Chapter 48

He said: 'By the One who sent you with the truth as a Prophet, I shall surely strive (jihad), and I shall leave them both.' He (the Prophet) said: 'You know best.' Al-Shawkani said: 'This is interpreted as jihad that is an individual obligation (fard al-ayn), in order to reconcile the two hadiths.' (1). ¶

It is stated in al-Minhaj and its commentary, Mughni al-Muhtaj: 'It is prohibited for a man to engage in jihad requiring travel or otherwise, except with the permission of his parents.' (2). ¶

In al-Qawanin al-Shar'iyya by Ibn Juzayy: 'Two things prevent one from jihad: the first is an immediate debt, not a deferred one... the second is parenthood; the parents have the right to forbid it, unless it becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn).' (3). ¶

The majority of jurists hold a similar view, and there is no need to cite the similar texts they have provided regarding this issue. (4). I (the author) say: This legal ruling applies to volunteers who go out to fight, i.e., those outside the regular army, which is under the authority of the ruler at any moment. As for the members of this army, jihad in their case carries the ruling of an individual obligation (fard al-ayn) whenever they are called upon. ¶

As for these volunteers, each of them has the choice of whether or not to go out for battle. As long as this is the case, if one intends to go out with the fighters, he must obtain permission from both of his parents, or whichever one is present. ¶

This is if jihad is not an individual obligation for the son, as previously mentioned. However, when jihad becomes an individual obligation, he does not need their permission in this situation; this is because, in this scenario, two duties coincide, both of which are individual obligations: jihad and honoring one's parents. Therefore, the more important one is prioritized, which is jihad, due to its general benefit. Regarding this, the author of Subul al-Salam says: ¶

It is haram for a child to engage in jihad if the parents, or one of them, forbid it, provided they are both Muslims; because kindness to parents (birr al-walidayn) is fard 'ayn (an individual obligation), whereas jihad is fard kifaya (a collective obligation). However, if jihad becomes fard 'ayn, then the prohibition does not apply. If it is asked: 'Kindness to parents is also fard 'ayn, and jihad, when it becomes mandatory, is also fard 'ayn, so they are equal—what is the basis for prioritizing jihad?' I respond: Because its benefit is more general, as it is for the preservation of religion and the defense of Muslims. Thus, its general benefit is prioritized over others, and it is even prioritized over the benefit of preserving one’s life! ¶

Now, we move to another condition in which fighting the enemy is prohibited: ¶

2. The prohibition of jihad for a debtor if he has not left behind the means to settle his debt (or similar) and the creditor has not permitted him to leave, provided it is not fard 'ayn. ¶

The majority of jurists held the aforementioned view. ¶

- It is stated in Al-Siyar al-Kabir and its commentary: 'If a debtor wishes to go to battle, and he has the means to pay off his debt, then there is no harm in him going. If he does not have the means to pay off his debt, it is better for him to stay and strive to settle his debt; because settling the debt is specifically mandatory upon him. Jihad, if it is not a general mobilization (nafir 'amm), is not specifically mandatory upon him. Thus, it is better for him to busy himself with earning the means to fulfill that which is specifically mandatory upon him. This is based on the well-known principle that when rights conflict, one begins with the most important, and settling debt is more important than battle... Then he said: If it is a general mobilization, there is no harm in the debtor going out [—for jihad—] whether he has the means to pay or not, and whether the creditor gave him permission or forbade him. Because going out in this situation is mandatory upon everyone capable of it, and it is a matter that cannot be delayed, whereas settling debt can be delayed. The harm in failing to go out is greater than the harm in delaying the payment of debt, because the harm [of not fighting] affects all Muslims. Therefore, it is obligatory for him to busy himself with repelling the greater of the two harms.' ¶

Regarding the regular army: The Imam should not send a person if another person is sufficient for that mission. If he (the individual) refuses to go, he must obey the Imam, because obedience to him in such matters is obligatory. After informing the Imam of his excuse, if the Imam does not accept it and orders him to go, then there is nothing better for him than to obey!(1). ¶

In Imam al-Shafi'i's Kitab al-Umm, regarding the debtor, it states: 'It is not permissible for him to engage in Jihad while he has a debt, except with the permission of the creditors, regardless of whether the debt is owed to a Muslim or a non-Muslim!' (2). ¶

