Chapter 60

Nevertheless, if they have no impact in inflicting damage upon the enemy, flight becomes obligatory. This text is clear in explaining the various situations and their rulings, and it stands in no need of commentary. ¶

3 - In the Shafi'i School: It is stated in Al-Muhadhdhab by Al-Shirazi that when the Muslim army meets the army of the disbelievers, we observe the following: First: If the number of disbelievers does not exceed twice the number of Muslims, there are two situations: - The First Situation: If the Muslims do not fear annihilation—that is, from fighting or continuing to fight—then remaining steadfast is mandatory, and fighting becomes obligatory upon them. However, it is permissible for them to depart from the battlefield for one of two reasons: (a) With the intention of maneuvering for battle (taharruf li-l-qital). (b) With the intention of joining a group (tahayyuz ila fi'a), even if it is distant. If any fighter turns away in this situation without this intention or that, he is sinful and has committed one of the major sins. - The Second Situation: If it is the overwhelming opinion of the Muslims that they will perish—that is, if they fight or continue to fight, despite the polytheists not exceeding twice the number of Muslims—there are two scholarly opinions (wajhan) regarding the ruling for this case: The first opinion: It is permissible for them to flee, based on the saying of the Almighty: "And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction" (2:195). The second opinion: It is not permissible for them to flee, and this is the authentic (sahih) view, based on the saying of the Almighty: "When you meet a group..." (1) Al-Qawanin al-Shar'iyya by Ibn Juzayy, p. 165. Furthermore, regarding the number (twelve thousand), Imam Malik generalizes the obligation for Muslim fighters to confront their opponents if they reach this quorum—in the context of a rebellion against rulers if they govern by other than the Shariah. It is stated in Ahkam al-Qur'an by Al-Jassas: "Al-Tahawi mentioned that Malik was asked: 'Is it permissible for us to refrain from fighting those who have emerged against the laws of Allah and governed by other than them?' Malik replied: 'If you have with you twelve thousand like yourself, it is not permissible for you to refrain.'" (4/228). This is also found in Al-Jami' li-Ahkam al-Qur'an by Al-Qurtubi (7/382). ¶

Remain steadfast. For the mujahid fights only to kill or to be killed. This applies when the disbelievers are not more than double the number of the Muslims. ¶

Second: If the number of the disbelievers exceeds double the number of the Muslims, they are permitted to withdraw and flee from the battle. In this state of permissibility, there is some detail: ¶

A - If it is highly probable that the fighting will not lead to the destruction of the Muslim combatants, then it is better that they fight and do not withdraw or flee, so that the Muslims are not demoralized. ¶

B - If it is highly probable that fighting in this situation will lead to the destruction of the Muslim army, there are two legal opinions (wajhan) regarding this issue: First opinion: It is obligatory (wajib) to withdraw and flee, based on the saying of the Almighty: 'And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction.' Second opinion: Withdrawal and fleeing is merely recommended (mustahabb), not obligatory, because if they are killed, they attain martyrdom. ¶

Furthermore, the author of Al-Muhadhdhab discusses a case of individual combat outside the battlefield, stating: 'If a man from among the Muslims encounters two of the polytheists outside of war, and they pursue him while he does not pursue them, he is allowed to turn away from them, as he is not prepared for battle. If he pursues them and they do not pursue him, there are two opinions regarding this.' ¶

One of these [opinions] is that he is permitted to turn away from the two, because the obligation of jihad is tied to the group (jama'ah) rather than individual combat. The second is that it is haram (forbidden) for him to turn away from the two, because he is a mujahid (combatant) against them, and thus he cannot turn away from them just as if he were part of a group. This is what is stated in the Shafi'i madhhab. ¶

4 - The Hanbali Madhhab: The Hanbalis addressed the issue of fleeing from the battlefield in a manner similar to the Shafi'is, with slight differences. It is appropriate to quote passages from Ibn Qudamah's 'Al-Mughni' in this regard for further emphasis and clarification, as he stated: «When the Muslims and the disbelievers meet, steadfastness becomes mandatory and fleeing is forbidden... under two conditions: First, that the disbelievers do not exceed double the number of the Muslims. If they do exceed them, fleeing is permitted... Second, that he does not intend to rejoin a group or regroup for further combat. If he intends either of these two, then it is permissible for him... And if the enemy is more than double the Muslims: (a) If the Muslims believe they have a strong probability of victory: It is better for them to remain steadfast due to the benefit (maslaha) therein, and if they withdraw, it is permissible because they are not secure from destruction. It is also probable that remaining steadfast is obligatory upon them if they are certain of victory, due to the benefit involved. (b) If they are certain of destruction by remaining and salvation in withdrawing: It is better for them to withdraw. If they remain steadfast, it is permissible, as they have the intention of martyrdom, though it is possible they may be defeated.» ¶

