Chapter 22

In Turkey, Sultan Abdul Hamid sought to buy his silence by granting him the rank of a military judge—a position that makes many office-seekers and pleasure-seekers salivate due to the high salaries, elegant robes, and prestigious status it holds in the eyes of those who worship dirhams and dinars. However, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was not of this type. When the Sultan’s men rushed to him with this news, he said to them: 'Tell your master, the Sultan, that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani considers the rank of knowledge to be the highest of all ranks; and tell him further that I cannot become like a decorated mule.' (1) ¶

His second stance provides a lesson for those who care only for their own private interests and psychological comfort, even if at the expense of Islam and the Muslims. Upon arriving at a Turkish airport, exiled from Iran, one of those receiving him asked about his luggage. He replied: 'As for the box of books, it is here,' pointing to his chest, 'and as for the box of clothes, it is this,' pointing to the robe he was wearing. He then added: 'At the beginning of my exile, I used to carry a second robe and trousers, but as the exiles continued, I began to find the second robe a burden, so I preferred to leave it at that which I am wearing until it wears out, at which point I replace it.' (2) ¶

Ninth: Sheikh Omar al-Telmesani, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, says: 'In everything I strive for, I seek the interest of the Islamic Da'wah.' (...born in Asadabad, near Kunar in the Kabul region of Afghanistan in 1254 AH / 1838 AD, from a family of the Hanafi school. He studied Islamic sciences in his youth, then turned to the study of philosophy at the age of twelve. He undertook several tours of the Islamic world and the entire globe. He combined writing, oratory, journalism, and politics. He was one of the greatest advocates of the idea of the 'Islamic Union' (Pan-Islamism) and established the journal *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* in France in collaboration with his student Muhammad Abduh. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani passed away in 1897 AD. See: *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Vol. 7, pp. 95-100; and *Al-Mawsu'ah al-Harakiyah* by Fathi Yakan, Vol. 1, pp. 21-26). (1) See: *Al-Iman wa Atharuhu fi Nahdat al-Shu'ub* by Yusuf al-Azm, pp. 65-66. (2) See the previous source. ¶

I have no personal interest, as I do not aspire to be a minister or a director, having reached the age of seventy-six; what more could I expect after this? If it were not a pledge of allegiance to Allah requiring loyalty and sacrifice in His cause, I would have retired from this work. But I wish to meet Allah the Almighty having fulfilled my pledge, and let whatever may happen, happen (1). ¶

The head of the 'state of knowledge and faith'!!—as is falsely and slanderously claimed—did not refrain from arresting this elderly Sheikh, who has reached the age of seventy-seven, for no crime other than saying 'My Lord is Allah,' at a time when Sadat is content with merely stripping Pope Shenouda of a symbolic position in which he holds no real authority to bind or loosen (2). ¶

These mujahid scholars could have turned into reclusive scholars and preachers of subservience, reading the minds and desires of rulers before they even expressed them, issuing them pre-packaged fatwas, twisting the necks of texts, engaging in contrived interpretations far from the meaning and intent of the text, and using weak evidence in order to gain a comfortable seat beside a tyrannical ruler and collect abundant wealth, even if this wealth were stolen from the sweat of the toilers and the sustenance of the weak and the destitute. ¶

However, the active scholars realized, through the beneficial knowledge, sharp understanding, and guidance in speech and action that Allah bestowed upon them, that Jihad in the cause of Allah is the path leading to His pleasure and His Paradise. They understood that Jihad is sometimes conducted through 'the best manner' (al-husna) when the misguided are individuals in need of guidance, correction, enlightenment, and clarification of the straight path; and at other times, it is conducted through force when a rebellious group possesses power that stands in the way of the people, diverting them from truth and guidance, and using its power to obstruct the implementation of Allah's Shariah (3). ¶

So, does any foothold remain for the advocates of seclusion after this clarification and explanation?!! ¶

Chapter Four: The Claim of Coercion (Ikrah) in Failing to Exercise Al-Wala' wa'l-Bara' (Loyalty and Disavowal) for the Sake of Allah ¶

