Chapter 37

It is stated in 'Al-Mu'tasar min al-Mukhtasar': 'Quraysh named it the "Hilf al-Fudul" (Alliance of Virtues)... and this is what is meant by the Prophet's ﷺ statement: "I witnessed with my paternal uncles the Hilf al-Mutayyibin." It is the same Hilf al-Fudul which was sworn by the Mutayyibin, whom the Messenger of Allah ﷺ did not witness initially. It is a sign of ignorance for anyone to say that he ﷺ was born after it, so how could he have witnessed it? The Prophet ﷺ said: "I witnessed a covenant in the house of Ibn Jud'an involving the Banu Hashim, Zuhra, and Taym, and I was among them. If I were invited to the like of it after Islam, I would have responded. I would not love to break it, even if I were granted red camels (the most prized possessions)." It was said: Their alliance was based on enjoining good and forbidding evil, and that they would not allow anyone to retain another's right (fadl), which is why it was called "Hilf al-Fudul"... and it was also called "Hilf al-Mutayyibin" (Alliance of the Perfumed Ones) because all its members were pure.' (1) ¶

This is a summary of what has been reported regarding the Hilf al-Fudul, which has been used as evidence for the 'legitimacy of intervening in the affairs of other states to remove injustice from oppressed non-Muslims who have no treaty with the Muslims.' ¶

I say: The reasoning for using this alliance as evidence for the issue at hand is, as it appears to me, not clear. The subject of the alliance, as previously mentioned, was the support of its members for anyone subjected to injustice in Mecca, whether the oppressed was a resident or a visitor. It involved forcing an oppressor from Mecca, regardless of his status, to provide justice to the oppressed, and using force to achieve that if necessary, as can be understood from the preceding text. ¶

All that this alliance indicates is that the transgressions committed by some leaders of Mecca by virtue of the power or status they enjoyed—as happens in many countries and in every era—were met by an alliance of other leaders in Mecca to restrain those transgressors and compel them to submit to the law of justice and equity that everyone must observe. ¶

Furthermore, the Messenger of Allah's ﷺ approval of this alliance falls under the category of affirming certain pre-Islamic (Jahili) customs which subsequently derived their legitimacy from the approval of Islam, similar to some rituals of Hajj. ¶

Among these matters is restraining the oppressor, delivering justice to the oppressed, and supporting them against their oppressor. Perhaps the reason for the Prophet’s (PBUH) praise of Hilf al-Fudul (the Alliance of Virtue) is that it contradicted the practice known in the pre-Islamic era (Jahiliyyah) of supporting an ally even if they were the oppressor, based on the apparent meaning of the Jahili adage: 'Support your brother, whether he is an oppressor or oppressed' (1). We saw this in the stance of the 'Ahlaf' regarding the oppressed merchant from the Zubaydi tribe and his oppressor, Al-As ibn Wa'il al-Sahmi. Thus, the essence of this alliance aligns with what was stated in the Prophetic tradition in Sahih al-Bukhari: 'Support your brother, whether he is an oppressor or oppressed. They asked: O Messenger of Allah! We understand supporting the oppressed, but how do we support the oppressor? He replied: Restrain his hands' (2). ¶

As for supporting the oppressed, restraining the oppressor, and utilizing force for that purpose, we have dedicated a specific research section to it in the first chapter of this thesis, entitled: 'Combat for the Defense of Public Sanctuaries.' ¶

In any case, the nature of this alliance and the Prophet’s (PBUH) endorsement of it indicate that it concerns internal relations among people and does not refer to external relations with other states and entities. The issue we are addressing here falls under the category of external relations, which are governed by specific Shariah rulings. ¶

This concludes the points regarding the evidence derived from Hilf al-Fudul. ¶

2. As for the Messenger’s (PBUH) support for the Khuza'a tribe against the Quraish during the Hudaybiyyah truce after they sought his help, it is outside the scope of our discussed issue; because that support was based on a defensive alliance established between the Prophet (PBUH) and the Khuza'a. In contrast, the issue we are treating here is: the intervention of Muslims in the internal and external affairs of other states, and providing support to the oppressed without an existing treaty mandating such support. ¶