In Abu al-Faraj al-Maqdisi’s Al-Sharh al-Kabir, it states: 'Whoever has a debt that is due (hal) or deferred (mu'ajjal) is not permitted to depart for a military expedition (ghazw) except with the permission of his gharim (3) — meaning the creditor — unless he leaves behind the means for repayment, appoints a guarantor, or secures it with collateral. This is the position of Al-Shafi'i. Malik permitted the expedition for one who is unable to repay his debt, because there is no immediate demand upon him, nor can he be imprisoned for it; therefore, he is not prevented from the expedition, just as if he had no debt at all!' (4). ¶

In Al-Qawanin al-Shar'iyya, it states: 'One is prevented from Jihad... if the debt is due, not if it is deferred. If he is indigent (mu'sir), he may travel without the permission of his owner (5)' — meaning the creditor. ¶

It should be noted that in Muntaqa al-Akhbar and its commentary Nayl al-Awtar, the evidence upon which the jurists relied to declare Jihad unlawful for a debtor without obtaining the creditor’s permission is cited. Al-Shawkani then clarified the methodology of inference from those proofs and debated the jurists on their deduction that Jihad is not permitted for the debtor, concluding that Jihad is not forbidden for the debtor under any circumstances. ¶

We will suffice by citing only one of the narrations provided in this regard, as they all agree on the same meaning. ¶

It is stated in Muntaga al-Akhbar: “From Abdullah ibn Amr that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) said: 'Every sin of a martyr is forgiven except debt; for Jibril (Gabriel), peace be upon him, told me that.' (Narrated by Ahmad and Muslim).” ¶

Al-Shawkani says: “The hadiths of this chapter are used as evidence that it is not permissible for someone who has a debt to go out for Jihad unless they have the permission of the creditor; because it is a human right, while Jihad is a right of Allah Almighty, and other human rights should be treated analogously... as there is no difference between one right and another. The line of reasoning in the hadiths of this chapter against a debtor going out for Jihad without the creditor's permission is that debt prevents the benefit of martyrdom, which is general forgiveness, and this invalidates the fruit of Jihad. ¶

Then he stated: “It is clear that the remaining debt on the martyr's account does not prevent martyrdom; rather, he is a martyr whose every sin is forgiven except the debt. The forgiveness of even one sin is a valid fruit of Jihad, so what then of the forgiveness of all sins except one? Thus, the claim that the fruit of martyrdom is the forgiveness of all sins is restricted. Similarly, the claim that the non-forgiveness of a single sin prevents martyrdom and invalidates the fruit of Jihad is also incorrect. The utmost that the hadiths of this chapter imply is that the martyr has all his sins forgiven except for the sin of debt. This does not necessitate that it is impermissible to go out for Jihad without the creditor's permission. Rather, if the mujahid wishes for his Jihad to be a cause for the forgiveness of every sin, he should seek the creditor's permission; if he is content that one sin remains, it is permissible for him to go out without permission!” ¶

Furthermore, the author of *Takmilat al-Majmu’ Sharh al-Muhadhdhab* has quoted the aforementioned words of al-Shawkani without attributing them to him, with some abbreviation, which indicates that the author of the *Takmila* favored al-Shawkani's opinion on this issue. However, the author of the *Takmila* recorded al-Shawkani’s opinion in this manner: “It is not permissible for someone who has a debt to go out for Jihad except with the permission of the creditor... And it has been argued from the hadith of Abdullah ibn Amr: 'Every sin of the martyr is forgiven except debt...' regarding the impermissibility [of going out without permission].” ¶

The permissibility of a debtor going out for jihad without the permission of their creditor... It is well known that the remaining of a debt on the shoulders of a martyr does not prevent martyrdom; rather, they are a martyr whose every sin is forgiven except for the debt, etc. (1). This context suggests that the author confirms what is stated in the text, 'Al-Muhadhdhab', regarding the impermissibility of jihad for someone who has a debt. However, the reader is then surprised to find that the commentator has backtracked from what they previously established to object to the derivation of that ruling from the aforementioned hadith, stating suddenly: 'It is not hidden that the persistence of debt on the martyr's account does not prevent martyrdom...' This creates confusion due to the contradiction between the assertive style used first and what is understood from retracting that position second. ¶