Ikrah (coercion) is the act of compelling a person to do or say something they do not consent to, such that if they were left to their own devices, they would not have performed that speech or action. ¶

Those who claim coercion as an excuse for not showing loyalty to the believers or not showing enmity toward the disbelievers resort to using certain texts from the Qur'an and Sunnah as pretexts and justifications. ¶

From the Qur'an, these include the words of Allah Almighty: 1. 'Let not the believers take the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers. And whoever [does] that has nothing with Allah, except when you take precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the [final] destination.' 2. 'Except for one who is forced [to renounce his faith] while his heart is secure in faith.' ¶

3. The saying of the Almighty: "Indeed, those whom the angels take [in death] while wronging themselves—[the angels] will say, 'In what [condition] were you?' They will say, 'We were oppressed in the land.'" up to His saying: "...ever Pardoning and Forgiving" (Quran, An-Nisa: 97-99). ¶

4. "And what is [the matter] with you that you fight not in the cause of Allah and [for] the oppressed among men, women, and children who say, 'Our Lord, take us out of this city of oppressive people and appoint for us from Yourself a protector and appoint for us from Yourself a helper?'" (Quran, An-Nisa: 75). ¶

From the Sunnah is the saying of the Messenger (PBUH): ¶

5. Narrated by Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both): "Verily, Allah has pardoned for my Ummah mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they have been coerced into doing." ¶

This Hadith, by its general implication, indicates that there is no accountability for the coerced person regarding what he was forced to say or do. These are the arguments of those who claim coercion (ikrah) regarding the non-allegiance to believers and the non-hostility toward disbelievers, as they argue that Allah has excused the weak (mustad'afin) who were unable to refrain from leaving what Allah commanded due to their weakness. A coerced person is necessarily a weak person, unable to refrain from performing what the disbelievers and their likes have commanded him to do. ¶

Our refutation of those who generalize coercion to every statement or action they commit is to discuss these evidences one by one until the correct concept of coercion becomes clear, along with the nature of what is permissible to be coerced in, and what is not permissible. Thus, we say, and with Allah is success: ¶

First: The meaning of Allah Almighty's saying: "Except that you protect yourselves from them in precaution" means unless you fear them with a definitive fear; there is no harm in that case in expressing friendship with the tongue for the sake of precaution (taqiyyah) and politeness. ¶

To repel their evil and harm, while the heart remains tranquil with hatred and enmity towards them. Scholars have differed regarding the permissibility of taqiyya (dissimulation) with the disbelievers: 1. Mu'adh ibn Jabal and Mujahid (may Allah be pleased with them) said: 'Taqiyya existed before the strength of Islam; however, today Allah has granted honor to Islam and honor to the Muslims, such that they need not practice taqiyya against their enemy.' 2. Al-Hasan al-Basri (may Allah have mercy on him) said: 'Taqiyya is permissible for a Muslim until the Day of Resurrection, but there is no taqiyya in matters of killing.' Thus, the verse serves as evidence for the permissibility of taqiyya, but the taqiyya intended in this verse, as understood by the pious predecessors (salaf) of this Ummah, is merely the permissibility of uttering disbelief under duress. As for interpreting taqiyya as the absolute permissibility of lying in speech and action without limits or restrictions, this is an erroneous interpretation. This is the view adopted by some Shi'a exegetes, who deem taqiyya mandatory and regard it as a religious obligation until the arrival of the Expected Qaim (the Mahdi). ¶

