Chapter 84

Second Topic: The Stance of Non-Combatant Muslims Regarding These Wars ¶

Allah (SWT) clarifies what the stance of Muslims who are not participating in the fighting should be regarding these wars, in His saying: 'And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly. The believers are but brothers, so make settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy.' (Surah Al-Hujurat: 9-10). This Shariah text establishes that the stance which Muslims who are outside the sphere of conflict must adopt is the stance of reconciliation between the conflicting parties. ¶

This obligatory reformist stance, to be adopted by these Muslims, is built on the foundation that both conflicting factions are bound together by Islamic brotherhood, despite the bloody conflict that has erupted between them. Therefore, it is not permissible to allow Muslim blood to be shed by their own hands without the intervention of other Muslims to reconcile and stop the hemorrhaging of blood. ¶

Furthermore, this reformist stance is built on the foundation that those undertaking the reconciliation are themselves linked by the bond of Islamic brotherhood with each of the two conflicting factions—that is, even with the faction that has proven to be the oppressor and aggressor. Therefore, it is not permissible for a brother to abandon his brother. ¶

Whether he is an oppressor or oppressed, leading to an end where his existence is extinguished. Rather, he must restrain his oppressor brother from his oppression, in order to save him and the one upon whom his oppression is unleashed. If this attempt does not succeed, the reformist brother must stand with the oppressed to the extent that he restores his right to him and repairs the rift between hearts and ranks, without exceeding this to vengeance, seeking gratification, or falling into a new form of oppression that leaves behind wounds in the soul, waiting for opportunities to seek revenge... and so on and so forth. ¶

In this manner, the aforementioned Shariah text clarifies for us what position Muslims who are not involved in the conflict should take regarding wars that occur between Islamic factions, and what is the basis that dictates this position to them? ¶

Imam al-Qurtubi elaborates somewhat on how to proceed in performing the duty of reform between the conflicting parties. In his commentary on the aforementioned Shariah text, he states: 'The scholars said: Two factions of Muslims, when they fight each other, fall into one of two categories: either both are committing transgression (baghi), or they are not. If it is the former, the duty is to mediate between them in a way that reconciles their differences and leads to compensation and truce. If they do not desist or reconcile and persist in their transgression, then one must fight them! ¶

As for the second category, where one group is transgressing against the other, the duty is to fight the transgressing group until it desists and repents. If it does so, reconcile between them and the aggrieved party with equity and justice. If fighting breaks out between them due to a doubt that has entered upon them, and both parties believe they are in the right, the duty is to remove the doubt with clear proofs and definitive evidence regarding the paths of truth. If they persist in their obstinacy and do not act according to the guidance they were given and the advice they were offered to follow the truth after it was clarified to them, then they have joined the ranks of the transgressing factions.' ¶

I (the author) say: If the Islamic Caliphate were in existence, it would be the authority responsible for deciding upon the disputes that might occur between the Islamic regions under its jurisdiction. ¶

Was the rebellion from all of them, with some against others? Or was there one party that exclusively committed the aggression against others, and another party against whom the aggression was committed? Based on this, attempts at reconciliation are pursued. If a resolution to the conflict is not reached, in that case, the Caliphate issues a decision to use force by other countries not involved in the fighting to put an end to that conflict—either by fighting both conflicting parties or one of them, in light of what was stated by Al-Qurtubi. This applies if the Islamic Caliphate is in existence. ¶

As for our current reality, with the absence of that Caliphate, the question that arises here is: What is the entity that could judge in this dispute, to whom the conflicting parties could submit for the purpose of reconciliation, and whose decision could be obeyed when it issues orders to other Islamic forces not involved in the conflict to intervene to resolve the dispute, if the reconciliation process does not lead to a result? I ask: What is this entity that can shoulder this entire burden? ¶

Before answering this question and announcing the entity nominated to perform this role, I hasten to say that this solution we are presenting remains a transitional solution and is not guaranteed to resolve the conflict. However, the definitive and decisive solution is, as previously indicated, the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and the rallying of all Islamic countries under its banner. In this case, the Caliph's decision to resolve the dispute would be religiously binding, due to the necessity of obeying the Imam, which is—by Islamic ruling—above the obedience of other leaderships, including political or military leaderships, in all countries of the state and their armed forces, provided, of course, that the Imam's decisions do not contain an order to commit a sin, even if there are other ijtihad (legal reasonings) that hold contrary to the decisions he adopted. This is in addition to the authority he possesses to mobilize the necessary forces to extinguish the raging strife when the situation demands it. ¶