3. As for the words of the Almighty: 'And why should you not fight in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, 'Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people...'' (3). ¶

As for this verse, it has already been established in the third discussion of this chapter that its subject matter is the assistance of oppressed Muslims living in Dar al-Kufr (in Makkah) before the Conquest, against the disbelievers who were aggressing against them. ¶

However, the issue at hand concerns the assistance of oppressed non-Muslims with whom there is no treaty of alliance with the Muslims... Therefore, the verse is outside the scope of our topic, as previously stated. ¶

4. Regarding the inference for our issue based on the legitimacy of intervention in the affairs of other states—according to contemporary international custom—for the sake of defending truth, abolishing falsehood, and protecting oppressed minorities in other states... this line of reasoning may lead to problematic consequences. Namely, if an international custom were to emerge that mandates non-interference in the internal affairs of other states regardless of the oppression and persecution occurring within their borders, then based on taking international custom as a binding proof, it would be prohibited to intervene in the affairs of those states to lift the lash of oppression from the tormented subjects, even if they belonged to the same faith as those seeking to defend them. I do not believe that proponents of the legitimacy of intervention in the affairs of others would subscribe to this. It seems that bringing up the legitimacy of intervention in the affairs of others in modern international law was not for the purpose of legal deduction, but rather to argue that the intervention sanctioned by Islam should not be considered an act of aggression against other states, just as intervention in the affairs of others today, for the aforementioned purposes, is not considered an act of aggression by its proponents. ¶

5. As for the inference based on the Sahaba’s (may Allah be pleased with them) conquest of Egypt because it was groaning under the tyranny of the Romans, this inference would only be valid if the Sahaba had decided to conquer 'Egypt' based solely on the mournful cries that were rising from under Roman tyranny! However, history does not record that the Muslims' decision to conquer Egypt was based on that groaning, even if that was indeed the reality. ¶

Rather, history records that Umar ibn al-Khattab had permitted Amr ibn al-Aas to march toward 'Egypt,' but then he sought guidance from Allah (Istikhara) after the army had already departed. He then saw fit to retract his decision to conquer, and sent a letter to 'Amr' requesting him to turn back from conquering 'Egypt' if he had not yet entered any part of it. ¶

Their land... and 'Amr received the letter after entering the land of Egypt... and thus matters proceeded toward the conquest. If the decision of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab initially to conquer Egypt had been based solely on removing the injustice inflicted upon its people by the Romans, he would not have performed Istikhara (seeking guidance from Allah) afterward to see whether he should proceed with his decision to lift the injustice from the oppressed, or leave them groaning under the tyranny of the Romans. Rather, what is clear from the conduct of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) regarding this issue is that Muslims are tasked with Jihad on all fronts, regardless of whether the subjects are reveling in the shadows of luxury and bliss, or are groaning under the tyranny of painful torment. This is for the sake of bringing Islam to them, so that they may enter into it, or submit to its rule, so that the former may taste the flavor of true bliss in its shade, and the latter may find comfort in the grace of Divine Justice within its expanse. Proceeding with the decision of Jihad, or halting it, is dependent upon the decision-maker's assessment of the Islamic power's capacity to bear the burdens of Jihad and execute the tasks entrusted to it, without exposing that power to severe damage. This is what 'Umar's conduct regarding the conquest of Egypt indicates, and this explains the hesitation that occurred. There is nothing in it to suggest that the issue of Roman oppression of the people of Egypt was placed on the table for discussion regarding the decision of the conquest. After this review of the arguments of those who support the idea of interfering in the affairs of other states in order to remove injustice from the oppressed, whether states or their subjects—after this review of those evidences and their discussion, we come to the final issue of this research. The Third Issue: The opinion we prefer in this matter. I say: The principle is that the Imam of the Muslims is responsible for his subjects, and every Muslim is responsible for his subjects... as stated in Sahih al-Bukhari from Ibn 'Umar, who said: 'I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: Every one of you is a shepherd (guardian), and every one of you is responsible for his flock. The Imam is a shepherd, and he is responsible for his flock...' ¶

It is stated in Subul al-Salam: "The ra'i (guardian/shepherd) is the one responsible for the interests of those he oversees"(1). ¶