C - If they believe that both staying and retreating will lead to destruction, it is better for them to remain steadfast so that they may attain the rank of martyrs. It is also possible that they may prevail, for Allah Almighty says: 'How many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of Allah. And Allah is with the patient' (Surah Al-Baqarah: 249). This is the position of the Hanbalis on this issue. ¶

In conclusion, this is a summary of what some jurisprudential references have stated regarding the issue of fleeing or retreating from enemies during an encounter, whether at the level of the army, a battalion, or the individual. With this, we conclude the second point and move to the third. ¶

Third point: Our view on the issue of fleeing from the battlefield and retreating from fighting the enemy. I say: Considering the reality of modern warfare and in light of the Shariah rulings on this issue, we hold the following view: 1. If a specific position or role is assigned to any fighter or combat unit in the formulated war plan, it is not permissible to deviate from what has been ordained for them, neither for the purpose of maneuvering for battle (al-taharruf lil-qital) nor for the purpose of joining another group (al-tahayyuz ila fi'a). This is based on what is reported in Sahih al-Bukhari regarding the 'Ghazwah of Uhud,' where 'The Prophet (ﷺ) stationed a group of archers, appointed Abdullah (i.e., Ibn Jubayr) over them, and said: Do not move. If you see us prevailing over them, do not move. And if you see them prevailing over us, do not come to our aid.' 2. If the general war plan allows for maneuvering for battle or joining another group as part of the sub-plans—where fighters are left with the discretion to act as dictated by the war situation and emerging circumstances on the battlefield—then in this case, it is permissible for the individual fighter or combat unit to move, relocate, or cease combat activity for a short or long period, within the permitted framework, for the purpose of maneuvering for battle or joining another group. ¶

Or moving position, or abandoning the fight for any reason other than this—is considered fleeing from the battlefield (farar min al-zahf). Here, individual fighters or combat units, large or small, may perform actions in this field about which the command cannot judge: were they done with the intention of maneuvering for combat (taharruf lil-qital) or shifting toward another unit (tahayyuz ila fi’ah), as is permissible, or were they done with the intention of distancing themselves from the fires of war and prioritizing safety? In this case, it is the intention driving these actions that makes them permissible, because they fall within the allowed limits, or renders them among the major sins, because it is an escape from combat, using permissible tactics as a pretext to cover that up. ¶

3. Jihad, in the case of offensive combat against the disbelievers, if the interest (maslaha) demands it, is only legally binding (wajib) when the balance of power between the Muslims and their enemy is in a state where the enemy’s strength does not exceed double the strength of the Muslims. However, if the Islamic strength falls below this level, jihad is then permissible but not mandatory, provided that no harm to the Muslims results from it. ¶

Indeed, jihad is mandatory or permissible, as mentioned, despite this deficiency in the Muslims' material military strength, because they possess what others do not—that which compensates for this deficiency and puts them in a position of advantage. I mean: they possess the spiritual power represented by faith in God, the anticipation of His reward for obeying His command to rise for jihad, the fear of His punishment in the event of fleeing from the battlefield, and the longing for Paradise through martyrdom, among other spiritual values. These are the values that led the righteous predecessors (al-salaf al-salih) of the Muslims to confront hostile forces that outnumbered them by tens of times in numerous battles. Nevertheless, victory walked in the company of the Muslims to the extent that they possessed that spiritual power—the power that prompted 'Al-Muqawqis' to say regarding them during the conquest of Egypt: 'By Him who is sworn by! If these people were to face mountains, they would remove them, and no one has the strength to fight them!' (1). ¶

Al-Qurtubi says in his tafsir: 'It is recorded in the history of Andalusia that Tariq (the mawla of Musa ibn Nusayr) marched with one thousand seven hundred men to Andalusia, in Rajab, the year 93... ¶

They migrated, and then met the King of Andalusia (Roderic), who had seventy thousand horsemen (1). Tariq marched towards him and remained steadfast; God defeated the tyrant Roderic, and thus the conquest was achieved (2). ¶