Now, we return to our current reality and the raised question: Until God guides the leaders of the Muslims to proceed on the path to restoring the Caliphate, what is... ¶

Question: Which entity in our current times can perform the role of reform and issue a religiously binding military decision to resolve the conflict between warring Islamic countries? ¶

Answer: The answer is for the leaders of all Islamic countries to shoulder their responsibilities, supported by the Muslim Ummah they govern, in exerting serious and sincere pressure on the two conflicting parties to stop their fighting and resort to Islamic 'Tahkim Shar'i' (Shariah arbitration). Each party shall send an arbitrator from their side to resolve the existing dispute, in light of the following: ¶

a) Defining the powers of the arbitrators to issue the rulings necessary to solve the problems causing the dispute. b) Making the sources of Islamic legislation the sole reference for issuing those rulings and solutions that adjudicate the points of contention. c) Obtaining a pledge from each of the conflicting parties, and from all leaders of Islamic countries, to accept the rulings and legitimate solutions issued by the arbitrators to end the current conflict, considering them mandatory for implementation under Islamic law. Turning away from them, or consenting to such refusal, incurs sin under Shariah. d) If the two arbitrators issue their agreed-upon rulings and solutions, and the two conflicting parties submit to them, the matter is settled, and Allah has sufficed the believers from fighting. e) If one or both parties refuse to submit to the arbitrators' judgment, the refusing party is considered the 'Baghi' (rebel/aggressor), whether the refusal comes from one or both. It then becomes a Shariah obligation upon the Islamic forces in other countries to place themselves under the command of the military decisions issued by the arbitrators, in order to intervene and resolve the conflict by force, provided that this does not result in damages or dangers greater than the harm of the existing conflict. f) It shall be within the authority of the arbitrators, by mutual agreement, to issue decisions regarding how to mobilize the armed forces in other Islamic countries in order to resolve the existing conflict, in light of what has been stated above. ¶

I say: Perhaps resorting to such a method for resolving disputes between Islamic countries is sufficient to block the path for any external powers that intervene in Muslim conflicts under the pretext that one of the parties to the conflict has invited them to intervene. They then exploit this opportunity to conspire against the Muslims, working to escalate those conflicts and impose a solution that suits them, serving only their own interests. Consequently, the Muslims suffer the effects of that solution, which are often worse than the strife of the conflict itself. Such suffering is of no concern to those powers! Indeed, this suffering is part of the objectives they intended when they imposed that ominous solution. We say: Perhaps resorting to arbitration, in the manner previously described, would block the path for those external powers that seek to spread corruption within the ranks of the Muslims. ¶

Furthermore, the Shariah-based binding nature of the resolution through arbitration, as we have proposed, is supported by the consensus (Ijma) of the Sahaba (Companions). During the period of the conflict that arose between Ali and Muawiyah, all the Sahaba agreed to resort to arbitration and to accept it. This included the Sahaba who were with Ali, those who were with Muawiyah, and those who remained neutral, such as Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, Ibn Umar, and others—may Allah be pleased with them all. ¶

It should not be argued that the arbitration at that time failed to resolve the dispute, implying that arbitration was not binding or does not lead to a result. This argument is invalid because the agreement of all the Sahaba to resort to arbitration signifies that its decisions are binding under Shariah, as long as they remain within the scope of the powers granted to the arbitrators. ¶

As for why that arbitration did not resolve the dispute, it appears that one of the reasons was the failure to pre-determine the issues of the dispute for the two arbitrators, who should have restricted their solutions to that scope only. However, it is not within the requirements of our current research to delve into this issue. ¶

We conclude from the incident of arbitration (tahkim) that the Sahaba unanimously agreed to resort to arbitration; and were it not for the binding nature implied in its decisions, resorting to it would have been of little use. It is not our concern here to examine the reasons that caused that specific arbitration to fail in its task. ¶