Furthermore, the imam's subjects (ra'iyyah) are the Muslims and the ahl al-dhimmah residing in the Dar al-Islam; it is regarding their interests that the imam is held accountable. Therefore, Muslims who do not reside in the Dar al-Islam are not among the imam's subjects, and he is not responsible for their interests, except in the case where they seek his assistance against their enemy, in which case he must assist them according to the conditions previously mentioned in the third section of this chapter. ¶

Likewise, the subjects of every Muslim are those whom the Muslim is responsible for overseeing and whose interests he must protect. Among such guardianship is the removal of injustices from the oppressed and defending them against the oppressors. However, non-mu'ahidin (non-treaty) disbelievers are neither part of the subjects, nor are they non-subject Muslims, nor are they bound by any treaty with the Muslims requiring the removal of injustice such that the Muslims or their imam would be responsible for defending them against the oppression and aggression they might face. ¶

Moreover, the commitment to defend non-Islamic entities or their subjects against aggression based on a defensive alliance entered into by the Muslims indicates that in the absence of such an alliance, the Muslims are not responsible for defending them against any aggression. ¶

In fact, the jurists have explicitly stated that a state bound to the Muslims by a peace treaty, but without the condition of defending it against external aggression, does not compel the Muslims to provide such defense if aggression occurs. This holds even if the treaty state pays jizyah to the Muslims, as long as the condition for defense is not stipulated in that treaty. Regarding this, it is stated in al-Siyar al-Kabir and its commentary: "We have only committed to the muwadi'in (those with whom a truce exists) to refrain from harming them, not to support them against their enemy. This is different from the case where some of them enter our territory under the terms of the truce"(2). That is: We are obliged to support the muwadi'in if they are attacked while they are within our territory, not if they are attacked while they are in their own territory—as per the detailed explanation provided in the previous section. ¶

- As stated in al-Siyar al-Kabir after establishing that the imam must repel the people of justice and the Khawarij, ¶

Likewise, regarding injustice against those with whom there is a treaty (al-muwada'in) while they are in their own domain by virtue of the treaty—it was stated after the determination of this ruling: 'Unlike the people of war (ahl al-harb), for the Imam of the Muslims is not required to repel the injustice of the people of war from them—meaning: from the treaty-bound parties—as long as they remain in their own lands, due to the treaty; because he did not commit to that for them.' ¶

Yes, it is permissible for Muslims to fight a state that oppresses its subjects... just as it is permissible to fight a state that commits aggression against other states and nations, provided that this oppressive or aggressive state is not in a peace treaty with the Muslims. However, the basis for this combat is that this state is a non-Islamic entity which, after being presented with Islam and refusing to enter into it, must come under Islamic governance—either voluntarily by consent, or by force through the power of arms, as long as the Islamic state is capable of doing so, in light of the interests of the Islamic da'wah, as will be detailed in the next chapter. ¶

The fact that a state oppresses its subjects or does not, or commits aggression against other states and nations or does not, is not the basis for declaring jihad against this or that state, or for concluding a peace treaty with this or that state. Rather, the basis, first and foremost, is the undertaking of jihad in light of the interests of the Islamic da'wah and the interests of the Islamic state as the bearer of that da'wah. ¶

The evidence for this is that Makkah contained a group of its subjects groaning under the tyranny of its disbelieving leaders. The Noble Quran recorded the oppression of the oppressors and the cry of the oppressed therein by recounting their supplication: 'Our Lord, take us out of this city whose people are wrongdoers.' ¶

- And despite the fact that this oppressed group in the 'state' of Makkah was Muslim, not disbelieving. - And despite the fact that the Muslims were commanded to fight the disbelievers of Makkah to remove injustice from the oppressed Muslims therein, by the command of the Almighty: 'And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children...' ¶

Despite all of that, the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) saw that the interest of the Islamic da'wah necessitated concluding a peace treaty. ¶

Regarding the peace treaty of Mecca, the Islamic community within it was being persecuted by their rulers to turn them away from their religion; yet, the Prophet ﷺ upheld that treaty and ceased fighting with Mecca based on that consideration. ¶