This is while the original text cited from 'Nayl al-Awtar'—without citation—is free from such confusion, as is clear from the preceding discussion. ¶

In any case, what seems correct to us regarding this issue is that jihad—outside of a situation where it is individually obligatory (fard 'ayn)—if it occurs under circumstances where it might lead some combatants to forfeit the rights of others, then it is not permissible for them to pursue that path. This is because violating rights is haram, and avoiding haram is more important than performing a duty that is a communal obligation (fard kifaya), especially when there are others sufficient to perform it (2). ¶

This issue is raised only in the case of volunteers outside the regular army. ¶

As for members of the regular army, they are subject to the orders of the authority to which they belong, which holds the final decision on accepting or rejecting the excuses of those who seek to be excused. The members of this army must simply obey, as Imam al-Sarakhsi established in the previously cited passage regarding obedience to authority... he says: 'And after he has informed him of his excuse, if he does not excuse him, then nothing is better than obeying him!' (3). ¶

Now, let us move to another situation in which fighting the enemies is haram according to Shariah. ¶

Prohibition of combat for Muslims when it leads to severe harm against them. This situation is determined by general Shariah principles, such as: 'There shall be no harming nor reciprocating harm' (la darara wa la dirar). Furthermore, abandoning an obligatory act is necessary if it becomes the only way to avert harm, and averting harm takes precedence over achieving benefits. Among the scenarios mentioned by jurists that fall under this condition are two: 1. Fighting the enemy when there is a predominant assumption that the enemy will overcome the Muslims. 2. Fighting the enemy when they use Muslims, or those under Muslim protection, as shields or armor to protect themselves. These are some of the jurists' opinions regarding the first scenario, i.e., when the enemy's victory over the Muslims is expected. It is stated in 'Mughni al-Muhtaj': 'If the disbelievers exceed double [the strength of the Muslims] and there is hope for victory—in that we believe we will prevail if we remain steadfast—then remaining steadfast is recommended (mustahabb). However, if there is a predominant assumption that we will perish without inflicting damage upon them, then retreat (al-firar) is obligatory for us; because of the Almighty's saying: {And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction}. Or, if there is a possibility of inflicting damage upon them, then retreating is recommended.' Furthermore, regarding the issue of shelling the disbelievers with weapons whose impact extends to Muslims residing in the lands of the disbelievers, it is stated in 'al-Muhadhdhab': 'If there are Muslim captives among them, it shall be examined:' ¶

If it is feared that if the enemy is left alone, they will attack and overcome the Muslims, it is permissible to fire upon them; for the preservation of the Muslims who are with us takes precedence over the preservation of those Muslims who are among them (the captives). If there is no such fear, the situation is assessed: If the captives are few, it is permissible to fire; for it is likely the projectiles will not strike them, though it is better not to do so, as there is a possibility that Muslims might be hit. If the captives are many, it is not permissible to fire; for it is likely that it will strike the Muslims, and that is not permissible without necessity. Furthermore, the ruling for Muslims in the enemy's land who are not captives is the same as that for the captive Muslims, as explicitly stated in the books of Fiqh. It is stated in Al-Qawanin al-Shar'iyya: 'If the Muslims know they will be killed, withdrawal is better; and if they also know that their fighting will have no effect in harming the enemy, then fleeing is mandatory. Abu al-Ma'ali said: There is no disagreement on this.' I say: If fleeing becomes mandatory when such a situation arises while war is already underway between the Muslims and their enemy, then not declaring war against the enemy at all, in such a situation, is even more mandatory. This implies the prohibition of fighting in the scenario presented here. It is stated in Al-Sayl al-Jarrar: 'If they (the Muslims) know through strong indications that the disbelievers will overcome them and prevail over them, they must refrain from fighting them, increase the number of Mujahideen, and call for help from the people of Islam. This has been proven by the verse of the Almighty: "And do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction" (2:195). Its ruling applies due to the generality of its phrasing, even if the reason for its revelation was specific—the reason being that when the Ansar occupied themselves with their crops and the reform of their wealth, neglecting Jihad, Allah revealed this regarding them.' ¶