4. The standard for assessing the balance of power between the Muslims and their enemy, according to the proportion mentioned above, is not the number of individual combatants on each side. Rather, it is the total power possessed by each party, regardless of its components, as estimated by military experts specialized in this field. Even if this opinion contradicts the view of the majority of jurists, which Imam al-Nawawi expresses by stating: 'They differed on whether the standard is purely numerical without considering strength and weakness, or whether the latter should be considered? The majority view is that they are not considered, due to the apparent meaning of the Quran (3).' I (the author) say: If our position of considering the aspects of strength and weakness in the total power possessed by each party contradicts the opinion of the majority, who consider the number of combatants the only measure of power, then our evidence is the action of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) in withdrawing from Ta'if after besieging it for over twenty days. During this time, intense fighting occurred, and arrows were exchanged between the two parties, resulting in the martyrdom of a number of the Companions, without any indication that victory could be achieved in this conflict by continuing the siege and the fighting (4). ¶

In this battle of Ta'if, the balance of material military power seemed to lean toward the enemy by more than double compared to what the Muslims possessed. This is because the enemy was surrounded by the defensive weaponry of the fortress of Ta'if, which the Muslims could not breach, nor could they weaken the resolve of the defenders behind it, even though they (the Muslims) used significant offensive weaponry against those defensive arms and those sheltered by them, such as the dababah (siege engine), the catapult, and arrows. However, the enemy, with those defensive fortifications and their reliance on offensive weapons—consisting of arrows and iron rails heated by fire, which were thrown at the Muslims from above—held the advantage. ¶

Walls - it managed to hold firm against the Muslims. From this, the Prophet (peace be upon him) realized that there was no utility in continuing the siege and combat in this manner, so he issued his command to stop the fighting, lift the siege, and head towards Medina. ¶

Furthermore, considering the numerical aspect of the combatants on both sides in this expedition, we note that the Muslim fighters who surrounded the fortress of Ta’if were, it seems, more numerous than the fighters of the people of Ta’if who stood on the walls of the fortress, launching projectiles and arrows from them. However, the calculation of total power leaned in favor of the enemy, despite the Muslims' superiority in the number of combatants. This—meaning the withdrawal from continuing the battle, despite the Muslims' numerical superiority—indicates that the Prophetic Sunnah, as manifested in the action of the Messenger (peace be upon him), did not consider only the numerical aspect of the combatants in fighting or continuing it against the enemy, but also took into account the calculation of total power, regardless of the numbers. ¶

Thus, we harmonize between what the Quranic text indicates—the consideration of only the number of combatants—and what the Prophetic Sunnah indicates in the siege of Ta’if—the consideration of total power without regard to the number of combatants. We harmonize between these two evidences by stating: ¶

- The number is considered a measure of power between the two parties when the number by itself is evidence of that power. That is: when there is parity or near-parity in the weapons used by both parties, and other such factors placed in the balance of power. ¶

- The consideration of number as a measure of power between the two parties is nullified when the number by itself is not evidence of that power, in the manner mentioned. ¶

Thus, the established jurisprudential principle—that implementing both evidences is better than implementing one and neglecting the other—governs what the various Shariah evidences convey in this matter, and assigns to each of them the domain over which it holds sway. ¶

Moreover, it is self-evident that contemporary weapons such as tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, and the like—which act as mobile fortresses advancing towards the opponent or swooping down upon them, bombarding them with the terrifying projectiles in their arsenal—these weapons are, it is obvious, more impregnable than the static fortresses that were... ¶

In ancient times, fortresses protected those within, as they showered the enemy with arrows from their quivers. . . If the Sunnah of the Prophet considered ancient fortresses in the decision to withdraw from them, and nullified the reliance on the number of fighters—as was the case in the Siege of Taif—then it is even more imperative that modern weaponry be given consideration in nullifying the limitation of relying solely on the number of fighters when calculating the balance of power between the Muslims and the enemy, especially when a decision to withdraw is made due to an imbalance in weaponry or similar factors between the two sides. . . As for the number twelve thousand mentioned in the noble Hadith regarding this matter, we do not understand it to mean that whenever the Muslims possess such a number, they cannot be defeated by an enemy, or that it is not permissible for them to withdraw from any force confronting them. . . I say: We do not interpret this Hadith in that way, because the Muslims possessed such a number at Hunayn and were defeated in the first round (1), just as they withdrew with a similar number from Taif. . . What we understand from the Hadith is that such a number, compared to what the Muslims usually faced from the forces of polytheism in the Arabian Peninsula, was a force capable of resisting those powers, and this was what actually happened. . . Furthermore, the mentioned Hadith should not be isolated from the rest of the textual evidence and other Shariah-based historical precedents used to judge the various facets of the issue we are addressing. In light of those texts and events, it signifies that the Prophet (PBUH) wished to express to his companions his joy at possessing an army of this size, and he urged them to remain steadfast against any enemy who confronts them as an aggressor or as an obstacle to the reaching of the Da'wah to the people. . . This is because they no longer lacked the numerical strength which was, for the most part, the criterion of power in their struggle against the leaders of paganism in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. . . ¶