I state: If the Prophet ﷺ did this—even though the oppressed minority in Mecca were Muslims—and if his fundamental basis for declaring or ceasing war was the interest of the Islamic call (Da'wah), then it follows, a fortiori, that Muslims are not obligated to lift oppression or repel aggression on behalf of oppressed minorities among the non-Muslim citizenry of other states. However, when the Islamic State possesses the power to fight the disbelievers and subdue them, it shall fight whoever stands in the way of the Muslims—whether they are oppressors or oppressed—to bring everyone under Islamic rule, should they refuse to enter into Islam. Once the Islamic system is applied, it is guaranteed to establish justice, remove oppression, and allow everyone to flourish within its embrace. ¶

This is my view on the matter at hand. ¶

In summary, defending oppressed non-Muslim subjects of other states is not an independent cause for fighting (Qital) in Islam. Rather, the cause for Muslims to fight such states is to compel them to submit to the rule of Islam if they refuse to embrace it or surrender authority to it. ¶

In this scenario, the removal of oppression from the oppressed is a result of applying the Islamic system after bringing the land under its authority through combat, not a cause for the combat itself. I do not consider the war against states that oppress their subjects to be merely a 'punitive war,' because the implication of a punitive war is that once the discipline achieves its goal and the oppressive states cease their injustice, the Muslims must stop fighting, and the legitimacy of the war would vanish in that instance. ¶

In reality, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the legitimacy of fighting non-Islamic states does not cease until they embrace Islam or submit to the Islamic system, unless there is a temporary peace treaty with them necessitated by the interests of the Islamic Da'wah. ¶

This applies to the fighting of states that oppress their subjects and scourge them with the whips of injustice, tyranny, and enslavement. ¶

As for the situation of weak or strong states that are subjected to aggression by a more powerful state seeking to occupy them, plunder their resources, and eliminate those opposing its designs—concerning this situation, when there is no prior defense treaty: - Should the Islamic State initiate aid for the victimized state? - Or should it respond to appeals for intervention to prevent or halt the fighting, or to stand by its side? The answer requires a premise that has been alluded to repeatedly, but it must be reiterated to serve as a foundation for the answer... which is: That when the Islamic State makes any decision regarding war or peace, neutrality or alliance with one party against another, or intervention in an ongoing or expected conflict in a manner that benefits one side against the other, it makes this decision in light of the interests of the Islamic Da'wah (call) that it carries and strives to propagate. ¶

When it fights, it fights only in the name of Jihad for the sake of Allah and to elevate the Word of Allah. This means that the goal of combat is to incorporate lands into the Islamic State and to apply the Islamic system within them, whether the inhabitants of those lands embrace Islam—which is the ultimate desire of the Muslims—or remain in their religions while submitting to Islamic rule. It does not matter whether this goal is achieved through a comprehensive, decisive war against the enemy or through limited, recurring military operations aimed at exhausting its strength until it eventually surrenders. ¶

This is the goal of combat in Islam. - Either the entry of other lands into Islam without coercion, and their subsequent natural integration into the Islamic State. This objective is expressed by the Prophetic tradition narrated by Al-Bukhari: 'I have been commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establish prayer, and pay Zakat...' (1) That is: until they enter into Islam. ¶

(1) Sahih al-Bukhari: Hadith no. 25, narrated from Ibn Umar (marfu'). ¶

Or, incorporating other lands into the Islamic State and subjecting them to Islamic rule through peace—that is, by mutual consent—or by force, through power and coercion. This objective is reflected in the verse of Jizyah: 'Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day... until they give the Jizyah willingly while they are humbled' (Surah At-Tawbah: 29), meaning until they submit to Islamic rule and commit to the obligations resulting from it. This objective, or the other, is why Islam declares jihad against any state. Even defensive war against aggression does not have the goal of merely responding to aggression or punishing the aggressors; rather, its goal is that either the enemy enters into Islam or submits to Islamic rule, whenever this is achievable. If an enemy state wages a war of aggression against the Islamic State, and the Islamic State responds to this aggression—resulting in destruction and ruin within the lands of Islam and many martyrs among the Muslim army—and then the authority of the enemy state announces its conversion to Islam, or its submission to the authority of the Islamic State, and accepts the covenant of Dhimmah (protection), the Islamic State has no choice but to stop this war. It cannot, and it is not permissible for it in any way, to continue fighting for the sake of vengeance. Similarly, it is not permissible to impose on those who have entered into Islam, or those who have accepted the status of Dhimmi, what is called 'compensation' for the damages, in terms of lives and property, incurred by the Muslims during that war of aggression. In light of this introduction, we return to the situation we are addressing: the case of a weak or strong state that is attacked by a state more powerful than itself. What is the position of the Islamic State regarding this war? Does it support the attacked state, even if there was no prior agreement for its defense? Does it respond to its plea for intervention on its side? The answer is that this situation cannot be given a ruling regarding supporting the attacked state or not, before considering the various circumstances surrounding it, which in reality makes it several different cases rather than one. Therefore, the ruling varies according to those circumstances. ¶