The enemy whose evil must be guarded against is of two types: (1) An enemy whose hostility is based on worldly interests. If the enmity is due to wealth, position, or physical harm, it is a right pertaining to the person himself. Thus, if he appeases them by forfeiting some of his rights to them, it is permissible, because such a concession does not cause direct harm to the religion. (2) An enemy whose hostility is based on religious disagreement. This type of enmity makes it obligatory for a Muslim to emigrate from that place to a location where he can manifest the religion of Allah. However, if he is unable to do so—either because he is among the vulnerable, such as the infirm, women, or children whom Allah has permitted to remain among the disbelievers due to their status as the oppressed, or because he cannot find a place to which he can relocate to practice his religion, as is the current situation of Muslims in most Muslim lands—then it is permissible for him to remain among the disbelievers and outwardly comply with them only to the extent of necessity, while simultaneously striving earnestly to change the Jahili reality in which he lives to one that is beneficial for Islam and the Muslims. If he is unable to do so, he should seek a stratagem to escape and flee with his faith from this town whose people are oppressors. If he is unable to leave, it is permissible for him to agree with the disbelievers outwardly—but not inwardly—in matters of speech, not in practical deeds. Compliance with them under these conditions is a concession (rukhsah), provided he keeps his determination in his heart. If he fights them and is killed, he is a martyr, as will be explained shortly, God willing, in the course of this discussion. Second: The intent of the verse, '...except for one who is forced while his heart is secure in faith,' refers to being coerced into uttering a word of disbelief when a Muslim is in the hands of the disbelievers and they are torturing him for it. Therefore, it is permissible to utter a word of disbelief to appease them, provided his heart is secure in faith, just as occurred with Ammar ibn Yasir (may Allah be pleased with him). ¶

When the disbelievers forced him to utter the word of kufr (disbelief) after torturing him and martyring his parents, he uttered the word they demanded. He later came to the Prophet (ﷺ) weeping in sorrow and grief over his compliance, to which the Prophet (ﷺ) said: 'If they repeat it, then you repeat it.' ¶

Thirdly: The mustad'afun (the oppressed/weak) in Makkah did not comply with the disbelievers in everything they desired under the pretext of weakness or coercion. They did not prostrate to an idol, drink alcohol, or commit indecency to please the disbelievers. All they did was reside among the disbelievers in their land, while maintaining a verbal and practical isolation from the disbelievers and what they worshipped besides Allah. ¶

As for what is mentioned in some narrations regarding the 'asbab al-nuzul' (occasions of revelation) that the cause for the revelation of Allah’s saying: 'Indeed, those whom the angels take [in death] while they are wronging themselves - [the angels] will say, 'In what [condition] were you?' They will say, 'We were oppressed in the land.' They [the angels] will say, 'Was not the earth of Allah spacious [enough] for you to emigrate therein?' For those, their refuge is Hell - and evil it is as a destination' (Surah An-Nisa: 97), is that some oppressed Muslims in Makkah were forced by the disbelievers to accompany them to the Battle of Badr, where some of them were killed, and thus Allah revealed this verse. ¶

The truth is that those who went out with the disbelievers were not among the mustad'afun for the following reasons: 1. The disbelievers did not coerce the Muslims who went out with the polytheists at Badr through 'ikrah mulji' (compelling coercion). This is evidenced by the narrations stating that Ibn Abbas said: 'There were some Muslims who were with the polytheists, increasing the numbers of the polytheists against the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ).' Consequently, Allah revealed His saying: 'Indeed, those whom the angels take [in death]...' ¶

(Regarding those who wrong their own souls, the angels will ask, "In what state were you?" They will say, "We were oppressed in the land." They will say, "Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to migrate therein?" For such, their abode will be Hell—what an evil destination! Except for the oppressed among men, women, and children who cannot devise a plan nor are they directed to a way. For them, it is expected that Allah will pardon them, and Allah is ever Pardoning, Forgiving (1). If they had been forced into that by absolute compulsion, there would have been a clarification that explains that situation. ¶

2. The stay of those who went out with the disbelievers at Badr was, in principle, illegitimate, as Allah (Mighty and Majestic) did not excuse anyone for remaining in the Abode of Disbelief (Dar al-Kufr) except for the oppressed (mustad'afun), and those capable of bearing arms are not among the oppressed. ¶