(1) It is worth mentioning here that the Prophet (PBUH) remained steadfast, along with a group of his companions, and they did not flee. . . It is stated in Sahih al-Bukhari that a man from Qays asked Al-Bara' ibn 'Azib: 'Did you flee from the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) on the day of Hunayn?' He replied: 'But the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) did not flee!' (No. 4317, Fath al-Bari: 8/28). See also those who remained steadfast with the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) on that day (Sirat Ibn Hisham - edited by Muhammad Muhyi al-Din 'Abd al-Hamid: 4/72). ¶

And its power, regardless of how much it may be possible to strengthen it, and whatever alliances and blocs it may form, cannot exceed the Shariah-prescribed threshold (nissab) within which Allah has mandated confronting the enemy (1). ¶

Furthermore, what has been presented in this paragraph pertains to the jihad that is obligatory in the case of offensive combat (al-qital al-hujumi) against the enemy. ¶

(e) As for the jihad that is obligatory in the case of defensive combat (al-qital al-difa'i), we state: When circumstances arise in which the offensive of the blocs of the disbelievers is unleashed upon the entire Muslim Ummah, aiming to eradicate it or—God forbid—to erase Islam from existence, then in such a situation, it is incumbent upon the leaders of the Muslim Ummah to work toward fragmenting that hostile front by any possible and legitimate means, with the objective of causing divisions within those blocs and diverting them from what they have gathered for, even if it be by enticing them or tempting some of them with material benefits. This is exactly what the Prophet ﷺ did during the Battle of the Trench, when all the prominent forces in the Arabian Peninsula gathered around Medina against him to wipe the Islamic base out of existence (2). And if war is ultimately inevitable, then at this point, the balance of power between the defending Muslims and the invading enemies is not to be considered, neither in terms of numbers nor in terms of weaponry. It is the duty of the Muslims to wage war regardless of how weak they are and how powerful their enemy has become, even if millions of Muslims were to fall as martyrs (3). In such a situation, it is not permissible for a Muslim to think of fleeing or withdrawing from this decisive battle; just as was the case of the Muslims during the Battle of the Trench. «And Allah will surely help those who help Him; indeed, Allah is All-Powerful, Exalted in Might.» (4). And Allah drove back the enemies who were allies... ¶

(1) See: Fath al-Bari regarding the gathering of Hawazin against the Muslims, Vol. 8/29. Furthermore, support for the argument that the number of twelve thousand is linked to the Shariah threshold when facing the number of polytheists can be found in Sirah Ibn Hisham: "Ibn Ishaq said: Some people of Mecca told me that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said—when he departed from Mecca to Hunayn and saw the vast number of the soldiers of Allah with him—(We shall not be defeated today due to small numbers). Ibn Ishaq said: Some people claimed that a man from Banu Bakr said it." Sirah Ibn Hisham, ed. Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid: 4/73. It is also mentioned that the polytheists in this battle were about double the number of the Muslims, which is the Shariah ratio for numerical balance between the two parties for the obligation of combat and steadfastness. (2) See Sirah Ibn Hisham: (Al-Rawd al-Unuf: 3/259). (3) See Hashiyat al-Bujayrimi 'ala Sharh al-Khatib: 4/229. (4) Surah Al-Hajj, verse 40. ¶

They attained no good with their disgrace, and those among the Jews who had violated the covenant and joined them were liquidated, as they had intended to stab the Muslims in the back(1). ¶

As for the scenario where the aggression of the disbelievers against the Muslims is not aimed at their total eradication nor the eradication of Islam from existence, but rather seeks to rob them of some of their assets—such as lands, regions, or wealth, and the like—then it is obligatory to defend [the land] by every possible legitimate means, regardless of the balance of power between the Muslims and their enemy. It is not permissible to flee from them, as the resulting harm from such flight is greater than the harm of standing firm against this invading enemy. However, when all calculations confirm that the harms of standing firm and resisting are, for Islam and the Muslims, greater than the harms of withdrawing from the face of the enemy, then in this situation, it is permissible for the leaders loyal to Islam and the Muslims in the state to decide to withdraw from the face of the invading army from certain cities or regions of the Islamic lands. This, however, is not with the intention of abandoning them permanently to the enemy, but with the intention of making the necessary preparations to engage them at the earliest possible opportunity and to repel them from what was abandoned due to military necessities. ¶