For example, we mention some circumstances within the framework of the aforementioned situation and the ruling we deem appropriate regarding it: ¶

1. If the Islamic state is unable to confront the aggressive powerful state, or is capable of doing so, but its support for the oppressed state would result in harm to the Muslims, then it is not permissible for the Islamic state to intervene in this fighting, due to the absence of Islamic interest in this intervention and the damage it would cause to the Muslims. This situation is governed by several Shariah maxims, such as: "Harm shall be removed, but not by (another) harm" (1) and "The ruler's discretion regarding his subjects is tied to the public interest (maslaha)" (2). ¶

2. If the Islamic state is capable of confronting the aggressive state and circumstances are favorable, we believe that the Islamic state must prevent the oppressor from their oppression and protect the oppressed from being subjected to injustice, but according to the Islamic method of preventing oppression and providing protection. This method is: re-presenting Islam to both the aggressive and the oppressed states for them to embrace it, or submit to its governance, and join the Islamic state. If both states accept this, then good; otherwise, whichever of the two states accepts this offer, the Islamic state shall incorporate it. Then, it and the state that joined it shall advance toward the other state to fight it until it enters Islam or submits to its governance as mentioned above. Thus, the Islamic state prevents the oppressor from their oppression and protects the oppressed from the infliction of injustice as a result of applying the just Islamic rule, as declared by the noble Companion who negotiated with Rustam, saying: "...Allah sent us to bring whomever He wills out of the worship of men into the worship of Allah, from the narrowness of this world to its vastness, and from the tyranny of religions to the justice of Islam..." (3). ¶

As for the case where both the aggressive and the oppressed states refuse to accept Islam or the application of its system, and they adopt a hostile stance toward Islam, it is not appropriate for the Islamic state to shed blood. ¶

It is not permissible to sacrifice the blood of Muslims in defense of a kufr (non-believing) entity that views Islam as its enemy, as long as there is no overarching benefit for Islam and the Muslims behind such an action. This situation differs from the case where Muslims defend a kufr entity that has entered into a defensive treaty with the Islamic State. In the presence of such a treaty, Muslims exert their blood in defense of the contract that Allah has commanded them to fulfill in His saying: 'O you who have believed, fulfill [all] contracts...' (Surah Al-Ma'idah: 1), even if the outcome of this action results in preventing oppression against the kuffar. Furthermore, the Islamic State does not enter into a defensive treaty with a kufr entity except on the condition that there is a compelling Islamic interest in this alliance—for instance, if that entity is inclined towards Islam, if Islamic thought is spreading among its subjects, and if there is hope for it to join the Dar al-Islam, as was the case with the tribe of Khuza'a, with whom the Messenger of Allah ﷺ formed a defensive alliance. 3. In the event that both the aggressor and the aggrieved states reject Islam or submission to its rule, and there is an expectation that the stronger state will overpower the weaker one, leading to an increased threat to the Muslims—in this case, it is incumbent upon the Islamic State to fight the aggressor state as long as it is capable of doing so. This is not from the perspective of defending the aggrieved state, but on the basis of declaring jihad against the state that poses the greatest threat to Islam and the Muslims, even if it is geographically further from the Muslims than many non-Islamic lands adjacent to Muslim territories. Regarding this, Imam Al-Shafi'i says in Kitab al-Umm: 'It is incumbent upon the Caliph, if the condition of the enemy is equal or if the Muslims possess strength, to begin with the enemy closest to the lands of the Muslims because they are adjacent to them... until the matter of the enemy is resolved, either by them accepting Islam or paying the jizya... If the condition of the enemy differs, and some are more harmful or more frightening than others, the Imam should begin with the most frightening or most harmful enemy. There is no harm in him doing so, even if their land is further away, if Allah wills... This falls under the category of necessity (darurah), for what is permitted in necessity is not permitted otherwise. The Prophet ﷺ received word that Al-Harith ibn Abi Dirar was gathering forces against him, so the Prophet ﷺ attacked him, even though there were enemies closer to him than him...' ¶