The verse, as narrated by Abu Dawood, Al-Nasa'i, and Al-Tirmidhi, who classified it as Sahih (authentic), as did Al-Hakim. It is established in the principles of jurisprudence (Usul) that consideration is given to the generality of the expression, not the specificity of the cause. It is well-known that one who advances while knowing that he will be killed, captured, or defeated, has cast himself into destruction. ¶

In Hashiyat Ibn Abidin, it is stated: 'It is obligatory upon the Imam to send a military detachment (sariyah) to the Dar al-Harb once or twice every year... This applies if he is reasonably certain that he can match them; otherwise, fighting them is not permissible.' ¶

These are examples of what the jurists have stated regarding the first scenario, where fighting the enemy is considered prohibited (haram) when it leads to severe harm befalling the Muslims. ¶

As for the second scenario: it is the prohibition of fighting the enemy when they use Muslims, or those under the protection (aman) of Muslims, as human shields or protection to safeguard themselves. ¶

Regarding this issue, it is stated in Al-Muhadhdhab: ¶

'If they [the enemies from the Dar al-Harb] use the Muslim captives with them as shields: - If this occurs during the heat of battle (iltiham al-harb), it is permissible to shoot at them, while taking precautions for the Muslims [captives], for the reason we previously mentioned—that refraining from fighting them would lead to harm befalling the Muslims. - If it is not during the heat of battle, it is impermissible to shoot at them by unanimous consensus... - If they use Dhimmis, or those with whom we have a pact of safety, as shields, the ruling is the same as the ruling regarding using Muslims as shields; for it is as forbidden to kill them as it is to kill Muslims.' ¶

Detailed discussions and the opinions of jurists on the issue of 'Tatarrus' (using human shields) will appear in their proper place in this treatise, so we shall limit ourselves here to what is necessary. ¶

I say: These were some of the situations in which the jurists decreed that fighting the enemy is prohibited... And there are others. ¶

Other cases have been mentioned here, and among what they have mentioned regarding those cases—even if only from the perspective of some ijtihad—are: ¶

- Combat without the permission of the Amir; combat against the kuffar after they have duly offered jizya (i.e., having accepted submission to Islamic rule); a Muslim fighting the kuffar after they have granted him safety and he has granted them safety; combat against those to whom the call (da'wah) has not yet reached; combat against a weak duelist; combat against the enemy within the Haram or during the sacred months; and combat for the sake of reputation and ostentation (riya'). ¶

Since our intent in this research is merely to establish that jihad is subject to conditions in which it becomes haram—while mentioning some of the evidences that indicate this ruling—we will limit ourselves to the cases already mentioned, along with some of their evidences and what the jurists have said regarding them. As for the latter cases, which we have merely listed and indicated their references in the footnotes—lacking the sharia or fiqh texts that demonstrate them here—they are either subjects that have already been discussed or will be researched hereafter. ¶

Here, we conclude the exposition of the various obligatory sharia rulings (al-ahkam al-taklifiyya) that affect jihad or combat against the enemy, depending on the general or specific circumstances surrounding it. ¶

With this, we reach the conclusion of the discussion on the first chapter of the fourth part of this thesis, the chapter in which we addressed: The detail of the rulings of jihad in Islamic fiqh books. We now proceed—with the help of Allah Almighty—toward the second chapter. ¶

The radiance of your countenance shines, and the smile of your lips sparkles. Around your face there is a halo, much like the way the sun's brow glistens. In your eyes resides that same manifestation, like a sign shining in the depths of night. From the traces of your footsteps, a story of light illuminates. Before the continuity of your beauty, every burden of this world fades and glimmers. ¶

Chapter Two: The Instrument of Jihad - The Islamic Army - Its Organization, Training, and Human and Material Resources. ¶

Introduction to the Chapter: Section One: Various organizational structures required for the army. Section Two: Various trainings required for the army. Section Three: Human resources: Topic One: The primary army personnel and their role therein. Topic Two: The reserve army. Subsection One: Popular arming and its limitations. Subsection Two: Volunteers in the army and their role therein. Subsection Three: The ruling on the participation of women in the army, and their role therein. Subsection Four: The ruling on the participation of children in the army, and their role therein. Subsection Five: The ruling on the participation of non-Muslim subjects in the army, and their role therein. Subsection Six: Foreigners in the Islamic army, and their role therein. Section Four: Material resources: Topic One: Methods of obtaining weaponry. Topic Two: What are the material resources for the various expenses of the army? ¶