Indeed, the commanders of the Muslim armies during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate—after they had conquered lands and cities, made them part of the Dar al-Islam, and annexed them to the Islamic state—were sometimes forced to abandon them. They would even return the jizya they had collected from the people of dhimma (protected non-Muslims) and withdraw from those lands and cities before the enemy. Yet, this was not done with the intention of abandoning them forever, nor of recognizing the enemy's control or rule over them, but with the intent of regrouping and preparing to engage the enemy once again, and to drive them back from what had been abandoned due to necessity, as previously mentioned. This occurred during the conquests of the Levant and Persia, in a manner well-known in the history of Islamic conquests(2). Such a withdrawal was not considered 'fleeing from the march' (al-firar min al-zahf). ¶

Rather, it was of the nature of repositioning toward a group for the purpose of counter-attacking after a retreat. And war, as it is said, consists of advancing and retreating. ¶

6. This is one aspect, and there is a situation that jurists encounter when discussing the subject of fleeing from the battlefield (farrar min al-zahf), for which we find similar manifestations in our modern era... ¶

An example is that some countries hostile to Muslims, which possess massive military power, may demonstrate that power with arrogance, haughtiness, and vanity before the Muslims—on land, at sea, and in the air. They may also mobilize their forces in sight of the Muslims with the intention of casting terror into their ranks so that they might offer the concessions they desire. In such an explosive situation, are the Muslims obligated to be the ones to ignite the fuse of an actual war between themselves and these states by attacking them or their forces? Is this not exactly what the enemy desires in order to adopt it as an international pretext to incite global public opinion against the Muslims through cunning and deception, subsequently striking them a painful blow that destroys their military power, thereby achieving their underlying greed to seize the resources of the Muslims and dominate them? ¶

I ask: Are the Muslims obligated to initiate war against this enemy? Or is it permissible for them to fortify themselves and refrain from engaging, regardless of how much the enemy displays arrogance, oppression, and psychological warfare before them? ¶

And if the Muslims refrain from engaging this enemy—who is provoking them to battle—are they, in this state, considered to be fleeing from the battlefield? ¶

Imam al-Shafi’i addressed a situation similar to the one we are discussing. We find the answer to the questions posed in the context of the following text from his writings: “There is no restriction on Muslims to fortify themselves against the enemy, in the lands of the enemy or in the lands of Islam, even if they are in a position of strength over the enemy, as they perceive it, provided they believe that this is more beneficial to their strength, so long as the enemy does not seize anything from the Muslims or their wealth while they are fortified against them. If either of these cases causes harm... [to] the obedient! I disliked this from your opinion and your action! And I asked your messenger about the opinion of all of you, and he claimed that it was the choice of your best, your wise, and your community! Then I knew that Allah (Azza wa Jall) would not unite your opinion except upon success, correctness, and guidance in this life and the hereafter. This eased the dislike I had felt before regarding your change. Your messenger has asked me for reinforcements, and I am sending them to you before he even reads this letter of mine to you!!’” p. 159. ¶

For the Muslims—if it is possible for them to depart [to join the battle], it is restricted [forbidden] for them to lag behind. However, if the enemy has become overwhelming, there is no harm in them fortifying themselves until reinforcements arrive or they gain strength. If aid is slow to reach them, there is no harm in them turning away from the enemy, provided they have not yet engaged them; for the prohibition specifically applies to turning away after the engagement has begun. ¶

The author of Al-Mughni states: 'If the enemy enters a town, its people may fortify themselves against them, even if they [the enemy] are more than half their number, so that they may receive reinforcements or strength. This does not constitute turning away or fleeing; turning away only occurs after engaging the enemy.' ¶

In Mughni al-Muhtaj, regarding the stance that individuals and groups of Muslims should adopt when facing such situations, it states: 'Groups and individuals among us should not hasten to repel a king among them who possesses great power and has entered the borders of our lands, due to the great danger involved.' ¶

Thus, if the interest, in the context we are discussing, lies in fortifying against the enemy and refraining from meeting them, this does not fall under the category of fleeing from the battlefield. However, if a confrontation occurs, war breaks out, and engagement takes place, then turning away from it constitutes fleeing, in light of what has been previously discussed in this research. ¶

In conclusion, this is what we observe and what we consider most sound regarding the ruling on the most important aspects related to the issue of fleeing from the battlefield. ¶

With this, we conclude this point and proceed to the final point in this research. ¶