3. Even if one were to hypothesize that they were forced by absolute compulsion, their duty was to join the Muslims. This is because coercion, regardless of its source, does not permit a Muslim to bear arms against his brother under the pretext of coercion (2). Since their going out was not legitimate for the aforementioned reasons, Allah (Exalted be He) did not excuse them; thus, He said regarding them: "For such, their abode will be Hell—what an evil destination!" ¶

One might say that the Muslims in Makkah who were not among the oppressed were not excused in the first place for remaining in Makkah, as migration to Madinah was possible. But what is the ruling? And what is the Shariah-compliant outlet for Muslims who live today under the shadow of disbelieving governments that often push them into fighting... ¶

used against Islam and the Muslims both internally and externally, while they are coerced into it, as they find no Islamic country or state to protect and shelter them. Even if they were to find one, they cannot leave without the permission of these disbelievers, who do not even allow them to think about leaving. Thus, they are caught between two fires: either they take up arms against their believing brothers, or they declare refusal and disobedience, in which case their fate is death at the hands of these disbelievers under the pretext of treason and disobedience. So, what is to be done in such a situation, which most Muslims in Islamic lands suffer from today? ¶

The answer, as it appears to me—and Allah knows best—lies in following one of the following paths: ¶

(1) If there is an existing, self-governing Muslim group within this state that is at war with Islam, it is religiously obligatory (shar'an) to join that group and work with it, either openly or covertly. It is also obligatory to sacrifice wealth and self to support and aid it and to perform Jihad with it. Abandoning or letting it down is considered equivalent to turning one's back on the day of battle (al-tawalli yawm al-zahf). Likewise, fighting against it under the pretext of coercion is a cause for the punishment of Hellfire, as Allah explained regarding those Muslims who went out with the polytheists at the Battle of Badr. ¶

(2) To separate from the polytheists in terms of residence and dwelling if one is able to find a way to do so. If one cannot, then one should resort to stratagem (makr) against the enemies of Islam, just as Nu'aym ibn Mas'ud (may Allah be pleased with him) did when he sowed discord among the Confederates (al-Ahzab). Therefore, whoever finds no organized Islamic group to join in his country and cannot leave for the lands of the Muslims, and is called to fight against believing people, must employ stratagem against the enemies of Allah. He should act contrary to their intentions, strike them from behind, and perform any action that would demoralize them, let them down, and bring about a crushing defeat for them. In such a case, he becomes a Mujahid soldier within the ranks of the enemy, and in that condition, he is more severe against the enemies than the believers who declare their war against kufr and its people openly and independently, for if he is sincere in his intention... ¶

Allah (Mighty and Majestic is He) has realized the virtue of the mujahideen and struck the enemy at their most vulnerable point, and thus he attains that which the believing mujahideen attain. ¶

(3) If one is unable to join the Islamic group within his country or abroad, and is unable to strategize against the enemies of Islam and the Muslims, and the enemies of Islam coerce him into harming the believers, it is incumbent upon him, according to the Shariah, to refrain from doing what he has been coerced into. ¶

There is a consensus (ijma) that it is not permissible for a Muslim, even if coerced, to ransom himself at the expense of his brothers. Rather, he must endure the trial with patience and ask Allah for well-being, and he must not deflect injustice from himself onto his believing brothers. This is especially true in the matter of killing, for if he kills a Muslim without a legitimate Shar'i right under the pretext of coercion, qisas (retribution) becomes legally mandatory upon him, and he has committed a grave sin. As for coercion in matters other than killing, there are two opinions: ¶

First Opinion: Those who hold that the best course for the one coerced regarding the rights of others is to adopt the path of azimah (strictness/determination) and refrain from what he is coerced to do. Even if he is beaten, killed, or tortured for it, it is better in the sight of Allah than opting for the rukhsa (concession). This is the position of the followers of Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on them), as they hold that when a permissive (mubah) and a prohibited (muharram) matter conflict, the prohibited one takes precedence. ¶