Virtues Series: Virtues of Hajj (By: Shaykh al-Hadith Mawlana Muhammad Zakariyya al-Kandhlawi, may Allah have mercy on him). In this book, the virtues of Hajj, the significance of Hajj, the rulings and etiquette of Hajj, the reward for an accepted (Mabrur) Hajj, and other important Shariah-related issues concerning Hajj have been explained in light of deep insight and authentic narrations. This book serves as an excellent guide for all those Muslims who aspire to attain the blessing of Hajj or for those in whose hearts the desire for the visitation of the Baytullah (House of Allah) is intended to be instilled. Publisher: Maktaba Shaykh al-Hadith, Urdu Bazaar, Lahore. ¶

Chapter Two: The Instrument of Jihad - The Islamic Army - Its Organization, Training, and Human and Material Foundations ¶

Introduction to the Chapter: This is the second chapter of the fourth part, which deals with the rulings of Jihad. In it, we discuss the instrument that carries out Jihad, without which Jihad lacks the existence through which Islam is conveyed to other lands, placing them before the three options previously discussed. It is also through this instrument that Islam is protected, and the Muslims and their lands are defended against the schemes of conspirators and the evil of aggressors. ¶

That instrument which turns the wheel of Jihad is the Islamic army. ¶

This army is not merely a human quantity that has gathered and taken up arms in a haphazard manner! No, rather it is a military apparatus with its own human and material foundations, subject to various regulations, whether in times of peace or war, which must be observed. ¶

It is also subject to various trainings that must be carried out. ¶

Since the army—as I have mentioned—is not merely a gathered human quantity that has taken up arms in a haphazard manner... but rather relies on human and material foundations... ¶

Then, what are its human foundations? And how are its material foundations provided for?... All these matters are what we will discuss in this chapter, in the manner we have outlined in the division of this chapter into its sections and subsections. ¶

We begin with the first section. ¶

There is no doubt that the fortress of Islam, which withstood the storms of kufr (disbelief) and shirk (polytheism) for centuries and taught the world the lessons of civilization and refinement, is this very iman (faith). It is this fortress whose protectors have been the noble Prophets (peace be upon them) and their successors (the scholars and the righteous). Now, let us reflect upon the point: What is the reality of this iman? And what does it demand? (1) The Reality of Iman: Iman does not merely mean a verbal declaration; rather, its meaning lies in affirming it from the depths of the heart and subsequently subjecting one’s entire life to the commands of Allah and the Sunnah of the Noble Prophet (peace be upon him). (2) The Demand of Iman: The demand of iman is that every action, every step, and every thought of a person must be in accordance with the pleasure of Allah. When a person embraces faith, their connection with Allah is established, and fulfilling the duties of this connection is the essence of life. ¶

First Section: The Various Organizations Required by the Army ¶

We will address this research through the following points: 1. First Point: What do we mean by the various organizations required by the army? 2. Second Point: What aspect of these organizations are we addressing? 3. Third Point: Examples of activities and tasks entrusted to these various organizations. ¶

1. First Point: What do we mean by the various organizations required by the army? By these organizations, we mean the creation of multiple bodies within the army, each of which oversees a type of work and activity related to its formation, structure, needs, and the missions it undertakes... and so on, regarding everything related to the army within the scope of organization. These bodies execute the supervision of their work and activities through various departments that branch out from them, each entrusted with one of the tasks needed by the army so that it is prepared to engage in military and bloody conflict with the enemy at any time, with the hope of winning that conflict to achieve the objectives entrusted to it. ¶

Brigadier General Dr. Muhammad Dahir Watar discusses these organizations by talking about the administrative bodies that carry out these arrangements... and how the Prophet (PBUH) - in his capacity as the commander of the Islamic army - was concerned with performing all the tasks that the various departments in the army perform. The Brigadier General says, in the context of talking about the administrative bodies in the army and their work... ¶