The core concept in this fiqhi (juridical) text is that an Islamic state may sometimes choose not to declare war against some of its neighboring enemy states, even if they are easily conquerable, and instead declare war on a distant state due to the anticipated gravity of the threat it poses. This does not contradict the command of Allah Almighty: 'O you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers...' (Quran 9:123); because the Prophet ﷺ, by his action of leaving the nearby enemy and declaring war on the distant enemy when a more severe danger was anticipated from the latter, demonstrated that the verse ordering to fight the nearest is applicable when the circumstances among the enemies are equal. Consequently, in the situation we are discussing, and in consideration of public interest (maslaha), the Islamic state might refrain from annexing a weak, victimized state to prevent the aggressor state from devouring it, even if the Islamic state is capable of doing so. This is done to preserve its power to use it for waging war against the state that is more dangerous to Islam and the Muslims than that weak and easily conquerable state. Here, waging war against the powerful aggressor state is not for the purpose of supporting the victimized state, as previously mentioned, but to avert the danger of that powerful state from Islam and the Muslims, even if the state that was subjected to aggression benefits from it. ¶

In conclusion, these are some of the various circumstances regarding the mutual aggression between other states, and the differing rulings for the Islamic state concerning intervention or non-intervention. ¶

We are not here to conceive of all the circumstances surrounding the aggression of those states against one another, nor to define the specific ruling we hold for every case regarding whether the Islamic state should intervene in combat against one party or another, or remain neutral. Indeed, we are not addressing that now. It is sufficient to know that the blood of Muslims is precious and should not be shed except in defense of Muslims, or those whom Allah has obligated the Muslims to defend by virtue of a dhimma (covenant), aman (protection), or muwada'a (treaty) that necessitates such defense, and that it should not be shed except in the service of the cause championed by the Islamic state: the Call to Islam. ¶

The objective of the Islamic state is not merely to repel aggression from weak or strong nations and then leave them independent, governing their subjects with non-Islamic systems. ¶

Indeed, ending aggression or oppression against nations and peoples is one of the goals that Islam strives for, but in the view of Islam, this goal is only realized through their conversion to Islam or their submission to its rule; it is not realized otherwise. "And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disobedient (wrongdoers)" (Al-Ma’idah: 45). If it is said that nations and peoples need someone to remove oppression and aggression from them—both being evils that Islam does not condone, and thus, one of the legitimate grounds for combat (qital) in Islam is the removal of oppression and aggression from nations and peoples; ¶

If this is said, then why is it not also said: that nations and peoples are equally in need of someone to remove the systems and rulers who push them into the abyss of vice and submerge them in the swamp of immorality? These are among the prohibited matters that Islam does not condone in any way, just like oppression and aggression. In fact, nations and peoples may be in greater need of protection from the dangers of these matters than from the need for protection against those who violate them by plundering their wealth or restricting their freedom. ¶

So, why do we not, in this case, include among the causes of combat in Islam the eradication of the legalization of vice or the opening of brothels in other states, which results in aggression against the citizens of those states regarding their lives, honor, modesty, and their physical and financial well-being... while we include as causes of combat in Islam the removal of the persecution or aggression occurring against the citizens of other states? ¶

In truth, neither this nor that constitutes an independent cause for combat in Islam. Yes, the Islamic state may indeed carry out military operations against another state that is persecuting segments of its subjects with the aim of removing such persecution, but not on the basis that removing persecution from disbelieving subjects in the lands of kufr is a fundamental cause of combat in Islam—unlike repelling aggression against Muslims or those under their protection, or conveying the Islamic message to nations and peoples, as these are recognized causes for combat in Islam. No, removing persecution from those disbelievers does not fall into that category. ¶