If the events of Islamic history are to be studied for the purpose of benefiting from their positives and rectifying their negatives and the errors that occurred within them, then one should look at the negative aspects and errors that surrounded the arbitration incident between Ali and Muawiyah (may Allah be pleased with them both) and work to avoid them. ¶

It is likely that the excellent selection of the two arbiters in terms of religious, intellectual, and political standards, their sense of zeal for the Islamic Ummah, as well as defining the issues of dispute, defining the responsibilities and powers of the two arbiters, and being keen to preserve the legitimate interests of both disputing parties as much as possible—all these factors are likely to ensure the success of the solution reached through the decisions issued by the two arbiters, by the permission of Allah. 'If they both desire reconciliation, Allah will cause reconciliation between them. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Acquainted [with all things].' (Quran 4:35). ¶

It remains for Muslim scholars across all Islamic lands to disseminate among the Ummah that arbitration is the Shariah-based solution, and that its decisions are binding by the consensus (ijma) of the Sahaba. This is to urge disputing countries to resort to this Shariah-based solution. Likewise, they must take a negative stance toward calls for holding multiple conferences that issue contradictory decisions! ¶

In conclusion, this is what I see regarding the issue raised in this section, which is: the stance of non-combatant Muslims regarding wars that occur between Islamic countries. Let us now move on to the final section of this research. ¶

Third Topic: The stance of those compelled to fight in wars occurring between Islamic countries. What position should a person who is compelled to fight in such wars between Islamic countries—which are, in reality, wars of fitna (civil strife)—take regarding this compulsion? Imam Ibn Taymiyyah answers this question in the context of the following text from his Fatawa: 'As for initiating fighting in times of fitna, it is undoubtedly impermissible. If he is compelled to be present, he must not fight, even if the Muslims kill him. This is similar to if the disbelievers were to compel him to stand in their ranks to fight against the Muslims, and similar to if a man were to compel another man to kill an innocent Muslim—it is not permissible for him to kill him by the consensus of the Muslims, even if he threatens him with death. Preserving one’s own life by killing that innocent person is not more important than the reverse. Therefore, he has no right to oppress someone else by killing them just to avoid being killed himself.' (1). I say: It is understood from this that responding by appearing on the battlefield due to compulsion is not a sin; rather, the sin lies in performing combat actions that harm other Muslims. Compliance in such matters is not permitted, even if the Muslim is coerced into it. This is also understood from what is mentioned in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir and its Commentary,' although the discussion in 'Al-Siyar al-Kabir' concerns the disbelievers compelling Muslim prisoners they hold to fight alongside them against the Muslims. However, the mentioned ruling also applies to the leaders of fitna who compel the combatants under their command to fight against other Muslims. It is stated in Al-Siyar al-Kabir and its Commentary: 'And if they say to them [i.e., the disbelievers say to the Muslim prisoners they hold]: Fight with us against the Muslims...' ¶

"And if not, we will kill you"—it is not permissible for them to fight against the Muslims; because fighting against the Muslims is in itself haram, and therefore, it is not permissible to proceed with it due to the threat of death. Just as if someone were to say to him: "Kill this Muslim, or else I will kill you." If they are threatened, they may stand in their ranks, but they must not fight against the Muslims; I hope that they would be in a state of leeway, because in this situation, they are doing no harm to the Muslims. (1) Following this, it was clarified that if there is no coercion or threat, even merely being present in the ranks of the enemy without fighting is not permissible; because this instills fear in the hearts of the Muslims, due to the large number of their enemies. However, in the presence of coercion and threat, what is permitted in this situation is solely the presence with the enemy, without engaging in combat. ¶

This pertains to the issue of coercion to initiate fighting against the Muslims. Now the question is: If a fighter is present on the battlefield during a fitna (civil strife) war—due to coercion—what should he do? ¶

The answer is: In light of what has been mentioned, he must not perform any action that results in the killing of Muslims. This is achieved either by refraining from fighting altogether, or by ensuring that his combat actions do not lead to the shedding of Muslim blood, such as by firing his projectiles in directions where they will not strike anyone whose killing is forbidden to him. ¶

But what if he happens to encounter his Muslim brother from the other side by chance, face to face, and this other person intends to kill him with the weapon he has? ¶