Second Opinion: This is the position of those who see the permissibility of adopting the rukhsa of coercion in matters other than killing. No one holds it permissible to kill a Muslim unjustly under the claim of coercion. Those who allow the concession of coercion in non-lethal matters do not permit it absolutely; rather, they argue for warding off the greater of the two evils by the lesser one regarding one's own self. ¶

And the right of his brother, regarding which he was coerced, is based on the legal maxim of 'averting the greater of two harms by the lesser of them.' ¶

Fourth: The hadith regarding coercion, 'Indeed, Allah has pardoned for my Ummah mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they are coerced into,' is a general statement that has been specified by several pieces of evidence, including the following: ¶

1. The saying of Allah the Almighty: 'And no bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another.' The reputable scholars have reached a consensus that it is not permissible for a person to save their own life from being killed by killing another innocent person. ¶

2. The hadith, 'Indeed, Allah has pardoned for my Ummah mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they are coerced into,' is weak in all its chains of narration, even if it is widely known. Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal strongly rejected it, and when Abu Hatim was asked about it, he said, 'These are munkar (rejected) hadiths, as if they were fabricated.' ¶

3. Killing another person under the claim of coercion contradicts the stern prohibition against a believer killing his brother believer. Allah the Almighty says: 'And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him and has cursed him and has prepared for him a great punishment.' Furthermore, the hadith states: 'Every sin, Allah may forgive, except for one who dies a polytheist, or a believer who intentionally kills another believer.' ¶

Thus, one who is coerced into killing unjustly is an intentional killer when he knows that he is taking the life of a human being. ¶

Without right, and the scholars of Usul (principles of jurisprudence) have stated that if a benefit (maslaha) and a harm (mafsada) conflict, the prevention of the harm is given priority over the attainment of the benefit. Based on this, they established the rule that if there is a conflict between that which is permissible (mubah) and that which is prohibited (muharram), the prohibition is given priority over the permissible (1). ¶

And my opinion in such a situation is to repel the greater of the two harms by the lesser of the two, as is established among the generality of scholars (2). ¶

Regarding the validity of the Hadith, 'Verily, Allah has pardoned for my Ummah mistakes, forgetfulness, and what they have been coerced into,' the Hadith is general, yet its specification has been established by the following: ¶

(1) The saying of Allah the Almighty: 'Except for one who is forced, while his heart is secure in faith' (3). The commentators have mentioned that this was revealed concerning Ammar bin Yasir, and Ammar was coerced into a verbal statement, not an action (4). ¶

(2) Allah the Almighty condemned those Muslims who went out with the people of Makkah to fight against the Muslims at Badr, even if it is argued that they went out under coercion. Therefore, the verse specifies the Hadith, for if coercion were a valid Shariah excuse in such a matter, Allah would not have said regarding them: 'Those—their refuge is Hell, and it is an evil destination' (5). ¶

In summary, the issue of coercion (ikrah) is divided into two categories, each of which is further divided into several types. Given that most of these types do not fall within the scope of our subject, we will limit ourselves to mentioning three types that are relevant to our topic: ¶

(A) Moral/Psychological Coercion. ¶

(b) Actual coercion (al-ikrah al-fi'li) in the realm of speech. (c) Actual coercion (al-ikrah al-fi'li) in the realm of actions concerning others. ¶

First: Moral Coercion (al-ikrah al-ma'nawi) There is a group of people for whom it is difficult to sacrifice themselves, their children, and their wealth for the sake of Allah. They claim that they are under 'moral coercion' to utter words of disbelief (kufr) and affirm them, because they strongly believe that if they do not utter these words of disbelief and affirm them, they will be subjected to harm and fitnah (tribulation) concerning their own selves, their wealth, and their children. They cite as evidence the story of Ammar ibn Yasir, which was mentioned earlier. ¶

However, how do these people compare to Ammar ibn Yasir (may Allah be pleased with him)? He had openly dissociated from the polytheists, criticized them, their religion, and their deities. His mother was martyred under torture, and he himself was subjected to severe physical suffering, to the point that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) would pass by them and say, "Be patient, O family of Yasir, for your appointment is Paradise." Despite all this, Ammar (may Allah be pleased with him) did not utter the word of kufr except once under the pressure of severe torture and threats. His heart was not at ease with saying it; rather, he went to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) weeping, and he never felt satisfied with repeating that word or anything similar before the disbelievers, nor did he ever agree with them in any act of kufr. ¶

