that mention some of these deviations into which a ruler may fall; we shall now mention these deviations and the texts that point to them. ¶

Among these deviations is: the ruler committing sins. The expectation is that the ruler should be a model in adhering to and implementing the Shariah. This leads to the Ummah despising the ruler due to such transgressions, and the ruler despising the Ummah due to the wave of discontent and denunciation they face him with. Thus, a rift deepens between them, leading to the exchange of curses and mutual hatred. ¶

The Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 'The best of your leaders are those whom you love and who love you, whom you pray for and who pray for you; and the worst of your leaders are those whom you hate and who hate you, whom you curse and who curse you.' It was said: 'O Messenger of Allah! Should we not oppose them with our swords when that happens?' He said: 'No, as long as they establish prayer among you. Behold, if anyone has a ruler appointed over him and he sees him committing an act of disobedience to Allah, let him detest the act of disobedience, but let him not withdraw his hand from obedience.' ¶

- Among the deviations of the ruler is: Ordering the subjects to commit sins. The Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 'Hearing and obeying is binding upon the Muslim, in what he likes and what he dislikes, as long as he is not ordered to commit a sin. If he is ordered to commit a sin, then there is no hearing and no obeying.' ¶

- Among the deviations of the ruler is: Committing forbidden acts, including the monopolization of worldly gains. This monopolization includes the exclusive appropriation of wealth, positions, jobs, and privileges, which he reserves for himself, his kin, and his faction, to the exclusion of the rest of the Ummah. The Prophet (peace be upon him) says: 'There will soon be self-serving preference (atharah) and matters that you will disapprove of.' They asked: 'What do you command us to do, O Messenger of Allah, if we reach that time?' He said: 'Fulfill the rights that are upon you, and ask Allah for your own rights.' ¶

- Among the deviations of the ruler is: Attacking individuals of the Ummah with harm, such as beating, torture, and confiscation of wealth, thereby signaling his deviation in governance from the way and Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him). ¶

Narrated Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman: I said, 'O Messenger of Allah! We were in a state of evil, then Allah brought us goodness (Islam) in which we now live. Will there be any evil after this goodness?' He said, 'Yes.' I asked, 'How will that be?' He replied, 'There will be leaders after me who do not follow my guidance and do not adopt my Sunnah. Among them will be men whose hearts are the hearts of devils in human bodies.' I asked, 'What should I do, O Messenger of Allah, if I live to see that time?' He said, 'Listen to the Amir and obey him, even if he strikes your back and takes your wealth; listen and obey.' ¶

Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman (may Allah be pleased with him), who frequently asked the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) about the future conditions of this Ummah, used to say: 'There will be amirs who will punish you, and Allah will punish them.' ¶

These are examples of the deviations that may occur by a Muslim ruler while governing a Muslim nation in a Muslim society. ¶

Furthermore, some Prophetic traditions indicate that the fundamental principle for a Muslim ruler is to lead the Ummah based on the Book of Allah (Exalted is He) and to establish His commandments among them. It is also an essential duty for him to safeguard the rites of Islam, such as prayer and fasting, and to call upon people to establish these rites. Likewise, it is a foundational duty that he should not allow sins or disbelief to be practiced openly and clearly without any reprimand. ¶

The following are the Hadiths that point to these matters: - The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: 'Even if a slave is placed in charge over you who leads you according to the Book of Allah, listen to him and obey him.' In another narration: 'O people, fear Allah, even if an Abyssinian slave who is mutilated is placed in charge over you, listen and obey him as long as he establishes the Book of Allah among you.' - The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) said: 'Shall I not inform you of the best and the worst of your officials?' They said: 'Yes, O Messenger of Allah.' He said: 'The best of them are those whom you love and who love you; you pray for them and they pray for you.' ¶

towards you. And their worst are those who are worst towards you, whom you hate and who hate you, and you pray to Allah against them and they pray to Allah against you. They asked: 'Shall we not fight them, O Messenger of Allah?' He said: 'No, leave them as long as they pray and fast.' ¶

Ubadah bin al-Samit (may Allah be pleased with him) says: 'We pledged allegiance to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) to listen and obey in times of hardship and ease, in our willingness and our reluctance, even if our rights are encroached upon, and that we would not dispute the authority of those who hold it, and that we would speak the truth wherever we are, fearing no blame from anyone regarding Allah—and in one narration: '...unless you see manifest kufr (disbelief)'—meaning open/clear disbelief—'regarding which you have proof from Allah.' ¶

Now, what is the stance of the Ummah regarding a ruler who falls into the deviations mentioned in the aforementioned hadiths, or violates the fundamental principles of a Muslim ruler, such as basing his rule on the Book of Allah, adhering to the symbols of Islam, calling to them, or allowing sins to be committed openly and manifest disbelief to appear without any censure? Is it permissible to use weapons against a deviant ruler to overthrow him, or is it not permissible? Or is there nuance in this matter? ¶

This is what we will discuss in the following point: ¶

Second: The views of jurists and Islamic thinkers on the use of weapons to overthrow a deviant ruler, and the view we hold. ¶

To address this point, we will mention the views of the classical jurists, then the views of contemporary Islamic thinkers, and finally, we will present our own view on this subject. ¶

- Views of classical jurists: ¶

- It is stated in the book 'Maqalat al-Islamiyyin' by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari: 'People have differed regarding the use of the sword (rebellion) into four opinions:' ¶

The Mu'tazila, Zaidiyyah, Kharijites, and many of the Murji'ah argued that: This (rebellion) is obligatory if we have the capability to remove the oppressors (ahl al-baghy) by the sword and establish the truth. They cited the saying of Allah (SWT): 'Cooperate in righteousness and piety,' and His saying: 'Then fight against the one that commits aggression until it returns to the command of Allah,' and they also cited the verse: 'My covenant does not include the wrongdoers.' ¶

The Rawafid (Shia) stated: The sword should be abandoned, even if people are killed, until the Imam appears and commands it. ¶

Abu Bakr al-Asamm and those who held his view said: The sword (is permissible) when there is an agreement upon a just Imam; then they shall go forth with him to remove the oppressors. ¶

Others said: The sword is invalid, even if the lineage (of the people) is destroyed, and the Imam may be just or unjust, and it is not for us to remove him even if he is a transgressor (fasiq). They denied rebellion against the ruler and did not permit it; this is the position of the Ashab al-Hadith (People of Hadith). ¶

It is stated in Ibn Hazm's 'Al-Muhalla': That removing a deviant ruler by force is obligatory if those revolting against him possess the capability to do so, and that this falls under 'commanding the good and forbidding the evil,' which is a duty that has not been abrogated. Furthermore, all hadiths indicating listening to and obeying a corrupt or deviant ruler are considered abrogated. His argument for this abrogation is that the prohibition of fighting, indicated by the hadiths regarding patience with a corrupt ruler, corresponded to the state of the religion before the command to fight. Then, this state was abrogated by the command to fight, and that 'forbidding the evil' remains and has not been abrogated; therefore, it—forbidding the evil—is the abrogator of what contradicts it. He then mentions that this view was the view of Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah honor his face) and the companions who were with him, as well as the view of the Mother of the Believers, Aisha, Talha, al-Zubayr, and the companions with them, as well as the view of Mu'awiyah and all the companions who were with him. ¶