- Should he surrender to be killed in this situation, so that he becomes one of the martyrs of the Hereafter, as he was killed unjustly? - Or should he fight in self-defense—if he kills the other, he is excused for it and bears no sin; because he is defending himself. And if he is killed, he would be among the martyrs of the Hereafter, as previously stated? ¶

Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, in the context of explaining some of the jurisprudential opinions on this issue—that is, the issue of defense or refraining from defense during a fitna war—states: "It is known that if an aggressor attacks a person, it is permissible for him to defend himself, according to the Sunnah and Ijma' (consensus). It is only..." ¶

The jurists disagreed on whether it is obligatory for one [forced to fight in civil strife/fitna] to defend oneself through combat; there are two opinions, which are two narrations from Ahmad [ibn Hanbal]. The first is that defense of one's self is obligatory; the second is that it is merely permissible. As for initiating combat during fitna, it is undoubtedly prohibited (1). ¶

I say: Further jurisprudential details on this issue have already been discussed in the research on 'combat of fitna,' which need not be repeated here. We have established there that self-defense, in the situation we are discussing, is permissible, unless refraining from defense leads to harms greater than the harm of surrendering to being killed, in which case defense becomes obligatory in that circumstance. ¶

Furthermore, in light of the foregoing, if those compelled into the combat of fitna reach the battlefield and are subsequently able to surrender as captives to the other party, thereby avoiding being forced to fight against Muslims, then such surrender becomes obligatory upon them. This is because, in this situation, it is the determined path to avoid falling into what is haram, and it constitutes choosing the lesser of two evils. ¶

In conclusion, this—in our view—is the position that those forced to fight in the wars of fitna occurring between Islamic countries should adopt. ¶

With this, we conclude this section, and with its completion, we reach the end of the third inquiry. We now transition—by the help and guidance of Allah—to the fourth and final inquiry of the seventh and last chapter of this treatise. ¶

(1) Fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah: 4/350. ¶

(28) ¶

Mr. Chairman, I will respond to the arguments presented by these gentlemen very briefly, as I am acutely aware of the shortage of time. Firstly, what they have stated bears no relation whatsoever to the fundamental teachings of Islam. The very soul of Islam lies in 'justice and equity' and the fulfillment of the 'rights of the people' (huquq al-'ibad). ¶

An important point to note here is that those who seek to achieve their own interests in the name of Islam are, in reality, the greatest enemies of Islam. Islam does not permit anyone to hide their personal agenda under the guise of religion. ¶

In summary, we must build a society where every individual possesses equal rights, regardless of which school of thought they belong to. This is the only path through which we can achieve our objectives. ¶

I thank all the gentlemen who participated in this discussion. It is hoped that this dialogue will prove to be a precursor to a positive change in our society. ¶

Was-salam. ¶

Fourth Topic: Combat Organizations in the Islamic World and the Shari'ah Ruling on Their Activities. This discussion will not be limited to those organizations that were primarily established to use arms to achieve their objectives. Rather, we will also address those organizations or groups that have used arms occasionally, or have been attributed to using arms to achieve a certain goal. Furthermore, it is not our intention in concluding this research with this topic to provide a study, or a semi-study, of all the organizations or groups in the Islamic world in recent times—in terms of which ones were established and faded away, or which remain to this day, nor to detail their underlying principles, orientations, objectives, and activities. I say: We do not intend any of that; because such an objective—regardless of the fact that it requires an independent dissertation rather than just a section within a dissertation—would take us away from the intended purpose of this research which we are addressing, namely: 'The position of Shari'ah jurisprudence regarding the combat activities or armed actions carried out by these organizations and groups—what is legitimate among them? What is illegitimate? And which of those activities and actions fall under the category of Jihad for the sake of Allah?' Therefore, we will limit the treatment of this research to the issues contained in the following sections: First Section: The most important theoretical foundations upon which these organizations rely in bearing arms, and the position of Shari'ah jurisprudence regarding them. ¶