Fourth Point: What is the penalty for fleeing from the battlefield? ¶

There are texts and historical accounts related to this issue. It has already been established in the first point of this research that the Prophet (ﷺ), during the Battle of Hunayn, anticipated that the battalion of Banu Sulaym might flee from the battlefield or contemplate flight. Consequently, he assigned the Juhaynah battalion to position themselves behind them, issuing an order to use their weapons on the necks of those fighters from that battalion who might attempt to flee the battle or show laxity in steadfastness, patience, and resisting the enemy—behavior that spreads a spirit of defeatism within the army. This is what may be understood from the text. Indeed, some narrations state that Juhaynah did kill a group from Banu Sulaym—specifically, the tribe of Banu Usayyah—who attempted to flee that day, manifesting the very behavior the Prophet (ﷺ) had feared. However, this narration is not authentic and, therefore, cannot be relied upon for deriving the Shariah-based ruling on punishing those who flee from combat or those who attempt to do so. Furthermore, the Hadith of Umm Sulaym during the Battle of Hunayn, which is recorded in Sahih Muslim—as previously mentioned—states that she said to the Prophet (ﷺ): 'O Messenger of Allah! Kill those among the Tulaqa (the freed captives) who are behind us; they have deserted you.' This Hadith indicates that, in the view of Umm Sulaym, one who flees the battlefield deserves to be killed. The response of the Prophet (ﷺ), it seems, does not reject her statement. Rather, his words, 'Allah has sufficed and acted well,' suggest that since the war ultimately concluded with the positive result of a Muslim victory in the second round, and Allah spared the believers from the expected harms resulting from the defeat of those who fled, there was no longer a necessity to punish these fugitives. Such discourse may imply that had their desertion led to adverse consequences, they would have been deserving of the mentioned punishment. Furthermore, during the era of the Rashidun Caliphate, it is recorded regarding the Battle of Yarmouk that many immigrant (Muhajir) women attended the battle, were seated behind the ranks of the Muslims, and stones were placed in front of them. Abu Sufyan said to them: 'Do not let any Muslim return to you (retreating) without throwing these [stones] at him.' ¶

stones, and said to them: Who can hope for you after fleeing from Islam, its people, and the women, while they are before the enemy of Allah?! Just as the army commander, Khalid ibn al-Walid, said to them at that time: 'O Muslim women! Whichever man comes to you defeated, kill him.'(1) ¶

It is also reported from the news of the Persian front during the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate—as mentioned in the first point—that when word reached Umar ibn al-Khattab of Abu Ubayd al-Thaqafi’s insistence on fighting in an unequal battle to inflict harm upon the enemy, even if he and the Muslims with him were martyred—and that is indeed what happened—when this news reached Umar ibn al-Khattab, he said: 'If they had turned back to me, I would have been a refuge (fi'ah) for them.' ¶

It is also reported, as previously stated, that Umar ibn al-Khattab rebuked two men who had fled from some battles on the Persian front, and he reprimanded them severely... Such reprimand is considered among the ta'zir (discretionary) punishments that authority imposes upon the disobedient and violators. ¶

I say: It is understood from the report of Abu Ubayd al-Thaqafi that withdrawal and turning to a supporting group (tahayyuz ila fi'ah) is permissible if the Islamic force is not capable of standing against the enemy's strength.(2) ¶

It is also understood from the report of the two fleeing men, whom Umar ibn al-Khattab rebuked, that when fleeing is prohibited, the perpetrator deserves a punishment determined by the one in authority. This may be a reprimand or rebuke, as Umar ibn al-Khattab did, and the punishment can even reach the level of flogging. ¶

(Footnotes): (1) Sayf Allah Khalid ibn al-Walid, by Umar Rida Kahhala: p. 148. See also: Tarikh Futuh al-Sham, by al-Azdi: p. 223 onwards. (2) This is also understood from the report of Ibn Umar mentioned in the first point. Although some hadith scholars deemed it weak, its implication is validated by other evidence. The permissibility of this is also understood from the report of the Battle of Mu'tah and Khalid ibn al-Walid withdrawing the army, and the Prophet (PBUH) describing Khalid’s action as a 'fath' (victory/opening), as in Sahih al-Bukhari (No. 1246, Fath al-Bari: Vol 3/116). We did not mention this report in the first point because it is not clear from historical accounts whether Khalid fought after taking command, achieved victory, succeeded, and brought back spoils and captives as some accounts claim, or if he withdrew the army as a war tactic to ensure the safety of the Muslims in an unequal battle, as implied by people calling them 'fugitives' in other accounts. Naming his action a 'fath' may mean war and victory, or it may mean success in protecting the army by abandoning the fight and withdrawing (See: al-Rawd al-Unuf: 4/81, and Majma' al-Zawa'id: 6/159-160). ¶

As in the report of Abu Sufyan at Yarmouk... or perhaps it may reach the level of execution, as might be understood from the hadith of (Umm Sulaym) at Hunayn, and as occurred in the threat by (Khalid ibn al-Walid) - as mentioned in the reports regarding his mandate to the Muslim women at Yarmouk to kill anyone who approached them while retreating, fleeing from the battlefield in the face of the enemy. ¶