Text: 'Administrative structures: These are the set of various apparatuses that provide combat and administrative services to the army. The number, organization, and size of these structures vary according to the country's economic and human capabilities, and the enemy's combat strength. - He then says -: The Arab Messenger (ﷺ) paid special attention to a number of administrative departments and gave them special importance, most notably: the department of planning and organization, the department of consultation (Shura), the department of moral guidance, and the departments of reconnaissance, operations, training, and armament. Then there are the departments of logistics and supply, war spoils (ghana'im), and medical services. - He then says -: These departments carried out their duties according to the requirements of combat duty. They did not have specific structures as we see today, nor were they separated from others or from the field army in their operations and personnel; as a combatant could be entrusted with a reconnaissance mission and another mission at the same time. One person headed all these departments, managing and supervising them, and he was the Commander-in-Chief. These departments were not centralized in a specific place; rather, they were part of the army, moving and stationing with it. For this reason, the army's 'teeth' (combat elements) were stronger than its 'tail' (administrative elements), and its fighting components were more numerous than its administrative ones' (1). ¶

This is what is said regarding the various organizations required by the army and the multiple departments entrusted with managing those organizations. ¶

With this, we conclude the first point and proceed to the second point. 2 - Second Point: From what perspective are we dealing with these organizations?: The perspective from which we are dealing with these organizations is governed by the title of the chapter we are in, and that title is: 'Rules of Jihad'. Since the army is the tool of Jihad, it was necessary for us, after having clarified the various Shariah rulings for Jihad in its own right—as we covered in the first chapter—to subsequently clarify the Shariah rulings related to the tool that undertakes the duty of Jihad, which is the army, and the various organizations that this tool encompasses, which ensure the preservation of its structure, the escalation of its strength, its combat readiness, and its success in the tasks entrusted to it. (1) The Military Administration in the Wars of the Messenger Muhammad (ﷺ): pp. 107-108. ¶

Hence, the point we are currently addressing is limited to the following question: - What is the Shariah ruling regarding the various organizational structures required by an army? That is: Is it permissible to establish specialized departments within the army, where each department has a specific task to which it is dedicated and does not concern itself with others, as is the case in modern armies? ¶

The answer to this question becomes clear in light of the following points: A- The Shariah texts that have obligated Muslims to mobilize, whether all of them or a portion, to fight the enemy according to the requirements of the situation with that enemy, and to prepare against them whatever power they can in order to deter (1) and intimidate them... these Shariah texts have not restricted Muslims to specific organizational forms in the mobilization and preparation of forces, and other matters related to the army and combat. ¶

Accordingly, the door is open to all organizational forms required for the mobilization and preparation of forces, provided that such organizations do not conflict with Shariah rulings. ¶

It is from here that 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) created the 'Diwan al-Jund' (Military Registry) and the 'Ata' (allowances), which was a form of organization for the Islamic army in one of its aspects, and the Companions approved of this, knowing that this organizational structure had been adopted from the Persians and Romans of that time (2). ¶

It is mentioned in the book 'Al-Tarateeb al-Idariyya,' commenting on the Prophet's (peace and blessings be upon him) command to dig the trench following the advice of Salman al-Farsi (may Allah be pleased with him) (3), that the land of Persia was the first to implement such an action. ¶

The defensive system—whereas the Arabs were ignorant of such a system in their defenses—is discussed in this book as follows: ¶

"...This indicates the permissibility of such precautions against the enemy, and the basis for this is the Almighty’s saying: {And prepare against them whatever you are able of power} (Qur’an 8:60). In this lies the greatest evidence that kingdoms and states that do not follow the pattern of their neighbors in adopting war machines, military arrangements, and scientific, practical, industrial, and agricultural systems, are likely to become spoils for them, even if after some time. The approach of our noble Prophet (PBUH) was to adopt the best and most beneficial in every matter, regardless of whether his people knew or practiced it or not. ¶

Therefore, it is established that he said to Asim ibn Thabit: 'Whoever fights, let him be fought as he fights.' Hafiz Ibn Taymiyyah said in his treatise on the universality of his mission: 'It is established from the Prophet (PBUH) that he ordered fighting the Turks and that his Ummah would fight them. It is known that the effective way to fight them was with Persian bows, but they were fought with Arab bows, which were of no avail. Instead, they (the Turks) prevailed over the Muslims due to the strength of their archery, so they must be fought with that which overcomes them.' Then the book addresses the issue of imitating the non-Arabs (A'ajim) and the ruling thereon, and among what was stated in this regard is: ¶