Second Topic: The various sources of financial, military, and political support upon which organizations rely, and the position of Shariah-based ijtihad (legal reasoning) regarding them. Third Topic: Types of organizations in terms of their operational fields. First Section: Border activities against enemies. Second Section: Fedayeen (guerrilla) activities against enemies, inside occupied territories, or within enemy lands. Third Section: Activities within Muslim countries against the state or certain segments of its society. Fourth Topic: Fighting between organizations, and the position of Shariah-based ijtihad regarding it. Fifth Topic: The position of Muslims regarding internal fighting between organizations. ¶

First Section: The most important theoretical foundations upon which militant organizations rely in taking up arms, and the position of Shariah-based ijtihad (legal reasoning) regarding them. This section contains two issues: Issue One: What are the most important foundations upon which militant organizations rely in taking up arms to achieve their objectives? Issue Two: What is the position of Shariah-based ijtihad regarding those foundations? That is, in terms of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of taking up arms based upon them. Issue One: What are the most important foundations upon which militant organizations rely in taking up arms? It is not our concern here which organizations were founded upon one or another of these foundations, except for what is mentioned by way of example. Nor is it our concern here whether those organizations relied on one foundation or more in launching their activities. Rather, what concerns us here in this issue is to review those foundations, or the most important of them, which those organizations relied upon to justify the legitimacy of their taking up arms in order to reach their goals. Consequently, we will address in the second issue: What is the position of Shariah-based ijtihad regarding those foundations? 1 - Among the foundations upon which some organizations were established, and upon which they relied for the legitimacy of taking up arms, is the liberation of Islamic lands from the occupation of the disbelieving colonizers—such as: 'The Algerian Liberation Front' (FLN) and, for example, the Palestinian 'Fatah' organization. It is stated in the 'Political Dictionary' in the definition of the Algerian Liberation Front... ¶

And the foundation upon which it was established is that: 'It is a national Algerian organization, formed since 1951 AD, which included the leaders of the secret fedayeen organizations and sincere political figures. It is the one that declared the armed revolution against the French colonialists on the first of November 1954 AD' (1). ¶

- In the definition of the Fatah organization in the 'Political Dictionary' (Al-Qamus al-Siyasi), the following is also mentioned: 'Fatah Organization: A Palestinian fedayeen organization, the name of which was derived from the abbreviation of the phrase (Harakat Tahrir Filastin - Palestine Liberation Movement) (2). It was founded on the principle that the recovery of Palestine can only be achieved by initiating the carrying of arms in the face of the Zionist occupation represented by the authorities of Israel, by conducting raids within the occupied territory, and destroying and sabotaging Israeli installations, relying in its activities on guerrilla warfare. The organization established a military apparatus within itself known as the Al-Asifa Army, to achieve the goals for which the organization was established' (3). ¶

2 - Among the foundations upon which some combat organizations were established is the endeavor to carve out parts of Islamic lands belonging to independent states existing in the Islamic world; with the aim of establishing new separate statelets in Muslim lands. An example of this is the 'Polisario Front,' which seeks to establish the 'Sahrawi Republic' in the Western Sahara, which includes the region of Saguia el-Hamra and Wadi el-Dahab, after they had entered the domain of the State of Morocco following the departure of Spanish colonialism (4). ¶

Of this kind are those militant organizations established by some Kurds in Iraq and its surrounding areas, in an attempt to establish an independent state comprising the Kurds in that region (1). ¶

3. Among the foundations upon which some organizations or associations in the Islamic world were established is the assassination of figures whom the organization or association deems guilty of treason against religion or the homeland, under the assumption that these physical liquidations protect Islam or the country from the danger represented by the role these individuals play, or attempt to play, in the country’s politics, and so forth. ¶

Among the organizations mentioned in this regard is the Iranian 'Fedayeen-e-Islam' association. ¶

In the Political Dictionary, the definition of this association is as follows: 'Fedayeen-e-Islam: An Iranian political association of an ideological nature, which played a prominent role in the political struggle in Iran after World War II. Its establishment is attributed to (Nawab Safavi). Among its principles is that the assassination of traitors to religion and the homeland is not considered a crime. Consequently, its name became associated with a number of assassinations, especially after it began to act under the orders of the religious leader (Ayatollah Kashani) following the imprisonment of its leader (Nawab Safavi). On March 7, 1951, one of the members of 'Fedayeen-e-Islam' assassinated the Prime Minister, General (Razmara), due to his pro-Western petroleum policy' (2). ¶