This and similar severe punishments are well-known in the laws of war among states. Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli says: "Prevailing laws of war dictate the execution of a soldier who flees during battle, so that they do not become a cause for the destabilization of the army's ranks, or the spread of a spirit of defeatism and weakness among the rest of the soldiers, which would lead to defeat" (1). ¶

Furthermore, in light of the aforementioned texts and the Shariah-based occurrences related to the issue of punishment for fleeing from the battlefield... we observe that there is no explicitly fixed punishment for fleeing from the battlefield attributed to the Prophet (PBUH). However, given that fleeing from the battlefield is one of the major sins, and it may result in consequences and effects that inflict the most severe harm and dangers upon the Muslims... and given that the person in authority has the right to impose a discretionary (ta'zir) punishment that serves as a deterrent against committing sins and violations... ¶

Therefore, we believe that it should be left to those in authority to determine the punishment they deem corrective and deterrent against the crime of fleeing from the battlefield, while taking into account—when estimating that punishment—the magnitude of the danger resulting from that crime, in light of the specific circumstances of each battle, the status of the person fleeing, their motives for fleeing, or the extent to which others were affected by them in this regard... the time at which this crime occurred, the time at which the punishment is being carried out, and other various considerations that the officials deem necessary to observe in determining the mentioned punishment. ¶

We also believe, regarding this issue, that such punishment should not reach the level of execution except in extreme cases where the dangers of this crime cannot be resolved except by such a punishment. Perhaps the evidence and reports mentioned earlier support this direction. ¶

With this, we conclude this final point. And with its conclusion, we come to the end of this research, and move on to a new topic—by the grace and assistance of Allah. ¶

(1) Athar al-Harb (The Effects of War): Professor Dr. Wahba al-Zuhayli, p. 727. ¶

They state that they themselves had also entered into the circle of discipleship (murideen) of Hazrat Maulana. The fame and acceptance that Hazrat Maulana attained during that period can be gauged by the fact that people from the length and breadth of the subcontinent, and even from outside India, would arrive to attain spiritual benefit (faiz). An important aspect of his life is his literary contributions. He authored many books on various religious and academic subjects, which remain a guiding light for seekers of knowledge today. His writings possess a simplicity and effectiveness that go straight to the heart. The essence of his teachings was sincerity (ikhlas), God-consciousness (taqwa), and presence of heart (hudur-e-qalb). He used to say that the attainment of the gnosis (ma'rifah) of Allah Almighty is only possible when a person cleanses their inner self from sins. Ultimately, he passed away, but his teachings and a vast chain of students trained by him keep his blessings alive to this day. ¶

Seventh Topic: The Martyr (Shaheed), His Rulings, and His Family After Him ¶

Among the issues that arise within the context of the treatment of 'members of the Islamic army during war'—which is the subject of the chapter we are addressing—is what relates to the conduct required toward the Muslim combatant if he attains martyrdom, and what relates to how his family should be treated after him, for he has left them as a trust with the Ummah for whose message he sacrificed his life, and in whose defense and for the sake of whose entity he fought. ¶

However, before discussing these two issues, it is necessary to discuss, in brief, the martyr we are speaking of—who is he? And why was he given this name? It is also necessary to adorn the breast of the martyr with gems from the Holy Quran and pearls from the treasures of the Sunnah, which radiate with the virtues of martyrdom and the honor of its people in the sight of Allah (Mighty and Majestic). Then, we will move on to mention the types of martyrs, and after that, we will enter into addressing what pertains to the preparation of the martyr after his death, and how his family should be treated after him. ¶

Accordingly, this discussion covers the following issues: 1. First Issue: Definition of the martyr in this research. 2. Second Issue: Why is the martyr called by this name? 3. Third Issue: Some Sharia texts regarding the virtue of martyrdom and the honoring of the martyr. 4. Fourth Issue: Types of martyrs, and some authentic texts concerning the martyrs of the Hereafter. 5. Fifth Issue: The required conduct toward the martyr. 6. Sixth Issue: The required conduct toward the martyr's family after him. ¶

First Issue: Definition of the martyr in this research. The schools of jurisprudence (Madhahib) have multiple definitions for the martyr, and based on them, some of those who are killed are included... ¶

Those Muslims who pass away and are included in the list of martyrs, whom we are currently discussing, or who are excluded from that list... however, it is not our purpose here to present all the definitions that have been mentioned regarding the martyr (shahid), which encompass matters beyond the scope of our research, nor to discuss the issue of martyrdom and martyrs in all its details. This is because we are governed by the subject matter we have at hand, namely, we are governed by matters relating to two points: ¶