'Not everything done by the non-Arabs are we forbidden to engage in, except for what the Shariah has forbidden and for which legal principles indicate abandonment. The prohibition is specific to what they do that is contrary to the requirements of our Shariah. As for what they do that is in accordance with the recommended, obligatory, or permissible acts in our Shariah, we do not abandon it just because they engage in it; for the Shariah does not forbid imitating an act that Allah has permitted. Indeed, the Prophet (PBUH) dug the Trench around Medina in imitation of the non-Arabs, such that the Confederates were astonished by it, only later to learn that it was at the suggestion of Salman al-Farsi.' ¶

The discussion then turned to the issue of clothing. Regarding this, a Hadith states: 'The Prophet (ﷺ) forbade the Arabs from imitating the non-Arabs (Ajam), but it has not been recorded that he forbade any delegation arriving from among the non-Arabs from wearing their own attire, nor did he urge them to adopt the dress of the Arabs.' Some scholars have said: 'Included in this meaning are those matters that were consistent with the Age of Ignorance (Jahiliyyah), for which no prohibition has reached us in our Shariah.' He then established the legal maxim governing this issue, which is: 'The default state of things is permissibility (ibahah) until a prohibition is proven.' (1). ¶

I say: From all of this, it becomes clear that the various regulations by which the army's affairs and circumstances are managed are matters of permissibility (mubah), as long as they do not contradict Shariah rulings. This applies whether those matters concern the locations of military bases, the distribution of troops across fronts and various regions, their combat formations, the uniforms worn by their members, their military ranks, or other such organizational matters. It is not the purpose of this treatise to exhaustively cover or discuss them all. ¶

B - The Shariah maxim, 'Whatever is necessary to fulfill a wajib (obligation) is itself a wajib' (2), dictates that if there are several methods to achieve an obligation, choosing one of them remains within the realm of the permissible. However, if only one specific method is available to perform that obligation, then it becomes, in that situation, a wajib with no other choice. Yes, if one method is better than another for performing the obligation—while others remain valid—then adopting the superior method takes on the ruling of recommendation (nadb) and preference (istihbab), not obligation (wujub); because this falls under the category of excellence (itqan) in performing tasks, and excellence is a value sought by the Shariah. ¶

It is stated in a Hadith: 'Narrated by Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) that the Prophet (ﷺ) said: Indeed, Allah loves that when one of you performs a task, he does it with excellence (itqan).' (3). ¶

C - It was previously established in the first chapter of this section that fighting the enemies may become an individual obligation (fard ayn) upon every accountable Muslim, such as when the enemy occupies a land of the Muslims, or is on the verge of doing so. In such a case, fighting the enemy becomes a fard upon every accountable Muslim in that land. I say: In light of these three aforementioned points, we shall answer the question raised in the point that... ¶

What is the Shariah ruling regarding the organizational structures required by the army? The answer is as follows: - The baseline for such organizations is permissibility (ibahah), as they are legitimate methods for carrying out the duty of Jihad. However, if specific organizational structures are determined to be essential for the army to function effectively, they then become mandatory, and it is not permissible to neglect them, based on the Shariah maxim: 'That without which a mandatory duty cannot be fulfilled is itself mandatory.' - Conversely, if the army can fulfill the duty of Jihad without such organizations, or without specific parts of them, without compromising its assigned tasks, but adopting these new or proposed structures makes the fulfillment of the duty of Jihad more productive and effective, then these organizations fall under the category of recommendation (nadb and istihbab) rather than obligation. This is based on the Hadith: 'Verily, Allah loves that if one of you performs a task, he does it with proficiency (itqan).' - However, when adopting those organizational structures that require specific units of the army to be dedicated solely to certain tasks—such as intelligence, logistics, medical care, or engineering work like digging trenches, building bridges, etc.—I say: when such structures dictate that army units be dedicated to these tasks, such dedication should not be to the extent that it disables the personnel occupying these units from the ability to carry arms and engage in actual combat. This is because, as previously stated, unforeseen circumstances may arise where carrying arms and engaging in actual combat becomes an individual obligation (fard al-ayn) upon every person. Therefore, it is mandatory to take the necessary measures to ensure that those who occupy these administrative units in the army remain in a state capable of carrying arms at all times. This is what is said in response to the Shariah ruling on the organizational structures required by the army. We now turn to the final point of this research. ¶