4. Among the foundations upon which some organizations in Islamic countries were established is to work on... ¶

Overturning the existing regimes in the countries of the Islamic world and establishing an Islamic state upon their ruins. ¶

Among the organizations or groups founded on this basis is the Jihad group in Egypt. Dr. Muhammad Imara, in presenting the foundational ideology upon which this group was built, states the following: 'Eliminating the state of kufr (disbelief) that has apostatized from Islam, establishing the Islamic state, returning Islam to the Muslims, and launching the movement to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate anew—this is the summary of the Jihad group's ideology, as it is scattered across the few pages of the book "The Neglected Obligation" (Al-Farida al-Gha'iba).' ¶

In the context of explaining the instrument upon which the Jihad group relies to achieve these objectives, Dr. Imara says: 'Jihad is the path to establishing the Islamic state. The mujahid group is the tool of jihad to establish this state, and this group is formed from a few believers in jihad who will challenge, and by the permission of Allah, overcome the stubborn majority.' Dr. Imara cites the following text from the book 'The Neglected Obligation,' which this group published: 'The basis for the presence of colonialism in the lands of Islam is these rulers. Therefore, starting by eliminating colonialism is a futile and useless act; it is nothing but a waste of time. We must focus on our Islamic cause, which is first to establish the law (Shariah) of Allah in our country and to make the word of Allah supreme. There is no doubt that the primary battlefield of jihad is to uproot those kafir (disbelieving) leaders and replace them with the complete Islamic system. From here, the journey begins.' ¶

Consequently, these are the most important foundations upon which some of the organizations or groups were established that... ¶

We made them models for others, which took up arms in the Islamic world and adopted it as a path to achieve their sought-after goals. ¶

With this, we conclude this first issue and move to the second issue. ¶

The Second Issue: What is the position of Shariah-based Ijtihad (legal reasoning) regarding those foundations? That is, in terms of the legitimacy or lack thereof of taking up arms based upon them. ¶

The answer to this question—briefly—is as follows: ¶

First: Taking up arms on the basis of fighting an enemy that has usurped Islamic lands is part of the Jihad that is obligatory upon all Muslims in all their regions, not just upon the people of the usurped lands. This applies until the liberation of the occupied land is achieved by eliminating the enemy, expelling them from the country, or by their surrender and the application of Shariah rulings regarding them. Detailed discussion on this has preceded in the third chapter regarding the causes for declaring Jihad, and subsequently in the sixth chapter regarding the causes for ceasing hostilities. ¶

Dr. Fathi Al-Dirini, in the context of discussing the ruling on fighting the disbelievers to liberate Islamic lands from occupation, states: 'The ruling in Shariah is that if any part of the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) is severed, it is incumbent upon all Muslims to fight the enemy and rescue these lands from the enemies of Allah. This is a Fard Ayn (individual obligation), which is binding upon all Muslims in all their lands to rise up for Jihad in the cause of Allah.' ¶

Based on this, some Palestinian combat organizations working in this field appeal to Muslims of every region and race to join the caravan of Jihad for the liberation of Palestine. ¶

One of the leaders of these organizations says: 'This holy land is not the land of the Palestinians, nor is it the land of the Arabs. This is the land of Islam.' ¶

Islam. And liberating it is a right and an obligation (fard), an individual obligation (fard al-ayn), not a collective one (fard al-kifaya). It is an individual obligation upon every Muslim to come forward with whatever they can to liberate this Muslim land, the land of Palestine (1). ¶

Then, regarding certain projects aimed at recognizing the Zionist entity and ceding parts of Palestine to Israel in order to reclaim other parts of that usurped land to establish a Palestinian state, he states in this context: 'No Palestinian, no Arab, and no Muslim has the right... to say: This land is not Palestinian or this land is not Islamic. This is the property of Islam. No one, whether they be Palestinian or Arab, any (2) international conference, any international body, or any international negotiations, has the right to affirm the legitimacy of the entity or to suggest relinquishing any part of the land of Palestine (3).' He then adds: 'In the name of all the mujahideen (strugglers) among your Palestinian brothers, we pledge to Allah, we pledge to the Messenger of Allah, and we pledge to every Muslim that we will remain standard-bearers and that we will remain armed as long as a vein pulsates. We will never surrender... This land is the land of the Arabs and the Muslims. We must eventually triumph. This is a vow. This is the vow of all the revolutionaries, this is the vow of every Palestinian who holds a stone inside the occupied territory to strike this usurping enemy...' (4). ¶