First Point: Whoever is killed or dies in war against the disbelieving enemies. Second Point: Whoever is subject to special rulings regarding the preparations after their martyrdom. That is, matters related to washing (ghusl), shrouding, praying over them, and burying them. ¶

As for the first point: that is, whoever is killed or dies specifically in war against the disbelieving enemies—this is because part of the matters related to jihad against the disbelievers is encouraging fighters toward martyrdom, sacrificing one's soul for the sake of Allah, and explaining the honor they possess before Allah and the everlasting bliss they are moving toward. Therefore, whoever dies in this path is among the martyrs, regardless of whether the special rulings regarding the preparation of martyrs after death apply to them, or the general rulings for deceased Muslims apply to them. Regarding this, Al-Shawkani says: 'There is no necessary correlation between establishing the title of martyrdom and the omission of ghusl...' (1) That is, the title of martyrdom may be established for some, and they are called martyrs, but in terms of the rulings of preparation—such as ghusl and others—they are treated like non-martyred Muslims. ¶

This relates to the first point that governs our definition of the martyr, as it clarifies for us who is meant by 'martyrs' in this research. ¶

As for the second point that governs the issue of defining the martyr, it refers to those martyrs who have special rulings concerning their preparation after martyrdom. This is because the department concerned with the affairs of the killed and the dead, which is part of the military, must observe the specific Shariah rulings in preparing whoever qualifies for the title of martyr in the ongoing war against the disbelieving enemies, whether this martyr—who deserves that special treatment—is a martyr in the sight of Allah, worthy of the special honor of martyrs, or... ¶

He is a martyr only in terms of worldly rulings, not a martyr in the Hereafter, due to his lack of some of the conditions required to attain the honor of martyrdom in the sight of Allah Almighty—as will be explained later. I say: Based on these two matters—that is, the person who is killed or dies in the war against the disbelievers, and the person who is treated specifically in the preparation for burial after his martyrdom in war or because of it—the term 'martyr' in this research does not refer to everyone to whom the name of martyrdom is applied according to various schools of jurisprudence (madhahib), even if exceptional rulings apply to him regarding his preparation after death. Rather, the 'martyr' meant here is everyone who is killed or dies in the war against the disbelievers, or because of it. For this reason, we will select from the definitions provided by the jurists regarding the martyr only that which concerns the specific type of martyr we are discussing, though we may address others if it is necessary for the clarity of the idea or the text we are citing. ¶

In the Hanafi School: - It is stated in 'Tuhfat al-Fuqaha': 'A martyr is of two types: one who is washed, and one who is not washed. As for the one who is not washed, he is the one who holds the same status as the martyrs of Uhud...' - In 'al-Bidayah' and its commentary 'al-'Inayah': 'A martyr is one who is killed by the polytheists, or is found on the battlefield with a mark on him—that is, an apparent wound, or an internal one, such as blood flowing from the eye or the like.' - In 'Fath al-Qadir', commenting on the above: 'This is a definition of the martyr to whom the aforementioned ruling applies—that is, not washing him or removing his clothes—not the absolute definition of a martyr, for that is broader, as we will mention that the *murtath* (one who is wounded but still exhibits signs of life) and others are also martyrs... Then he says: And whoever is in a state of *irtithath* (having received treatment or signs of life after wounding) shall be washed... *Irtithath* is when he eats, drinks, sleeps, receives medical treatment, or is moved from the battlefield alive, because he has attained some of the comforts of life, whereas the martyrs of Uhud died thirsty...' ¶

Also, in (Al-Tuhfah): 'This is why the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) washed Sa'd ibn Mu'adh, even though he was a martyr, because he was a murthath (one who survives for a time after being mortally wounded in battle).' In Al-Siyar al-Kabir: 'If one becomes a murthath, he is a martyr in the rulings of the Hereafter, but in this world, he is treated like the deceased, being washed and shrouded.' In summary: The martyr, according to the definition relevant to our discussion regarding war with non-believers, is the Muslim killed in battle who is not a murthath—that is, not wounded or in a similar state, living until after the battle ends, only to die later. There are details and varying opinions among the jurists on this matter, as recorded in the jurisprudential references. This is the Hanafi position. In the Maliki school: Regarding the definition of the martyr in our context: 'He is the one who is killed solely in combat against the belligerent (harbi) non-believers... even if killed within the lands of Islam, such as if the belligerents attacked the Muslims, or if he was not fighting, such as being caught unaware or asleep, or if killed by a Muslim who mistook him for a non-believer, or was trampled by horses, or his sword turned back upon him...' ¶