How then can those who hasten—without any actual coercion—to flatter and appease the disbelievers and their likes, even when they have not been asked to do so, let alone coerced, use the story of Ammar as a proof? Then, when someone debates them on this, they claim, "We are coerced into this behavior." ¶

The correct position, according to the majority of scholars, is that verbal or practical compliance with the disbelievers, in the absence of 'coercion that leaves no choice' (ikrah mulji'), is neither valid nor permissible. ¶

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on them) are of the view that coercion (ikrah) is only considered valid when there is direct torture, such as beating, the threat of killing, severe imprisonment, or the like. As for verbal or moral threats from the disbelievers and those like them, this does not constitute coercion. Therefore, if a Muslim captive fears that the disbelievers might torture him, imprison him, or come between him and his wife, children, and wealth, it is not permissible for him to utter the word of disbelief until the coercion has actually occurred. As for the fear that the disbelievers might separate him from his family and wealth or torture him physically, this does not count as coercion, because the fear of something before it happens is not coercion (1). Furthermore, there is no issue of enjoining good and forbidding evil where a person does not fear being harmed; if it were permissible for a Muslim to abandon every issue where there is a fear of harm, we would not find anyone enjoining good, forbidding evil, or striving (jihad) in the way of Allah. ¶

Second: Actual coercion to utter words of disbelief: Some scholars have restricted coercion as a concession allowing the utterance of the word of disbelief only in speech and not in actions, provided that the necessary conditions are met, which are: 1. The heart being tranquil with faith, maintaining loyalty to Allah, His Messenger, and the believers, and enmity towards His enemies. 2. The presence of compelling coercion (al-ikrah al-mulji') that actually drives a person to seek relief from the harm and torture of the disbelievers. ¶

Al-Hasan al-Basri, al-Awza'i, Sahnun, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal held this position, although Imam Ahmad believed that it is superior to remain steadfast upon the truth even if one is killed for it. ¶

As for the narration from the Prophet (ﷺ) in which he advised a group of his companions, saying: 'Do not associate partners with Allah, even if you are cut to pieces or burned,' the intended meaning is polytheism of the heart, not of verbal expression, similar to the verse: 'But if they endeavor to make you associate with Me that of which you have no knowledge, do not obey them.' All other statements can be subject to compulsion (ikrah); therefore, if one is forced unjustly to utter any statement, no legal ruling is incurred, and one is not held accountable for it in the judgments of this world or the Hereafter, provided that one's heart is secure in faith. This is the distinction between the one compelled, the one who forgets, and the ignorant. ¶

Third: Compulsion regarding acts that contradict Islam: We have previously clarified at the beginning of this discussion that scholars have reached a consensus (ijma') that it is not permissible for a Muslim to kill another Muslim under the pretext of compulsion. As for a Muslim harming his brother... ¶

As for a Muslim who is under duress in matters other than taking a life, the weightier opinion is that it is not permissible. This is the view of those who believe that patience during trials is superior to taking a concession (rukhsah), and leading them is Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may Allah have mercy on him). ¶

In my view, in such a situation where a Muslim is coerced into harming his brother, he should repel the greater harm by choosing the lesser of the two evils, both for himself and his brother equally. This is according to the view of those who permit the use of the concession. As for those who believe that enduring harm is better than shifting it from oneself to another innocent person, I say: It is not the right of a Muslim to ward off harm from himself by causing similar or greater harm to his brother. However, if he wards off the greater harm with the lesser one—whether for himself or his brother—it would be justice and fairness for both, according to his capability and capacity, in matters short of killing. ¶

As for the one who kills a believer under the pretext of duress, he has incurred a grave sin and transgression. Allah Almighty says: 'And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah will have become angry with him and have cursed him and will have prepared for him a great punishment.' ¶

Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both) held the view that if a Muslim intentionally kills a believer, his repentance is not accepted. ¶

The majority of scholars state: 'The repentance of one who intentionally kills a believer is accepted if it is a sincere and earnest repentance (tawbah nasuha).' They argued that disbelief (kufr) is a greater sin than killing, and since repentance from disbelief is accepted, it is even more fitting that it be accepted for killing. In any case, it is more probable that the repentance of one who intentionally kills a believer is accepted, even though the threat (wa'id) against him is severe. ¶

The aforementioned verse emphasizes that whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide forever, and upon him is the wrath and curse of Allah, and for him is a great punishment. Hadiths with this meaning have also been reported, even if their chains of narration contain weakness, such as the hadith: 'Whoever assists in the killing of a believer even with half a word will meet Allah the Almighty with it written between his eyes: Despaired of the mercy of Allah'(1). And the hadith: 'The victim who was killed unjustly will come on the Day of Resurrection with his head carried in one of his hands—either his left or his right—holding his killer with the other hand, while his jugular veins are gushing blood, reaching the Throne of the Most Merciful, saying: O Lord, ask Your servant why he killed me. Ibn Abbas says: There is no prophet who came after your Prophet, nor any book revealed after your Book'(2). Because of this, Ibn Abbas held the view that the repentance of one who intentionally kills a believer is not accepted, although we have mentioned that the preferred view is that repentance is accepted. In any case, the warning in this matter is severe; therefore, every Muslim must seek caution and safety in his worldly life and his hereafter, so he should not kill a Muslim nor assist in the killing of a Muslim unjustly, whether by word or deed, even if coerced. Indeed, coercion in the matter of killing does not absolve one from criminal responsibility. For this reason, jurists (Fuqaha) have differed in such cases: Is the retribution (Qisas) upon the one who ordered the killing, the one who executed it, or both? There are three opinions on this matter: ¶

1. The view of the majority of jurists is that Qisas is upon the one who ordered and the one who executed alike, due to their participation in the crime of murder. This is the view of Malik, Al-Shafi'i, and the well-known position from Ahmad(3). ¶

2. A group stated that the retribution (Qawad and Qisas) is upon the one who ordered, not the one who executed, because the coerced person became like a tool in the hands of the one who ordered. This view is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and one of the two narrations from Al-Shafi'i(4). ¶

3 - The opinion of Zufar(1) is that the qisas (retaliation) is upon the person commanded (al-ma'mur) alone, not the commander (al-amir), because he (the commanded) was capable of abstaining, and it is a sin by the consensus(2) of all. ¶

What we favor in this matter is that qisas applies to both the commander and the commanded together. This is because the commander, who possesses authority and governance, issued an unjust command, which contradicts his obligations, and this is a sin for which he will be held accountable. The commanded implemented this injustice and carried it out through his actions, and he too is held accountable for executing and facilitating the injustice. To those who argue that the punishment lies with the commander alone, not the commanded, citing the Almighty's words: "Except for when you take precaution against them in prudence," the answer is that there is no 'taqiya' (dissimulation) in actions, nor is there compulsion for them, as previously clarified(3). ¶

So, what will the executioners of the tyrants and their oppressive henchmen do in the face of these great texts that promise severe punishment for those who harm a Muslim? With what face will they appear before Allah, while their hands are dripping with the blood of the innocent, the oppressed, and the wrongfully persecuted? Do they think that Allah is unaware of what they do? The Almighty said: "And do not think that Allah is unaware of what the wrongdoers do. He only delays them for a Day when eyes will stare in horror."(4) And the Almighty said: "And the Day when the enemies of Allah will be gathered to the Fire, then they will be driven in groups. Until, when they reach it, their hearing and their eyes and their skins will testify against them of what they used to do. And they will say to their skins, 'Why have you testified against us?' They will say, 'We were made to speak by Allah, who has made everything speak; and He created you the first time, and to Him you are returned.' And you were not concealing yourselves, lest your hearing or your eyes or your skins would testify against you; but you assumed that Allah does not know much of what you do. And that was your assumption..." ¶