In my view, although it is permissible for the Islamic State to undertake this, the reason for it—as I see it—when the Islamic State performs it, is the legitimate cause for jihad, which is: conveying Islam to other states so that they may enter into it or submit to its rule. ¶

However, internal or external circumstances may sometimes not permit the Islamic State to carry out jihad for the purpose of subjecting some other states to the entire Islamic system and incorporating them into Dar al-Islam (the Abode of Islam). Yet, it may still be able to subject them to specific rulings of this Islamic system, where the Islamic State determines that the adherence of those states to these specific rulings achieves a benefit for the Muslims and for the Islamic Da'wah (call). Hence, the Islamic State declares jihad against those states in order to compel them to observe those rulings, and ceases combat against them once they comply... until the Muslims, considering their strength and their internal and external circumstances, become capable of subjecting those states to the entire Islamic system and annexing them to Dar al-Islam, in accordance with the specific Shariah rulings related to that. ¶

And those specific rulings for which the Islamic State might consider declaring jihad against other states in order to compel them to comply, may include: - Abolishing their system of dealing in Riba (usury), for example. - Or cancelling the permission for indecency on their land. - Or preventing the persecution of minorities among their subjects, even if they are non-Muslims. - Or imposing harsher penalties on drug traffickers within their countries. - Or preventing the media therein—whether written, audio, or visual—from publishing or displaying what is harmful to human values or high moral standards, such as showing pornographic films on their screens, at a time when borders have vanished in the face of this type of display and media. - Or the Islamic State may consider obligating some states to allow the opening of offices for the Islamic Da'wah within them, or to grant a license for the establishment of an Islamic party from among their subjects... and other similar matters which it deems it can compel others to observe, which would achieve a benefit that returns to the Muslims, their Da'wah, and their state. Ultimately, this also returns with benefit to those very states that are intended to be guided. ¶

Islam and the application of the Islamic system upon it completely, whenever circumstances permit. Yes, an Islamic state may declare war to compel certain nations to adhere to this or that ruling of Islam, as it deems in the interest of the state. But, in light of this, can we say that one of the grounds for the legitimacy of combat in Islam is to invalidate the usury system, for example, or to abolish the permissibility of vice and immorality, or to prevent the persecution of minorities who are subjects of other states? If so, the grounds for the legitimacy of combat in Islam would be nearly countless! The most encompassing explanation is to state: one of the instances of the legitimacy of jihad in Islam is carrying the message of Islam to nations and peoples to apply the entire Islamic system to them within the framework of the Shariah rulings related to it; this is the principle when capability and favorable circumstances exist. Or, it may be to apply a partial Islamic system if one is unable to achieve the whole, within the limits dictated by Islamic interest, in accordance with the legal maxims: 'That which cannot be attained in its entirety should not be left in its entirety,' and 'That which is easy/possible is not nullified by that which is difficult/impossible.' This is also in line with what is understood from the Prophetic biography regarding the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. Before concluding this treaty, the Prophet (peace be upon him) stirred the infidels of Makkah towards the veneration of the sanctities of Allah by saying: 'By Him in whose hand is my soul, they will not ask me for any plan in which they uphold the sanctities of Allah, but I will grant it to them.' Ibn al-Qayyim understood from this statement of the Prophet, as recorded in *Zad al-Ma'ad*, the following: 'Indeed, if the polytheists, the people of innovation and immorality, the rebels, and the oppressors request a matter in which they uphold a sanctity of Allah, they are to be answered and aided in it, even if they are denied other things! Thus, they are assisted in what constitutes the veneration of Allah’s sanctities, not in their disbelief or transgression.' I say: it is clear that the matter of venerating the sanctities of Allah is not contingent upon reaching an agreement with the disbelievers. ¶