In emphasizing that the cause of Palestine is the cause of all Muslims in the Islamic world and that they must fulfill their duty to reclaim all of it from the usurping enemy, and that it is not permissible to isolate them from performing this duty—in emphasizing this matter, the Cultural Counselor of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus, Dr. Sadegh Ainehvand, says: 'The cause of the noble Jerusalem (al-Quds al-Sharif) and dear Palestine is not an Arab-Jewish issue. Rather, it is far beyond that... It is...' ¶

The war between Islam and Zionism: This deformed offspring of global arrogance, and the repugnant germ that the hateful British colonialism planted in Islamic lands. Those who wish to reduce the issue of Al-Quds and Palestine to a merely Arab-Jewish conflict, and who struggle within the confines of their own specific region, are working to sideline the moral and material powers of eight hundred (800) million Muslims, who believe in one God, one Prophet, perform the same prayer, and hold common values and ideals. Sidelining these forces is an unforgivable sin and an unwise act. ¶

Furthermore, this is the basis upon which some combat organizations are founded, with the goal of reclaiming Islamic lands from the occupying infidel—among them are the organizations working to liberate Palestine. ¶

It is not our concern here to enter into the ongoing debates regarding whether these organizations are capable of continuing the fight until they succeed in drawing Muslims into a popular war through which the country is liberated, or if their role is limited to carrying out restricted combat operations to keep the arena of conflict hot against the enemy, and to keep the spirit of Jihad burning in the hearts of the Ummah until various conditions become ripe for the liberation of the land decisively through conventional warfare. ¶

I say: It is not important for us to enter into these discussions. What is important is that the basis of relying on armed struggle in the confrontation with the usurping enemy is a legitimate basis, and fighting on this basis is part of Jihad in the way of Allah. Whoever has a sincere intention in this fight shall have the reward of the Mujahideen, and whoever among them is martyred shall have the reward of the martyrs. It is irrelevant whether this armed activity leads to the liberation of the land in the end, or is limited in the current state to keeping the enemy in a constant state of terror and anticipation through fedayeen operations that disturb their sleep from time to time. All of this is 'Jihad Mabrur' (an accepted Jihad). ¶

Second: As for taking up arms based on the pursuit of establishing separate states that are cut off from the body... ¶

Independent states existing within the Islamic world—this is an unlawful (ghayr mashru’) act; because it contradicts the textual evidences (nusus) and the Shari'ah principles from which the call for the unity of Muslims into a single entity and a single state is understood. This, and the detailed discussion and exposition of the Shari'ah proofs regarding this issue, have already been presented in a previous section under the title 'Combat for the sake of the unity of Islamic lands' in the first chapter. And as previously indicated, we have not included this final chapter of the treatise for the purpose of resuming the treatment of the topics whose headings appear within it, as all or most of them have already been studied in their proper context within the preceding sections. Rather, our intent with this chapter—given the topics it includes—is to draw attention to them and, consequently, to point out the locations of their treatment throughout this treatise. ¶

Thirdly: As for taking up arms on the basis of carrying out political assassinations and liquidating individuals who are judged by the perpetrators of this basis to be traitorous criminals against the religion and the country—under the assumption that resorting to this terrorism is a means to deter those in charge of the country's affairs from proceeding along the path of deviation, conspiracy, and policies that harm the interests of the Ummah, and to compel them to oversee the affairs of the Muslims according to the teachings of Islam—I say: taking up arms on this basis is an unlawful (ghayr mashru’) act, as we have favored in the previous researches connected to this issue, such as 'Combat for the defense of public sanctities,' 'Combat against the ruler's deviation,' and 'Combat for the establishment of the Islamic state.' In summary, when the society is not an Islamic society—meaning its relationships and systems do not function according to the teachings of Islam—then rectifying the deviation of those who are deviant within it is not achieved through terrorism and assassinations. Rather, it is achieved through the endeavor to establish the Islamic society, and then protecting this society from deviations. ¶