(1) He is Zufar ibn al-Hudhail ibn Qais al-Anbari (Abu al-Hudhail), a jurist who studied under Abu Hanifah. He authored works and died in 158 AH. See: Mu'jam al-Mu'allifin, Umar Rida Kahhala, Vol. 4, p. 181. (2) See: Jami' al-'Ulum wal-Hikam, Abd al-Rahman ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, pp. 354-355. And see: Usul al-Fiqh, Muhammad al-Khudari Bak, pp. 106-108. (3) The same source mentioned above. (4) Surah Ibrahim, Verse (43). ¶

“And that thought of yours which you thought about your Lord, has brought you to destruction, so you have become of those utterly lost.” Then, if they have patience, yet the Fire is a home for them, and if they beg for excuses, they are not of those who will be excused. ¶

Scholars have differed regarding the situation where a person is coerced (ikrah): which is better for them—to take the concession (rukhsa) regarding what they are coerced into doing, or to endure the harm and refuse to carry out the act, even if it leads to their death (martyrdom)? There are two views on this matter: ¶

First View: Those who say that taking the concession of coercion is better than enduring the harm. Abdullah ibn Mas'ud (may Allah be pleased with him) held this view, as it is narrated that he said: “There is no speech that could ward off two lashes of pain from a ruler’s punishment except that I would utter it.” ¶

Some of the people of Iraq stated that if a person is threatened with killing, amputation, or beating that is feared to cause fatal damage, it is better for them to do what they are coerced into, provided it does not relate to the rights of others—such as being coerced into drinking wine or eating pork. If they refuse and are killed, we fear they might be sinful, because in this situation, they are like one compelled to eat carrion or drink impure water. ¶

If the compelled person refuses to eat the carrion or drink the impure water until they die, they would be sinful for that. ¶

Ibn al-Arabi said: “Uttering disbelief when coerced into it abrogates the verses and hadiths regarding patience during torment.” In his view, both are equivalent: either uttering the word of disbelief when coerced, or enduring the torment until death occurs, in which case the killing would be considered martyrdom. ¶

Second View: The view of those who say that enduring the harm and bearing the killing or... ¶

Enduring beating or imprisonment is preferable to taking the concession (rukhsah) and complying with the demands of an oppressor to commit a prohibited act (haram) under duress. Proponents of this view rely on the hadith of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) narrated by Khabbab ibn al-Arat (may Allah be pleased with him), who said: 'We complained to the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) while he was reclining on his cloak in the shade of the Kaaba, saying: "Will you not seek victory for us? Will you not pray for us?" He replied: "Before you, a man would be seized, a pit dug for him in the earth, and he would be placed in it. A saw would then be brought and placed upon his head, splitting him in two, and his flesh and bones would be scraped with iron combs, yet that would not turn him away from his religion. By Allah, this matter (Islam) will certainly be perfected, until a traveler can ride from Sana'a to Hadhramaut fearing none but Allah, and the wolf for his sheep; but you are impatient."' ¶

Thus, in this hadith, and in the stories of Bilal, the parents of Ammar—Sumayyah and Yasir—the account of Khabbab ibn al-Arat in the valley of Makkah, Khubayb ibn Adi, the People of the Trench (Ashab al-Ukhdud), and the accounts of Imam Ahmad, Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Hanifah, and others who endured torture for the sake of Allah, there is the greatest proof that perseverance through harm is preferable for those who are confident in their own capacity for endurance and the firmness of their creed. ¶

The pinnacle of faith is embodied by those who reached the summit of patience, sacrifice, and certainty, and were not driven by fear or coercion to execute the commands of tyrants, oppressors, and criminals. They did not scurry before the enemies of Islam, nor did they pant under their feet, shower them with false praise, or carry out their orders in disobedience to Allah. So, what is your estimation of those who carry out such commands (willingly)? ¶