Their initiating this, although the phrasing of the Prophet ﷺ here might imply that this matter is contingent upon the demand of the disbelievers, it does not mean that it is impermissible for Muslims to initiate an invitation to the disbelievers to observe the sanctities (hurumat) of Allah. Rather, it is merely a way of stirring the sense of honor of the disbelievers of Mecca so that they themselves might initiate this request, since they claimed to be the custodians of the Sacred House of Allah and the upholders of its sanctity, making them more likely to adhere to what they themselves requested. Furthermore, the sanctities of Allah that the Messenger ﷺ invited the disbelievers to agree upon observing are not limited to the rites of Hajj and Umrah, to which the aforementioned statement of the Prophet ﷺ referred. All Shariah rulings brought by Islam are among the sanctities of Allah. Therefore, it is permissible to invite disbelievers to adhere to some of these sanctities and rulings, even if they refuse to adhere to others, as explicitly stated by Ibn al-Qayyim in what we quoted from him earlier, provided they are not subject to the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam) and all rulings are not applied to them. ¶

Among those sanctities and rulings that the Islamic state may invite other states to adhere to are the examples we previously cited: prohibiting drugs, preventing the oppression of minorities, or stopping the aggression of peoples and states against one another. ¶

In this case, lifting oppression from persecuted subjects in other states, or preventing those states from committing aggression against each other—such as preventing them from dealing in usury, for instance, or prohibiting them from trafficking in drugs—is not in itself an independent cause for combat in Islam. Rather, the cause, as mentioned, is carrying the message of Islam to those states for them to enter it, or to submit to its rulings, either in full or in part, as mentioned above, according to what the public interest dictates and what power and circumstances permit. ¶

Finally, we do not want it to be understood from the above that we believe Islam prohibits Muslims or the Islamic state from defending non-treaty disbelievers among oppressed peoples and weak states. ¶

For as long as it is permissible for Muslims to initiate treaties and enter into alliances with them—which consequently entails the obligation to defend them—this indicates that defending them is, in principle, a permissible matter, even in the absence of a covenant or alliance. Were this not the case, it would not have been permissible in the first place to take the risk of opposing others for the sake of defending them. ¶

However, we do not wish to elevate this permissibility to such a level of importance that it could be exploited in another matter, namely, making the aggression against weak peoples and nations a cause for fighting in Islam for the sake of their defense, based on that permissibility—as is the case with carrying the Islamic call (Da'wah) or defending Muslims and those under their protection. Such an approach leads to the dissipation of Islamic energy in directions other than where it ought to be employed. Furthermore, this permissibility, which is taken as an argument to divert Islamic energy from its natural path, was not legislated in Islam except for the interest of the Muslims and the interest of the Islamic call. ¶

With this, we conclude the discussion on this third and final issue of this research, which brings to an end the first chapter of this section, entitled: Responding to Aggression (Radd al-'Udwan) as a cause for fighting in Islam. ¶

This book is the Urdu translation of "Miftah al-Khaza'in" (Key to the Treasures), which covers various devotional practices (a'mal) and litanies (waza'if). The book includes the following topics: Quranic verses and their virtues, dhikr (remembrance of Allah) and tasbihat (glorification), Sunnah-based supplications, practices in accordance with the Shariah, and spiritual remedies and solutions to difficulties. By reading this book and implementing its contents, readers may attain goodness in both this world and the Hereafter. May Allah (SWT) make this book beneficial for the Muslim Ummah. Amin. ¶

Chapter Two: Standing Against the Islamic Call (Da'wah) ¶

- An introduction to the topics covered in this chapter. 1. First Section: What is meant by 'standing against the Islamic Call' as a cause for the legitimacy of Jihad in Islam? 2. Second Section: To what are non-Muslims in other states invited? 3. Third Section: The stances of other states and peoples toward the call to Islam or the call to rule by Islam, the consequences thereof, and the legitimacy of declaring Jihad. 4. Miscellaneous issues related to the causes of declaring Jihad: a. Is Jihad merely a defensive war, or can it also be an offensive war? b. Is Jihad an interference in the affairs of others? c. What is the fundamental basis for the relationship between Muslims and others: peace or war? ¶

Haqqaniya Library, 'Al-Fiqh al-Akbar' by Imam Abu Hanifa al-Nu'man (may Allah be pleased with him), Commentary by Mulla Ali al-Qari, Haqqaniya Library, Peshawar, Pakistan. ¶